State Of Orissa vs Ram Bahadur Thapa

Case Name: State Of Orissa vs Ram Bahadur Thapa

Citation – AIR 1960 Ori 161 (or 1960 CriLJ 1349)

Court   – Orissa High Court

Date of Decision – November 9, 1959

Bench Composition –   Chief Justice R.L. Narasimham

Justice S. Barman

Introduction

This case exemplifies the mens rea in Criminal Law and stands as the benchmark for interpretation of a ‘mistake of fact’. The accused Rama Bahadur Thapa  truly believed he was acting in good faith freeing him of any amount of mens rea ( criminal mind ) due to the consequence of deep seared cultural belief. Defining how good faith and due care of attention are evaluated in the defence of ‘mistake of fact’ ; not objective idealized standard to subjective and contextualized to the particular situation.[1]

Facts Of The Case

This case arose before the High Court as an appeal from the State of Orissa against the acquittal of the defendant, Rama Bahadur Thapa passed by the Sessions Court of Mayurbhanj. Rama Bahadur Thapa was a  Nepali servant who accompanied Jagat Bandhu Chatterjee of the firm Chatterji Brothers, Calcutta, who came to  Rasgovindpur village in Balasore district some  time in April 1958. The purpose of this visit was to purchase the aeroscrap which was in the abandoned  aerodrome in the village of Rasgovindpur. The aerodrome was guarded by two choukidars named Dibakar and Govind, appointed by the Garrison Engineer of the Defence Department  with a view to prevent pilferage by unauthorised persons. The aerodrome was surrounded by Adivasi villages thus there were several footpaths cutting the aerodrome but the people  inhabiting the villages were mostly  Santals and Majhi who had strong belief in ghosts and the abandoned aerodrome earned a notoriety in that area as being infested with ghosts thus they would stay away from the aerodrome.

On the 20^th May 1958 one Chandra Majhi who was a resident of village Telkundi close by went to the tea-stall of Krishna Chandra Patro where Jagat Bandhu Chatterjee and his servant,  the accused were staying because Chandra Majhi was afraid of walking alone to his village because of ghosts. Jagat Bandhu Chatterji and his Nepali servant (the accused) were anxious to see the ghosts. Thus at midnight they convinced  Krishna Chandra Patro to accompany them to see the ghosts and also woke up Chandra Majhi to escort him to his village Telkundi, and while returning to Rasgovindpur through a foot-path across the aerodrome they noticed a flickering will-o  wisp kind of light at a distance of about 400 cubits from the path-way of camp No. IV they were passing through. The lights, a strong wind blowing and some apparitions moving around the flickering light created a scene which they thought was ghosts dancing and ran up to the particular place. The servant reached there first and began to attack the ghosts with his ‘khurki’. Krishna Chandra Patro arrived there sometime late unnoticed by him, one of his blows of  Khurki  caused a severe injury to Krishna Chandra Patro and he screamed that the servant had  injured him. The ghosts in question also led out a cry which stopped the servants’ attack and the ‘ghosts’ were discovered to be alive women of  Majhis gathered to collect ‘Mohua’ flowers at that time under a ‘Mohua’ tree with a hurricane lantern. Due to the indiscriminate attack by the respondent with his ‘Kurki’ one women ;Gelhi Majhiani was killed, and two others namely Ganga Majhiani  and Saunri Majhiani were grievously injured including Krishna Chandra Patro.

The respondent was charged-

under Section 302 I.P.C. for the murder of Gelhi Majhiani,

under Section 326 I.P.C. for causing grievous injury to Saunri Majhiani and Ganga Majhiani

under Section 324 I.P.C. for hurting  Krishna Chandra Patro.

