Home » Blog » Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC)

Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC)

Authored By: Meriam

University of Western Cape

Case Name: Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC)

Facts

In 2000, Kennet Makate, a trainee accountant employed by Vodacom, devised a concept for a free messaging service that would enable prepaid users with no airtime to send a call-back request to other users. This idea was a response to his own difficulty maintaining communication with his girlfriend, who could not afford airtime. Makate shared the idea with Mr Geissler, Vodacom’s director of product development; the two verbally agreed that Vodacom would trial and potentially implement the idea as a product, and that if it proved commercially successful, Makate would receive compensation. They agreed that the amount of compensation would be negotiated at a later stage, and that if no agreement was reached, the Vodacom CEO would determine a reasonable amount of compensation.[1]

Vodacom proceeded to launch a product under the name “Please Call Me”, which became a substantial commercial success and generated billions of rands in revenue. Despite this success, Vodacom did not compensate Makate and later denied that Geissler had the authority to bind the company to such an agreement. Vodacom’s executives also engaged in efforts to discredit Makate’s role in creating the idea, including attributing its origin to the CEO in public communication. Makate initiated legal proceedings to enforce the agreement, and although the High Court accepted the core facts as true, it ruled against him on the grounds that his claim had been prescribed and that Geissler lacked authority to bind Vodacom. Both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. The matter then came before the Constitutional Court.[2]

Legal issue

The case required the Constitutional Court to determine whether Vodacom could be held contractually bound by an agreement concluded between Makate and Geissler. The court also had to decide whether Geissler had the authority, either actual or apparent, to bind Vodacom in the circumstances. Another key issue was whether Makate’s claim had prescribed under the Prescription Act 68 of 1969,[3] given the lapse of time between the agreement and institution of legal proceedings. In addition, the court had to consider whether the relevant common law and statutory rules required development or constitutional interpretation to promote justice and fairness. Finally, the case involved the question of whether ostensible authority is a form of estoppel. If it was a form of estoppel, a procedural question followed: Can someone rely on estoppel to establish his case that a company is bound to a contract, or can estoppel only be pleaded in replication, for example, to prevent the company from denying authority?[4]

Arguments Presented

Before this Court, Mr Makate argued that the High Court erred in finding that ostensible authority had not been pleaded and that any claim or debt owed by Vodacom had prescribed in 2004. He also argued that the High Court’s failure to determine his case on ostensible authority violated his right to access courts. Vodacom claimed that no facts were pleaded in the High Court to support a case for ostensible authority and, in any case, ostensible authority was not proved. Vodacom also argued that Mr Makate’s claim had prescribed.[5]

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the rules of agency law and held that a principal may be held liable for the conduct of an agent who exceeds the actual mandate if the principal has, by the conduct or presentation, created a reasonable impression that the agent had the necessary authority. This is referred to as ostensible or apparent authority. In this case, the court found that Geissler, by virtue of his role as director of product development, held a senior position within Vodacom and had the responsibility of evaluating and facilitating new products. His actions, in combination with Vodacom’s internal decision-making culture, made it reasonable for the market to believe that Geissler had the authority to bind the company to an agreement.

The court drew a careful distinction between ostensible authority and estoppel. It clarified that ostensible authority is the form of authority that arises from the appearance of legitimacy created by the principal’s conduct, whereas estoppel is a legal rule that prevents a party from denying a representation that has been relied upon by another to their detriment. Ostensible authority is pleaded as part of the main cause of action, whereas estoppel must be pleaded in replication and requires additional elements, such as proof of prejudice and a direct misrepresentation to the party.

The High Court found that Mr Makate had proved that he had agreed with Mr Geissler. However, it dismissed the claim on the basis that Mr Makate did not plead the ostensible authority (the seeming or apparent authority) of Mr Geissler to contract on behalf of Vodacom and further had failed to demonstrate that Mr Geissler had such authority. Additionally, it found that Mr Makate’s claim against Vodacom had prescribed. The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Makate’s application for leave to appeal for lack of reasonable prospects of success.

The court was split 6 to 3 on legal principles. However, the majority and minority judgments reached the same conclusion that Vodacom was bound by Geissler’s undertaking and had to negotiate fair remuneration with Makate.

The majority judgment held that the High Court adopted the incorrect approach to the pleadings. By holding that ostensible authority had not been pleaded, the High Court had conflated ostensible authority with estoppel. On application of the elements of ostensible authority to the facts, the majority judgment found that ostensible authority had been established. Given Mr Geissler’s position at Vodacom, the organisational structure within which he exercised his power, and his role in the process which had to be followed before a new product could be introduced at Vodacom, the judgment held that Mr Geissler had ostensible authority to bind Vodacom.[6]

On the issue of prescription, the majority held that because Mr Makate’s claim was not a debt as contemplated by the Prescription Act, the claim had not prescribed. The court held that the meaning of “debt” has to be construed in light of section 39(2) of the Constitution,[7] which imposes an obligation on the courts to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights. Thus, a provision that limits the right in the Bill of Rights (in this case, the right to access the courts) is to be interpreted narrowly. The majority judgment concluded that the High Court had incorrectly interpreted “debt”, which did not extend to the present claim.

