FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA V NNAMDI KANU (2025)

NAME OF CASE: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA V NNAMDI KANU (2025)

CITATION: FHC/ABJ/CR/383/2015

COURT: FEDERAL HIGH COURT OF NIGERIA (Abuja Judicial Division, Holden at Abuja)

PARTIES:

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA ————— COMPLAINANT

AND

NNAMDI KANU —————————————- DEFENDANT

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 20TH NOVEMBER, 2025

JUDGE OF COURT: HON. JUSTICE J. K. OMOTOSHO

Introduction

The decision of the Federal High Court in the case of Nnamdi Kanu v Federal Republic of Nigeria^[1],  delivered in November 2025, did far more than conclude a criminal trial. It ignited a national debate that spilled from courtrooms into social media, newsrooms, and private conversations across the country. For weeks, Nigerians argued passionately, each side convinced that justice had either been too harsh or dangerously lenient. The case became a lens through which Nigerians examined the limits of state authority, the protections of constitutional rights, and the tension between law, justice, and public perception. This essay critically reviews the trial, focusing on the extraordinary rendition, the constitutionality of prosecuting under a repealed law, and the broader implications for justice in Nigeria.

Fact of the case.

The Defendant, Nnamdi Kanu, an adult male of Afaranukwu Ibeku, Umuahia North Local Government Area of Abia State, was arraigned before the Federal High Court, Abuja Judicial Division, on a seven count charge by the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The charge, numbered FHC/ABJ/CR/383/2015, bordered on terrorism, incitement, membership of a proscribed organisation, and the illegal importation of communication equipment. The prosecution alleged that Kanu, as leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, a proscribed group, engaged in conduct intended to intimidate the population, incite violence, and disrupt economic activities between 2015 and 2021. A major part of the case rested on broadcasts allegedly made by Kanu in 2021, in which he threatened death and warned those who disobeyed IPOB’s sit-at-home orders to prepare their wills. These broadcasts reportedly led to closures of banks, schools, markets, and fuel stations across Eastern States.

The prosecution further alleged that Kanu incited attacks on Nigerian security personnel and their families, and directed IPOB members to manufacture bombs, under the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013. Count Seven related to his importation of a radio transmitter concealed in household items in 2015, contrary to section 47(2)(a) of the Criminal Code Act. Evidence included his arrest at the Golden Tulip Hotel in Lagos, recovered Radio Biafra items, written statements, five witnesses, and thirty-four exhibits.

Kanu later absconded while on bail and remained outside Nigeria for about four years. In 2021, he was returned through extraordinary rendition from Kenya without formal extradition procedures. Upon return, he gave a fresh statement to the Department of State Services on 17 July 2021. These events provided the court with the background against which the charges were assessed.

Legal Issues for Determination and Scope of this Article.

In arriving at its judgment, the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve fundamental questions touching the integrity of the trial process and the legality of the defendant’s prosecution. These included whether Nnamdi Kanu was denied his right to fair hearing, whether his extraordinary rendition from Kenya invalidated the proceedings, whether the statutory provisions under which he was charged were repealed or inoperative, and whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.^[2] While the court considered these issues within the framework of the charges before it, this article goes further by interrogating the constitutional consistency of section 98 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2022 with the 1999 Constitution^[3]. It also questions the legality of the defendant’s rendition and reflects on whether the gravity of the allegations is sufficient to justify the erosion of fundamental rights. Ultimately, the concern is the kind of precedent this decision sets for future adjudications in Nigeria.

Prosecution’s Argument

The prosecution sought to establish the guilt of the defendant through a wide range of evidence, including oral testimony, documents, audio and audiovisual materials. These were tendered to prove the seven count charge against him. Several witnesses were called and examined by the prosecution, while the defendant was afforded the opportunity to cross examine them. At the instance of the defence, the court granted numerous adjournments in the interest of justice and in observance of the defendant’s constitutional right to fair hearing under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution^[4]. Although these repeated adjournments caused delays, the court remained patient and allowed the defence adequate time to prepare its case.

