Authored By: Zarin Ahsan
Premier University
I. Introduction
Since the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, South Asia has experienced three unprecedented political upheavals driven by Generation Z (“Gen Z”) protests: Sri Lanka’s economic collapse in 2022, Bangladesh’s July Quota Movement in 2024, and Nepal’s corruption crisis in 2025. Although each upheaval arose from distinct grievances, all three converged on the same constitutional demand — accountability under the rule of law.1
The need for institutional reform becomes most apparent when public mobilisation is treated as the last resort for restoring constitutional order. As A. V. Dicey argued, the rule of law is not merely the existence of law, but the capacity to restrain the arbitrary exercise of state power and prevent executive overreach.2
Comparative legal scholarship on these youth-led movements has focused heavily on digital mobilisation, political participation, and constitutional resistance, yet few studies examine whether the post-mobilisation period reflects a sustainable rule of law — or whether weakened institutions instead produce only a temporary pause in an otherwise volatile and undemocratic order.3
This article addresses that gap. It argues that the freedom won through mass protest can generate significant political momentum and lasting historical impact, but cannot achieve durability unless constitutional institutions firmly establish an independent judiciary, enforceable remedies, and effective parliamentary oversight — the essential conditions for realising the rule of law. The article proceeds as follows: Section II situates the rule of law beyond electoral processes across South Asia through an evaluation of foundational legal principles; Section III offers a comparative analysis of post-movement developments in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal; Section IV traces the passage from Gen Z uprisings to constitutional permanence; and Section V sets out recommendations for addressing fragile rule of law.
II. Rule of Law Beyond Elections — Evaluation of Legal Principles
A. V. Dicey’s foundational doctrine of the rule of law, together with Lord Bingham’s contemporary account of the same principle, does not treat periodic elections as the sole or most effective safeguard of constitutional government. Instead, both scholars maintain that the rule of law rests on the equal subjection of all persons — including public officials — to the courts, and on the exercise of public power within legal limits subject to independent adjudication.4
This raises an obvious question: if periodic elections were already taking place across South Asia, why did these institutions fail before the Gen Z uprisings occurred?
In Sri Lanka, the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in 2020, legally consolidated presidential control over the appointment of judicial personnel, while the Rajapaksa family’s dominant presidential influence further weakened judicial independence.5
The much-criticised Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides that a member of parliament forfeits their seat if they vote against their party’s position — a rule that has steadily eroded meaningful parliamentary oversight over the years.6
The Constitution of Nepal, comparatively more modern than its regional counterparts and established in 2015, has likewise failed to prevent executive overreach. Under Part 21, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) has repeatedly been staffed with politically affiliated appointees rather than neutral officials.7
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal were each functioning as electoral democracies before their respective Gen Z protests began, which demonstrates precisely that periodic elections, on their own, did not translate into constitutional accountability. Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers — which insists on separating the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary — places particular emphasis on judicial independence, ensuring that elected representatives cannot themselves become instruments of arbitrary rule. This principle remains central to any functioning democratic state.8
III. Comparative Analysis of Post-Movements across South Asia
Sri Lanka
The 2022 Aragalaya (“struggle”) movement, led by Gen Z, directly protested the executive overreach enabled by the Twentieth Amendment. In its aftermath, the Twenty-First Amendment restored some — though not all — checks on executive authority, curtailing presidential power over the Constitutional Council and statutory commissions.9 However, a UN report published in late 2025 found that the Office of Missing Persons had traced only 18 individuals out of roughly 15,000 filed cases, and had done so without disclosing the required details. The report attributed this shortfall to a lack of political will and a weak institutional framework, both of which prevented the office from fulfilling its core mandate.10
This illustrates a recurring pattern: mass mobilisation can generate real, if momentary, pressure for political change, but its permanence depends on the underlying strength of constitutional infrastructure — the true foundation of the rule of law.
