Kumari Chandra v. The State of Rajasthan

Kumari Chandra @ Sati Lajnani, daughter of Tolaram, by caste Sindhi, aged 21 years, resident of House No.3597, Mukeri Mohalla, Nasirabad, District Ajmer       ….…Accused-Appellant

Versus

The State of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor         ….…Respondent

Background:

The present appeal before the Honorable High Court is filed by accused-appellant Kumari Chandra @ Sati Lajnani after being aggrieved by the order dated 12.01.1987 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, whereby in the said decree the said judge convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302^[1],307^[2] and 374^[3] of Indian Penal Code,1860 thereby sentencing the appellant for an offence under section 302 IPC^[4] with a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default of the said payment the said accused was to undergo one month of rigorous imprisonment. The said accused was further sentenced for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC^[5] and Section 364 IPC^[6], wherein the appellant was sentenced to undergoing rigorous imprisonment of four years with a fine of Rs. 400/- and in default of the said imprisonment the said appellant was to undergo four months of rigorous imprisonment, the above-mentioned penalization was granted to the appellant for offences punishable under Section 307 IPC^[7] and the said appellant was to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years along with the fine of  Rs. 400 and in default of payment of the said fine the appellant had to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of four months. Thus, the appellant being aggrieved by the said decree filed the present appeal before the Honorable High Court of Rajasthan.

Facts:

On August 11, 1981, Gangaram’s son Chilumal informed the Nasirabad City Police Station that he had heard from an unnamed source that a Sindhi woman had forced three children down a well. A girl and a boy were rescued, while the third child remains unaccounted for. The occurrence took occurred about 11:30 A.M.

Chilumal discovered a large number of individuals near the well. Udhavdas, one of the boys who had been rescued, was shivering as he perched on a bench. He told Chilumal that he and the other two children were on their way to school when they were given a ride to a temple and a well by a woman they named “Sati bhua” (aunt). Then she flung them into the well. The missing boy, Omprakash, was still missing.

Following an investigation and the filing of an FIR for attempted murder and kidnapping, the police charged the accused, Sati (also known as Chandra Lajnani), with offenses including murder. When the case went to trial, the defense presented 12 papers and 6 witnesses, while the prosecution provided 28 witnesses and 29 documents. The defendant claimed that she was wrongly accused.

The accused was convicted of kidnapping, murder, and attempted murder by the trial court. She received additional terms for the other offenses, including penalties and further jail time if the fines were not paid, in addition to a life sentence for murder. The appellant thereby aggrieved by the Trial Courts decree filed the present appeal before the Honorable Court of Rajasthan.

Arguments posed by the Advocate for the Petitioner:

Mr. V.R. Bajwa, the accused’s defense attorney, argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the accused abducted three children and attempted to kill them by shoving them into a well on August 11, 1981. He questioned the testimony of the juvenile witnesses, Udhavdas and Deoki, who were easily persuaded or coached, claiming that the evidence was inconsistent, untrustworthy, and contradictory to normal human behavior. Bajwa further mentioned that a number of key witnesses, including Kamla and others, were either labeled hostile or made contradictory statements, hinting that the prosecution’s case was made up.

The defense attorney stated that because the accused had no reason to harm the children, the prosecution had failed to demonstrate a motive for the accused’s murder of them. According to him, the accused’s angry demeanor in the days leading up to her menstrual cycle was caused by a mental ailment known as premenstrual stress disorder. According to the defense, the accused should be protected from prosecution under Section 84^[8] of the Indian Penal Code, which states that crimes are not committed by those who are mentally ill and unable to appreciate the implications of their actions.

In order to bolster their argument that the accused had this illness, which caused her unpredictable conduct, the defense team cited medical testimony from physicians and testimony from defense witnesses. In order to bolster his claim that the accused should not have been found guilty, he also referenced a number of court rulings and publications on premenstrual syndrome as a defense in criminal cases.

Arguments posed by the Advocate for the Respondent:

On the other hand, the learned public prosecutor, Mr. R.S. Raghav, contested the appeal, claiming that Kamla (PW-1) who was with the accused-appellant at the time of the occurrence saw the deceased and two injured people alive. Kamla disclosed her physiognomy by describing the woman as wheatish in color. There were three children seen with the accused-appellant.

