Authored By: Snothando Hlatshwayo
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Introduction
In the contemporary South African socio-legal landscape, the emergence of “sugar relationships” often referred to as “blesser-blessee” relationships, have gained increasing visibility, particularly among young people who are navigating economic pressures and social expectations. These relationships typically involve an exchange of companionship, intimacy, or affection for financial or material benefits, however this has ignited complex debates regarding the boundaries of romantic autonomy and criminal conduct.
The legal ambiguity stems from the striking similarities between sugar relationships and prostitution, specifically regarding the exchange of intimacy for material gain. While the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (SORMA)[1] explicitly prohibits sexual acts performed for “reward,” sugar relationships are typically characterized by their emotional depth and romantic framing. This creates a significant judicial tension: determining whether these multi-faceted bonds fit the strict statutory definition of prostitution.
This article investigates the potential criminalization of sugar relationships under South African law. It begins by outlining the legal framework governing prostitution, followed by an analysis of judicial interpretation, particularly through landmark case law. It will then explore the nature of sugar relationships and evaluates whether they meet the legal criteria for prostitution. Finally, the article provides a critical analysis of the current legal position and highlights areas of ambiguity and potential reform.
Legal Framework Governing Prostitution
The primary hurdle for legality of sugar relationships lies in section 11 of SORMA[2] as this section criminalises the engagement in sexual services for “financial or other reward, favour or compensation.” This definition is intentionally broad, capturing a wide range of exchanges where sexual services are provided in return for some benefit.
Unlike the common law understanding of the term “reward”, in South African law it is not limited to direct monetary payment but may include gifts, favours, or other forms of compensation. This expansive interpretation creates the possibility that relationships involving indirect or non-monetary benefits could fall within the scope of the law.
However, for conduct to qualify as prostitution, there must be a clear intention that sexual services are rendered in exchange for a reward. For a criminal conviction, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that intercourse was contingent upon the reward, rather than the reward being a byproduct of a romantic relationship. This element of intention plays a crucial role in distinguishing criminal conduct from other forms of relationships that may involve financial or material support.
Judicial Interpretation of Prostitution
The legal understanding of prostitution has been shaped significantly by case law, particularly the Constitutional Court decision in S v Jordan[3]. In this case, the Court confirmed that prostitution constitutes a criminal offence for both the person providing sexual services and the person paying for them. The internal rift between the majority and minority judgements provides the primary “blurred lines” for sugar relationships.
The majority judgment, delivered by Ngcobo J[4], emphasised the state’s role in regulating “commercialized sex” to uphold broader societal interests, including the protection of human dignity and the prevention of exploitation. The Court rejected arguments that such criminalisation unjustifiably infringes constitutional rights, particularly the right to privacy incorporated in section 14 of the Constitution.[5]
In contrast, the minority judgment, delivered by Sachs J and O’Regan J[6], took a different view, arguing that the criminalisation of consensual adult sexual activity infringes upon the constitutional right to privacy and private sexual autonomy. The minority judgement relied on earlier jurisprudence, including the case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice[7], which recognised the importance of autonomy in intimate relationships. They argued that the states should not interfere in consensual, private sexual intimacy between adults, suggesting that the “harm” in prostitution is often a result of its illegality rather than the actual act itself.
Further constitutional considerations arise in the case of Kylie v CCMA[8], where the Court acknowledged that even individuals engaged in illegal work, such as prostitution, are entitled to constitutional protection, particularly the right to dignity, indicated in section 10 of the Constitution[9], and thus might outweigh the state’s interest in criminalisation. This highlights the tension between criminalisation and the protection of fundamental rights.
Understanding Sugar Relationships
Sugar relationships are commonly defined as arrangements in which an older, financially established individual provides financial or material support to a younger partner in exchange for companionship, intimacy, or emotional connection[10]. What makes it unique from traditional prostitution is that these relationships are often framed as ongoing and emotionally involved rather than purely transactional.
Academic literature suggests that sugar relationships exist within a broader category of “transactional relationships,” where benefits are exchanged within the context of a perceived romantic connection. Scholars such as Mampane[11] and Jewkes[12] have highlighted that these relationships are often influenced by socio-economic factors, including financial need and gender norms.
Importantly, participants in sugar relationships often do not view themselves as engaging in prostitution. The presence of companionship, emotional involvement, and social acceptance distinguishes these relationships from the conventional understanding of sex work. However, the existence of material benefits raises questions about whether they can be legally distinguished from prostitution.
Application: Do Sugar Relationships Meet the Legal Definition of Prostitution?
The key issue is whether sugar relationships satisfy the elements required for prostitution under South African law. On one hand, there are clear similarities. Both involve an exchange where intimacy or sexual interaction may be linked to some form of reward. The broad definition of “reward” under SORMA could potentially encompass the financial or material benefits present in sugar relationships.
However, significant differences also exist. Prostitution is typically characterised by explicit agreements for sexual services in exchange for payment, often occurring on a transactional and short-term basis. In contrast, sugar relationships often involve ongoing interactions, emotional connections, and less explicit arrangements regarding the exchange of benefits.
Furthermore, the requirement of intention (mens rea) is critical. In traditional sex work, the animus (intent) is purely commercial. In many sugar relationships, the exchange of benefits may not be directly conditional upon specific sexual acts. Instead, the relationship may be framed as mutually beneficial companionship, making it more difficult to establish the necessary intention required for criminal liability. This posits that the financial support is a manifestation of the partner’s “duty of support” or “generosity” within a romantic bond.
This distinction creates a legal grey area. While certain sugar relationships may resemble prostitution in substance, others may fall outside the legal definition due to their relational and emotional characteristics.
