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Collateral or protected? The Failure of International Law to Safeguard Women and Children in Gaza.

Authored By: Maria Fejzulla

Salford University

And the protection of civilians lies at the heart of international humanitarian law. Yet in contemporary armed conflicts, this principle appears increasingly strained. The ongoing situation in Gaza provides a stark example of this tension, particularly in relation to women and children, who constitute a significant proportion of the civilian population. Reports from international organisations consistently indicate that these groups bear the brunt of hostilities, facing disproportionate harm, displacement and deprivation. This raises A pressing legal question. To what extent does international law effectively protect women and children in such contexts? This article argues that despite the well-developed legal framework, the protection of women and children in Gaza remains inadequate due to weaknesses in enforcement, the elasticity of proportionality assessments and the political constraints surrounding accountability mechanisms.

International humanitarian law (IHL) provides a comprehensive framework for protecting civilians during armed conflict. The 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 established the foundational principle that civilians must be protected from the effects of hostilities.[1] In particular, the 4th Gen Convention emphasises the protection of civilian persons in times of war, including special provisions for women and children.[2] Additional Protocol I further reinforces these protections, requiring parties to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants.[3] The principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution form the cornerstone of lawful military conduct.[4]            

Women and children are afforded additional protections under both IHL and international human rights law. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) requires states to ensure the protection of women in situations of conflict.[5] Similarly, the Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC obligates states to take all feasible measures to ensure the protection and care of children affected by armed conflict.[6] These instruments reflect the recognition that women and children are particularly vulnerable and require heightened safeguards.

Despite these legal protections, the situation in Gaza suggests a significant gap between law and practice. Civilian casualties have been widely reported, with women and children forming a substantial proportion of those affected.[7] Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including hospitals, schools and water systems, has been severely impacted.[8] Displacement has further exacerbated vulnerabilities, particularly for women who face a heightened risk of exploitation and for children who are deprived of education and basic security.[9] While such outcomes may be framed as incidental to military operations, their scale raises serious questions about compliance with IHL principles.

The principle of distinction requires that parties to a conflict differentiate between civilian and military targets.[10] However, in densely populated areas such as Gaza, the practical application of this principle becomes increasingly complex. The presence of military objectives within civilian areas does not negate the obligation to protect civilians.[11] Nevertheless, the frequency of civilian harm suggests. Either a failure in target verification processes or an acceptance of civilian risk that may exceed lawful limits.

Closely linked to distinction is the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks expected to cause excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated military advantage.[12] This principle, however, is inherently subjective. The assessment of what constitutes ‘‘excessive’’ harm often depends on the perspective of the attacking party.[13] In practise, this flexibility can dilute the protective function of the rule. In the context of Gaza, repeated instances of high civilian casualties raised concerns that proportionality assessments may be interpreted too broadly, allowing significant harm to be justified under the guise of military necessity.

The principle of precaution further requires that all feasible steps be taken to minimise civilian harm.[14] This includes choosing means and methods of warfare that reduce risk and providing effective warnings where possible.[15] While warnings are sometimes issued, their effectiveness is questionable in situations where civilians lack safe avenues of escape.[16] The requirement of feasibility must therefore be interpreted in light of the realities on the ground rather than as a formalistic obligation.

Beyond the substantive rules of IHL, the issue of enforcement presents a significant challenge. International law relies heavily on state compliance, and mechanisms for accountability are often limited. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over war crimes, including attacks on civilians.[17] However, its effectiveness is constrained by jurisdictional issues, political resistance, and the practical difficulties of investigation.[18] Similarly, United Nations bodies may issue reports and resolutions, but these often lack binding force.[19]

The politicisation of international law further undermines accountability. Responses to alleged violations frequently depend on geopolitical considerations rather than consistent legal standards.[20] This selective enforcement weakens the credibility of the legal framework and diminishes its deterrent effect. In the case of Gaza, calls for investigation and accountability have often been met with limited action, reinforcing perceptions of impunity.

It is also necessary to consider the interaction between IHL, an international human rights law. While IHL is the primary framework during armed conflict. Human rights obligations continue to apply.[21] Rights such as the right to life, health and education are particularly relevant to women and children.[22] The ongoing deprivation of these rights in Gaza highlights the limitations of existing protections when enforcement mechanisms are ineffective.                              

The failure to adequately protect women and children in Gaza does not stem from a lack of legal norms. On the contrary, the legal framework is extensive and well-established. The problem lies in the interpretation and implementation of these norms. The flexibility inherent in key principles, combined with weak enforcement and political constraints, creates an improved environment in which violations can occur with limited consequences.

In light of this analysis, several reforms may be considered. First, greater clarity in the application of proportionality could enhance accountability. While some degree of flexibility is unavoidable, clearer guidelines or interpretive standards may reduce the risk of abuse.[23] Secondly, strengthening investigative mechanisms, including independent fact-finding bodies, could improve the documentation of violations.[24] Third, increased support of international judicial institutions may enhance their capacity to pursue accountability. Finally, greater emphasis on the protection of vulnerable groups, particularly women and children, should be integrated into military planning and operational decision-making.

In conclusion, the situation in Gaza illustrates the limitations of international law in protecting women and children during armed conflict. Despite A robust legal framework, the realities on the ground reveal significant gaps in implementation and enforcement. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution remain central to civilian protection, yet their effectiveness is undermined by interpretative flexibility and political constraints. Without meaningful reforms and a stronger commitment to accountability, the promise of protection under international law risks remaining largely theoretical. The continued suffering of women and children in Gaza serves as a stark reminder that legal norms alone are insufficient; their value ultimately depends on consistent and principled application.

Table of Cases

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136

Table of Legislation and International Instruments

The First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (signed in Geneva, 12 August 1949, came into force in 1950)

The Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 1949)

The Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949)

The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949)

Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) (8 June 1977, came into force 7 December 1978)

Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, came into force 3 September 1981)

Convention on the Rights of the Child (20 November 1989, came into force 2 September 1990)

Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, came into force 1 July 2002)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966, came into force 23 March 1976)

Bibliography

Books

Y Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd edn, CUP 2016)

W.A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (5th edn, CUP 2017)

M Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing 2011)

Reports and Publications from Institutions

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2005)

ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (2nd ed., 2016)

ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009)

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Gaza Humanitarian Situation Reports (2024–2026)

World Health Organization (WHO), Health Conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024)

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Children in Armed Conflict Reports (2024)

United Nations Human Rights Council, Reports on the Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024)

United Nations General Assembly, Resolutions on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Various Years)

United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry, Reports on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Various Years)

[1] Geneva Convention I-IV (1949)

[2] Geneva Convention IV Relative the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (1949)

[3] Additional Protocol I (1977), art. 48

[4] ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005)

[5] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)

[6] Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), art. 38

[7] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Gaza Reports (2024–2026)

[8] WHO, Health Conditions in Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024)

[9] UNICEF, Children in Armed Conflict Reports (2024)

[10] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Art 48

[11] ICRC Commentary on the Geneva Conventions (2016)

[12] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Art 51(5)(b)

[13] Dinstein Y, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (3rd edn)

[14] Additional Protocol I, art 57

[15] ibid

[16] Human Rights Council Reports on Gaza by UN (2024)

[17] Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (1998)

[18] Schabas W, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (5th edition)

[19] General Assembly Resolutions on Gaza by UN (different years)

[20] Koskenniemi M, The Politics of International Law (2011)

[21] ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (2004)

[22] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

[23] ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities (2009)

[24] UN Independent International Commissions of Inquiry Reports (several)

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