POLICE POWERS OF STOP, SEARCH, AND ARREST IN NIGERIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE. 

ABSTRACT 

This article critically examines the constitutional and human rights dimensions of police powers of stop, search, and arrest in Nigeria. Drawing on the 1999 Constitution, the Police Act 2020, and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, it analyses the scope of police authority in light of fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, privacy, and fair hearing. The work highlights recurring abuses, including arbitrary detention, unlawful searches, and excessive force, particularly in the aftermath of the EndSARS protests, and interrogates the tension between state security imperatives and individual freedoms. Comparative insights from other Commonwealth jurisdictions—such as the United Kingdom, South Africa, Kenya, and India—are incorporated to contextualise Nigeria’s framework within broader global human rights standards. The article concludes by recommending reforms aimed at balancing effective policing with the protection of civil liberties, including stronger judicial oversight, institutional accountability, and enhanced compliance with international human rights obligations. 

INTRODUCTION 

Police officers in Nigeria wield extensive powers to stop, search, arrest and detain individuals, powers which are rooted in both constitutional and statutory law. The Police Act 2020, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015 and the 1999 Constitution (as amended) collectively regulate these powers. On the one hand, these powers are justified as necessary tools to maintain public order and security (e.g. to prevent crime, pursue suspects and apprehend offenders). On the other hand, their exercise raises serious human rights concerns – particularly violations of privacy, liberty and dignity. High-profile abuses of police powers (most dramatically epitomized by the 2020 #EndSARS protests against police brutality) have underscored the urgent need to align Nigeria’s law enforcement practices with human rights standards. This article will analyze the legal framework governing stop-and-search and arrest in Nigeria, assess the balance between security objectives and rights protections, and compare Nigeria’s approach with that of other Commonwealth jurisdictions (UK, South Africa, Kenya, India). It will draw on Nigerian case law and recent reforms (notably post-EndSARS measures) to propose concrete recommendations for reforming police powers and oversight. 

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 

“Stop and search” refers to police powers to detain or pat-down a person, or inspect their property, on suspicion of wrongdoing. “Arrest” involves depriving a person of liberty to bring them before a court. Both concepts implicate fundamental rights: privacy and personal liberty among others. Under Section 37 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, “the privacy of citizens, their homes [and] correspondence…is hereby guaranteed and protected”. Section 35(1) provides that no one can be deprived of personal liberty except on specified grounds (e.g. reasonable suspicion of an offence, execution of court orders) and “in accordance with a procedure permitted by law”. In effect, any police stop, search or arrest must fit within the constitutionally permitted exceptions or be expressly authorized by statute. Nigerian courts have emphasized this point: for example, in Chika Enyinnaya v. State (2014), the Court of Appeal held that “the invasion of [a home] is unlawful as it violates [the suspect’s] fundamental human right to the privacy of his person and his home guaranteed by Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution”. Likewise, in Ojoma v. State (2014) the Court held that any search “that is not permitted by law is unconstitutional”. 

Nigeria’s legal regime for policing is thus dual: the Constitution sets baseline rights and permissible exceptions (subject to general limitations under Section 45), while statutes define the scope of police authority. Prior to 2020, the primary law was the Police Act (Cap. P19 LFN 2004) and the Criminal Procedure Act. The new Police Act 2020 now codifies police powers comprehensively. The ACJA 2015 (and equivalent state laws) supplements this by regulating arrest procedures, custody and trials to curb abuses. International human rights instruments to which Nigeria is party (e.g. the ICCPR, the African Charter) further endorse norms of legality, necessity and proportionality in policing. This conceptual framework creates an inherent tension: on one side, the public security rationale that empowers police to stop/suppress suspected crime; on the other, the rights-guarantee rationale demanding that any interference be lawful, necessary and proportionate. The analysis below unpacks this tension in the specific context of stop-search and arrest powers.

POLICE POWERS OF STOP AND SEARCH IN NIGERIA 

Legal Basis under the Police Act 2020 and Other Statutes 

Under the Nigeria Police Act 2020 (which came into force in December 2020), officers may search people and premises in specified circumstances. Section 28, for example, empowers a senior officer (Assistant Commissioner or above) to authorize searches of houses or premises for stolen or unlawfully obtained property. Section 29 explicitly gives any officer the power to stop, detain and search a person “whom he reasonably suspects of having in his possession…anything which he has reason to believe to have been stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained”. Notably, the term “reasonable suspicion” mirrors constitutional language: Section 35(1)(c) permits arrest (and thus detention) on reasonable suspicion of crime. In practice then, a Nigerian officer may stop a person in public without a warrant if the officer personally and objectively suspects criminal possession. The Act also provides safeguards: searches must be conducted in a manner minimizing embarrassment, and an officer must identify himself (name, rank, unit) and state the grounds for the search. Section 54 of the Act expressly forbids basing suspicion on arbitrary personal factors like “age, color, dress, hairstyle, previous conviction…or stereotyped images”. 

