Authored By: Anastasija Krila
Riga Graduate School of Law
Introduction
In October 2025, two minors riding an e-scooter died after being hit by a train in Latvia. A tragic fatal incident in Riga involving two 13-years-olds on a shared e-vehicle exposed critical legal gaps in micro-mobility regulation in Latvia. The minors accessed an e-scooter provided by “Ride Mobility” using third-party account to bypass age restrictions, resulting in a fatal collision at a railway crossing. While the tragedy sparked public outage, determining civil and administrative liability among the platform operator, the account holder and municipal regulators remains legally complex.
Shared micro-mobility platforms fail to enforce age verification effectively, relying on terms of services that are easily circumvented. Furthermore, under the regulatory framework in force at the time of the accident, Latvian legislation classified these high-powered e-vehicles similarly to traditional bicycles under the former wording of Article 24(4) of the Road Traffic Act, creating a regulatory mismatch between actual vehicle capability and statutory oversight.
This article argues that while recent statutory amendments have addressed vehicle reclassification, existing regulatory framework and platform mechanisms remain insufficient to prevent unauthorized access, necessitating defined delictual liability for account holders under the Latvian Civil Law and stricter technical verification standards.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I sets out the factual context and core legal dilemmas. Section II examines the evolution of the Latvian regulatory framework and its recent amendments. Section III analyzes remaining regulatory gaps in tortious liability for account transfers. Section IV explores comparative approaches in foreign jurisdiction. Section V proposes targeted legislative reforms to close the account-sharing loophole.
Evolution of the Latvian Regulatory Framework
The Pre-Incident Regulatory Framework
Under Clause 29 of Section 1 of the Road Traffic Act (prior to recent amendments), vehicles equipped with human-powered pedals and an auxiliary electric motor with a rated power under 0.25 kW and a capped speed of 25 km/h were formally classified as a traditional bicycles.
Exploiting this statutory definition, e-scooter platforms such as “Ride Mobility” installed rudimentary pedal assemblies to classify high-powered e-vehicles under bicycle regulations. Consequently, these heavy motorised vehicles operated legally on sidewalks and pedestrian crossings without mandatory registration, OCTA insurance, or helmet requirements. This lenient statutory framework notably relieved sharing operators of any legislative obligation to enforce strict user identity or age verification.
Legislative Response: The New Statutory Classification of Self-Propelled Bicycles
After this sensational incident and the subsequent necessity to revise the legislation governing light vehicles, a clear statutory distinction was drawn between different types of micromobility devices, introducing a new legal term.
Hence, a vehicle equipped with pedals but fitted with an electric motor with a power output of up to 1000 W, capable of moving solely by means of the motor’s propulsion, is now classified as a self-propelled bicycle (pašgājējs velosipēds). In contrast, vehicles with an auxiliary motor of up to 250 W, which assists only during active pedaling and disengages at 25 km/h, are strictly classified as electric bicycles. While a traditional, muscle-powered bicycle is permitted to operate on pavements and pedestrian crossings, the new regulations explicitly ban self-propelled bicycles from pedestrian infrastructure to ensure public safety.
Mandatory Registration, OCTA Insurance and Statutory Age Verification Requirements
Administrative and technical requirements for owners and sharing operators have also tightened significantly. All electric scooters and self-propelled bicycles must now be registered in the CSDD database and display a physical licence plate or a registration sticker. Furthermore, this category of micro-mobility vehicle is now subject to mandatory third-party liability insurance (OCTA) to cover potential damage caused to third parties.
Sharing platforms face new statutory obligations as well. Operators are now legally required to verify that users hold a valid driving licence and meet the minimum age requirement before unlocking a vehicle. Additionally, platforms must implement in-app reaction and sobriety tests for potential drivers during night hours and in high-risk zines.
However, despite these comprehensive public-law regulations, the critical issue of unauthorized account transfers remains entirely unaddressed by the current legislative framework.
Contractual Disclaimers and Delictual Liability in Account Sharing
Limitations of Digital Terms of Services and Verification Controls
Digital Terms of Service (ToS) function merely as a civil contract between the platform and the user. Consequently, while users contractually agree not to transfer their accounts, the law imposes no affirmative duty on operators to continuously monitor compliance with these contractual clauses. Although ToS restrictions exist de jure, they are easily circumvented de facto.
Currently, one-time verification protocols, such as scanning an ID card or passport during the registration, fail to prevent account misuse. An adult user can successfully verify their identity once and subsequently pass the unlocked app or device to a minor. Thus, initial onboarding mechanism are structurally insufficient to eliminate third-party entrustment risk in real-time operations.
