Home » Blog » S.A.S. v France

S.A.S. v France

Authored By: Anastasija Krila

Riga Graduate School of Law

Case Name: S.A.S. v France 

Basic Information

S.A.S. v France

Application No. 43835/11, ECHR 2014 (extracts)

European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber)

1 July 2014

President: Dean Spielmann

Judges: Josep Casadevall, Guido Raimondi, Ineta Ziemele, Mark Villiger, Boštjan M.  Zupančič, Elisabeth Steiner, Khanlar Hajiyev, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Ledi Bianku,  Ganna Yudkivska, Angelika Nußberger, Erik Møse, Andre Potocki, Paul Lemmens, Helena  Jaderblom, Aleš Pejchal

Registar: Erik Fribergh

Introduction

The landmark judgment in the case of “S.A.S. v France” (2014) concerns the restriction  of religious freedoms in the interests of public order. In assessing the French law banning face covering clothing, the ECHR recognised for the first time the social concept of “Living  Together” (Le vivre ensemble) as a legitimate aim for restricting rights under Articles 8 and 9  of the ECHR. This judgment enshrined a wide margin of appreciation for states in regulating  religious symbols in society.

Facts of the Case

The applicant, a French citizen born in 1990 and a practicing Muslim, filed a complaint  with the European Court of Human Rights against the Republic of France, represented by the  legislature. The applicant, of her own free will and by her own choice, without pressure from  third parties, wore the niqab and burqa in her daily life – clothing that completely covers the  face and body, leaving only the eyes exposed. According to her, wearing this clothing was an  expression of her religious, cultural and personal beliefs. At the same time, in accordance with  religious rules, she was prepared to uncover her face for security checks or when social  interaction was necessary. She did not wear this religious headdress all the time, but chose to  do so at her own discretion, depending on the circumstances.

On 11 October 2010, the French Parliament adopted Law No. 2010-1192. Article 1  thereof prohibited the covering or concealing of the face in public places, whilst Article 3  provided the penalty for non-compliance with Article 1 in the form of a fine of up to 150 euros

and/or an obligation to follow a citizenship course. By “public place”, the legislation meant all  public areas within the state, including streets, public transport, shops and administrative  offices. Between October 2010 and April 2011, the French authorities carried out awareness raising campaigns and informed the public about the new legislation.

On 11 April 2011, the law officially came into force, leaving the applicant with a choice:  to either renounce her beliefs and religious practices or face the constant risk of criminal  prosecution and fines. The applicant emphasized that the adopted measure in fact deprived her  of the ability to present herself in public places without compromising her spiritual values. On  the same day, the applicant applied to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that the  law violated her rights under Articles 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the European Convention on  Human Rights.

Legal Issues

Admissibility

Whether the complainant has a “potential victim” status under Article 34 of the  European Convention on Human Rights if, at the time the complaint was lodged, she had not  yet been prosecuted or fined?

Article 8 and Article 9 of the ECHR

Whether the statutory ban on covering or concealing one’s face in public places  constitutes an interference with the Applicant’s right to respect for private life (Article 8) and  freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9)?

Legitimate Aim and Proportionality

Whether ensuring public safety and the conditions for “Living Together” (Le vivre  ensemble) constitute a sufficiently significant aim to justify interfering with Articles 8§2 and  Article 9§2, and whether a total ban is proportionate to achieving a legitimate aim?

Article 14 of the ECHR

Whether the general ban on covering and concealing the face results in indirect  discrimination against Muslim women who choose to wear the full-face veil, in violation of  Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 and Article 9?

III. Arguments Presented

Appliсant’s Arguments

Interference with Fundamental Rights (Articles 8 and 9 of the ECHR)

Complete prohibition on covering and concealing the face infringes the claimant’s  rights, as the wearing of the niqab is a personal choice, a form of self-expression and an  element of the claimant’s religious identity.

Disproportionate Measures

The ban imposed by the new law has an absolute nature, applies to all public places and does not respect the personal circumstances of citizens, such as their religion. The  applicant considers that, to ensure safety, it is sufficient to require individuals to uncover their  faces temporarily – during the documentation verification process or other similar necessary  social interactions. Such a measure is deemed to be unjustifiably strict.

