Authored By: Ashna Dhaliwal
University of Greenwich
Maritime piracy has long been a destabilising force in international trade, maritime security, and the protection of seafarers. Although the phenomenon has ancient roots, its modern manifestations pose acute challenges to global commerce and international law. Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas1 against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.”2 This definition captures the essence of piracy as a crime of violence for private gain, while situating it firmly within the broader architecture of international law3.
Despite centuries of legal codification and military suppression, piracy persists as a contemporary threat, particularly in strategically vital regions such as the Gulf of Aden, the Somali littoral4, and the Gulf of Guinea5. Its effects are multidimensional6: beyond the immediate dangers of hostage-taking and violence, piracy undermines global supply chains, inflates insurance premiums, and compels states and private actors7 alike to invest heavily in naval patrols and security infrastructure8. For the United Kingdom, an island nation with a distinguished maritime heritage, one of the world’s largest shipping industries, and a vested interest in the free flow of international trade, the regulation of piracy is both an international obligation and a question of national economic security9.
The UK’s legal framework for addressing piracy is deeply embedded in international law10, most prominently through UNCLOS11, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention 1988), and a series of UN Security Council Resolutions12. At the domestic level, legislation such as the Merchant Shipping Act 199513, the Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 199714, and the Terrorism Act 200015 provides statutory mechanisms for prosecuting piracy and related offences. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Jurisdictional complexities often frustrate enforcement; the increasing reliance on private armed security personnel aboard UK flagged vessels16 raises ongoing legal questions around accountability17, proportionality in the use of force, and oversight, despite existing regulations and licensing schemes18; and the evolution of maritime crime often intertwined with terrorism, trafficking, and organised criminal networks, continues to blur the boundaries of traditional piracy19.
This article argues that while the UK’s legal response to piracy rests on robust international and domestic frameworks, it is tested by three interrelated challenges: enforcement difficulties arising from jurisdictional fragmentation, legal ambiguities concerning private maritime security companies20, and the shifting character of modern piracy as a hybridised security threat21. The discussion proceeds in four parts: first, by examining the international legal regime governing piracy;
second, by analysing the UK’s domestic legislative and policy responses; third, by evaluating enforcement challenges and the role of private armed guards22; and finally, by assessing whether the UK’s legal architecture is adequate to confront the complexities of twenty-first-century maritime piracy.
International law has long recognised piracy as a crime hostis humani generis, an offence against all mankind, reflecting its threat to the collective security of states and the freedom of the seas. The modern legal regime is anchored primarily in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)23, supplemented by the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), as well as a range of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. These instruments provide a coherent, though not flawless, framework for the suppression of piracy and maritime violence.
UNCLOS Articles 100–107 and 11024 codify the international law of piracy. Article 100 imposes on all states a duty to “co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” Article 101 defines piracy, while Articles 102–107 elaborate on its commission by state actors, the scope of liability, and the authority to seize pirate ships. Article 105 is particularly significant, granting states universal jurisdiction: any state may seize a pirate vessel and prosecute the offenders, regardless of nationality or flag25. This universal jurisdiction is exceptional in international law, usually reserved for egregious crimes such as genocide or slavery, and underscores the gravity of piracy.
Yet UNCLOS26 has notable limitations. Its definition confines piracy to acts committed for “private ends” and only on the “high seas.”27 This excludes politically motivated maritime violence, such as terrorist attacks, and attacks occurring within a state’s territorial waters, where most contemporary piracy takes place28. Moreover, while UNCLOS29 authorises states to prosecute pirates, it imposes no obligation to do so, leading to a “prosecution gap” where many captured pirates are released without trial30.
The SUA Convention of 198831 was negotiated partly in response to these deficiencies. Prompted by the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking, SUA32 criminalises a broad range of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, including acts of violence not motivated by private ends, and it extends to crimes occurring in territorial waters33, though its scope is limited to offences that endanger the safe navigation of ships, rather than ordinary armed robbery34 or petty theft. SUA35 thereby complements UNCLOS36 by capturing terrorist acts at sea and extending jurisdictional reach.
