Authored By: RAJAALAN A
Central University of Tamil Nadu
1. Case Citation and Basic Information
Sterling Holiday Resorts Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, ITA No. 843/Mum/2024, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai Bench (two-member bench), pronounced 25 June 2026, relating to Assessment Year 2015-16.[2]
The appeal arose from a demerger and amalgamation scheme involving Sterling Holiday Resorts India Limited (“SHRIL”), Thomas Cook (India) Limited (“TCIL”), and Thomas Cook Insurance Services (India) Limited (“TCISL”), a wholly owned subsidiary of TCIL. The Tribunal was called upon to decide whether the resulting entity, TCISL, was entitled to carry forward SHRIL’s accumulated business losses and unabsorbed depreciation under Section 72A(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Introduction
This case concerns the tax treatment of a corporate restructuring undertaken by the Thomas Cook group to integrate the hospitality and resort business of Sterling Holiday Resorts India Limited into its wider travel portfolio. Although the underlying commercial transaction was approved by the Bombay High Court under the Companies Act, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal denied the resulting company’s claim to carry forward losses exceeding Rs. 240 crore, holding that the statutory definitions of “demerger” and “resulting company” under Sections 2(19AA) and 2(41A) of the Income-tax Act had not been literally satisfied. The decision is significant because it illustrates the gap that can arise between a commercially sound, court-sanctioned restructuring and the technical conditions that trigger tax-neutral treatment, and because it reopens debate on how far the doctrine of strict interpretation of taxing statutes extends.
3. Facts of the Case
Thomas Cook (India) Limited (TCIL), a listed company, held Thomas Cook Insurance Services (India) Limited (TCISL) as its wholly owned subsidiary. Sterling Holiday Resorts India Limited (SHRIL) was an independently listed company operating resorts and time-share properties. To integrate SHRIL’s business into the Thomas Cook group, a three-party scheme of arrangement was framed and approved by the Bombay High Court.
Under the scheme, SHRIL’s resort and time-share undertaking (“Undertaking I”) was demerged and transferred to TCISL, while SHRIL’s residual holiday-activity business (“Undertaking II”) was amalgamated into TCIL. As consideration for the entire composite scheme, TCIL issued shares directly to SHRIL’s shareholders; TCISL itself issued no shares to anyone. The arrangement was sanctioned by the Bombay High Court under the relevant provisions governing court-approved schemes of arrangement.[3] Following the scheme, SHRIL ceased to exist as a separate entity.
For Assessment Year 2015-16, TCISL filed a return claiming carry forward of SHRIL’s accumulated business losses of approximately Rs. 121.67 crore and unabsorbed depreciation of approximately Rs. 113.29 crore, together with set-off of a further Rs. 5.19 crore of unabsorbed depreciation, an aggregate claim of about Rs. 240.15 crore under Section 72A(4).[4] The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the scheme did not meet the definition of “demerger” because the entity that received the undertaking (TCISL) was not the entity that issued shares to SHRIL’s shareholders (TCIL). This disallowance was carried in appeal to the Tribunal.
4. Legal Issues
The Tribunal was principally required to determine the following questions of law:
Whether the transfer of Undertaking I from SHRIL to TCISL, where consideration shares were issued not by TCISL but by its holding company TCIL, satisfies the definition of “demerger” under Section 2(19AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in particular clause (iv) thereof, which requires the resulting company to issue shares to shareholders of the demerged company.
Whether TCISL qualifies as a “resulting company” within the meaning of Section 2(41A), given the parenthetical words “(including a wholly owned subsidiary thereof)” appearing in that definition.
Whether, consequently, TCISL is entitled to carry forward and set off SHRIL’s accumulated business losses and unabsorbed depreciation under Section 72A(4).
Whether the doctrine of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, as reaffirmed in Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co. and Director of Income Tax v. American Express Bank Ltd., precluded the assessee’s construction of Sections 2(19AA) and 2(41A).
5. Arguments Presented
5.1 Appellant (TCISL/Assessee) Arguments
The assessee argued that the scheme, having been sanctioned by the Bombay High Court, reflected a bona fide and commercially coherent restructuring that ought not to be defeated by an unduly technical reading of the tax statute. The assessee’s central textual submission was that the parenthetical phrase “(including a wholly owned subsidiary thereof)” in Section 2(41A) would be rendered entirely redundant if the Revenue’s interpretation were accepted, because a wholly owned subsidiary is, in any event, already a “company” within the meaning of the opening words of that provision. On the assessee’s reading, the only situation in which the parenthetical adds independent meaning is precisely the one at hand: a scheme in which the undertaking is received by a wholly owned subsidiary while the holding company issues the consideration shares. The assessee relied on the principle that courts should avoid a construction that renders statutory language surplus or otiose, and cited decisions such as Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT[5] and CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd.[6] in support of a construction favourable to the assessee where two views are reasonably possible.