He was then accounted under Section 79.[2]

Legal Issues

• Whether Section 79 was the appropriate provision
• Whether the accused can claim a general exception when he voluntarily and deliberately placed himself in the situation by going ghost hunting at midnight
• Whether a superstitious belief qualifies as good faith requiring due care and attention under Section 79 IPC
• Whether due care under Section 79 is evaluated objectively or subjectively against the individual’s capacity and context
• Whether the respondent exercised due care and attention given his superstitious beliefs, intellectual capacity and the circumstances of the encounter

Arguments Presented

Petitioner–

The prosecutor argued that the respondent failed to act with ‘due care and attention” and acted with negligence. The state contended that the respondent lacked mens rea and that his superstitious beliefs are genuine reason for mistake of fact.

But the state argued that the responded had a torch which he did not use and did not meet the standard  of due care thus making him liable for culpable homicide under Section 304A  I.P.C. for having caused the death of Gelhi Majhiani and under Section 336 I.P.C. for injuring the  other persons.[3]

Respondent-

On the other hand the defendant argument was firm on genuine mistake of fact backed by the evidence of  Jagat Bandhu Chatterjee that the respondent had genuine complete belief that he was attacking ghosts, this makes the respondent eligible for  protection under good faith.

The defence argument can be inferred from the court’s reasoning which relied upon in Emperor v. Abdeol Wadood Ahmed –“ The standard of care and caution must be judged according to the capacity and intelligence of the person whose conduct is in question.” “The question of good faith must be considered with reference to the position of the accused and the circumstances under which he acts”.

The respondent was a new comer , who had deep superstitious beliefs, going to a place know for having belief  creating absolute certainty that he would see ghosts and his companions not clearing this certainty but reinforcing it by aiming to see ghosts. And the scene of  the flickering light  looking like “will-O’- the wisp” with some apparitions moving round it and  Krishna Chandra Patro shouting  “Hark’, here is the ghost” leaving the respondent with no reason to doubt that he was attacking ghosts.[4]

Courts Reasoning and Analysis

The respondent had prier beliefs that ghosts exist. And his landlord or his master made any effort to remove this notion from his mind. In fact it was reaffirmed as the purpose of offering to go with him for the purpose of seeing the ghosts and the fact that Chandra Majhi , a local  resident took shelter in the tea shop only because he did not want to encounter ghosts. 

The evidence provided Jagat Bandhu Chatterjee provides the respondent  the protection of good faith under section 79 unless it can be reasonably concluded from the facts that he did not act in good faith contingent upon due care and attention as defined under Section 52 IPC, but what standard to evaluate if the respondent practiced due care in his circumstances.

This can be answered in Waryam Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 554 and Bouda Kui v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Pat 664. The High Court held that the assailant was protected by Section 79 I.P.C. because  the circumstances under which the apparition appeared before him and his pre-disposition, it would be reasonably inferred that he believed, in good faith, that he was attacking a ghost and not a human being.

 There may be slight difference on facts between these cases and the instant case. But based on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the mere fact that had he exercised extra care and attention the incident might have been averted is no ground for denying him the protection of that section is clear that the respondent is protected by Section 79 I.P.C..

The respondent had prier beliefs that ghosts exist. And his landlord or his master made any effort to remove this notion from his mind. In fact it was reaffirmed as the purpose of offering to go with him for the purpose of seeing the ghosts and the fact that Chandra Majhi , a local  resident took shelter in the tea shop only because he did not want to encounter ghosts.  [5]

Judgement and Ration Decidendi

The Court held that the standard of due care and attention is subjective to the individual’s capacity and circumstances adopted from Waryam Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 554 case.

While the court did not address the voluntarily placement of himself in the situation , the court ruled that the responded exercised due care given his circumstances and capacity and accepted superstitious beliefs as a valid basis for good faith, and accordingly applied Section 79 IPC to protect the respondent.

