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S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC

Authored By: SURPRISE NTOMBISODWA MATHEBE

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

  1. Case Citation and Basic Information

S v Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), Constitutional Court of South Africa (11- Judge Constitutional Bench), decided 6 June 1995[1]

  1. Introduction

This case is about constitutional law, criminal law and the Bill of Rights under the interim Constitution of 1993.[2]This is the first case to be heard and decided by the Constitutional court of South Africa and its ruling is considered the founding judgment.[3] The case is significant or landmark due to the fact that it has ended the death penalty in South Africa and set in place a way of interpreting the Constitution for the new democracy. What makes the case noteworthy for the development of the law is because it has raised human dignity to a higher level and the right to life as the most important values of the Constitution, it brought in Ubuntu as a value of the Constitution that is justifiable. Lastly it made it clear that people’s opinions cannot take away the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution and that when making a decision if a limit on rights if fair, the court needs to check if the limit is balanced and properly explained in a manner that fits with democracy.

  1. Facts of the Case

In 1990, the appellants Makwanyane and Mchunu committed murders and robberies in Gauteng. [4]The Witwatersrand Local Division found them guilty of four murders, one attempted murder and seven robberies that were made worse by serious circumstances.[5]Under section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, The trial court gave them death penalty for each murder.[6]

The appellants appealed to the Appellate Division for the review of their case. While the appeal was still in progress, the Interim Constitution of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 came into effect.[7]Section 9 assures the right to life, section 10 guarantees human dignity and section 11(2) forbids cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.[8]The Appellate Division rejected the appeal against the convictions but sent the question of whether the death penalty was constitutional to the Constitutional Court under section 102(6) on the Interim Constitution.[9]

  1. Legal Issues

The first issue: Whether section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal procedure Act 51 of 1977 violates section 9,10 and 11(2) of the Interim Constitution.[10]

The second issue: Whether if such violation exists, it constitutes a reasonable and justifiable limitation under section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution.[11]

  1. Arguments Presented

Appellant’s Arguments

The appellants argued that the death penalty violated the rights to life, dignity and the freedom from cruel punishment in the Interim Constitution.[12] They supported this by citing international cases such Furman v Georgia[13] and Soering v United Kingdom [14]showing that the globally death penalty was seen as arbitrary, discriminatory and lacking any proven deterrent effect. [15]

Respondent’s Arguments

The State argued that the Interim Constitution allowed death penalty and that it was necessary for deterrence, prevention and retribution in a society facing high violent crime.[16] They also disputed that the right to life was not absolute and could be limited under section33(1)[17]

  1. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court rendered a judgment whereby all the judges agreed on the decision.Chaskalson P wrote the main judgement with all judges agreeing. [18]Six judges wrote added concurring opinions to support the ruling. On interpretation, the court held that the rights must be interpreted in a broad manner and with a clear aim.it stressed that the rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights.[19]

On limitation, the court put to use a proportionality test under section 33(1) ,[20]requiring that any limitation of right must reasonable and  justifiable in a democratic society. On deterrence, the court found no evidence that the death penalty deterred crime more than life imprisonment[21]and held that retribution must respect the human dignity and the value of Ubuntu.[22]

The court did not approve reliance on public opinion. Chaskalson P stressed that the duty of the court is to protect rights even if death penalty is supported by public opinion.[23]Under section 35(1) the court considered international law and found a global movement towards abolition.[24]

  1. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

The Decision

The Court stated that section 277(1)(a) and all the connected provisions allowing death penalty are not aligned with the Constitution.[25] The death sentences were set aside and sent them to the High Court for appropriate sentences other than death.[26]

Ratio Decidendi

The court held that death penalty violates the rights to life, dignity and freedom form cruel punishment, and this infringement is not justifiable and reasonable under section33(1).[27]

  1. Critical Analysis

Significance of the Decision

The decision is this case is the most important because in South African legal history as it was the first time the Constitutional Court used it authority of Constitutional review, ruling against a law: death penalty, as it was against the Constitution.[28]It resolved the uncertainty concerning death penalty under the Bill of Rights. It ended parliamentary supremacy by introducing the Constitution as the Supreme law [29]and also aligned domestic law with international law standards whereby the Court heavily referenced international to determine if South Africa’s stance aligned with global human rights standards, this includes United States, Canada and the European Court of Human Rights and identified a clear movement towards abolition in open and democratic societies.[30] It introduced Ubuntu as justifiable value of the Constitution.[31]