Unaddressed regulatory Gaps: Civil Liability of Account Holders for third-party Entrustment
Articles 1779 and 2347 of the Civil Law (Civillikums) contain no specific provisions imposing delictual liability on account holders for the negligent handling of credentials or the intentional transfer of platform access to third parties.
In the absence of dedicated statutory provisions, establishing tortious liability for account entrustment remains legally challenging. Unless legislative reforms explicitly classify account transfers as creating a source of heightened danger (paaugstinātas bīstamības avots), such conduct is treated merely as a breach of contract rather than an actionable tort. Furthermore, when an account is transferred to a minor, OCTA insurers may legally deny coverage due to terms of service violations, leaving injured third parties without effective civil remedies.
Platform Operator Accountability and User Fraud
Without explicit legislation imposing liability on account holders, precisely defining the boundary where legal responsibility shifts from the platform to the individual remains impossible. Platform operators implement standard verification tools and contractual disclaimers to disclaim liability for unauthorized third-party access. Consequently, while companies protect themselves from downstream claims, individuals face no statutory accountability for breaches.
This creates a systemic regulatory imbalance: the platform absolves itself of legal liability, while individual users remain immune to delictual remedies. Until private individuals bear direct financial and civil liability for transferring account access to third parties, regulatory reforms will remain fundamentally incomplete, failing to deter recurring incidents.
Comparative Legal Framework
France (Paris Municipal Model)
In France, micromobility regulation combines strict municipal oversight with a rigorous legislative classification framework. At the municipal level, following a referendum on 2 April 2023, the Paris City Council exercised its administrative powers over public domain management (conventions d’occupation du domaine public) by refusing to renew agreements with major operators, resulting in a complete ban on shared e-scooters from 1 September 2023.
Jurisprudentially, the French Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) confirmed that, pursuant to Decree No. 2019-1082 and the Highway Code (Code de la route), motorized micromobility devices are classified as motorized land vehicles (véhicules terrestres à moteur). This subjects operators and users to strict civil liability under the Loi Badinter. However, enhanced platform monitoring faces regulatory boundaries: in CNIL Decision SAN-2023-003, the data protection authority fined an operator €125 000 for excessive geolocation tracking, demonstrating that identity verification must balance against GDPR proportionality standards.
Germany (Halterhaftung Framework)
In Germany, micromobility regulation relies on dedicated secondary legislation – the Ordinance on Small Electric Vehicles (Elektrokleinstfahrzeuge-Verordnung – eKFV). Under the eKFV, electric scooters are strictly classified as motorized vehicles, requiring a mandatory insurance sticker (Versicherungsplakette) and restricting operation to individuals aged 14 and over.
A key doctrinal pillar of the German framework is the principle of strict keeper liability (Halterhaftung), enshrined in Section 7 of the Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz – StVG). This doctrine imposes strict civil liability on the registered holder or account owner who exercises operational control over the vehicle for third-party damages. Transposing the Halterhaftung concept into the Latvian Civil Law (Civillikums) provides a compelling mechanism to close the current regulatory gap by establishing direct delictual liability for account holders who entrust platform access to unauthorized minors.
United Kingdom (Road Traffic Act Strictness)
In the United Kingdom, micromobility regulation is characterized by statutory strictness under motor vehicle law. Pursuant to the Road Traffic Act 1988, electric scooters are classified as motor vehicles, requiring a valid driving licence and third-party insurance, while the use of privately owned e-scooters on public roads and pavements remains strictly prohibited. Within authorized trial schemes, the statutory framework enforces public-law accountability: entrusting an account or device to an unlicensed user or minor is categorized as aiding and abetting driving without a licence or insurance.
The UK approach offers a compelling comparative model wherein account transfers are treated not merely as contractual breaches of platform terms, but as statutory offences triggering criminal and administrative penalties for account holders.
Proposed Legal Solutions and Technical Compliance
Closing the Account-Sharing Loophole: Recommended Amendments to the Civil Law (Civillikums)
To close the existing liability vacuum, targeted legislative amendments must be introduced to the Civil Law (Civillikums). Specifically, the unauthorized transfer of a micro-mobility account to third parties (particularly minors) should be statutorily classified as an independent actionable delict, backed by direct civil financial liability. Granting access to a personal credentials profile that confers operational control over a vehicle must be recognized as creating a source of heightened danger (paaugstinātas bīstamības avots), triggering strict delictual consequences for the account holder.
Furthermore, the Latvian legal framework should incorporate and adapt the German Halterhaftung doctrine. By legally treating the account holder as the temporary operational keeper (holder) of the vehicle during the active rental period, the law would establish a direct legal basis for holding individuals responsible for damages caused by unauthorized third-party users.
