John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v Thomas Fletcher (commonlycited as Rylands v Fletcher).

Case Citation and Basic Information

• Full Case Name: John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks v Thomas Fletcher (commonly cited as Rylands v Fletcher).
• Citation: (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (HL).
• Court: House of Lords (United Kingdom).
• Date of Decision: 17 July 1868 (heard on 6–7 July 1868).
• Parties: John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks (appellants – mill-owners, defendants in the lower courts) v Thomas Fletcher (respondent – mine-owner).
• Judges: Lord Cairns (Lord Chancellor) and Lord Cranworth (the bench consisted of only these two judges; Lord Colonsay was absent) en.wikipedia.org.

Introduction (Context and Significance)

Rylands v Fletcher is a landmark case of the 19^th– centuary. In this case the decision of House of Lords had introduced a new rule of strict liability in the English tort law. The law before this case restricted accidental damages caused by the property of another party to the negligence (or nuisance and trespass) in most cases.  Rylands, the court determined that an individual who introduces dangerous thing on his property, which is most likely to result in mischief in case it gets out of control, and where that particular thing actually gets out of control and inflicts harm, the person is liable without negligence uni-trier.de.

This rule in Rylands v Fletcher so constituted an absolute (strict) liability on some hazardous escapes.  It reconciled between the private law on reservoirs and dangerous uses of land and the public law (public reservoir statutes)  aglawjournal.wp.drake.edu .  Observers have pointed out that this was an influential.  The rule was subject to rapid influence both in English law and elsewhere, on which subsequent cases on hazardous industrial activity were founded.  Its long-term value is that it acknowledged the risks inherent in the non-natural utilisation of the land which the law was to assign to the land-user.

Facts of the Case

Rylands (a mill -owner) signed an agreement in or about 1860 to construct a large reservoir on his premises to feed the adjacent Ainsworth Mill.  He left the building to contractors and an engineer, and did not participate in the active part.  The contractors made some discoveries during the construction process, as they found a number of old disused mine shafts and passages under the proposed location, which were unclearly filled with debris.  These shafts were stretched out and linked horizontally to the other coal mines owned by Fletcher.  The contractors, who were aware of the shafts, however, did not block/secure them appropriately.

The recently built reservoir collapsed on 11 December 1860 soon after filling first.  The weight of the water tore into the insufficiently stuffed shafts and poured down into the coal mine of Fletcher (Red House Colliery) where it flooded and resulted in a serious amount of damage (estimated at PS937)  .  Fletcher immediately pumped out the water, but on 17 April, 1861 his pumping plant broke and the mine flooded up again.  Then a mines inspector was summoned and the coal shafts that were sunk under the reservoir were found.  The escape of water could not be caused by unusually high precipitation or by any other apparent agency of God but by the artificial build-up of substantial amount of water on concealed mine workings.

Fletcher also sued Rylands (the reservoir owner) and Jehu Horrocks (his manager) on 4 November 1861 to recover the damage.  At first the tort of trespass was considered inapplicable to such an incident and he pleaded negligence.  Rather, the action was carried on more or less on nuisance or the like.  By trial (Liverpool Assizes, September 1862, before Mellor J and a special jury), it was held by the jury that Fletcher had made out a cause of action and had suffered damages.  The case was consensually submitted to arbitration under the Exchequer (special procedure).  On December 1864 the arbitrator found the contractors guilty of negligence (they were aware of the shafts), but did not find Rylands guilty at all because he did not know anything about the shafts.  Nevertheless, Fletcher was attractive.

His winning case in the Court of Exchequer (1863) is that Rylands had not proved a cause of action, a fact that Fletcher had failed to demonstrate.  This was overruled on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber (1866): it was held that Rylands would be liable to the escape, upholding the opinion of Fletcher (Lord Justice Blackburn giving the court ruling).  Lastly, the case was taken to the House of Lords by Rylands and Horrocks.  The decision of the Exchequer Chamber was upheld by the House of Lords (in 1868) which stated that the defendants were liable to the damage.

Legal Issues

The following questions of law had to be resolved by the House of Lords:

• Strict Liability: Does a landowner have a duty of care to take care of or of damaging persons through the escape of something belonging to his land without any evidence of negligence or intention to damage? (Otherwise stated, is there a strict liability rule in situations where a dangerous thing breaks free and damages the property of another)?.
• Non-Natural Use: Did Rylands use his land (constructing and filling the reservoir) amount to a non-natural use, thus making him a victim of escape? (This is about what is natural and unnatural use of land .
• Defendant Duty: What is the extent of duty of one who invites something on his land which is likely to cause harm? Is the duty of care (including the need to be negligent), or is it an absolute duty to prevent escape?