5.2 Respondent (Revenue) Arguments
The Revenue contended that Sections 2(19AA) and 2(41A) are unambiguous and admit of only one reading: the entity that receives the demerged undertaking must itself be the entity that issues shares to the shareholders of the demerged company. Since TCISL received Undertaking I but issued no shares, while TCIL issued shares but received no undertaking, the composite scheme did not satisfy the conjunctive requirement built into the definition of “resulting company.” The Revenue emphasised that TCIL and TCISL are distinct legal persons and that the obligations of a subsidiary cannot be treated as discharged by an act of its parent. The Revenue further submitted that, because the provisions in question were unambiguous, the beneficial-construction principle from Vegetable Products and Bajaj Tempo had no application, and that the Tribunal was bound to follow the strict-interpretation doctrine affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Dilip Kumar and applied more recently in American Express Bank. It was also argued that High Court sanction of the scheme under company law carried no assurance of tax-neutral treatment, since the High Court itself had left compliance with Section 2(19AA) to be examined by the tax authorities.
6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Tribunal proceeded in stages. It first set out the statutory text of Sections 2(19AA), 2(41A), and 72A(4), noting that Section 72A(4) operates only once the anterior conditions of a valid “demerger” under Section 2(19AA) are satisfied. It then rejected the assessee’s reliance on Vegetable Products and Bajaj Tempo on the footing that those authorities apply to genuinely ambiguous or incentive-oriented provisions, whereas the Bench considered the language before it to be plain and grammatically conjunctive: the phrase “issues shares to the shareholders of the demerged company” is tied, by the word “and,” to the same “resulting company” that receives the undertaking.
The Tribunal anchored its interpretive approach in the Supreme Court’s rulings in Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co.[7] and Director of Income Tax v. American Express Bank Ltd.[8], both of which affirm that taxing and exemption provisions must be read strictly, without importing equitable considerations or supplying words the legislature has not used. Applying this approach, the Bench held that TCIL and TCISL remain separate legal entities notwithstanding their holding-subsidiary relationship, and that the holding company’s issuance of shares could not be treated as fulfilling the subsidiary’s own statutory obligation under Section 2(41A). The Tribunal also observed that no binding precedent from a High Court or the Supreme Court supported the assessee’s construction of the parenthetical clause. On the High Court sanction point, the Tribunal held that approval of the scheme under the Companies Act did not amount to, and was never intended as, a determination of compliance with the Income-tax Act, since the sanctioning court had expressly left the tax question open for the revenue authorities to examine.
Notably, the Tribunal’s order did not directly engage with the assessee’s redundancy argument concerning the parenthetical words in Section 2(41A), nor did it address the linked consequence that a non-qualifying demerger removes the shelter of Sections 47(vib) and 47(vid), exposing the transaction to capital-gains tax under Section 45.
7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
The Tribunal dismissed the assessee’s ground of appeal and upheld the disallowance of the claimed carry forward of business losses and unabsorbed depreciation aggregating approximately Rs. 240.15 crore. The ratio decidendi of the decision is that, for a transaction to qualify as a “demerger” attracting tax-neutral carry-forward benefits under Section 72A(4), the very entity that receives the transferred undertaking must itself issue consideration shares to the shareholders of the demerged company; a split arrangement in which one group entity receives the undertaking while a related but distinct entity issues the shares does not satisfy Sections 2(19AA) and 2(41A), however commercially unified the group and however clearly the High Court has sanctioned the scheme under company law.
8. Critical Analysis
8.1 Significance of the Decision
The ruling is significant because it addresses a structuring pattern that is common in multi-entity group reorganisations, where a holding company issues shares on behalf of the group even though a subsidiary receives the operating undertaking. By denying tax-neutral treatment to such an arrangement, the Tribunal has effectively required strict entity-level symmetry between the recipient of an undertaking and the issuer of consideration shares in every demerger, regardless of group unity.