The majority said that estoppel is used when authority is alleged by a plaintiff and denied by the defendant. The plaintiff must then raise estoppel in replication against the denial of authority; for example, it cannot be used by the plaintiff in making out a case in the first place. Accordingly, Makate could not rely on estoppel in founding his case.[8]

But the majority then relied on a sentence in one case from England to conclude that ostensible authority is not a form of estoppel. The majority ignored a long line of English Commonwealth cases, including a more recent House of Lords decision saying the opposite of the case relied on by the majority. It found that two South African cases that also held ostensible authority to be a form of estoppel were wrong.[9]

The majority stated that ostensible authority is the authority of an agent “as it appears to others” and that it was a form of actual authority. The majority said that the only requirement for ostensible authority is that the company must create the appearance that the agent has the power to act on its behalf. It continued: “nothing more required. The means by which that appearance is represented need not be directed at any person. In other words, the principal need not make the representation to the person claiming that the agent had apparent authority”. The majority also said that the other contracting party need not approve reliance or prejudice.

The majority found that Geissler had ostensible authority because Vodacom created the impression that he was authorised.

The concurring judgment of the minority relied on different grounds. It explained that ostensible authority is based on estoppel by representation, as was held in a long line of cases. It concluded that the procedural obstacle that estoppel can only be pleaded in replication does not form part of our law. It found that the requirements of estoppel had been satisfied on the facts. It did not agree with the majority that ostensible authority can be a form of actual authority.[10]

Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

In a concurring judgment, Wallis AJ agreed that Mr Makate was entitled to the relief in the majority judgment. The concurring judgment agreed that the key issue was whether Vodacom presented that Mr Geissler had the authority to conclude the agreement with Mr Makate. However, it reached a different conclusion on the issue of ostensible authority.[11]

Wallis AJ disagreed on the juristic nature of ostensible authority where there is no actual authority. He argued that it was settled law that ostensible authority was a form or instance of estoppel, which was why it was commonly referred to as agency by estoppel. Wallis AJ held that there are cases in which ostensible authority coincides with the actual authority arising by implication, and where actual authority and ostensible authority would be two sides of the same coin. But this was a case where it was accepted that there was no authority at all, expressed or implied. That took it into the realm of estoppel.

 The concurring judgment then concluded that Mr Makate has to prove that Vodacom presented to him that Mr Geissler had a necessary authority to conclude the agreement for remuneration with him. It held that the board presented to the world, including Mr Makate, that Mr Geissler had the authority to conclude such an agreement on behalf of the company. He may have had actual authority, but it was sufficient to say that it was represented that he had authority, in other words, ostensible authority. The consequence was that Mr Geissler had ostensible authority to conclude a contract with Mr Makate, and Vodacom was estopped from denying that authority. It was bound by the contract Mr Geissler concluded on its behalf

As a result, leave to appeal was granted and the application was upheld with costs.

Critical analysis

This case raises a critical issue of fairness, authority and accountability. Furthermore, it helped with the distinguishing of ostensible authority and estoppel based on agency law. However, the majority and minority judgments leave uncertainty with regard to ostensible authority, ensuring that this case will remain a reference for future debates in agency and contract law.

Conclusion

The majority decision in Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd has veritably ‘set the cat amongst the pigeons’ by distinguishing estoppel from ostensible authority, when in fact there is a wealth of contrary authority both in English and South African law to the effect that a principal may be held bound to the unauthorised juristic act concluded by its agent based on estoppel by representation. Instead of following established legal precedent, the majority held that apparent authority is in fact a form of actual authority distinct from estoppel, which only requires a representation of authority by the principal in respect of the agent. This bald rule fashioned by the majority is not actually located in any legal principle and suffers from significant conceptual deficiencies, notably the lack of an element of causality. Generally, a misrepresentation must engender reasonable belief on the part of another to have legal consequences. 2021 Acta Juridica 319 Although the court did draw an analogy between estoppel and the ‘objective theory of contract’, on the one hand, and ‘apparent authority’ and estoppel, on the other, it did not apply the reliance theory in the circumstances, and the rule that it fashioned does not accord with the generally accepted test for that theory. As a result, this decision has caused uncertainty and is at odds with established law. Notwithstanding, it is suggested that the majority’s approach can be salvaged by duly reformulating its rule purely in terms of the reliance theory and it is hoped that the courts will eventually provide suitable clarification on the matter. Successful invocation of the reliance theory gives rise to an actual contract and reliance-based authority would follow suit. This would accordingly distinguish reliance theory-based actual authority from estoppel-based apparent authority. Such an approach preserves the integrity of established law that bases ostensible or apparent authority on estoppel, while at the same time recognising that, facts permitting, the reliance theory may be directly applied to the issue of a principal’s contractual liability for the unauthorised legal act of its agent.

Bibliography

Cases

Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC)

Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 191 (GSJ

Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

Journal articles

T Naude, ‘Termination of obligations’ in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds)The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2017)

Legislation

The Prescription Act 68 of 1969

[1] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), para 4-5

[2] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), para 6-13

[3] Section 11(d) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969.

[4] T Naude, ‘Termination of obligations’ in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds)The Law of Contract in South Africa 3 ed (2017) 387 at 399.

[5] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 191 (GSJ).

[6] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), para 44

[7] Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

[8] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), para 46

[9] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), para 47

[10] Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC), para 130

[11] Justice Jafta scripted the majority judgment with six other justices concurring, and acting justice Wallis wrote for the concurring judgment with three other judges concurring.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top