The SUA Convention37 also obliges states to establish domestic jurisdiction over offenders, based on principles of territoriality, nationality, and flag state jurisdiction38. The aut dedere aut judicare obligation requires states either to prosecute offenders found within their territory or to extradite them to a state with jurisdiction. This framework reduces the likelihood of impunity and has become central to modern maritime counter-terrorism law.
Nevertheless, SUA39 too has weaknesses. It depends on state implementation into domestic law, and many states lack the capacity or political will to prosecute complex transnational crimes. Furthermore, SUA’s40 scope remains tied to the safety of navigation and does not comprehensively address the wider criminal networks, trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, that often underpin modern piracy.
The UN Security Council41 has played an active role, particularly in relation to Somali piracy42. Beginning with Resolution 1816 (2008), the Council authorised states cooperating with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial43 waters to repress piracy, an extraordinary derogation from the principle of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction44. Subsequent resolutions (e.g., 1846, 1851, 1918) expanded these authorisations, including permitting operations on Somali soil against pirate bases45.
These resolutions demonstrate the Council’s ability to adapt international law to urgent security crises46, legitimising naval coalitions such as EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield47. However, their exceptional nature also underscores the fragility of the system: ad hoc authorisations are not a substitute for long-term institutional capacity within coastal states.
Taken together, UNCLOS48, SUA49, and Security Council practice provide a reasonably comprehensive framework for combating piracy50. UNCLOS51 enshrines universal jurisdiction; SUA52 extends coverage to terrorism and territorial waters; and Security Council resolutions offer flexibility in acute crises. Yet the regime is fragmented. UNCLOS’s narrow definition remains outdated53, SUA’s implementation is uneven54, and Security Council measures are temporary and geographically limited. The net result is a patchwork system reliant on the political will of states, particularly naval powers.
Thus, while international law establishes the possibility of robust anti-piracy enforcement55, its effectiveness depends less on normative architecture than on practical enforcement, political commitment, and the integration of international norms into domestic legal systems56. The UK’s approach exemplifies these tensions, as its domestic framework draws heavily on these international instruments but faces persistent obstacles in their application.
The United Kingdom’s response to maritime piracy is shaped by its dual obligations: as a maritime trading nation with substantial interests in global shipping, and as a party to international instruments such as UNCLOS57 and the SUA Convention58. Domestically, piracy is criminalised through a combination of statutory provisions and common law principles, with enforcement powers distributed across multiple agencies, including the Royal Navy, the Crown Prosecution Service, and the courts. While the UK has established a robust legal architecture, its practical application is constrained by evidentiary, jurisdictional, and policy considerations.
The Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 199759 is the key implementing legislation for the SUA Convention60, creating offences related to unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, including violence against ships and destruction of navigational facilities, with extraterritorial reach that reflects the UK’s obligations to prosecute or extradite offenders. By contrast, the Merchant Shipping Act 199561 preserves jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium, maintaining continuity with the historic law of piracy under UNCLOS62.
While piracy was historically a common law offence, its modern application is now firmly rooted in statutory provisions, with courts still drawing on the jure gentium tradition in interpretation, which historically fell within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty courts and was punishable by death until the Piracy Act 1837 abolished the death penalty63.
Beyond these statutes, the Terrorism Act 200064 provides a separate framework for prosecuting politically motivated maritime violence. While distinct from piracy law, it enables the UK to exercise jurisdiction over maritime terrorism even where the ‘private ends’ limitation in UNCLOS would otherwise exclude such acts. Sections 1 and 59 provide jurisdiction over terrorist activities at sea, enabling prosecution even where acts fall outside the “private ends” limitation of UNCLOS65. The overlap between piracy and terrorism thus creates a dual pathway for prosecuting maritime violence, though the distinction is not always straightforward.
UK courts exercise jurisdiction over piracy on the basis of universal jurisdiction, reflecting customary international law66 and codified in section 2 of the 1995 Act67. This empowers the UK to prosecute offences committed on the high seas regardless of the nationality of the perpetrators or victims. In practice, however, the UK has been reluctant to assert this jurisdiction aggressively. The costs of prosecution, difficulties in securing evidence, and the potential burden on the prison system have all acted as deterrents.
Instead, the UK has frequently transferred captured pirates to regional states for prosecution, particularly Kenya and the Seychelles, under formal bilateral transfer agreements established in the late 2000s. While this relieves the UK of prosecutorial burdens, it raises questions of due process and human rights, especially where local judicial systems face capacity constraints. The UK’s selective use of jurisdiction illustrates the gap between legal authority and political will.