Implications and Impact

The practical consequences regarding the decision of the case were instant and spread across the entire justice system as the death penalty law changed, the prisoners who were sentenced to death has their sentences set aside and changing the judicial sentence to life imprisonment, therefore no Court may impose death afterwards.[32] In legal system, the case has set up a two step test under section 36 of the final Constitution of 1996, which involves verifying whether a right is violated and secondly whether the infringement is reasonable and justifiable.[33] This decision has been applied in landmark cases such as S v Williams[34] in order to put an end to juvenile whipping and to uphold life imprisonment as not cruel in S v Dodo,[35] as a result this shifted public policy towards rehabilitative justice. It remains one of the powerful examples of how Constitutional supremacy has reshaped the law of South Africa.

Critical Evaluation

The strengths of the Court’s reasoning were strong because it followed a clear principled method and placed human dignity at the centre of its analysis.it correctly ruled that public opinions cannot decide constitutional rights, since the Bill of Rights exist to protect the vulnerable ones.[36] This approach helped secure judicial independence in South Africa’s new democracy.

One of the weaknesses is based on how the court dealt with deterrence whereby it required proof that death deters crime more than life imprisonment of which research cannot show,[37] the other point is that the judgement also gave limited under section 12(1)(c) and to the safety of community in face of violent crimes.[38]an alternative approach could have kept the death penalty only for most serious cases with strict safeguard as seen in India’s Bachan Singh v State of Punjab.[39] Although there were weaknesses, the Court’s reliance on Ubuntu gave a stronger moral of foundation.

  1. Conclusion

In S v Makwanyane the Constitutional court put an end to death penalty by rejecting section 227(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act and regarded it unconstitutional.[40]It found that death penalty infringes the rights to life, dignity and freedom from cruel punishment and it cannot be justified under the Constitution.

The most important principle is that life and dignity are the foundation of all rights. The state cannot take life as a manner of punishment even against those who took lives of others. This case is remembered as the founding judgment of South African Constitutional Court due to the fact it has ended death penalty and introduced Ubuntu. With regards to future implications, there are some questions that remain unresolved. Courts are still facing the challenges concerning maintaining balance in victim’s rights to safety with the convicted person’s dignity and making a decision whether life imprisonment without conditional release is cruel punishment.

Bibliography

Cases

Bachan v State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898

Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 (1972

Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439

S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC)

S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) (CC)

S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC)

Legislation

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996

Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977

[1] S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) (CC)

[2] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution)

[3] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1)

[4] S v Makwanyane and Another ( n 1) para 2-5

[5] S v Makwanyane and Another ( n 1) para 6

[6] Criminal Procedure Act  51 of 1977, s 277(1)(a)

[7] Interim Constitution (n 4)

[8] Constitution ( n 4) ss 9, 10,11 (2)

[9] Consitution (n 4) s 102(6)

[10] Criminal Procedure Act (n 8); ss 9, 10, 11(2)

[11] Constitution (n 4) s33(1)

[12] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) paras  26-32

[13] Furman v Georgia 408 US 238 (1972)

[14] Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439

[15] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) paras 34-40

[16] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) paras 42-55

[17] Constitution (n 4) s 33(1)

[18] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) para 1

[19] S v Makwanyane and Another para 144

[20] Constitution (n 4) s 33(1); S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) para 100

[21] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) paras 120-128

[22] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) paras 223-232 (Langa J), 223-232 (Mokgoro J)

[23] S v Makwanyane and Another (n 1) para 88

[24] Consitution ( n 4) s 35(1); S v Makwanyane and Another ( n 1) paras 34-36

[25] S v Makwanyane and Another ( n 1) para 146

[26] S v Makwanyane and Another ( n 1) para 147

[27] S v Makwanyane and Another ( n 1) para 146

[28] S v Makwanyane (n 1)

[29] Consitution (n 4)

[30] S v Makwanyane (n 1) 34-36

[31] Constitution (n 2) s 35(1)

[32] S v Makwanyane ( n 1) para 148

[33] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s 36

[34] S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC)

[35] S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC)

[36] S v Makwanyane (n 1) para 88

[37] S v Makwanyane (n 1) para 120-128, Constitutional Interpretation 1996

[38] S v Makwanyane ( n 1) para 130

[39] Bachan v State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898

[40] S v Makwanyane ( n 1) para 144,Criminal Procedure Act s 227(1)(a), Constitution 1996

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