After the prosecution closed its case, the defendant was given a prolonged period to enter his defence. Instead of doing so, he filed a no case submission in October 2025. The prosecution opposed this, arguing that a prima facie case had been made out and that the defendant had a duty to respond to the evidence placed before the court.

Defendant’s Argument

In his no case submission, the defendant challenged the legality of his return to Nigeria, describing it as an extraordinary rendition that violated his right to fair hearing. He relied on the Court of Appeal decision in FRN v Nnamdi Kanu^[5] and argued that the alleged rendition rendered the entire trial a nullity. He also claimed that his right to confidential communication with counsel had been breached, alleging that the DSS eavesdropped on his discussions with his lawyers.

The defendant further argued that he was not given sufficient time to enter his defence and that the court misled him while taking his plea. He also contended that he could not be tried under a law that had been repealed. These claims were largely supported by affidavit evidence, without any oral testimony.

Court’s Decision and Reasoning.

The court rejected the defendant’s arguments. It held that the alleged extraordinary rendition could not invalidate an existing criminal trial, relying on the Ker-Frisbee doctrine as laid down in Ker v Illinois^[6] and Frisbie v Collins^[7]. The court agreed with the appellate reasoning that the lower court erred in holding that the manner of arrest could defeat a subsisting charge, particularly where the defendant had earlier jumped bail and became a fugitive.

The court further ruled that affidavit evidence was insufficient to establish the claims of rendition and eavesdropping. It demanded oral evidence, which the defendant failed to provide. It also found that the record of proceedings showed compliance with section 271(2) and (3) of the ACJA 2015^[8] in taking the defendant’s plea. The court in her ruling held that Section 98 of the Terrorism Act^[9] allows for the continuation of trials under the repealed law. The court noted that the defendant had been granted countless adjournments and opportunities to enter his defence. Relying on Edevie v Orohwedor.^[10] The court held that affidavit evidence cannot replace oral testimony in criminal trials. Since the defendant failed to adduce any credible defence, the court dismissed the no case submission, upheld the seven count charge and proceeded to convict and sentence him.

Critical Legal Analysis.

• Examination of the Extraordinary Rendition and Human Rights Implications.

Under international law, the practice of extraordinary rendition is widely condemned because it undermines due process and the rule of law. It violates core principles under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, particularly articles 3, 9 10 and 13, which protect liberty, prohibit arbitrary arrest and guarantee fair hearing, freedom of movement as well as article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Rendition, in its ordinary sense, refers to the transfer of a suspect from one state to another for prosecution. However, an extraordinary rendition occurs where such transfer is carried out forcibly, secretly, and without recourse to lawful extradition procedures or judicial oversight^[11]

Ordinarily, such conduct would amount to a grave breach of international human rights standards. In the case of Nnamdi Kanu, however, the circumstances are unusually complex. The defendant had jumped bail and remained outside Nigeria for years, making him a fugitive from justice. By doing so, he had already submitted himself to the coercive powers of the Nigerian state, and his right to freedom of movement had been lawfully restricted upon his initial arrest under Nigerian law. Although one may argue that this restriction applied only within Nigeria, it is significant that a Kenyan court recognised the infringement of his rights and awarded damages against the Kenyan Government for his unlawful transfer^[12].

This judicial remedy satisfied the requirement of accountability in international law, restoring his violated rights within the jurisdiction. Upon his return, the Nigerian court relied on the principle demonstrated in Ker v Illinois and Frisbie v Collins, holding that the manner of arrest does not divest a court of jurisdiction. In this light, it would be legally unsound and morally inconsistent for the defendant to retain the benefit of damages while also seeking to extinguish valid criminal charges. The law must not be used as a shield for manipulation. His rights were acknowledged, remedied and preserved, while the integrity of the criminal process remained intact.

• The constitutional consistency of Section 98 of the Terrorism Act.

Section 36(12) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria affirms that no person shall be convicted for an offence unless the act was criminalised and the penalty prescribed by a written law. On the surface, the continued prosecution of the defendant under a repealed terrorism statute appears inconsistent with this provision. Yet the issue is more complex. Where an offence was committed while a law was valid, the repeal of that law does not automatically extinguish liability, particularly where the new statute expressly preserves pending proceedings. Section 6 of the Interpretation Act^[13] provides that repeal does not affect existing rights, liabilities or legal proceedings unless a contrary intention appears.