A Criticism of the “Le vivre ensemble” concept

The concept of “Living Together” has a very broad definition, is largely a social  factor, and its boundaries are not defined by the state authorities. The application of this  concept cannot be considered a legitimate justification for restricting the rights set out in  Articles 8 and 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Indirect Discrimination (Article 14 of the ECHR)

Although the law applies to all citizens and is drafted in neutral wording, its actual  application discriminates and restricts specifically Muslim women who wear the burqa and  the niqab.

The Respondent Government’s Arguments

Legitimate Aims

The ban on face coverings is a measure designed to ensure public safety and is  necessary for the purposes of identifying individuals, reducing fraud and maintaining public  peace. This law protects the rights of third parties and fosters social cohesion, thereby  reinforcing the values of the French Republic – gender equality and human dignity.

Margin of Appreciation

According to this principle, the legislature has the full right to independently  determine the laws and regulations applicable within its territory, based on national traditions,  historical values and the socio-cultural landscape.

Proportionality and severity of punishment

The ban specifically concerns covering the face, not religious clothing in general. It  still permits the wearing of the hijab, headscarves or other forms of body-covering clothing. Furthermore, the penalties for non-compliance with the law are minimal and mainly  disciplinary in nature.

IV.Court’s Resoning and Analysis

Admissibility under Article 34 of the ECHR

On the basis of the conditions described in Article 34 of the European Convention on  Human Rights, the court deemed the applicant’s complaint, as a “potential victim”, to be  admissible, as the law enacted placed the applicant in a dilemma: either to violate her religious customs and beliefs or to face a constant risk of criminal prosecution and fines.

Interference with Articles 8 and 9 of the ECHR

The court approved the applicant’s complaint and confirmed that a blanket ban on  concealing the face in public places constitutes an interference with the right to respect for  private life, described in Article 8, and the right to freedom of religion, described in Article 9.

Legitimate Aims

The Court considered the argument regarding the safeguarding of public safety  through a total ban on face covering to be an excessively strict and unjustified measure,  pointing out that this objective could be achieved by carrying out targeted identity checks.  However, the Court agreed that the face plays a crucial role in establishing social relations  and that concealing the face undermines the minimum requirements of civilian interaction.  The Grand Chamber recognized that open interpersonal communication is essential for  democratic interaction, and therefore accepted that preserving the conditions of “Living  Together” (Le vivre ensemble) constitutes a legitimate aim under the scope of protecting the  “rights and freedoms of others.”

Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality

Given that there is no common concept within the Council of Europe regarding a ban  on the wearing of the niqab, burqa and other religious headwear covering the face, the  Government of the French Republic has a wide margin of appreciation. The Court  emphasized that where general social policy is at stake, state authorities are better placed than  an international tribunal to evaluate local needs and public interests. Furthermore, in relation  to other potentially applicable measures, the penalties for breaching the law adopted are  minimal and insignificant. Consequently, the court ruled that the ban is justified and  proportionate to the stated objective.

Indirect Discrimination

The court does consider that the law has a greater impact on certain groups of people – such as Muslim women. Nonetheless, it reaffirmed that a neutral measure that affects a  specific group does not automatically violate the principle of non-discrimination if it is  supported by an objective rationale. However, as the measure was found by the court to be  objective and to have a reasonable justification, there was no breach of Article 14, in  conjunction with Articles 8 and 9.

Judgment and Racio Decidendi

Holding: 

The Court found no violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the ECHR (15 votes to 2). II. The Court found no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 8 and 9 (15 votes to 2).

III. The Court unanimously declared the complaints under Articles 3 and 11 to be  inadmissible.

Ratio Decidendi:

The State has the right to restrict the wearing of clothing that completely covers the  face in public places on the grounds of safeguarding the principle of “Living Together” (Le  vivre ensemble) as an element of “the rights and freedoms of others”, provided that such  restrictions are based on the State’s broad discretion and are accompanied by proportionate  sanctions.

