Nayan Bhowmick v Aparna Chakraborty

Case Citation and Basic Information

Full Case Name: Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty

Citation: 2025 INSC 1436, Civil Appeal No. 5167 of 2012

Court: Supreme Court of India

Date of Decision: 15 January 2026

Bench: Manmohan J. and Joymalya Bagchi J.

Parties: Nayan Bhowmick (Appellant); Aparna Chakraborty (Respondent)

Introduction

In Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, the Supreme Court of India acknowledged and dissolved a long-dead marriage by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not recognize irretrievable breakdown of marriage as an independent ground for divorce. The Court therefore turned to Article 142, holding that even where a strict case of desertion is not proved, this does not bar the exercise of its power to do complete justice between the parties.

Facts of the Case

The marriage between the Appellant and the Respondent was solemnized according to Hindu rites on 4 August 2000 at Shillong. The parties had known each other before marriage, having worked together since 1992 as Development Officers with the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The Respondent supported her elderly, ailing mother, her brother, and other dependents financially — a fact known to the Appellant before the marriage.

The Appellant and his family, however, pressed the Respondent to give up her job, and she alleges she endured sustained ill-treatment from the Appellant and his family. In 2001, the Respondent was compelled to leave the matrimonial home. In 2003, the Appellant filed a divorce suit before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Shillong, under Section 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act (desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the petition). That suit was dismissed as premature in 2006. The Appellant’s subsequent Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 9(SH) of 2006) was withdrawn in 2007, with liberty to file afresh.

The Appellant refiled in November 2007, this time under both Section 13(1)(i-a) (cruelty after solemnization) and Section 13(1)(i-b) (desertion) of the Act. In 2010, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Shillong dissolved the marriage on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b).

The Respondent appealed (RFA (SH) No. 1 of 2010), and the High Court, in its judgment dated 13 April 2011, allowed the appeal, finding no intent to permanently forsake and abandon the Appellant. The High Court held that desertion, like any other matrimonial offence, must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, and that it is a matter of inference from the facts and circumstances of each case. It found no sincere attempt by the Appellant to welcome the Respondent back — the letters he relied on read more like ultimatums than genuine invitations — and concluded the correspondence appeared designed to create a hostile atmosphere so as to later claim desertion. The present appeal challenges that 13 April 2011 High Court judgment.

Legal Issues

1. Whether the marriage had irretrievably broken down so as to justify dissolution under Article 142 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the High Court was right to set aside the Trial Court’s order and restore the divorce decree.

Arguments Presented

Appellant’s Arguments

The Appellant submitted that the parties had lived separately since 2001 with no realistic possibility of reconciliation despite sincere efforts, and that the marriage had irretrievably broken down — evident from the fact that although both parties work as Development Officers at the same LIC branch, they do not interact. He pointed to the Respondent’s cross-examination admission that she received two letters requesting her to return to the matrimonial home, to which she never replied, continuing instead to live with her parents. This, he argued, proved she had no inclination to resume matrimonial life. He contended that both ingredients of desertion — the factum of separation and the intent to permanently end cohabitation — were established and had been correctly appreciated by the Trial Court.

Respondent’s Arguments

The Respondent submitted that she never intended to desert the Appellant; rather, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home because of sustained abuse and humiliation by the Appellant and his family. She had informed the Appellant of her responsibilities toward her family before marriage, yet after the marriage he and his relatives pressured her to resign from her job because his father disapproved of a working woman. She characterized the Appellant’s letters as an eyewash, made without any sincere effort to resume matrimonial life. She further argued that the haste with which the Appellant filed for divorce in 2003 demonstrated his true intent to end the marriage.

