The Security Council Veto: Preserving Peace or Perpetuating Paralysis in International Law?

Introduction

In an international system established to prevent future wars, the authority of five states to block collective action remains one of the most contested features of modern international law. The United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”), entrusted with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” possesses extensive powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including the ability to impose binding measures on member states.¹ Yet the veto power granted to the Council’s five permanent members has repeatedly prevented unified responses to serious international crises, raising concerns about the legitimacy of the collective security system.²

The veto was conceived as a political compromise to secure the participation of the major powers after the Second World War. By allowing the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China to prevent decisions contrary to their fundamental interests, the Charter sought to avoid direct confrontation among powerful states.³ Contemporary practice, however, demonstrates growing tension between preserving great-power stability and the international community’s obligation to respond to threats to peace, humanitarian crises, and violations of international law.⁴

This article argues that although the Security Council veto remains legally valid under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, its unrestricted exercise has contributed to institutional paralysis and weakened the legitimacy of collective security mechanisms. Rather than advocating complete abolition, it proposes that meaningful reform through limitations on veto use in exceptional circumstances is necessary to reconcile state sovereignty with the objectives of the Charter.

In the early hours of 25 February 2022, as Russian forces advanced into Ukraine, the Security Council confronted the very crisis it was created to prevent: a permanent member directly involved in an armed conflict while retaining the power to block any substantive Council response. A draft resolution condemning Russia’s aggression failed after Russia exercised its veto under Article 27(3), illustrating a recurring dilemma: the institution designed to preserve peace can itself be constrained by the privileges granted to those entrusted with protecting it.⁵

Similar deadlocks have recurred throughout the Syrian conflict and the war in Gaza, where numerous draft resolutions concerning humanitarian access, accountability, and ceasefires failed due to vetoes or threatened vetoes.⁶ These episodes raise a fundamental question: has the Security Council veto remained a necessary safeguard against great-power confrontation, or has it evolved into an obstacle preventing the international community from fulfilling its collective security obligations?

Accordingly, this article addresses the following research question: To what extent does the unrestricted exercise of the Security Council veto under Article 27(3) of the United Nations Charter undermine the Council’s ability to fulfil its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and is reform both legally justifiable and institutionally necessary?

It proceeds in four parts, examining the legal framework governing the veto, the limited judicial treatment of the Council’s authority, the veto’s contribution to institutional paralysis through the case studies of Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza, and, finally, existing proposals for reform.

I. Legal Framework: The Constitutional Role of the Security Council Veto

The United Nations Charter establishes the Security Council as the principal organ entrusted with maintaining international peace and security. Unlike the General Assembly, whose resolutions are largely recommendatory, the Council exercises decision-making powers capable of creating binding legal obligations for all Member States.⁷ Article 24(1) provides that Member States confer upon the Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and recognize that the Council acts on their behalf in discharging it.⁸ This is reinforced by Article 25, under which all Member States undertake to “accept and carry out” Council decisions.⁹

The scope of this authority is most clearly articulated in Chapter VII. Before coercive measures may be adopted, Article 39 requires the Council to determine the existence of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”¹⁰ Once such a finding is made, the Council may impose non-military measures under Article 41 or authorize military action under Article 42.¹¹ Because Council decisions may require states to alter domestic legislation or participate in enforcement measures, the ability of a single permanent member to block such measures through the veto has profound implications for international law itself.¹²

The legal foundation of the veto lies in Article 27, which distinguishes procedural matters, requiring nine affirmative votes, from substantive matters, which additionally require the concurring votes of the five permanent members.¹³ In practice, the negative vote of any one permanent member prevents adoption of a substantive resolution. Notably, the Charter does not use the word “veto”; the term emerged through interpretation of the phrase “concurring votes of the permanent members.”¹⁴

The inclusion of this power was a matter of political necessity rather than legal theory alone. The League of Nations had failed in part because it lacked the sustained participation of the world’s major military powers.¹⁵ At the San Francisco Conference, the sponsoring governments made clear that they would not join an organization capable of authorizing measures against their fundamental interests.¹⁶ As US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius observed, the veto represented “the price of unanimity among the great powers.”¹⁷ It was therefore conceived not as an unconditional privilege, but as a constitutional safeguard intended to preserve consensus among the major powers and thereby prevent the collapse of the collective security system itself, even as it created an enduring tension with the Council’s mandate under Articles 24 and 39.¹⁸

II. Judicial Treatment and Institutional Authority

International courts have had remarkably few opportunities to scrutinize the Security Council’s powers directly, since the Charter establishes no general mechanism through which the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) may review the legality of Council resolutions.