This witness identified her throughout judicial proceedings. Her arrest memo (Exhibit P-26) describes a similar physiognomy.

Dr. Mahesh Chandra Agarwal (PW-6)’s postmortem report (Exhibit P-7) states that the deceased Omprakash drowned. Deoki sustained three injuries, all of which were abrasions, according to her injury report (Exhibit P-5).

Exhibit P-6, an injury report for an additional wounded Udhavdas, shows that he received two abrasions. The accused-appellant was captured immediately, as indicated by the fact that he was pummeled by a number of others who had gathered there, causing injuries.

Legal Issues:

The question is whether the accused-appellant was functioning under a defect of reason at the time of the incident, as well as suffering from any psychological disease or unsound mind due to premenstrual stress syndrome.

Court’s Decision:

The court considered whether the accused-appellant might plead “premenstrual stress syndrome” as a reason for insanity under Section 84^[9] of the Indian Penal Code. Although there is little precedent for this defense in India, the accused can argue that her disease caused a flaw in her reasoning, resulting in the involuntary deed. Three doctors endorsed the insanity plea, and the court emphasized that the accused just needs to submit a plausible defense; the prosecution must demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated that the accused’s burden of proof is equivalent to that in civil proceedings, citing established legal principles. The accused successfully demonstrated that she was experiencing premenstrual stress syndrome-related mental instability at the time of the occurrence, and the court determined that the evidence threw reasonable doubt on her intention. As a result, the court approved the defendant’s appeal, exonerated her, and ordered her to post a bond to guarantee her appearance in future court proceedings.

Critical Analysis:

Section 84 of the IPC has a lot of possibility for misuse because of the Court’s erroneous and irrational thinking in this case. The argument employed has set an undesirable precedent for cases employing PMS as an insanity defense. It has completely destroyed the basic concept of insanity as a defense. This case exemplifies the complete lack of application of judicial intellect. The judgment’s basis in foreign law is a major flaw in the logic that was applied. There is no reason for Indian law to allow this argument for a girl with PMS. The court’s decision to equate medical with legal insanity has further undermined the defense. Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand^[10] established that legal insanity is the only defense authorized under Section 84 of the IPC^[11]. The court made a significant error in comparing medical and legal madness. The following is an analysis of the mistakes in the court’s reasoning.

Implication of the Case:

In cases where PMS is used as a defense under Section 84, the verdict establishes an improper precedent. This has the potential to undermine the essential premise of Section 84, opening the door to future abuse. The defense of insanity is only granted in order to avoid punishment from being imposed on the insane. As previously said, PMS is a typical condition that affects all women. It is also commonly known that between 70 and 90 percent of females will experience PMS at some point in their lives, with 60 percent exhibiting mild symptoms and the remaining 40 percent expressing moderate symptoms. Women can become agitated and aggressive, but it’s debatable whether or not this aggression can be justified by insanity. Because of this ruling, any woman experiencing PMS can now simply claim insanity and get away with it. The decision provides needless protection to a woman experiencing PMS, which could lead to the illogical acquittal of women who commit crimes while experiencing PMS. The outcome would be a mockery of justice.

Conclusion:

There are numerous major problems with the current case’s decision to allow the defense of insanity. This increases the potential for exploitation of the insanity argument while also weakening the defense’s essential principle. The author doesn’t understand why the Rajasthan High Court chose to depend on foreign publications and reports rather than analyzing the case’s specific facts and circumstances. Furthermore, the court in this case did not examine the motive issue. Motivation was overlooked, despite its importance. Furthermore, the court failed to employ judicial reasoning to decide the case on its merits. The author is adamant that the sole basis for this case is irrational and improper reasoning, which undermines section 84’s core aim.

Reference(s):

^[1] Section 302, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[2] Section 307, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[3] Section 374, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[4] Section 302, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[5] Section 307, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[6] Section 364, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[7]  Section 307, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[8] Section 84, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[9] Section 84, Indian Penal Code,1860.

^[10] Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2011 Supreme Court 627.