Authored By: Zakiya
Quantum University, Roorkee
- Introduction
India has many laws to protect the environment. the system looks strong. Laws like the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986[1] were made to control pollution and make industries responsible. There are also separate laws for air and water pollution. Government bodies like Pollution Control Boards are also there to check whether industries are following the rules.[2] But if we look at reality, the situation is different. Factories still release polluted water into rivers. Smoke from industries still crosses legal limits. In many places, rules are either ignored or followed only on paper. This creates a big question — if laws already exist, then why do people still break them?
Usually, we say the problem is weak enforcement or low penalties. That is true, but it is not the full picture. The real issue goes deeper. It is not just about law, it is about how people think and make decisions. This is where behavioural economics becomes important.[3] It helps us understand that people do not always act logically. Sometimes they take shortcuts. Sometimes they think they will not get caught. Sometimes they follow what others in the industry are doing. In simple words, behaviour matters as much as law.
In India, many industries do not break environmental laws only because of profit. They also do it because they think checking is rare, rules are complicated or “everyone else is doing the same thing.” So, the problem is not only legal, it is also behavioural.
This article tries to explain why polluters continue to violate environmental laws in India. It looks at the issue from both a legal and human behaviour point of view. The aim is simple — to understand the real reasons behind non-compliance and to see whether changing behaviour can be more effective than just making stricter laws.[4]
- Environmental Laws in India
India’s environmental laws are not weak. In fact, they are quite detailed and give strong powers to the government. The main law is the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986,[5] which is considered an “umbrella law” because it covers all types of environmental issues. Along with this, there are specific laws like the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974[6] and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981,[7] which deal with pollution control in a more focused manner.
One of the most important provisions is Section 3 of the Act.[8] This section gives wide powers to the Central Government to take any measures necessary to protect and improve the environment. This includes setting pollution standards, controlling industrial activities, and coordinating with state authorities. On paper, this is a very strong power.
Then comes Section 5,[9] which allows the government to issue direct orders. It can even order closure of industries or stop electricity and water supply if environmental rules are violated. This shows that the law is not just advisory — it has strict enforcement power.
Further, Section 7[10] clearly states that no person or industry can discharge pollutants beyond prescribed limits. This is the core compliance rule. If industries follow this properly, most pollution problems can be controlled. Similarly, under the Water Act, industries must take consent from State Pollution Control Boards before discharging effluents, and violation of such conditions can attract penalties.[11]
Similarly, Section 8[12] deals with hazardous substances. It requires industries to follow safety procedures while handling dangerous materials. This is especially important for preventing industrial accidents. The Air Act also regulates emission of pollutants into the atmosphere and requires industries to obtain prior consent before operating in notified areas.[13]
The Act also provides strong enforcement tools, Section 10[14] allows authorities to enter and inspect any industrial premises. Section 11[15] allows them to take samples of air, water, or soil for testing. Section 15[16] provides penalties, including fines and imprisonment for violations.
So clearly, the legal framework is not weak. It has power, authority, penalties. But the problem is not in the law — it is in how it works in reality. For example, even though Section 10 allows inspections, in practice inspections are not always regular. Many industries operate for long periods without strict monitoring. This reduces the fear of getting caught. Similarly, even though Section 15 provides punishment, enforcement is often slow. Cases take time, and penalties are sometimes not strong enough to create real fear. There is also a gap between “formal compliance” and “actual compliance.” Many industries complete paperwork and get approvals, but still violate standards in practice. This shows that following the law on paper is easier than following it in reality. India has strong environmental laws, but their effectiveness depends on consistent enforcement. When enforcement is weak or delayed, even the strongest legal provisions fail to change behaviour.
This is why just studying legal provisions is not enough. We also need to understand how industries actually respond to these laws in real life — which brings us to the behavioural aspect.
- Understanding Human Behaviour: What is Behavioural Economics?
To understand why industries break environmental laws, we must also understand human behaviour. Behavioural economics explains that people do not always act logically.[17] Instead of carefully following rules, they often take decisions based on habits, convenience, or what others are doing. an industry may violate pollution rules because it feels the chances of getting caught are low. This is called low risk perception. Another reason is bounded rationality[18] laws are complex, so not everyone fully understands them.
There is also a social factor. If many industries are not following rules, others may do the same. It becomes a normal practice. So, violations happen not just because of weak laws, but because of how people think and behave.
- Why Do Polluters Still Break the Law
Even though India has strong environmental laws, violations continue in everyday practice. The reason is not just weak law, but how industries actually behave in real situations.