In Certain Expenses of the United Nations, the ICJ adopted a functional approach to institutional authority, reasoning that the powers of UN organs should not be interpreted narrowly where doing so would frustrate the Organization’s purposes, and observing that “each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.”¹⁹ The Advisory Opinion illustrates that while the Council does not operate entirely without legal constraints, the Charter allocates it considerable institutional discretion, with only limited scope for judicial supervision.²⁰

The Lockerbie proceedings reinforced this position. Following Security Council sanctions against Libya after the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103, Libya argued before the ICJ that its obligations under the Montreal Convention conflicted with the sanctions regime.²¹ Although the Court disposed of the cases on preliminary objections, the proceedings confirmed that, under Article 103, Charter obligations prevail over conflicting treaty obligations, while the Court declined to undertake any comprehensive review of the substantive legality of the Council’s sanctions.²² This judicial restraint was echoed in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court observed that it possesses no power of judicial review or appeal over decisions of UN organs.²³

Where meaningful judicial review is absent, the exercise of veto power depends largely on the political restraint of the permanent members themselves. This constitutional imbalance, between extensive legal authority and limited institutional accountability, provides the strongest normative justification for reconsidering the contemporary operation of the veto system.

III. The Veto as a Mechanism of Institutional Paralysis

Repeated reliance on Article 27(3) has prevented the Security Council from responding effectively to some of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

1. The Syria Conflict

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, deep divisions among the permanent members have repeatedly blocked decisive Council measures. Successive draft resolutions imposing targeted sanctions, establishing accountability mechanisms, or referring the situation to the International Criminal Court were vetoed, despite mounting evidence of widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including the use of chemical weapons and enforced disappearances.²⁴ While Article 2(7) safeguards state sovereignty, Articles 24 and 39 simultaneously impose upon the Council the primary responsibility for maintaining peace through effective collective measures; in Syria, these competing principles proved increasingly irreconcilable.²⁵

2. The Ukraine Conflict

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed one of the Council’s most significant constitutional weaknesses: as both a permanent member and a party to the conflict, Russia vetoed a draft resolution condemning its own actions, allowing the state accused of breaching international peace to block enforcement action against itself.²⁶ The episode demonstrates that the veto may operate not as a safeguard of international peace, but as a mechanism through which powerful states avoid collective accountability.

3. The Gaza Conflict

Despite widespread calls for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire, the Council repeatedly failed to adopt a unified response to the conflict in Gaza because of divisions among its permanent members, with several draft resolutions calling for a ceasefire or stronger humanitarian protections vetoed.²⁷ Prolonged inaction during a humanitarian crisis risks creating the perception that geopolitical interests outweigh the Charter’s commitment to protecting civilian populations, correspondingly diminishing confidence in the Council’s legitimacy.

Arguments Supporting the Continued Use of the Veto

The veto was not introduced as an arbitrary privilege but as a deliberate compromise to secure the participation of the world’s most powerful states in the collective security system, and these justifications remain relevant, if not beyond criticism.

First, the veto reduces the risk of direct confrontation among major powers: without it, powerful states might disregard Council decisions altogether, undermining the Organization’s authority and increasing the likelihood of unilateral action.²⁸ This rationale remains compelling, but preserving great-power consensus cannot become an end in itself — where the veto repeatedly prevents the Council from responding to aggression or mass atrocities, it impedes rather than promotes collective security.²⁹

Second, the veto reflects the unequal distribution of power within an international system that lacks a central sovereign authority.³⁰ Yet recognizing this political reality does not require accepting unlimited discretion. Reform proposals such as the French–Mexican initiative on voluntary veto restraint and the ACT Code of Conduct demonstrate that it is possible to preserve the constitutional role of the veto while encouraging its more responsible exercise in exceptional circumstances.³¹

The Legitimacy Crisis of Unlimited Veto Power

The contemporary legitimacy crisis does not arise because the veto is unlawful. Article 27(3) expressly authorizes it.³² Rather, it lies in the growing disconnect between the Charter’s legal framework and the Council’s practical operation: while Article 1 identifies the maintenance of international peace and security as the UN’s foremost purpose, repeated vetoes have frequently prevented the Council from responding effectively to armed conflict, mass atrocities, and humanitarian emergencies.³³

This produces a widening gap between legality and legitimacy. The Council possesses unparalleled authority to adopt binding decisions under Chapter VII, yet there is no comparable mechanism to ensure political accountability when that authority is rendered ineffective through repeated vetoes. The challenge, therefore, is not whether the veto should exist, but whether its unrestricted exercise remains compatible with the purposes and principles upon which the United Nations was founded.³⁴

IV. Comparative Perspectives and Reform Options

Several proposals aim to improve the Council’s effectiveness without dismantling the Charter framework, sharing the common objective of limiting veto use where humanitarian concerns demand collective action.

The French–Mexican initiative calls on permanent members to voluntarily refrain from exercising the veto in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, or other mass atrocity crimes.³⁵ Because it relies on political commitment rather than Charter amendment, it avoids the demanding ratification procedure under Article 108, but its effectiveness ultimately depends on the willingness of the permanent members to comply.

The ACT Code of Conduct similarly encourages Council members, particularly the permanent members, to support timely action in mass-atrocity situations and to justify their voting decisions publicly, though compliance remains entirely voluntary.³⁶

General Assembly Resolution 76/262 (2022) establishes a standing mandate for the Assembly to convene automatically whenever a permanent member casts a veto, requiring public justification before the wider UN membership.³⁷ It does not limit the veto itself, and, as a General Assembly resolution, remains recommendatory rather than binding.