Notably, the 2020 Act does not require a warrant for stops in public, but does require warrants to enter private premises except in narrowly defined emergencies (e.g. hot pursuit of escaped prisoner, court order). Section 55(1) allows forced entry only when a suspect has fled into a house. The Police Act also mandates that strip-searches be done by an officer of the same sex and “strict regard” paid to dignity. In sum, Nigerian stop-and-search law is structured to parallel common-law models (as in the UK) by requiring reasonable suspicion and identification, and by prohibiting obvious profiling. 

Practice and Cases 

In reality, stop-and-search is routine in Nigeria. Many citizens report being stopped at roadblocks or by patrol officers. The Tribune newspaper observes that “being stopped and searched by the Police is like a norm in Nigeria”. However, despite the formal standards, abuses occur. Prior to the 2020 Act, warrantless searches of homes were widespread; the cases above (Enyinnaya, Ojoma) show the courts invalidating such searches under Section 37 (dignity/privacy) in absence of law. The Police Act’s Section 28 aims to legalize certain home entries (for stolen goods) by senior authorization, but critics note it still permits a wide “reasonable belief” exception with little accountability. 

Comparatively, Nigeria’s stop-and-search regime is less restrictive than in some jurisdictions like the UK or Kenya. In the UK, for instance, Section 1 of PACE 1984 allows search only when an officer has objectively reasonable grounds that a person is carrying prohibited articles. The grounds must be “significantly more than mere inconvenience” and must be recorded. UK law explicitly forbids search on mere appearance or stereotypes. Nigeria’s Police Act echoes the UK in banning profiling, but does not yet impose rigorous documentation and review of stops (such as requiring reports to a supervising officer). Similarly, Kenya’s 2010 Constitution declares in Article 31 that “every person has the right to privacy”, including a categorical right not to have their person or property searched. Kenya’s Police Act (Cap. 84) allows search without warrant only if an officer reasonably believes a delay in obtaining one would defeat the search. South Africa’s Constitution (Section 14) similarly forbids warrantless searches except under strict necessity; its criminal procedure requires either consent or exigent circumstances before search. Nigeria’s law falls between these: a general suspicion-standard for searching persons (similar to UK) but still broad enough to allow surprise stops. 

EndSARS and Reform Context 

Public concern over stop-and-search in Nigeria intensified during the #EndSARS protests (2020) against police brutality. Protesters and human rights groups urged tighter limits on arbitrary searches, especially those by rogue units like SARS. In response, the Police Act 2020 tightened the legal framework but, as Amnesty notes, post-EndSARS reforms have yet to curb abuses. For example, Nigeria now has a “Complaint Response Unit” mandated by the 2020 Act to handle misconduct reports, but it has been criticized as ineffective. There is no routine requirement (as in some countries) to record stop-search incidents in a searchable database, making accountability difficult. 

POLICE POWERS OF ARREST AND DETENTION IN NIGERIA

Constitutional and Statutory Grounds 

Under the 1999 Constitution, every person is “entitled to personal liberty”. Section 35(1) specifies the only lawful grounds for arrest/detention: e.g. execution of court sentences, failure to comply with court orders, or “reasonable suspicion” of criminal offence. Crucially, Section 35(1)(c) permits arrest “for the purpose of bringing [the person] before a court … or upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed a criminal offence” (emphasis added). The proviso to Section 35 caps pretrial detention at the maximum sentence for the offence, underscoring the presumption of innocence. Any deprivation of liberty beyond these grounds is unconstitutional except insofar as saved by the general limitation clause (Section 45). 

Statutorily, Nigeria codifies arrest powers in both Police Act 2020 and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015. Police Act 2020, Section 24, largely continues the old law: an officer may arrest without a warrant any person found committing a crime, or whom he “reasonably suspects” of having committed or being about to commit any felony or misdemeanor. This again invokes “reasonable suspicion” (by law or catch-phrase) as the trigger for arrest, matching the constitutional language. Section 25 allows execution of a warrant even if not physically carried, provided it is shown to the detainee at the station. Section 27 requires that anyone arrested without warrant be taken before a magistrate as soon as practicable (typically 48 hours) or released on bail, reflecting the Constitution’s 48-hour requirement (Section 35(4)). The Police Act also has provisions on private citizens’ power of “citizen’s arrest” (s.39–40), but these are rarely in practice. 