VI.Critical Analysis

Significance of the Decision

This ruling set a landmark precedent, establishing the principle of “Living Together”  not as an abstract social principle, but as a defence of the rights and freedoms of third parties,  and enshrined the concept of “Le vivre ensemble”. 

The Court confirmed and emphasised that, in the absence of a European Consensus on  issues affecting both religion and social security, Member States have the widest possible  margin of appreciation.

This ruling provided an official basis for the adoption of similar laws in other Council  of Europe Member States and established a new standard in Europe. Based on this case, the  Belgian government introduced a similar ban within the framework of the Dakir v Belgium,  2017 case.

Implications and Impact

The main victims of this ruling are Muslim women, who have been forced to choose  between isolation from society and rejection of their religious norms in relation to the  wearing of the burqa or niqab.

Equally significant was the fact that, following this precedent, the governments of EU  member states gained additional legal grounds for restricting religious symbols in public  places in order to reinforce the secular nature of the state (laïcité).

The court’s ruling was met with criticism from the international human rights  academic community, as it directly contradicted the position of the UN Human Rights  Committee, which in 2018 recognised the ban on wearing the niqab and burqa as a violation  of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the Yaker v France and  Hebbadj v France cases.

Critical Evaluation

Strengths of the Holding

The court demonstrated judicial discretion, recognising that national parliaments are  more qualified to assess the social needs and traditions of their societies than an international  court in Strasbourg, thereby showing respect for national sovereignty. This approach has  enabled the Court to avoid imposing a single cultural standard on states with fundamentally  different historical approaches to state secularism (laïcité). 

The court rightly highlighted the leniency of the penalties, avoiding excessively harsh  criminal measures and recognising that the sanctions were proportionate. Prioritising  educational measures (civic education courses) over imprisonment highlights the legislature’s  commitment to integration rather than mere punishment.

Weaknesses of the Holding

The concept of “Living Together” (Le vivre ensemble) is extremely unclear and subjective.  The use of this term sets a dangerous precedent, allowing fundamental human rights to be  restricted on the basis of the vague social preferences of the majority, thereby undermining  social minorities. Introducing such a vague criterion creates the risk that it will be applied  arbitrarily to restrict any other unpopular forms of individual expression in the future.

Formally neutral law is, in practice, directed against a small and vulnerable group of  women, which effectively legitimises indirect discrimination – the prohibition of which is set  out in Article 14 of the ECHR – and leaves vulnerable individuals without effective  protection. Consequently, by disregarding the actual adverse effect on a specific group, the  Court weakened the standard of protection against indirect discrimination within the meaning  of Article 14 of the Convention.

Declaring the aim of the law to be the protection of women from coercion, the Court  upheld a measure which ultimately punishes these very women, depriving them of access to  public institutions and thereby creating and reinforcing a paradox in the protection of rights. Rather than increasing women’s autonomy, the decision effectively forces them to choose 

between complete isolation at home and violating their own religious beliefs.

Conclusion

In the “S.A.S. v France” case, the ECHR prioritised social cohesion over individual  religious expression, recognising that the ban on the niqab was proportionate to upholding the  principle of le vivre ensemble. 

The key significance of the ruling lies in the legitimisation of “Living Together” as a  basis for restricting rights and in granting states broad discretion. However, the contradiction  between the ECHR and the UN Human Rights Committee leaves open the question of  protecting vulnerable minorities from indirect discrimination.

Reference(S):

Legislation and National Statutes

Law No. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 prohibiting the concealing of the face  in public spaces (Loi n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 visant à interdire la  dissimulation du visage dans l’ espace public) [France].

International Treaties and Conventions

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR).

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December  1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).

Table of Cases

S.A.S v France App no 43835/11 (ECtHR [GC], 1 July 2014) Dakir v Belgium App no 4619/12 (ECtHR, 11 July 2017)

UN Human Rights Committee Views

Yaker v France, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 2747/2016  (7 December 2018) UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016.

Hebbadj v France, UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 2807/2016  (7 December 2018) UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2807/2016.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top