The most comprehensive reform would require Charter amendment under Article 108, which requires ratification by two-thirds of Member States, including all five permanent members, a requirement that makes fundamental reform exceptionally difficult, since each permanent member can effectively block amendments affecting its own privileges.³⁸ In practical terms, complete abolition of the veto remains politically improbable; more realistic reform is likely to focus on encouraging restraint, strengthening transparency, and increasing institutional accountability.

Conclusion

The Security Council veto emerged from the political realities of 1945 as a constitutional compromise designed to secure the participation of the major powers in a system of collective security. Nearly eight decades later, that compromise remains legally valid under Article 27(3). Yet contemporary practice demonstrates that its unrestricted exercise has increasingly contributed to institutional paralysis, preventing the Council from responding effectively to armed conflict, mass atrocities, and humanitarian emergencies. As the case studies of Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza illustrate, repeated deadlock has weakened confidence in the Council’s ability to fulfil its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.

This article has argued that the central challenge is not the existence of the veto itself, but the absence of meaningful limits on its exercise. A mechanism intended to preserve great-power cooperation should not become a means through which accountability is indefinitely postponed. Accordingly, reform efforts should focus on achievable measures rather than wholesale institutional redesign, including but not limited to greater support for voluntary veto restraint in situations involving genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, enhanced transparency following the exercise of the veto, and continued dialogue on accountability mechanisms consistent with the Charter. Preserving the veto while promoting its more responsible use represents the most practical path towards ensuring that the Security Council remains faithful to the purposes and principles upon which the United Nations was founded.

Endnote(S):

1. Charter of the United Nations art 24(1), 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
2. United Nations Security Council, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Voting and the Veto (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>.
3. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, vol 11 (United Nations Information Organizations 1945) 318–319.
4. Nico Krisch, ‘The Security Council and the Great Powers’ in Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M Malone and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (eds), The UN Security Council in the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2016) 133–154.
5. UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation Casts Veto’ (25 February 2022) UN Doc SC/14808.
6. UN Security Council, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: The Maintenance of International Peace and Security – Syrian Arab Republic (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>; UN Security Council, ‘Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution Calling for Immediate Humanitarian Ceasefire in Gaza, as United States Casts Veto’ (8 December 2023) UN Doc SC/15519.
7. Charter of the United Nations arts 24–25.
8. Charter of the United Nations art 24(1).
9. Charter of the United Nations art 25.
10. Charter of the United Nations art 39.
11. Charter of the United Nations arts 41–42.
12. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 163–68.
13. Charter of the United Nations art 27(2)–(3).
14. Goodrich, Hambro and Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents.
15. Ruth B Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940–1945 (Brookings Institution 1958) 35–52.
16. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Documents… San Francisco 1945 vol 11, 710–714.
17. Edward R Stettinius Jr, The United Nations and the United States (Brookings Institution 1950) 76–79.
18. Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council.
19. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 167–68.
20. Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946–1967: Documents and Commentary (Oxford University Press 1969) 86–94.
21. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 9; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America) (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 115.
22. Charter of the United Nations art 103; Charter of the United Nations arts 24 and 39.
23. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 45.
24. UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2014/348 (22 May 2014) (proposed referral of the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic to the International Criminal Court), vetoed by the Russian Federation and China; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc A/HRC/52/69 (7 February 2023) paras 15–45.
25. Charter of the United Nations arts 1(1), 2(7), 24(1), 39 (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
26. UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2022/155 (25 February 2022) (condemning the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine), vetoed by the Russian Federation.
27. UN Security Council, S/PV.9498 (8 December 2023); UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2023/970 (8 December 2023), vetoed by the United States; see also UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2024/835 (20 November 2024), vetoed by the United States.
28. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Documents… San Francisco 1945 vol XI, 710–714; Charter of the United Nations art 27.
29. Charter of the United Nations arts 1(1), 24(1).
30. Charter of the United Nations art 27; Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2012) vol I, commentary on art 27.
31. France and Mexico, Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (2015); Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council Action against Genocide, Crimes against Humanity or War Crimes (2015).
32. Charter of the United Nations art 27(3) (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
33. Charter of the United Nations art 1(1); art 24(1).
34. Charter of the United Nations arts 1(1), 24(1), 27(3); see also UN General Assembly, Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council, GA Res 76/262 (26 April 2022).
35. France and Mexico, Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (2015).
36. Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group, Code of Conduct regarding Security Council Action against Genocide, Crimes against Humanity or War Crimes (2015).
37. UN General Assembly, Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council, GA Res 76/262 (26 April 2022).
38. Charter of the United Nations art 108 (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.

Bibliography

Table of Cases

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16

Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 9

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UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2023/970 (8 December 2023)

UN Security Council, Draft Resolution S/2024/835 (20 November 2024)

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UN Security Council, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Voting and the Veto (United Nations) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>

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