Counsel for the Respondent relied on Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey¹, for the proposition that a marriage cannot be dissolved merely on one party’s assertion that it has broken down, and on Prabhavathi @ Prabhamani v. Lakshmeesha M.C.², for the proposition that the “bogey” of irretrievable breakdown cannot be used to benefit a party solely responsible for wrecking the marriage. [Note: the source judgment renders this word as “boggy” — likely a transcription artifact for “bogey”; please verify against the original text before publication.] She submitted, finally, that she continued to affirm the marriage and remained willing to resume matrimonial life with the Appellant.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

First, the Supreme Court observed a long period of separation with no hope of reconciliation: the litigation began within two years of the marriage and had been pending for 22 years, with the parties living apart for 24 years. Court-ordered mediation, dated 26 March 2012, had also failed. The Court noted that consistent long-term separation without hope of reconciliation amounts to cruelty inflicted on both parties, citing Rakesh Raman v. Kavita³, where 25 years of separation was held to render a marriage “only on paper” and irretrievably broken.

Second, the Court held that in matrimonial disputes it is not for courts or society to adjudicate which spouse’s approach to marriage is “correct” — both parties may hold sincere but irreconcilable views, and a mutual refusal to accommodate each other itself amounts to cruelty. It relied on Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli⁴, which held that an unworkable, defunct marriage is a source of ongoing misery and that the law cannot ignore prolonged continuous separation without harming both society and the parties. It also drew on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh⁵, where prolonged separation was held to render the matrimonial bond “beyond repair” — reducing the marriage to a legal fiction whose forced continuation causes, rather than prevents, mental cruelty.

Third, the Court held that its power to do “complete justice” under Article 142(1) is not fettered by any doctrine of fault or blame. It cited Pradeep Bhardwaj v. Priya⁶, where the Court exercised Article 142 power to dissolve a marriage on findings of complete detachment and prolonged estrangement amounting to an irretrievable breakdown incapable of repair. It further relied on Kumari Rekha v. Shambhu Saran Paswan⁷, holding that the absence of a statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act does not bar the Court from exercising Article 142 power where it is satisfied that a marriage has irretrievably broken down.

Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

The Court held that no sanctity remained in the marriage and that reconciliation was not realistically possible. While affirming that the sanctity of marriage should ordinarily be preserved, it found that the parties’ prolonged separation left nothing to preserve, and that granting divorce would not adversely affect any third party. It further observed that allowing matrimonial litigation to persist indefinitely only sustains a marriage “on paper,” and that severing such ties serves both the parties’ and society’s best interests. Exercising its power under Article 142, the Court dissolved the marriage, upholding the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial)’s 2010 order and setting aside the High Court’s 2011 judgment.

Critical Analysis

Significance of the Decision

Although irretrievable breakdown is not a statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act, this judgment reinforces a now well-established line of authority dissolving marriages under Article 142 on that basis. It underscores that consistent long-term separation without hope of reconciliation constitutes cruelty to both parties, reducing a marriage that exists only on paper to a legal fiction whose forced continuation itself causes mental cruelty.

Implications and Impact

The judgment confirms that Article 142’s power to do complete justice is not constrained by a fault-and-blame framework, and that the absence of a statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act does not prevent the Court from exercising this power where it is satisfied a marriage has irretrievably broken down — reflecting a continuing shift away from strictly fault-based divorce.

Conclusion

Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty is another significant instance of the Supreme Court exercising its Article 142 power to do complete justice. Because the Hindu Marriage Act does not recognize irretrievable breakdown as a statutory ground for divorce under Section 13, the Court has increasingly relied on Article 142 to grant divorce on this basis in recent years. That power, however, must be exercised cautiously, on reasoned findings and careful evaluation of each case’s facts — not routinely or as a matter of course. More fundamentally, Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act warrants legislative revisiting: irretrievable breakdown is a lived reality, and the law would do well to recognize it formally as a statutory ground for divorce.

Table of Authorities

Legislation

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, s. 13(1)(i-a), s. 13(1)(i-b)

The Constitution of India, Article 142

Reference(S):

1 Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey, (2002) 2 SCC 73 (para 17)

2 Prabhavathi @ Prabhamani vs. Lakshmeesha M.C [Civil Appeal No. 8790/2024] (para 6)

3 Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita [(2023) 17 SCC 433]

4 Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558

5 Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511

6 Pradeep Bhardwaj v. Priya (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1436

7 Kumari Rekha v. Shambhu Saran Paswan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1032