8.2 Implications and Impact
For corporate restructuring practice, the decision carries immediate consequences. Groups planning multi-entity demergers must now ensure that the entity designated to receive the undertaking is the same entity that issues shares directly to the transferor company’s shareholders; any subsequent consolidation of ownership within the group must occur through a separate transaction after the demerger has independently satisfied Section 2(19AA). The judgment also confirms that sanction of a scheme by a company court carries no tax warranty, making a pre-scheme tax opinion addressing each condition of Section 2(19AA) an essential, rather than optional, step in restructuring transactions. Beyond the immediate parties, the decision leaves open a substantial question for the Bombay High Court: whether the parenthetical reference to a wholly owned subsidiary in Section 2(41A) has independent operative meaning that could accommodate differentiated group structures, or whether it is merely confirmatory and adds nothing to the provision.
8.3 Critical Evaluation
The Tribunal’s conclusion is grammatically defensible on a plain reading of the conjunctive language in Section 2(41A). However, the order is arguably incomplete in its treatment of the assessee’s redundancy argument.[9] If a wholly owned subsidiary is, by definition, already a “company” under the opening words of Section 2(41A), it is not self-evident what independent role the parenthetical phrase performs under the Revenue’s reading, and canons of construction generally caution against interpretations that leave statutory words without operative effect. The order also does not explore the cascading exposure to capital-gains liability that follows a non-qualifying demerger.[10] Whether these gaps amount to reversible error is a matter for the Bombay High Court, but they suggest the decision should be treated as the current, rather than necessarily final, word on Sections 2(19AA) and 2(41A) in multi-entity demerger structures.
9. Conclusion
Sterling Holiday Resorts Limited v. DCIT illustrates how a technical, entity-specific requirement buried within the definition of “demerger” can override an otherwise commercially coherent and court-sanctioned restructuring. The Tribunal’s insistence on strict, literal compliance with Sections 2(19AA) and 2(41A) denied the resulting company the benefit of carrying forward substantial accumulated losses, reaffirming that approval under company law provides no assurance of favourable tax treatment. The decision’s lasting significance lies less in its outcome than in the interpretive question it leaves open for higher courts: whether a rule requiring every statutory word to carry meaning can, and should, operate alongside the established doctrine that taxing provisions be construed strictly. Practitioners advising on group reorganisations would be prudent to ensure that the entity receiving a demerged undertaking is always the entity issuing consideration shares, pending any clarification from the Bombay High Court.
10. Reference(S):
Income-tax Act, 1961, ss. 2(19AA), 2(41A), 45, 47(vib), 47(vid), 72A(4).
Sterling Holiday Resorts Limited v. DCIT, ITA No. 843/Mum/2024 (ITAT Mumbai, 25 June 2026).
Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3327 of 2007 (SC, 30 July 2018).
Director of Income Tax (IT)-I, Mumbai v. American Express Bank Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 8291 of 2015 (SC, 15 December 2025).
Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. CIT, (1992) 196 ITR 188 (SC).
CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd., (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC).
Companies Act, 2013, ss. 230-232.
[1] 2nd Year LL.M., Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur.
[2]Sterling Holiday Resorts Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, ITA No 843/Mum/2024 (ITAT Mumbai, 25 June 2026).
[3]Companies Act 2013, ss 230–232 (sanction of schemes of arrangement by the National Company Law Tribunal, exercising jurisdiction earlier vested in the High Court).
[4]Income-tax Act 1961, s 72A(4), read with the definition of ‘demerger’ in s 2(19AA) and of ‘resulting company’ in s 2(41A).
[5]Bajaj Tempo Ltd v CIT (1992) 196 ITR 188 (SC).
[6]CIT v Vegetable Products Ltd (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC).
[7]Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors, Civil Appeal No 3327 of 2007 (SC, 30 July 2018).
[8]Director of Income Tax (IT)-I, Mumbai v American Express Bank Ltd, Civil Appeal No 8291 of 2015 with Civil Appeal No 4451 of 2016 (SC, 15 December 2025).
[9]For a fuller elaboration of this redundancy critique and the associated anti-surplusage canon, see CA Tirth Shah, ‘Evolution of Strict Tax Interpretation: From Literalism to Purpose in Sterling Holiday Decision’ (TaxGuru, 8 July 2026). The present summary adopts the underlying analytical point but restates it independently.
[10]Income-tax Act 1961, s 45 (capital gains) read with the exemptions in ss 47(vib) and 47(vid), which apply only where the transaction qualifies as a ‘demerger’ under s 2(19AA).