In many cases, industries find it cheaper to violate the law than to follow it. Installing pollution control systems and maintaining standards requires money and effort. On the other hand, penalties are often low or delayed. Because of this, some industries take a practical decision — they prefer to risk violation rather than invest in compliance.[19] This shows that behaviour is influenced by cost, not just legal rules. Courts in India have recognised this problem. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India[20], the Supreme Court took a strict stand against polluting industries and introduced the principle of absolute liability. The Court made it clear that industries cannot escape responsibility for environmental harm. However, even after such strong judgments, violations continue, which shows that legal principles alone are not enough unless they are consistently enforced.
Another major issue is weak enforcement. If inspections are rare or predictable, industries start believing that they will not get caught. This creates a mindset where violating the law feels safe. Behavioural economics calls this “low risk perception”[21] — when people think the chances of punishment are low, they are more likely to break rules.
The Supreme Court has also tried to address this through principles like the precautionary principle and polluter pays principle in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India[22]. The Court clearly stated that industries must take preventive steps and bear the cost of pollution. But again, the impact depends on how effectively these principles are applied on the ground.
There is also the problem of complexity. Environmental laws and procedures are often technical and difficult to understand. Smaller industries, in particular, may not fully understand compliance requirements. This leads to unintentional violations or deliberate ignorance. Behavioural economics explains this through “bounded rationality” — people make decisions with limited understanding and information³. At the same time, social behaviour also plays an important role. If an industry sees that others in the same sector are not following rules, it may do the same to stay competitive. Over time, this creates a culture where non-compliance becomes normal. Law loses its moral force when violations become common practice.
Finally, delays in legal and administrative processes reduce the fear of punishment. Even when action is taken, it often takes years to reach a final outcome. This weakens the deterrent effect of law. the problem is not just that laws are weak
the problem is that human behaviour, system gaps, and weak enforcement together reduce the effectiveness of even strong laws.
5. Changing Behaviour, Not Just Laws: The Way Forward
If the problem is not only legal but also behavioural, then the solution must go beyond just making stricter laws.
First, enforcement needs to become more visible and consistent. When industries know that inspections can happen anytime and violations will be punished quickly, their behaviour starts changing. The fear of being caught plays an important role in ensuring compliance.[23]
Second, penalties must be meaningful. If the cost of violating the law is lower than the cost of following it, industries will continue to take risks. Strong and timely penalties can shift this balance.
At the same time, the system should not rely only on punishment. Behaviour can also be improved through simple steps like making rules easier to understand, providing clear guidelines, and increasing awareness. When compliance becomes easier, industries are more likely to follow the law.[24]
Another effective method is using social pressure. Public disclosure of polluting industries, sometimes called “naming and shaming,” can influence behaviour. Companies care about reputation, and this can push them towards better compliance.
Courts have already supported such approaches by strengthening environmental principles and holding industries accountable. However, real change will come only when legal enforcement and behavioural understanding work together.
the goal should not just be to punish violations, but to create a system where following the law becomes the natural choice.
- Conclusion
India’s environmental laws are strong in design, but their impact is limited by how they are followed in practice. The continued violation of these laws shows that the problem is not only legal, but also deeply connected to human behaviour. Industries do not always act based on law alone. Their decisions are influenced by cost, risk, social norms, and system efficiency. This is why behavioural economics becomes important in understanding environmental compliance.
If India wants real environmental protection, it must move beyond just creating laws. The focus should be on making those laws work in practice by improving enforcement, simplifying compliance, and influencing behaviour. Only then can the gap between “law on paper” and “law in action” be reduced.
7. Reference(S):
[1] Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, No. 29 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1986).
[2] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2023-24 (Gov’t of India), https://moef.gov.in.
[3] Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy (2018).
[4] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Behavioural Insights and Environmental Policy (2017).
[5] Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, supra note 1.
[6] Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, No. 6 of 1974, INDIA CODE (1974).
[7] Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, No. 14 of 1981, INDIA CODE (1981).
[8] Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 § 3.
[9] Id. § 5.
[10] Id. § 7.
[11] Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, supra note 6, §§ 25–26.
[12] Id. § 8.
[13] Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, supra note 7, §§ 21–22
[14] Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, supra note 1, § 10.
[15] Id. § 11.
[16] Id. § 15.
[17] Sunstein, supra note 3.
[18] OECD, supra note 4.
[19] Sunstein, supra note 3.
[20] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395.
[21] OECD, supra note 4.
[22] Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647.
[23] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, supra note 2.
[24] OECD, supra note 4.