The ACJA 2015 elaborates procedural safeguards. Section 4 mandates that an arresting officer “shall actually touch or confine” the suspect, preventing arrest by announcement alone. Section 5 prohibits use of “unnecessary” force beyond what is needed to prevent escape. Section 6 requires the officer to inform the arrested person of the cause of arrest and of their right to remain silent and counsel (mirroring the Miranda rule). Section 8 prohibits torture or degrading treatment of detainees. Sections 9–12 govern search of an arrested person and any premises the suspect has entered, insisting on decency (same-sex search if possible) and documentation. Section 17 of ACJA provides for automatic bail for all non-capital cases, aiming to reduce needless detention. Although ACJA is federal law, most states have adopted it by their own laws. In theory, these rules mean a Nigerian suspect has rights very similar to those in many jurisdictions: timely access to a judge, reasons for arrest, and protections against abuse. 

Practice and Case Law 

In practice, however, illegal or arbitrary arrests remain common. Police and paramilitary units sometimes detain suspects without basis and hold them for months before trial. Some reasons for “arrest” in Nigeria are disquieting: e.g. being found near a crime scene, lacking identity papers, or simply resisting police extortion. Courts have on occasion forced release of unlawfully detained persons: if a detainee is not produced before a court within 48 hours as required by Section 35(4) Constitution, the detention is unlawful. (Local human rights organizations counsel detainees to assert this right immediately.) Nigerian judges have reiterated that detention must not be “perpetual” and any long detention without trial violates Section 35’s proviso. 

Constitutional litigation (via the Fundamental Rights Enforcement procedure) has challenged wrongful arrests. For example, in Mr. Sunday Addeh v. Sherifat Abudu (Edo State panel, 2018) the claimant was found unlawfully arrested and detained for four days by soldiers, violating Section 35. Appeals courts have emphasized that a warrantless home arrest or search can only be justified by law, and any acts beyond such authorization (e.g. unnecessary force) violate Sections 37 (dignity) and 35. However, many cases do not result in remedies, often due to inaccessible courts or intimidation. 

Comparatively, Nigeria’s arrest regime is broadly similar to other common-law systems in terms of grounds (suspicion, fleeing, etc.) but weaker on checks. In the UK, for instance, a constable can arrest without warrant only if an offence is being committed or just committed, and must have “reasonable grounds” (PACE 1984, s.24). Arrested persons in the UK enjoy strict access to counsel and must be charged or released within 24 hours (48 in exceptional cases). South African law (CPA s.40) similarly requires reasonable suspicion for arrest and limits detention. In India, the Code of Criminal Procedure lists categories of offences allowing warrantless arrest, and the Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 (liberty) to demand fair procedure (not mere “procedure established by law”). 

The tension between security and liberty is stark here: Nigeria’s constitution itself acknowledges that arrests may be justified “for the purpose of preventing the unlawful entry of any person into Nigeria or … preventing him from committing an offence”, reflecting a public order concern. Yet Section 45 states that fundamental rights may be limited only by laws which are “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, in the interests of defence, public safety, public order…” (the same phrasing used in many jurisdictions for limiting rights). In other words, even where security is at stake, any police power must meet a proportionality test. Human rights bodies have repeatedly warned that Nigeria’s broad security concerns (Boko Haram, kidnappings, insurgency) do not excuse blanket suspension of rights – rather, law enforcement must be conducted under law and oversight. 

Human Rights Implications 

Stop-search and arrest powers have immediate implications for several human rights under Nigeria’s legal framework and international law. Right to Personal Liberty (Section 35) and fair trial (Section 36) are directly affected: wrongful arrest or prolonged detention jeopardize liberty and the presumption of innocence. Right to dignity (Section 34) and privacy (Section 37) may be violated by intrusive searches and handcuffing. Freedom of movement (Section 41) is curtailed by stops (though legitimately restricted in some cases). In addition, victims of abuse can invoke the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment (Section 34) if they are beaten or tortured during arrest or in custody. 

In practice, abuses of these rights are not uncommon. Amnesty International documents a “resurgence of police brutality” in Nigeria: torture during detention, extrajudicial killings of detainees, and extortion by officers who “harass or arrest innocent citizens with impunity”. EndSARS protest records revealed that detainees were often denied access to lawyers or family, held incommunicado, and subjected to physical and psychological torture. For example, one protester recounted being tied up and beaten with machetes in an attempt to force a confession. Under Nigerian law (and international law), such treatment is absolutely prohibited; yet the courts see very few prosecutions of rogue officers. Amnesty’s recent report notes that suspects held for years without trial is a “travesty of justice” and a violation of due process. 

