Authored By: Syeda Momina Anjum
Sultan Ul Uloom Collage of Law
Abstract
The use of social media has drastically increased for entertainment and for staying informed faster then the legal framework can catch up. This article will analysis the legal dissonance between the law and the practical applicability and the legal issues which arises from short form content and how they violates art 19 and existing laws and proposes a doctrine of epistemic integrity to add on existing laws
Introduction
According to the Wall Street Journal, an internal Facebook report warns that “algorithms exploit the human brain’s attraction to divisiveness.”[1]
Social media platforms are a business product. As the goal of any business is to make profit, social media and especially short form content are designed to maximise engagement, through the use of new and insidious technology like AI and personalised for-you-pages, clickbait, rage bait, and fear mongering. A growing body of research has examined the role of social media in political polarisation.[2] A large portion of this work has centred on the position that social media sorts users into “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles” that selectively expose people to content aligning with their pre-existing beliefs. However, some recent scholarship questions whether the “echo chamber” narrative has been overstated. Complementing this debate, empirical analysis of Twitter and Facebook data established that posts expressing hostility toward political out-groups generated substantially greater engagement than all other content categories measured with out-group animosity identified as the single strongest predictor of social media sharing across all variables.[3]
In May of 2026, Rahul Gandhi posted on Instagram with the newly elected Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The reel captured the oath taking ceremony of the Chief Minister and in his two statements caught much traction, his address thanking the Gen Z supporters and his address to the Leader of the Opposition which according to some sources enunciated a prior or strong connection. It tracked twelve million views in one hour. The reel was taken down. This action was put to three authorities; the platform itself which claimed no reason for the inaccessibility of his account, the ruling party which denied any allegations and delegated its claims to the MeitY, which also claimed no involvement.[4] This article is not concerned with by who or why the reel was taken down but with the easy unaccountability which can be waved by all three authorities whether they had involvement or not. If the voice of the opposition leader can be blocked so easily even in a minor reel, it shows a major error in the existing legal framework.
Existing law addresses the removal of unlawful content but does not provide a remedy for the arbitrary use of fake media and half truths used for agenda and propaganda, leaving a vacuum of unaccountability where no authority , platform, government, or regulatory body is required to explain or justify the suppression of lawful content.[5]
This article argues that the IT Rules 2021 and IT Act 2000 are inadequate and too vague, failing to uphold Article 19(1)(a) as interpreted in Shreya Singhal and Anuradha Bhasin, to protect the right to receive unmanipulated information and form beliefs without algorithmic interference, and proposes a doctrine of epistemic integrity comprising algorithmic transparency, contextual disclosure, and enforceable platform accountability.
Existing Legal Framework and it’s Analysis
Article 19 of the Constitution
According to art 19 (1) (a) , citizen of India has the right of expression, their thoughts , opinions and ideas through speech , writing and printing or visual representations or any other Means .The suppression of out group- perspectives , personalised feeds of the user does not fall under the restrictions and Exceptions listed in the article.
Section 79 of Indian IT Act 2000
Section 79of Indian IT Act 2000 facilitates protection to the intermediates from legal liability from the action of third party or user action , providing they are a natural interface and perform their due diligence, thereby protecting the free force of digital media and growth of social platforms.
But the vague definition of ‘reasonable effort’ to stop unlawful , allows the platform to over censor content.
And, while the purpose of making the platform neutral does stay intact it also allows the accountability to be easily differed due to ‘glitch’ technical issues and a third party use for maintenance of due diligence, in the evening of censorship of lawful content or suppression of legal content due to third party interference or malicious flagging. [6]
Section 69 of IT Act
According to Section 69A of the IT Act, the government is allowed to block public access to online content in the interest of national security, sovereignty, public order, and foreign relations.¹ Rule 16 mandates strict confidentiality on blocking orders, meaning users cannot be notified of the reason for their content being blocked, nor can the public access information via RTI requests.[7] This creates a “secret blocking power” which can be used arbitrarily, resulting in a transparency gap.[8] This gap also obstructs legal remedies because the orders are kept strictly secret.[9]
IT Rules 2021 — Rule 3(1)(b), Rule 3(2)(b), Rule 3A
Rule 3(1)(b) mandates the intermediates to inform users of its Rules and regulations and make reasonable effort to make the user comply with the list prohibitions. Platforms inform the users about the regulations of the platform but do not disclose how the interface will process or track the users information.
Rule 3(2)(b) mandates removal of prohibited Act such as sexual acts nudity, impersonation or morphed images with in 2 hrs of complaint reduced from 24hrs limit for maximum victim protection. It does not provide specific reality for removal of lawful content or arbitrary use
Rule 3A established Grievance Appellate Committees (GACs) which allow users to appeal decisions made by an intermediary’s Grievance Officer, with the aim to resolve complaints within 30 days via an online dispute resolution mechanism. Cite Source: India Code[10] GACs resolve complaints about content removal decisions. But algorithmic suppression or Visibility Filtering is not a removal decision. It is an invisible architectural choice.