Bangladesh
The most significant product of Bangladesh’s July Quota Movement was the July Charter, which called for reform of several constitutional provisions. Article 33, in particular, permits the state to detain individuals for up to six months without any advisory review, creating scope for abuse during periods of political opposition and civil unrest.11 Article 141 similarly empowers the President to declare a state of emergency whenever he judges the state to be under threat, a determination that temporarily suspends the enforceability of fundamental rights until the emergency is lifted. Because such declarations are treated as non-justiciable political questions, the judiciary cannot review them.12
The landmark case of Secretary, Ministry of Finance v Md Masdar Hossain & Others succeeded in separating the subordinate judiciary from the executive branch, leading to the creation of the Bangladesh Judicial Service (BJS) in 2007, distinct from the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS).13 Even so, the judiciary remains only partially independent of executive influence: there is still no separate judicial secretariat responsible for the appointment, resignation, benefits, and financing of judicial personnel, leaving the judiciary structurally dependent on the executive branch. The Gen Z–led July Movement drew sharp attention to these long-standing constitutional weaknesses, but exposure alone does not amount to legally entrenched reform.
Nepal
Article 19 of the Constitution of Nepal expressly guarantees the right to communication.14 Nevertheless, in 2025 the government shut down 26 social media platforms without offering any valid justification — a decision that ignited mass digital mobilisation, particularly among Gen Z, and further exposed deeply entrenched corruption within the governance system.15 This youth-led response to the arbitrary internet blackout highlighted a direct breach of Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protects freedom of expression.16
While reforms such as the Good Governance Blueprint reflect a stated willingness toward transparent government, these commitments have yet to be embedded in binding legislation capable of providing enforceable constitutional safeguards.17
IV. From Gen Z Uprisings to Constitutional Permanence
Within South Asian democracies, reliance on street mobilisation as a substitute for constitutional checks carries the risk of extrajudicial pressure that can itself erode the rule of law. This article identifies two such risks.
The Risk of De Facto Mob Governance
Article 14 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence.18 These protections are placed at risk if mob-driven justice supplants the judicial process, since a culture of mob action is fundamentally at odds with the principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty — a cornerstone of natural justice.
The Delusion of Reform
As comparative constitutional scholars have observed, political parties may rise and fall, but without root-level constitutional amendment, entrenched executive dominance will inevitably reproduce itself. Protests can trigger dramatic shifts in political structure, but durable legal reform remains the true key to lasting state stability.
V. Recommendations on How to Combat Fragile Rule of Law
1. Constitutionalising Transitional Governance and the Doctrine of Necessity
One of the principal challenges facing post-protest states is the legal uncertainty surrounding political transitions. Following the August 2024 uprising in Bangladesh, the executive sought an advisory opinion from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court under Article 106 of the Constitution to pave the way for an interim administration. The Supreme Court endorsed the establishment of the interim government on the basis of the Doctrine of Necessity, a position later affirmed by the Appellate Division in Muhammad Mohsen Rashid v Bangladesh in late 2025.19 Reliance on such an extraordinary judicial doctrine, however, produces a perpetual state of constitutional fragility.
South Asian states should instead create codified, self-executing constitutional mechanisms for transitional governance to ensure long-term democratic continuity:
- Codification of Non-Partisan Caretaker Frameworks: Constitutional amendments should permanently establish neutral, statutory interim administrations ahead of national elections, removing executive discretion over electoral machinery.
- Judicial Appointment Commissions: Independent, multi-stakeholder commissions composed of senior jurists, bar representatives, and civil society actors should oversee appointments to the higher judiciary, insulating the process from unilateral executive selection and preventing judicial capture.
2. Reinforcing Public Interest Litigation and Executive Liability
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) must evolve from a discretionary judicial tool into a mandatory mechanism for structural administrative accountability.
- Statutory Enforcement of the Public Trust Doctrine: Codifying the public trust doctrine into administrative statutes would impose explicit personal civil and criminal liability on public officials whose decisions cause catastrophic macroeconomic failure, systemic examination leaks, or illegal resource allocation.