Proportional Biometric Verification and Platform Joint-and-Several Liability
To enforce compliance, statutory amendments to traffic regulations must mandate dynamic, continuous user verification prior to every unlock attempt, utilizing biometric mechanisms such as facial recognition, fingerprint scanning, or digital licence checks. Drawing on the French regulatory experience, such verification should rely strictly on on-device processing to uphold the GDPR principles of data minimisation and privacy by design, avoiding centralized biometric databases or continuous location tracking.
Crucially, the legal framework should introduce platform joint-and-several liability. Operators must share civil liability with account holders for third-party damages whenever an unauthorized transfer occurs due to the platform’s failure to maintain adequate verification safeguards. Reallocating this financial exposure incentivizes mobility providers to actively develop robust technical barriers, aligning corporate commercial interests with public safety goals.
iii. Inter-Agency Data Sharing and Insurance Reform (OCTA Adjustments)
To establish effective operational oversight, statutory amendments must mandate inter-agency integration between shared mobility platforms and the CSDD database. Automated, real-time verification of driver’s licence status would allow platforms to instantly revoke access for individuals with suspended or cancelled driving privileges. Concurrently, the compulsory motor third-party liability insurance framework (OCTA) must be adapted to the specific risks of micromobility rentals. The law should guarantee that injured third parties receive insurance compensation even if the vehicle was operated by an unauthorized user or a minor. To uphold accountability, insurers must be granted an explicit statutory right of recourse against the account holder who permitted unauthorized access, thereby balancing unconditional protection for vulnerable road users with strict financial consequences for account misuse.
Conclusion
The rapid and unprecedented expansion of shared micromobility services in Latvia has significantly outpaced the evolution of the national legislative framework. This structural disconnect has generated a critical regulatory vacuum regarding unauthorized account transfers, minor access, and civil liability for third-party damages. As demonstrated by the comparative legal analysis of French, German, and UK regulatory models, contractual Terms of Service (ToS) are legally insufficient to guarantee public safety, manage systemic risks, or safeguard vulnerable pedestrians.
Addressing these complex legal challenges requires a comprehensive and multi-tiered legislative reform in Latvia. Introducing direct delictual liability for unauthorized account entrustment into the Civil Law (Civillikums), drawing directly on the German Halterhaftung (strict keeper liability) doctrine, provides a clear basis for individual accountability. Furthermore, pairing this civil law reform with proportionate biometric verification under GDPR principles, platform joint-and-several liability for verification failures, and adapted OCTA insurance recourse mechanisms will effectively eliminate the current liability loophole.
Systemically, this proposed legal framework bridges the gap between digital platform operations and traditional tort law. Ultimately, it strikes a necessary and pragmatic balance between enforcing strict accountability for account misuse, ensuring fair financial compensation for injured victims, and fostering the continued growth of sustainable urban mobility across Latvian municipalities.
Reference(S):
Legislation and Statutory Instruments
Latvia
Civillikums (Civil Law of the Republic of Latvia) 1937, Part Four: Law of Obligations (Saistību tiesības), Arts 1779, 2347
Ceļu satiksmes likums (Road Traffic Law of the Republic of Latvia) 1997, s 1(29), art 24(4)
Sauszemes transportlīdzekļu īpašnieku civiltiesiskās atbildības obligātās apdrošināšanas likums (OCTA Law) 2004
Cabinet Regulation No 279, Ceļu satiksmes noteikumi (Road Traffic Regulations) 2015
France
Loi n° 85-677 du 5 juillet 1985 tendant à l’amélioration de la situation des victimes d’accidents de la circulation et à l’accélération des procédures d’indemnisation (Loi Badinter)
Décret n° 2019-1082 du 23 octobre 2019 relatif à la réglementation des engins de déplacement personnel
Code de la route, art R311-1
Germany
Elektrokleinstfahrzeuge-Verordnung vom 6 Juni 2019 (BGBl I S 756) (eKFV)
Straßenverkehrsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 5 März 2003 (BGBl I S 310) (StVG), s 7
United Kingdom
Road Traffic Act 1988, ss 143, 190
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s 8
European Union
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1 (GDPR), arts 5, 9
Cases and Regulatory / Administrative Decisions
CNIL Decision SAN-2023-003, Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (Délibération de la formation restreinte n° SAN-2023-003 du 16 mars 2023)
Mairie de Paris, Decision of the Paris City Council on Non-Renewal of Public Domain Occupancy Agreements (Conventions d’occupation du domaine public following the Municipal Referendum of 2 April 2023)
Valsts Policija, Official State Police Investigative Report on the Railway Crossing Incident in Riga (October 2025)
Secondary Sources
Hentschel P and König P, Straßenverkehrsrecht (46th edn, CH Beck 2021)
Torgāns K, Saistību tiesības (Tiesu namu aģentūra 2014)