DPDP 2023
It protects personal data from misuse. But does not address indirect use of data which can be used to build an digital profile that shapes your information environment against you.
Case Law Analysis
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
In this case the court up held the freedom of speech and struck down the overreach use of art 66 (a) which criminalised sending “offensive” or “menacing” messages through a computer resource or communication device. The legal action taken against the plaintiff proves the grounds of the article , that digital activity can be used against the user. The IT Rules 2021 has the same shortcoming as section 66A.The vague blanket term such as ‘unlawful and ‘harmful’ provides a lofty framework for the platforms to follow which can be defined as would it serve to suppress lawful content and not Prohibit unlawful content without explanation. Creating the same chilling effect the court condemned in Shreya singhal.
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020),
In the state of Jammu and Kashmir the government before the abrogation of Art. 370 the government implement a blanked shutdown of communication , fearing a mobilization of a rebellion due algorithmic and digital amplification , the government pre-emptively silenced an entire population establishing that digital interface can be source of narrative control and propaganda. Rather than deploying targeted, lawful mechanisms to censor misinformation, the administration weaponized complete infrastructural exclusion. This caused a information vacuum, allowing a singular, state curated reality to dominate the public sphere.[11]
Twitter v Union of India
X ,formally Twitter filed a petition against the government of India because the Indian government under the section 69a ordered the platform block account on account of the content being “anti India” .The now formally Twitter argued blocking the entire accounts of the users was a violation of free speech and an over reach and Twitter also argued the failure of the government to inform the platform before blocking the account.
Rahul Gandhi reel block Analysis
The content of the reel did not meet any statutory grounds allowing the government to block online posts. Despite this, the reel was taken down without any justification or reason provided for the restriction. This demonstrates how the section fails to provide a legal remedy against arbitrary enforcement , leaving the user with no clear legal path to contest it.
The Grievance Appellate Committee (GAC) provides a remedy for the shortcomings of Section 69A and similar content blocking rules. However, in cases where the platform defers accountability for the arbitrary blocking of content, the system provides no functional framework. By using automated legal templates that blame local compliance for algorithmic glitches, the platform avoids issuing a formal corporate decision. This lack of a clear paper trail prevents the user from successfully filing an appeal, breaking a remedy that should work in this case.[12]
Accountability vacuum
The absence of protective accountability reveals the central failure this article identifies; what action would the platform and the MeitY have taken if this was never raised to attention ? what action should they be required to take?
Critical Evaluation
Epistemic harm
Epistemic occurs when an information system undermines your ability to acquire knowledge, perceive truth, or trust your own reasoning.[13]For example, if a user searches whether eggs are healthy in short-form content, they will find creators who argue with varying degrees of credibility that eggs are beneficial. As they scroll down, they will encounter another source claiming eggs are unhealthy, followed by another explaining the ‘right’ way to consume them. Based on user interaction, the algorithm tracks consumption metrics and suggests related content. While this content is not inherently unlawful or harmful, in specialized areas such as medicine where users require deep media literacy that short-form content inherently decreases the consumer is exposed to a mix of accurate information and misinformation. Because the advice given in short-form media consists of blanket assertions that ignore the specific user’s medical profile, the systemic burden falls entirely upon the user to distinguish whether a creator is a verified, credible medical source, and whether the information is real or fake.
Counter Argument
The concept of personal responsibility – Adults are independent thinkers responsible for their own beliefs.
This argument does not completely hold because the digital ecosystem prevents true informed consent. A user cannot be held responsible for a choice if the system fails to disclose how that choice is being influenced, directly or indirectly, whether arbitrarily or by simple statistics. While the platform closely tracks the digital behaviour of the user, the individual consumer may lack the media literacy to understand how the underlying system works. Data personalization is marketed as being designed in the interests of the user, but it primarily harvests data assets for corporate profit; at the baseline, it remains a commercial business. By tracking metrics like watch time and swipes, the recommendation algorithm builds a behavioural profile that seamlessly blends organic content with targeted advertisements, with the ultimate goal of keeping the user in a passive, suggestible state.
Comparative Perspective
Article 34 of DSA
Requires large online platforms and of very large online search engines should identify, assess any systemic risks in the Union such as Spread of illegal material, Harm to privacy, free speech, data protection, and children’s rights , Gender-based violence, public health risks, and mental health harm , Negative impacts on elections, free speech, and public safety , stemming from the design or functioning of their service and its related systems, including algorithmic systems, or from the use made of their services, once every year and before launching any major new features.