- Specialised Anti-Corruption and Merit Tribunals: Independent, constitutionally protected tribunals — operating outside executive line ministries — should be established to investigate merit-system violations, examination leaks, and procurement corruption.
VI. Conclusion
Across Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal, Gen Z has demonstrated remarkable resilience through innovative digital mobilisation and unity of purpose. These movements have functioned as constitutional alarm bells, exposing how formal institutions have repeatedly failed to secure citizens’ democratic rights. Yet youth-led protest cannot serve as a permanent substitute for the state architecture on which the rule of law depends. Lasting reform depends less on the resilience of young protesters and more on the accountability, transparency, and judicial remedies embedded within constitutional institutions — the true measure of the rule of law in practice.
Table of Cases
Muhammad Mohsen Rashid v Bangladesh [2024] 1 SCOR 145
Secretary, Ministry of Finance v Md Masdar Hossain & Others (1999) 52 DLR (AD) 82; 20 BLD (AD) 104
Table of Legislation
Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972
Constitution of Nepal 2015
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171
Bibliography
Bingham T, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010)
Montesquieu, Baron de, The Spirit of the Laws (Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone trs, Cambridge University Press 1989)
Dicey AV, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1959)
Abdalla LH, ‘The New Constitutionalists’ Transformation of Political Resistance: The Legal Implications of Gen Z–Led Movements Confronting Tyranny and State Violence’ (Record of Law, 14 February 2026)
Joseph J, ‘Sri Lanka Supreme Court Rules Government Officials Breached Public Trust in Management of the Economy’ (JURIST, 14 November 2023)
Parliament of Sri Lanka, ‘Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution’ (Documents.gov.lk, 2022)
UN Human Rights Council, ‘Situation of Human Rights in Sri Lanka: Comprehensive Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Advance Unedited Version)’ (OHCHR, 12 August 2025)
Digital Rights Nepal, ‘Decoding Nepal’s 100-Point Governance Reform Plan: A Digital Rights Review’ (Digital Rights Nepal, 28 March 2026)
Note(S):
1. Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 1978, art 1; Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 1; Constitution of Nepal 2015, art 1.
2. AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1959) 188.
3. Latta Hussein Abdalla, ‘The New Constitutionalists’ Transformation of Political Resistance: The Legal Implications of Gen Z–Led Movements Confronting Tyranny and State Violence’ (Record of Law, 14 February 2026) accessed 5 August 2026.
4. Dicey (n 2) 193; Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane 2010) 3.
5. James Joseph, ‘Sri Lanka Supreme Court Rules Government Officials Breached Public Trust in Management of the Economy’ (JURIST, 14 November 2023) accessed 5 August 2026.
6. Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 70.
7. Constitution of Nepal 2015, art 238; Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, ‘Introduction’ (CIAA Nepal, 2026) accessed 5 August 2026.
8. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone trs, Cambridge University Press 1989) bk XI ch 6, 156.
9. Parliament of Sri Lanka, ‘Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution’ (Documents.gov.lk, 2022) — please verify and insert your original pinpoint source; the draft cited the Twentieth Amendment document here in error.
10. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Situation of Human Rights in Sri Lanka: Comprehensive Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (Advance Unedited Version)’ (OHCHR, 12 August 2025) accessed 6 August 2026.
11. Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 33 — citation added; please confirm pinpoint against your source, as the original draft did not attach one here.
12. Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 141.
13. Secretary, Ministry of Finance v Md Masdar Hossain & Others (1999) 52 DLR (AD) 82; 20 BLD (AD) 104.
14. Constitution of Nepal 2015, art 19 — corrected from art 12 in the original draft, which cited the wrong article for this claim.
15. Abdalla (n 3).
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 19.
17. Digital Rights Nepal, ‘Decoding Nepal’s 100-Point Governance Reform Plan: A Digital Rights Review’ (Digital Rights Nepal, 28 March 2026) accessed 5 August 2026.
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 16) art 14.
19. Muhammad Mohsen Rashid v Bangladesh [2024] 1 SCOR 145; Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 106.