This was a straight dismissal with no additional directions, timelines or compliance orders issued rejecting the appeal of the state, and acquitting Rama Bahadur Thapa.[6]

Ratio Decidendi

The case centres around bona-fide mistake of fact under section 79. Due care and attention subjective to the circumstances and the individual’s capacity. It is not a universal standard. If the respondent acts good faith in the best of his capability then he is eligible for the protection under Section 79.[7]  It established that if a situation is highly convincing and terrifying, a person is legally allowed to act immediately on their perception. They do not carry an absolute burden to stop and verify facts if doing so puts their safety at risk.[8]

Critical Analysis

Significance of the Decision

The judgement did not depart from prior precedents but defined the scope of mistake of fact under section 79 in Criminal Law,  defining how ‘mens rea’ and good faith is evaluated.

While the judgment does provide a shield for defendants from marginalised, underdeveloped communities where the intent is not criminal but stems from ingrained cultural beliefs, it can also extend grace to criminal culpability. Whether the respondent is not guilty can be accepted as just due to his fundamental beliefs. Ghost hunting is not a crime, and voluntarily placing oneself into a circumstance such as the facts of this case and attacking what one believes to be ghosts is also justified and protected under Section 79.

However the respondent did not attack once. There were multiple victims including a member of his own party, killing one of them. This means he struck multiple victims multiple times with enough force to kill a person. For Gelhi Majhiani, who was killed on the spot, the blade inflicted a deep fatal blow. Forensically, a full force swing from a forward weighted ‘kukri’ is classified as a heavy chopping wound which would require considerable force and physical contact with a human body.

When one stabs or swings a sharp tool into an object with any force, unless the object is overwhelmingly resistant, a person would have to continue or increase that force to cut through after impact. Thus after the first strike the respondent’s belief should have been contradicted by the physical reality that the alleged ghosts were in fact living humans. Yet the respondent continued his attack on multiple victims including a member of his own party. This would indicate either that the respondent developed mens rea after the initial encounter or lost mental stability in a manic breakdown. If the latter is the case and the respondent was not guilty, he should have been acquitted under Section 84. Acquitting him under Section 79 may be just for the respondent but not for the victim who lost her life. It chooses individual justice over victim protection and extends too wide a grace to the products of backward, deadly and irrational social systems.

Conclusion

This case functioned as a massive stepping stone for expanding human psychology and context based reasoning in criminal justice, defining the scope of mistake of fact and what constitutes good faith. Whether the acquittal of the respondent was justified and whether it should have been under Section 79 or Section 84 can be debatable, but what cannot be argued is that the court chose individual justice over victim protection. A woman lost her life brutally and others were grievously injured, and while it is true that at the time there was no legal framework to compensate victims, not a single question was raised as to whether, if the respondent is not guilty, what then is the remedy for real injury caused by imaginary reasons.

Reference(S):

[1] State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa’ (LawBhoomi, 16 January 2026) https://lawbhoomi.com/case-brief-state-of-orissa-v-ram-bahadur-thapa/ accessed 22 May 2026 and Case Summary: State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa’ (Aequitas Victoria, 22 November 2021) https://www.aequivic.in/post/case-summary-state-of-orissa-v-ram-bahadur-thapa accessed 22 May 2026

[2] State of Orissa v Ram Bahadur Thapa \(1960\) CriLJ 1349 (Ori HC) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489567/ accessed 24 May 2026.

[3] State of Orissa v Ram Bahadur Thapa \(1960\) CriLJ 1349 (Ori HC) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489567/ accessed 24 May 2026.

[4]   State of Orissa v Ram Bahadur Thapa \(1960\) CriLJ 1349 (Ori HC) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489567/

[5]   State of Orissa v Ram Bahadur Thapa \(1960\) CriLJ 1349 (Ori HC) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489567/

[6] State of Orissa v Ram Bahadur Thapa \(1960\) CriLJ 1349 (Ori HC) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489567/

[7] State of Orissa v Ram Bahadur Thapa \(1960\) CriLJ 1349 (Ori HC) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1489567/

[8] State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa’ (JudicateMe, June 2020) https://judicateme.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/State-Of-Orissa-v.-Ram-Bahadur-Thapa.