Comparative perspective: In the UK, police searches and arrests that violate rights can be challenged in courts or via the Civil Liberties watchdogs. For instance, UK courts have quashed evidence obtained by unlawful search (the exclusionary rule) and convicted officers for abuse of power. In South Africa, the Constitution obligates that “any infringement must be reasonable and justifiable”, and victims can sue the state for unlawful arrest or assault. Kenya likewise entrenches privacy and has a vibrant human rights commission to address police misconduct. Nigeria has legal remedies (e.g. Section 46 enforcement actions, FR hearings) but in practice these are under-used due to cost, delay and fear of reprisal. Moreover, unlike some jurisdictions (UK’s Independent Office for Police Conduct; South Africa’s IPID; Kenya’s Independent Policing Oversight Authority), Nigeria lacks a fully independent, empowered body to investigate complaints against police. 

The tension between public security and human rights is palpable. The government frequently justifies robust police powers by referring to terrorism, kidnapping, and social unrest. But scholars note that unchecked powers breed abuse and undermine public trust. For example, after EndSARS, it was reported that victims of crime hesitated to cooperate with police for fear of harassment, weakening overall security. Human rights law requires that security measures be necessary, proportionate, and accompanied by safeguards. Nigeria’s Supreme Court has held that even laws aimed at public safety must accord with constitutional limits (e.g. search powers “permitted by law” and “justifiable” under Section 45). Thus, the challenge is to craft and implement rules that effectively fight crime without sliding into oppression. 

CHALLENGES AND COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS 

Challenges in Nigeria: Many practical and systemic obstacles impede a proper balance. First, lack of training and resources means officers often err on the side of suspicion rather than procedure. The 2020 Police Act itself notes that many reforms remain unimplemented due to institutional inertia. Second, weak accountability is a root problem. Despite the Act’s provisions, very few officers are investigated or disciplined for illegal stops or arrests. Victims often fear reprisal or corruption when complaining. Third, legal literacy is low: many citizens (and even officers) are unaware of the precise legal limits on stops and arrest. For instance, some police still perform “stop and frisk” of motorists without any articulable reason, then extort bribes. Fourth, corruption and abuse of power are endemic; some officers view ordinary Nigerians as presumptively criminal. This is exacerbated by ethnic biases and social stereotypes (despite Section 54’s ban on profiling). Fifth, the judicial process is slow, so even legitimate arrests can become de facto indefinite detention as trials drag on. ACJA’s bail reforms remain unevenly applied, leading to overcrowded detention centers of remand inmates.

Comparative insights: Other Commonwealth jurisdictions offer instructive models. In the UK, all stops must be recorded. Annual government data shows how many stops occur, with breakdowns by area and ethnicity. The Lammy review (2017) highlighted disproportionate targeting of minorities, prompting calls to strengthen PACE codes and oversight. Nigeria could adopt similar transparency: requiring officers to document stops in a register and justify them to supervisors. The UK also limits suspicion less stops to narrowly authorized situations (Section 60 orders for specific high-risk periods); Nigeria’s law could similarly restrict blanket roadblocks or search powers to exceptional circumstances approved by higher authorities. 

In South Africa, any search or arrest is judged by the constitutional standard of “reasonableness and justifiability”. Courts regularly exclude evidence obtained through rights violations, creating a deterrent. South Africa also has an independent police complaints authority (Ipid) whose findings can lead to prosecutions. Nigeria could strengthen its internal Complaint Response Unit into a genuinely independent Commission with prosecutorial powers (as recommended by human rights advocates). 

In Kenya, the 2010 Constitution explicitly makes privacy a fundamental right. Kenyan law enforcement must navigate this: their Police Act allows warrantless search only under an express “special circumstances” clause (delay in getting a warrant would defeat purpose). Kenya also has public litigation on police abuse (e.g. enforcing “duty of care” on police to avoid excessive force). Nigeria might emulate Kenya by narrowing statutory exceptions and empowering courts to review such searches. In India, police reforms have sought to curb arbitrary arrests through judicial guidelines (the D.K. Basu guidelines) and by mandating rapid magisterial oversight of detention. Importantly, India’s Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 (life and liberty) to require that “procedure established by law” must be just, fair and reasonable. This “due process” standard could influence Nigeria: indeed, Nigeria already has an Article 14 interpretation (in 1985) to similar effect. Comparative study suggests that adopting procedural safeguards like mandatory audio/video recording of arrests, early judicial review (e.g. habeas corpus within 24 hours) and an ombudsman for detained persons could significantly improve Nigeria’s system. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

In summary, Nigeria’s laws on stop, search and arrest provide a formal framework intended to balance security and rights, but implementation has lagged. On paper, police officers must have reasonable grounds for stops and arrests, identify themselves, and bring detainees before a court promptly. The Constitution enshrines privacy, dignity and liberty. In reality, however, excessive reliance on suspicion, combined with weak oversight, has led to frequent rights violations – a pattern laid bare by recent tragedies in Nigeria’s policing history. 