They must check the following factors; Algorithmic recommendation systems. Content moderation practices. Terms of service enforcement. And targeting systems. Data privacy practices. Intentional manipulation (bots, fake accounts, viral misinformation).[14]
Article 35 of the EU Digital Services Act
This article mandates that very large online platforms and search engines implement proportionate measures to mitigate systemic risks, such as adapting algorithms; Adjusting recommendation systems and AI features and modifying content moderation, and enhancing child protection by adding strict age verification, parental controls, and abuse reporting tools. Mark AI-generated or manipulated images, audio, and video clearly. Provide a report button for fake media. Labelling AI-generated or manipulated images, audio, and video clearly. Provide a report button for fake media. Increase internal staff, testing, and risk tracking. Change how ads are selected, targeted, and displayed.
India has laws such as IT Rules 2021 IT Act 2000 and article 19 of the Constitution they do not have the dynamicity to be applied to the growing complexity and neurons of the modern technology , while this article does not claim the EU laws are perfect where is much scope to learn from such as Labelling AI generated content , adding age strict verifications, Adjusting recommendation systems , mandate the platforms to assess privacy of users and spread of harmful information what else.
Doctrine of Epistemic Integrity
This article does do demand the platforms to disclose their entire interface.
It proposes that social platforms disclose how their digital activity will be processed, Prohibit users data to be used for AI algorithm and learning resource, Prohibit AI generated content and over edited content , Regulate verified medical content and such other area , mandate creators to cite their facts and source of their opinion and other content discourage discourse about extreme, harmful dogma of religion , politics , misogyny extreme feminism etc. which violates the Constitution.
Regulate infinite scroll due to its addictive design increase media literacy and ban certain demograph of social media of social media as legislated in Australia under the Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024[15] but not completely the media should not be over Sanitized but be child appropriate the children targeted media short or long form must be officially certified by certified neurologists prior to distribution.
And provide remedy for unfair Deplatforming , Throttling and shadow banning of lawful content and make platforms accountable for ‘glitches mistakes by the algorithm.
The MeitY should play a proactive role in regulating and imposing the law and stop arbitrary suppression or promotion of narratives , fake news , propaganda , Harmful ideology in targeted demography such as misogyny in ‘manosphere’.
Conclusion
This article has the following findings:
The legal gap
Both IT Acts and IT Rules provide a good starting point for the legal framework for social media but they fail in practice and addressing the dynamic and nuances of the growing changes in technology and how it impacts society. And to show this, this article has taken the most recent and in general polarizing topic; politics. Rahul Gandhi’s post was taken down as in the ways of politics and its shows the legal gap , how even the senior member of the opposition in a Democracy is not immune to being censored and the accountability is easily differed by three authorities the platform it self , the ruling party a d the MeitY.
While the laws of the EU is not completely perfect but in practice does provide comprises legal framework and law , as compared above.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Legislation — Indian
Information Technology Act 2000, ss 69A and 79
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, rr 3(1)(b), 3(2)(b), 3A
Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009, r 16
Legislation — International
Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) [2022] OJ L277/1, arts 34 and 35
Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024 (Cth)
Constitutional Provision
Constitution of India, art 19(1)(a)
Cases
Shreya Singhal v Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523
Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India AIR 2020 SC 1308
Twitter Inc v Union of India WP No 13710/2022 (Karnataka HC, 2023)
Tanul Thakur v Union of India WP© 13035/2020 (Delhi HC, 2022)
Secondary Sources
Journal Articles
Steve Rathje, Jay J Van Bavel and Sander van der Linden, ‘Out-Group Animosity Drives Engagement on Social Media’ (2021) 118(26) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences e2024292118 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8256037/ accessed 13 May 2026
Jieun Shin, Chris DeFelice and Soojong Kim, ‘Emotion Sells: Rage Bait vs Information Bait in Clickbait News Headlines on Social Media’ (2025) 13(7) Digital Journalism 1271 https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2025.2505566 accessed 6 May 2026