The courts have long held that statutes must be interpreted in line with the intention of the legislature and the spirit of the law, as stated in A.G. Federation v Abubakar^[14] and A.G. Ondo v A.G. Federation.^[15] It would be unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to create a loophole through which serious crimes could escape judicial scrutiny. The law was meant to preserve accountability, not to protect impunity.

Conclusion

This case underscores the delicate balance between enforcing state authority and protecting constitutional rights. While the defendant faced serious allegations supported by extensive evidence, his claims of extraordinary rendition and reliance on repealed law required the court to examine the limits of due process. The judgment affirms that irregular arrest procedures cannot automatically nullify a valid criminal charge, particularly when the accused has absconded and become a fugitive.

Equally, it reinforces that constitutional rights must be substantiated. The defendant was given ample opportunity to present a proper defence and provide credible evidence, yet failed to do so. The court’s insistence on procedural compliance and oral proof was not punitive but a safeguard of fairness.Ultimately, the decision clarifies that justice cannot be derailed by technicalities or evasion. It establishes that legality, accountability, and fairness must coexist, providing guidance for future cases where individual rights intersect with the demands of national security.

REFERENCE LIST

Legislation

1.  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended 2011) (CFRN)
2.  Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA 2015)
3. Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act 2013
4.  Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2022

Nigerian Cases

1. Federal Republic of Nigeria v Nnamdi Kanu FHC/ABJ/CR/383/2015 (Federal High Court, Abuja Judicial Division, 2025)
2. FRN v Nnamdi Kanu CA/ABJ/CR/625/2022 (Court of Appeal, Abuja Division, 2022)
3. Edevie v Orohwedor & Ors  [2022] LPELR-58931 (SC)
4. Attorney-General of the Federation v Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt 1041) 1
5. Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222

Foreign Cases

1. Ker v Illinois 119 US 436 (1886)
2.  Frisbie v Collins  342 US 519 (1952)
3.  Kanu (Suing on behalf of and Representing the Subject Nwannekaenvi Nnamdi Kenny Okwu‑Kanu) v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government & 4 others [2025] KEHC 8967 (KLR) (Constitutional Petition E359 of 2021) (High Court of Kenya, Milimani Law Courts, 24 June 2025) [https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/8967/eng%402025-06-24]accessed 7 February 2026

International Instruments

1. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, Articles 3, 9, 13 [https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights] accessed 7 February 2026
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, Articles 9, 14 [https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights] accessed 7 February 2026

Articles and Reports

1. John Chuks Azu and Abdullateef Aliyu, Kenyan court affirms Kanu’s rights violation, awards 10m shillings damage Daily Trust (7 May 2025) [https://dailytrust.com/kenyan-court-affirms-kanus-rights-violation-awards-10m-shillings-damage/] accessed 7 February 2026

^[1]Nnamdi Kanu v Federal Republic of Nigeria FHC/ABJ/CR/383/2015 (Federal High Court, Abuja, 2015)

^[2] Ibid 1

^[3] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) s36(8) & (12)

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] FRN v Nnamdi Kanu CA/ABJ/CR/625/2022 (Court of Appeal, Abuja, 2022)

^[6]  Ker v Illinois 119 US 436 (1886)

^[7] Frisbie v Collins 342 US 519 (1952)

^[8] Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (ACJA 2015) s 271(2)-(3)

^[9] Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2022 s98

^[10] Edevie v Orohwedor & Ors [2022] LPELR-58931 (SC)

^[11] Ibid 1

^[12] Kanu (Suing on behalf of and Representing the Subject Nwannekaenvi Nnamdi Kenny Okwu‑Kanu) v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government & 4 others [2025] KEHC 8967 (KLR) (Constitutional Petition E359 of 2021) (High Court of Kenya, Milimani Law Courts, 24 June 2025) <https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2025/8967/eng%402025-06-24> accessed 7 February 2026.

^[13] Interpretation Act LFN 2004 s.6

^[14]  Attorney-General of the Federation v Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt 1041) 1

^[15] Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772) 222