Defences Have any defences been available (e.g. act of God, default of plaintiff) that would exonerate Rylands? (Plaintiff default or vis major would have been a defense to this case, but there is no evidence that either party used it, and the case had been previously ruled that defenses would be excused by the prior action of the plaintiff) . The previous dissent by Bramwell J implied the recourse to trespass/nuisance. The Lords were left with a decision on whether to codify such a rule into a separate tort.

In short, the gist of the matter was, whether water reservoir, being made by Rylands, put upon him a strict liability of repairing the natural resulting consequences of its escape.

Arguments Presented

Arguments of Appellants (Rylands and Horrocks)

• No Personal Fault: The defendants stressed that Rylands have used capable contractors and an engineer to construct a reservoir. He himself was not an active participant in the construction.  They highlighted that nobody (including even the contractors) knew that there were the old shafts under the reservoir location.  In such a manner, the defendants claimed, the harm did not occur due to their negligence, but owing to accidental lack of innocence or unforeseen deficiency.
• Act of God or Excuse: The appellants implied in their story that the flooding was a chance accident (like an act of God) of which they should not be blamed. They might have said that the escape of water, was merely the action of natural laws (hydrostatic pressure on weak shafts), and that Fletcher might have prevented his mine (as by the construction of a barrier) had he cared.  Later on as stated by Lord Cairns, in the natural use of such land, were there to take place any accretion of water…passed off…by the action of the laws of nature, the Plaintiff could not have complained. The defendants successfully argued that the reservoir was a normal (natural) use of the land and that any consequenceant flood was a misfortune, and not an unlawful wrong.
• Limitations of Liability: The side of Rylands stated that they should not be liable to the negligence committed by the contractors. They may refer to the principle that the general rule that an employer is not liable in case of the independent negligence of contractors applies.  This would have been supported by the special finding by the Exchequer judge that the contractors had not taken reasonable care.  Basically, Rylands argued that he did not have any direct liability,  it would be unfair to hold him directly liable just because he had given the work to the professionals.

The appellants did not use any authority that was cited to hold them liable to strict liability in these conditions.  Their policy aimed at restricting responsibility to torts of fault (negligence or nuisance), and in fighting against the establishment of a strict principle.

Arguments of the respondent (Fletcher)

• Strict Liability Principle: The case in which Fletcher was involved was based on the principle of strict liability which was new. Counsel on behalf of Fletcher had claimed that a large body of water – a substance likely to cause mischief were it to escape – had been brought onto their land, and collected and retained there by Rylands and Horrocks, who had therefore an obligation to retain it there at their peril.  He applied to the statement made by Lord Cairns in the Exchequer Chamber (adopted by Blackburn J):… we believe that the actual rule of law is, that he who, for his own purposes, introduces in his land… anything tending to do mischief had he got away, must keep at his own peril…  Fletcher says that after water got out of hand and caused injury, Rylands became prima facie liable to all the injuries as a result.

• Right to Enjoy Property: Fletcher also noted the common sense of the fact that any landowner has a right to enjoy his land without being interfered with by some other people. He indicated that the activities of Rylands had directly affected the enjoyment of Fletcher by flooding his mine.  In the argument (which reiterated the statement made by Baron Bramwell on the first instance), Fletcher presented that any physical invasion (such as water getting into his mine) could be subject to action.  He argues that the facts came squarely under some rule similar to nuisance or trespass: a wrongful intrusion of some dangerous thing.  According to Lord Cairns, later on, cases like Smith v Kenrick and Baird v Williamson affirmed the fundamental concept that escapes of things that are dangerous should result in liability.

• Lack of Excuse: Fletcher made the claim that the excusing conditions were not applicable: the plaintiff did not cause the escape himself, and it was not the result of extraordinary forces of nature the human being lacks control. This being the case because the escape happened due to the introduction of water by the defendants, he held that they ought to suffer the consequences.  In his advice, Fletcher suggested that the law must not be used to excuse the defendants because they had not been negligent in a technical manner.

Altogether, the arguments presented by Fletcher revolved around the new rule of strict liability when it comes to non-natural use of land: evidently that Rylands posed an inherent risk and it actually did escape the land, it should be liable to case.

The Rationalization and analysis of the court.

The House of Lords under the leadership of Lord Cairns (L.C.) and Lord Cranworth, concurred with the move taken by the Exchequer Chamber and embraced strict liability rule.  The dominant opinion given by Lord Cairns establishes the reasoning.  He initially made a distinction on the natural use and the non-natural use of land  .  He believed that, in case the defendants would have used the land in an entirely normal or natural manner (such as water gathering and flowing away by the law of nature) Fletcher would not have been able to complain – any resultant escape would have been a normal act of nature .  But it was not the case, here.  Rylands had decided to add and deposit on the land water above or below ground in the quantities and in a manner non-resultant of work or operation on or under the land – a use which Lord Cairns described as non-natural.