Critical Analysis
The current legal framework does not adequately address the complexity of modern relationships such as sugar arrangements. The broad definition of prostitution under SORMA creates uncertainty, particularly in cases where the line between transactional and relational interactions is blurred.
One major concern is whether the law reflects contemporary social realities. Sugar relationships are increasingly common and are often shaped by economic inequality and shifting social norms. For many sugar dating is a survival strategy rather than a lifestyle choice. Treating all such relationships as potential criminal conduct may fail to account for their nuanced nature. Criminalising the “blessee” (who is often the economically weaker party) further marginalises young women, as they navigate poverty, high unemployment, and the rising costs of higher education.
Section 9 of the Constitution[13] offers an important framework for questioning whether the policing of sugar relationships is constitutionally sound. Section 9(1) guarantees equality before the law, yet the enforcement of SORMA tends to expose a class-based disparity. Street-level sex work attracts heavy policing, whereas sugar arrangements, which may satisfy the very same legal elements of “sex for reward”, are largely left undisturbed, presumably because of their private and financially privileged character. This inconsistency gives rise to indirect discrimination on the basis of socio-economic status and carries serious implications for human dignity. Moreover, where the State targets those who engage in transactional sex out of economic necessity while turning a blind eye to wealthier “blesser” dynamics, it may amount to unfair discrimination under section 9(3) prohibition on unfair discrimination on the grounds of gender and sex. Unless SORMA is applied uniformly across all social classes, the criminalisation of compensated intimacy threatens to undermine the constitutional promise of substantive equality, placing a disproportionate burden on the economically vulnerable while leaving the affluent effectively untouched.
At the same time, there are legitimate concerns regarding exploitation and gender inequality. Studies have shown that transactional relationships may reinforce harmful gender norms and contribute to gender-based violence. This has led some policymakers, including the South African Law Reform Commission[14], to support the continued criminalisation of prostitution as a means of addressing broader social harms.
However, criminalisation also raises constitutional concerns, particularly regarding dignity and autonomy. As recognised in cases such as Kylie v CCMA[15], individuals engaged in such relationships retain fundamental rights that must be respected.
The deliberately vague nature of the exchange in sugar relationships makes it very hard for the State to satisfy the actus reus requirement of prostitution. Section 11 of SORMA[16] demands that the prosecution demonstrate a clear causal link between the sexual service rendered and the reward received. Where money or gifts are given under the guise of broad financial support within an ongoing relationship, that direct connection — essential for a criminal conviction — breaks down. As a result, sugar relationships tend to operate as a kind of legal loophole: though their underlying reality closely resembles prostitution, the way in which the arrangement is structured shields it from meaningful legal challenge.
The challenge, therefore, lies in balancing the need to prevent exploitation with the need to respect individual autonomy. The current legal framework does not clearly distinguish between exploitative conduct and consensual relationships involving financial support, resulting in uncertainty and inconsistent application.
Conclusion
Sugar relationships occupy a complex and contested space within South African law. While they share certain characteristics with prostitution, particularly the exchange of intimacy for material benefit, they also differ in significant ways, including the presence of emotional connection and social acceptance.
The analysis in this article demonstrates that sugar relationships do not neatly fit within the legal definition of prostitution under SORMA. The requirement of intention, combined with the relational nature of these arrangements, creates a distinction that cannot be ignored.
However, the lack of clear legal guidance results in a grey area that may lead to uncertainty and inconsistent enforcement. This suggests a need for greater clarity in the law, whether through judicial interpretation or legislative reform. Ultimately, the question is not simply whether sugar relationships constitute prostitution, but whether the current legal framework is equipped to address evolving forms of intimacy and exchange in modern society. Without such adaptation, the law risks failing to reflect the realities it seeks to regulate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
- Cases
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (2) SACR 1 (CC)
S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002 (2) SACR 499 (CC)
Kylie v CCMA and Others 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC)
- Legislation
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007
- Secondary Sources (Journal Articles & Reports)
Bhamjee S, Strode A and Goosen S, ‘Lifestyle choice or sex work? The criminality or otherwise of blesser-blessee relationships within the context of the 2021 amendments to the Sexual Offences and Related Matters Act, and the implications for healthcare providers and researchers’ (2025) 18(3) South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 121
Jewkes R, Morrell R, Sikweyiya Y, Dunkle K and Penn-Kekana L, ‘Transactional relationships and sex with a woman in prostitution: prevalence and patterns in a representative sample of South African men’ (2012) BMC Public Health
Mampane JN, ‘Exploring the “Blesser and Blessee” Phenomenon: Young Women, Transactional Sex, and HIV in Rural South Africa’ (2018) SAGE Open South African Law Reform Commission, Sexual Offences: Adult Prostitution (Project 107 Report, 2015)
[1] Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (SORMA).
[2] Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 s 11.
[3] S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002 (2) SACR 499 (CC).
[4] Jordan (n 3) para 74 (Ngcobo J).
[5] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 14.
[6] Jordan (n 3) para 110 (O’Regan and Sachs JJ).
[7] National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (2) SACR 1 (CC).
[8] Kylie v CCMA and Others 2010 (4) SA 383 (LAC).
[9] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 10.
[10] S Bhamjee, A Strode and S Goosen, ‘Lifestyle choice or sex work? The criminality or otherwise of blesser-blessee relationships…’ (2025) 18(3) SAJBL 121.
[11] JN Mampane, ‘Exploring the “Blesser and Blessee” Phenomenon…’ (2018) SAGE Open.
[12] R Jewkes et al, ‘Transactional relationships and sex with a woman in prostitution…’ (2012) BMC Public Health.
[13] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9.
[14] South African Law Reform Commission, Sexual Offences: Adult Prostitution (Project 107, 2015).
[15] Kylie (n 8).
[16] SORMA (n 1) s 11.