Yukta Chordia and Kanika Chhajerh, ‘From Shield to Sword: How Safe Harbour Became the State’s Tool of Platform Control’ (RGNUL Student Research Review, 6 March 2025) https://www.rsrr.in/post/from-shield-to-sword-how-safe-harbour-became-the-state-s-tool-of-platform-control accessed 14 May 2026
News Sources
Jeff Horwitz and Deepa Seetharaman, ‘Facebook Knows It Encourages Division, Top Executives Nixed Solutions’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 26 May 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-executives-nixed-solutions-11590507499 accessed 13 March 2026
‘Instagram Removes Rahul Gandhi’s Reel; Congress Alleges Censorship’ The Hindu (Chennai, 11 May 2026)
Official Documents and Reports
Press Information Bureau, ‘Grievance Appellate Committee Workshop Organised by MeitY to Enhance Grievance Redressal Framework for a Safer Internet’ (Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, 8 January 2025) accessed 16 May 2026
Internet Freedom Foundation, ‘IFF Statement Against the Alarming Escalation of Social Media Censorship and Proposed Expansion of Takedown Powers’ (2026) https://internetfreedom.in/iff-statement-against-the-alarming-escalation-of-social-media-censorship-and-proposed-expansion-of-takedown-powers/ accessed 16 May 2026
Amala Dasarathi, ‘Delhi HC Orders MeitY to Give Copy of Ban Order and Hearing to Mr Tanul Thakur’ (Internet Freedom Foundation, 16 May 2022) https://internetfreedom.in/delhi-hc-directs-meity-to-provide-a-copy-of-the-blocking-order-and-a-post-decisional-hearing-to-mr-tanul-thakur-whattheblock/ accessed 16 May 2026
Online Sources
‘Article 34 — Risk Assessment’ (EU Digital Services Act, 2022) https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com/Digital_Services_Act_Article_34.html accessed 16 May 2026
Ananya K, ‘Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India 2020: Case Analysis’ (iPleaders, 21 February 2024) https://blog.ipleaders.in/anuradha-bhasin-v-union-of-india-case-analysis/ accessed 15 May 2026
[1] ¹ Jeff Horwitz and Deepa Seetharaman, ‘Facebook Knows It Encourages Division, Top Executives Nixed Solutions’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 26 May 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-executives-nixed-solutions-11590507499 accessed 13 March 2026
[2] ² Jieun Shin, Chris DeFelice and Soojong Kim, ‘Emotion Sells: Rage Bait vs Information Bait in Clickbait News Headlines on Social Media’ (2025) 13(7) Digital Journalism 1271 https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2025.2505566 accessed 6 May 2026
[3] Steve Rathje, Jay J Van Bavel and Sander van der Linden, ‘Out-Group Animosity Drives Engagement on Social Media’ (2021) 118(26) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences e2024292118 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8256037/ accessed on 13 May 2026
[4] ‘Instagram Removes Rahul Gandhi’s Reel; Congress Alleges Censorship’ The Hindu (Chennai, 11 May 2026).
[5] Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021; Information Technology Act 2000, s 69A.
Yukta Chordia and Kanika Chhajerh, ‘From Shield to Sword: How Safe Harbour Became the State’s Tool of Platform Control’ (RGNUL Student Research Review, 6 March 2025) https://www.rsrr.in/post/from-shield-to-sword-how-safe-harbour-became-the-state-s-tool-of-platform-control accessed 14 May 2026
[7] Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009, r 16.
[8] Twitter Inc v Union of India (2023) WP No 13710/2022 (Karnataka HC); Internet Freedom Foundation, ‘IFF statement against the Alarming Escalation of Social Media Censorship and Proposed Expansion of Takedown Powers’ (2026) https://internetfreedom.in/iff-statement-against-the-alarming-escalation-of-social-media-censorship-and-proposed-expansion-of-takedown-powers/.
[9] Tanul Thakur v Union of India (2022) WP© 13035/2020 (Delhi HC); Amala Dasarathi, ‘Delhi HC orders MeitY to give copy of ban order and hearing to Mr Tanul Thakur for banning his website #WhatTheBlock’ (Internet Freedom Foundation, 16 May 2022) https://internetfreedom.in/delhi-hc-directs-meity-to-provide-a-copy-of-the-blocking-order-and-a-post-decisional-hearing-to-mr-tanul-thakur-whattheblock/
[10] For Rule 3A from India Code the OSCOLA citation is:
Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021, r 3A https://www.indiacode.nic.in accessed 14 may 2026
[11] Ananya K, ‘Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020: case analysis’ (iPleaders, 21 February 2024) https://blog.ipleaders.in/anuradha-bhasin-v-union-of-india-case-analysis/ accessed 15 May 2026.)
[12] Press Information Bureau, ‘Grievance Appellate Committee workshop organised by MeitY to enhance grievance redressal framework for a safer internet’, Ministry of Electronics & IT, 8 January 2025, share.google, accessed 16 May 2026
[13] Ananya K, ‘Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020: case analysis’ (iPleaders, 21 February 2024) ipleaders.in accessed 15 May 2026.
[14] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act) [2022] OJ L277/1, arts 34 and 35, Article 34 — Risk Assessment’ (EU Digital Services Act, 2022) https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com/Digital_Services_Act_Article_34.html accessed 16 May 2026
[15] Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024 (Cth) https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r7124 accessed 16 May 2026