Lord Cairns was of the view that in cases where one leaves his ordinary use and transports something harmful to his land he does so in his own peril.  He has formulated the rule (quoting Blackburn J) that the individual who… causes to come onto his land and collects and retains there anything which is likely to cause mischief, will be answerable, at his own peril, to all the damage which is the natural result of its escape; and who fails to do so, has a prima facie case to answer.  That is, the liability exists because there is a danger which has been known to escape.  This was further explained by Lord Cairns, by stating that it was but reasonable and just that where a neighbour brings at least on his land something that is harmless, but dangerous once crossed the boundary, fairness awards him to make good any injury should it escape.  He rejected any implication that the non-existence of personal fault on the part of Rylands was exculpatory, since in this instance there was no defence, the escape was not occasioned by the fault of Fletcher and was not a vis major or an act of God.

Finally, Lord Cairns declared that these mere principles would actually decide this case.  He agreed with the statement by the Exchequer Chamber of the rule in its entirety and verified its decision.  Lord Cairns concluded by formally requesting that the decision of the Exchequer Chamber be upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Lord Cranworth gave a concurring judgment, which restated the rule to a large extent in his own words.  He admitted that the statement of Blackburn J was rightly applied.  Cranworth pointed out that when an individual introduces, or piles up, on his premises, anything that once unleashed can happen to harm his neighbour, he would do it at his own risk.  Should it succeed in making its escape, and do harm, he is answerable, though as cautious as he could be.  That is, liability by this rule would not be relieved even in case of every precaution having been taken.  The agreement established that liability was caused by the very act of accumulation and escape and not by negligence.

Therefore, the argument presented by the Lords was: Rylands had acted in an unnatural manner with his land by constructing the reservoir and bringing in huge amounts of water; and in these conditions, Rylands would be liable to the harm  .  The principle of strict-liability was used and there was no necessity of establishing any fault.

Judgment and Ratio Decidendi.

The House of Lords unanimously upheld the appeal by Fletcher striking out the appeal by Rylands and Horrocks.  The losses on the first instance were maintained.  The ratio decision on which the case was based is summed up in the statement of the rule made by Lord Cairns:

“he who brings on his land, and gathers and retains there, anything which is likely to produce mischief, upon escaping, is bound to do so in at least, and is, in that regard, prima facie answerable, all the damage which is the natural consequence of such escape”

The House in effect determined that a landowner who gathers on his premises a substance or thing that has a probable capacity to produce harm should it be emitted, is, in the occasion that the use is non-natural, strictly liable to any damage caused by the use.  The case therefore established a new common law exception to the general rule which demanded the proving of negligence.  Actionable negligence or intent was not required to be demonstrated but a responsibility to hold the dangerous thing contained was imposed by the court.  This was later affirmed in (Lord Cranworth at the time agreed with this by reiterating that any escape resulting in damage renders the defendant liable despite how careful he can be.) The House directed that Fletcher had to be compensated by Rylands on the flooding.

Critical Analysis

Reasonableness of the Decision.

The case of Rylands v Fletcher is of historic importance since it forms the basis of a strict liability rule in English tort law.  It indicated that there might be some dangerous applications of land which are liable without negligence.  The decision harmonized the liability on privately operated reservoirs with those on the law in the public water supply (statutes on the public water supply), thus bringing the law into line and a major shift in the doctrines of law.  To Lord Cairns the case was simply an issue of justice: were the injury to have never arisen but that the defendant should have employed the land in an unnatural manner, it was just that the defendant should pay the money.  According to legal theorists, the common law principle of strict liability without demonstrating that a person was negligent was first introduced in this case.  In fact, it even became a reference point to the contemporary nuisance and environmental torts: the “Rule in Rylands v Fletcher” was invoked in an array of subsequent cases and jurisdictions to treat the case of pollution, chemical spills, gas releases, and escapes of other hazardous materials.

The value of the idea of free enjoyment of property was also pointed to in the case.  Rylands enhanced the rights of private-proprietors by ensuring that a landowner has the right to use and enjoy his land free of any sudden interference by his neighbouring dangerous material.  This idea was reflected in the dissent of Baron Bramwell (since echoed by the Lords): one is entitled to possess land without the the invasion by another.  Rylands put real practice to that right in circumstances where the traditional torts (trespass or negligence) may not apply.

Practically speaking, Rylands increased the level of care in all people who performed unusual or dangerous actions on the land.  As an illustration, firms that possessed hazardous chemicals or those that have built big reservoirs were placed at a greater legal responsibility of ensuring escapes were avoided.  The ruling did not only have an impact on English law but foreign systems.  In the United States, such a stricter-than-liberal rule was adopted in many states in respect of ultra-hazardous activities (mirroring the Restatement of Torts).  Similar doctrines arose in civil law jurisdiction (usually embodied in environmental or liability legislation).  The case therefore had a short and long-term effect in the sense that it admitted that modern day industrial activities may present special risks which should be treated with special laws.