To align practice with principle, Nigeria should pursue legal and institutional reforms informed by best practices: 

Tighten statutory criteria and oversight for stops/searches. Amend the Police Act/Criminal Procedure laws to require written documentation of all stops and searches (time, place, reason, officer ID) filed in a central registry. Restrict suspicionless roadblocks (e.g. allow only for emergencies with prior authorization) and ban profiling. 

Enhance accountability mechanisms. Transform the Complaint Response Unit into an independent Police Complaints Commission with clear powers to investigate and prosecute misconduct. Introduce periodic judicial or parliamentary reviews of police stop/search statistics and patterns (as in UK “Stop and Search Monitoring”). Impose meaningful penalties on officers who violate procedure. 

Enforce judicial safeguards. Ensure strict compliance with the 48-hour constitutional limit for detention: courts should dismiss charges against suspects detained longer without court order. Provide for audio/video recording of all arrests and interrogations (drawing on India’s model). Expand legal aid so detainees can challenge unlawful arrest or detention promptly (as in other jurisdictions). 

Public and police education. Conduct nationwide training for police on human rights and legal limits, using Kenya and UK curricula as templates. Include community outreach so citizens know their rights (e.g. right to ask officer’s name/rank, to see a warrant, to remain silent). 

Legislative reform and oversight. Parliament should regularly review policing laws and amend them to close loopholes. For example, clarify in law the meaning of “reasonable suspicion” and codify a proportionality test for searches. Empower civilian oversight boards (on federal and state levels) that include human rights experts.

Cultural change and demilitarization. Work to shift police culture from a “us vs them” mindset to community partnership. De-emphasize the role of paramilitary units for ordinary policing. Institute measures to reduce corruption (e.g. good salaries, rotation policies, benefits) so officers are less tempted to extort. 

Reforming police powers in Nigeria is urgent for both security and justice. Experience from Commonwealth peers shows that rigorous legal standards, transparent reporting and independent scrutiny are effective in curbing abuse. By bolstering the rule of law – ensuring that every stop, search or arrest genuinely meets legal criteria – Nigeria can improve public safety without sacrificing rights. Ultimately, public confidence in law enforcement depends on the police themselves demonstrably respecting the very rights they are sworn to protect. 

Bibliography 

Primary Sources 

Constitution, Statutes and Legislation 

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 

Police Act 2020 (Nigeria). 

Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 (Nigeria). 

Criminal Procedure Act Cap. C41 LFN 2004 (Nigeria). 

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK). 

Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (South Africa). 

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 

Constitution of Kenya 2010. 

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (India). 

Cases 

Chika Enyinnaya v State (2014) LPELR-23957 (CA). 

Ojoma v State (2014) LPELR-23094 (CA).

Sunday Addeh v Sherifat Abudu (Edo State Panel on Police Brutality, 2018). D.K. Basu v State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 (India). 

International Instruments 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966. 

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981. 

Secondary Sources 

Books and Articles 

Oludayo Amokaye, ‘Human Rights, the Police and the Rule of Law in Nigeria’ (2016) Journal of African Law. 

Yemi Akinseye-George, Fundamental Rights and Enforcement in Nigeria (2nd edn, Akinseye Press 2012). 

Enyinna Nwauche, ‘The Nigerian Police and the Rule of Law’ (2019) African Human Rights Law Journal. 

David Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2018).

Reports and Online Sources 

Amnesty International, Nigeria: “Killings, Arbitrary Arrests and Torture in the Context of the EndSARS Protests” (2020). 

Amnesty International, Nigeria: Police Brutality – A Reality after EndSARS (2022). Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Police Reform and Human Rights (2021). 

Federal Government of Nigeria, Report of the Judicial Panels of Inquiry on Police Brutality (2021). 

UK Home Office, Police Powers of Stop and Search (2019). 

Independent Police Investigative Directorate (South Africa), Annual Report (2021).

Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights and Police Accountability (2020).