There have been relatively few prosecutions of piracy in the UK in recent decades, reflecting the government’s policy of regional prosecution. One significant case is R v. Mohammed & Others (2012)68, where Somali nationals were prosecuted in the UK following the attempted hijacking of the MV Montecristo69. The court affirmed that piracy jure gentium remains a prosecutable offence under domestic law, consistent with the UK’s obligations under UNCLOS70. The case demonstrated the courts’ willingness to apply international definitions within the domestic framework but also highlighted the logistical challenges of bringing foreign defendants, evidence, and witnesses into UK proceedings.
The UK’s response to piracy extends beyond statutes and case law. The Royal Navy has played a central role in international counter-piracy operations, particularly through EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. Domestically, the Department for Transport issues guidance for shipowners on best management practices, including the employment of private armed guards71, and requires compliance with international frameworks such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) and relevant IMO guidelines72. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) coordinate diplomatic initiatives, while the Crown Prosecution Service evaluates prosecutorial viability in individual cases.
This multi-agency framework demonstrates the UK’s commitment to a whole-of-government approach. However, it also diffuses responsibility, sometimes resulting in a cautious or fragmented response. In particular, the preference for transferring suspects abroad reflects a pragmatic balancing of resources but arguably undermines the UK’s role as a leader in enforcing international maritime law.
The UK’s domestic framework is legally comprehensive: piracy is criminalised under multiple statutes, universal jurisdiction is affirmed, and institutional capacity exists for enforcement. Yet the record of prosecutions is sparse, suggesting that political and practical considerations often override legal authority. The reliance on regional prosecutions may be defensible as a matter of efficiency, but it risks weakening the deterrent effect of UK law and diminishing accountability for maritime violence. Moreover, the coexistence of piracy and terrorism statutes raises potential ambiguities in prosecutorial strategy, especially as modern piracy increasingly overlaps with transnational organised crime and terrorism.
Ultimately, the UK has the legal tools necessary to prosecute piracy robustly, but its cautious enforcement posture reveals the disjunction between legal capacity and political will. This tension becomes especially pronounced when considering the practical challenges of enforcement, which form the focus of the next section.
Piracy remains one of the oldest yet most persistent challenges to maritime order, threatening not only the safety of seafarers but also the stability of global trade and security. The international legal framework, grounded in UNCLOS73, the SUA Convention74, and UN Security Council75 practice, provides a robust but fragmented architecture. While universal jurisdiction under UNCLOS offers unparalleled scope for prosecution, the narrowness of its definition and the lack of mandatory obligations dilute its impact76. The SUA Convention77 expands coverage to politically motivated acts and territorial waters, yet its effectiveness depends heavily on domestic implementation. Security Council authorisations, meanwhile, demonstrate international adaptability but remain exceptional and geographically confined.
Within this international regime, the United Kingdom has constructed a comprehensive domestic legal framework. Statutory provisions under the Merchant Shipping Acts78, the Terrorism Act 200079, and the implementation of SUA80 collectively criminalise piracy and related offences with extraterritorial reach. In theory, this grants UK courts wide latitude to prosecute offenders. In practice, however, prosecutions have been rare, with the UK preferring to rely on regional partners such as Kenya and the Seychelles. This cautious enforcement posture reflects concerns over evidentiary burdens, resource allocation, and political sensitivities.
Three interrelated challenges continue to test both the international and UK frameworks81. First, jurisdictional complexities, particularly the divide between high seas piracy and territorial maritime crime, create legal uncertainty82. Second, the increasing reliance on private maritime security companies raises difficult questions about accountability, proportionality in the use of force, and the privatisation of coercive power83. Third, the evolving character of piracy, now intertwined with terrorism, organised crime, and even cyber threats, stretches traditional legal definitions beyond their intended scope.
The UK’s response to piracy is therefore best understood as a balance between legal sufficiency and practical restraint. Its laws are capable of addressing piracy, but enforcement choices reveal a prioritisation of pragmatism over deterrence. If the UK is to maintain its role as a leader in global maritime security, it must reconcile this gap by clarifying the legal position of private security actors, investing in prosecutorial capacity, and adapting its domestic framework to the hybridised threats of twenty-first-century piracy.
Ultimately, piracy persists not because of legal vacuum, but because of uneven enforcement and the inability of existing frameworks to evolve as quickly as criminal enterprises at sea. For the UK, the challenge lies not in building new laws, but in exercising its existing powers with greater consistency and foresight, ensuring that international maritime security is preserved for the next generation.
Bibliography:
Table of Cases
R v Mohammad Ghani & Others Woolwich Crown Court
Table of Legislation
UK Statutes
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (UK)
Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997 (UK)
Terrorism Act 2000 (UK)
International Treaties and Conventions
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 221
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 arts 100–107, 110
UN Security Council Resolutions and International Instruments
SC Res 1816 (2 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1816
SC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846
SC Res 1851 (16 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1851
SC Res 1918 (27 April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918
Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (10 November 2008) OJ L301/33
IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (2014)
International Maritime Organization, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) https://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/pages/sua-treaties.aspx accessed 12 September 2025
NATO, ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ (2009 2016)
– https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm
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1 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 13 2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
3 Anders Henriksen, International Law (4th edn, OUP 2023) ch 8
4 Fu X, Ng AKY and Lau Y-Y, ‘The impacts of maritime piracy on global economic development: the case of Somalia’ (2010) 37(7) Maritime Policy & Management 677
5 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Piracy off the coast of Somalia (HC 2009–10, 113)
6 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2021 (ICC International Maritime Bureau 2022).
7 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 11 8 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014
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17 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014
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19 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 11
20 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014
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22 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014
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24 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
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26 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
27 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 13
28 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 11
29 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
30 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 11
31 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
32 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
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34 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2021 (ICC International Maritime Bureau 2022).
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36 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
37 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
38 International Maritime Organization, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (IMO, adopted 10 March 1988; entry into force 1 March 1992; 2005 Protocols adopted 14 October 2005, entry into force 28 July 2010) https://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/pages/sua treaties.aspx
39 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
40 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
41 SC Res 1816, UN SCOR, 63rd Sess, 5916th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008).
42 Fu X, Ng AKY and Lau Y-Y, ‘The impacts of maritime piracy on global economic development: the case of Somalia’ (2010) 37(7) Maritime Policy & Management 677
43 Fu X, Ng AKY and Lau Y-Y, ‘The impacts of maritime piracy on global economic development: the case of Somalia’ (2010) 37(7) Maritime Policy & Management 677
44 SC Res 1816 (2 June 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1816.
45 SC Res 1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846; SC Res 1851 (16 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1851; SC Res 1918 (27 April 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1918.
46 Anders Henriksen, International Law (4th edn, OUP 2023) ch 8
47 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (10 November 2008) OJ L301/33; NATO, ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ (2009–2016) https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm
48 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
49 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
50 International Maritime Organization, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (IMO, adopted 10 March 1988; entry into force 1 March 1992; 2005 Protocols adopted 14 October 2005, entry into force 28 July 2010) https://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/pages/sua treaties.aspx
51 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
52 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
53 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
54 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
55 Anders Henriksen, International Law (4th edn, OUP 2023) ch 8
56 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Piracy off the coast of Somalia (HC 2009–10, 113)
57 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
58 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
59 Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997
60 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
61 Merchant Shipping Act 1995
62 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
63 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 11 64 Terrorism Act 2000
65 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
66 Anders Henriksen, International Law (4th edn, OUP 2023) ch 8
67 Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (CUP 2009) ch 7
68 R v Mohammad Ghani & Others (2012)
69 Fu X, Ng AKY and Lau Y-Y, ‘The impacts of maritime piracy on global economic development: the case of Somalia’ (2010) 37(7) Maritime Policy & Management 677
70 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
71 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014 72 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014
73 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
74 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
75 SC Res 1816, UN SCOR, 63rd Sess, 5916th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008).
76 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 39564 (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 100–107, 110.
77 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
78 Merchant Shipping Act 1995
79 Terrorism Act 2000
80 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1678
81 Anders Henriksen, International Law (4th edn, OUP 2023) ch 8
82 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) ch 13 83 IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1405 – Interim Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies, 2014