Implications and Impact

The implication of the Rylands rule was far reaching.  It was a tort law staple in England and Wales in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which was referred to in cases of fire, sewage, floods, gas and other escapes.  But as time went by, its status changed.  Subsequently the rule was narrowed or subsumed by other torts over time in courts.  Above all, in House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Co Ltd (1994) and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council (2003), it was determined that Rylands could no longer be viewed as a separate tort.  The rule did not need to be extended in Cambridge, Water Lord Goff maintained that the rule should be considered as a sub-species of nuisance.  He indicated that the current laws (including the Environmental Protection Act 1990) provided more direct means of addressing environmental damage.  In Transco Lord Bingham also upheld the rule, but modified it to be a subspecies of nuisance effectively combining it with traditional nuisance law.  He also restricted Rylands claims to damage of property (other than personal injury) .

The responses in other nations have been mixed.  Scotland notoriously made the rule a heresy to be rooted out; in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) the rule was abolished without preserving its impact by the Australian courts as an extension of the general principles of negligence.  A modified version of the doctrine (but with more stringent conditions) was still in existence in Canada.  Rylands-style liability is occasionally mentioned today in the environmental and industrial setting, but has largely been replaced by statutory regulation and extended principles of nuisance/strict liability.

But nonetheless Rylands left behind him a legacy.  It foresaw subsequent advances in environmental- and strict-liability law more than a century.  The notion that a party that creates extraordinary risk should retain it at his peril has informed the contemporary doctrines, such as the ultra-hazardous activity rule of American tort and principles of polluter pays of environmental law.  The fact that it handles the allocation of risk by having the introducer of a hazardous object into land insure against the object escaping is still a convincing policy, despite any legal reformulations that might have taken place.

Critical Assessment (Strengths, Weaknesses, Current Applicability)

Merits: The main merit of the Rylands rule is that it is easy to understand and that it provides a severe protection of victims.  It does away with the frequent hard work of establishing fault in case of damage caused due to a risky escape.  The rule encourages the taking of caution and precautionary steps by imposing the liability on the party that decided to use the land in a dangerous manner.  It also gives certain clarity in certain instances: whenever all of the conditions are satisfied (non-natural use, an escape of a dangerous thing, damage), the liability is virtually automatic.  During its heyday, this served claimants in gaining damages that would otherwise be lost due to the gaps in the negligence or nuisance law.

Limitations: The rule on the other hand has been criticised as being unfair and unpredictable.  It is notoriously hard to define non-natural use of land, which may depend on the context of time.  An extraordinary use in one place or time would be ordinary in another.  This has been a difficult concept with the courts.  Moreover, the necessity to escape and physical injuries restricts the application of the rule.  There are innumerable losses (e.g. personal injury, economic loss, or damage not involving a discrete escape event) that are beyond the range of Rylands.  Philosophically, such restrictions have made the rule of narrow applicability.  It has been noted that Rylands has not fared well and must be read and critically applied by the commentators.  It was described as one of very narrow applicability and in fact throughout the 20th century its boundaries have narrowed with foreseeability and other limitations imposed on it by the courts.

Importantly, there are those scholars who suggest that Rylands does not sit well with other concepts of torts.  An example is that D. Nolan points out that putting Rylands under the umbrella of private nuisance is issue since Rylands can be claimed by a person who has no interest in the land but nuisance has always had the requirement of a person having an interest in land.  Similarly, the fact that the policy of treating Rylands as a form of nuisance is a variant also provokes questions, as the policy justifications are different.  These theoretical challenges are one of the reasons why the modern English law has been constrained by Rylands as opposed to being based on it.

Contemporary Significance

The case Rylands v Fletcher is now predominantly of theoretical and historical value.  In English law it still remains as a type of nuisance, and has further conditions (including foreseeability of harm), not found in the original rule  .  Its traditional version of strict liability is hardly ever applied outside in analogy.  However, the fundamental logic of Rylands, according to which the people who cause extraordinary dangers have to face the outcomes, remains the support of the liability principles in environmental law and tort.  An example of the same policy is regulatory regimes that require strict liability of pollution or hazardous activities.

Summing up, the case of Rylands is praised as the first to introduce strict liability, yet its application was very narrow.  The rule provided excellent protection of victims and encouraged care but was strict in its application, which might suppress innocent activities and create anomalous results.  Most jurisdictions in the late 20th century repealed or severely limited the rule, and instead used either negligence or statutory schemes to deal with contemporary hazards.  However, the case itself is a classic study in the conflict between individual enterprise and community protection and today, it is still studied as part of the foundation of tort law.  This legacy lives on in the notion that the retention of something dangerous on land represents a duty to ensure that it is not leaked.

Conclusion

Rylands v Fletcher gave rise to the well-known principle that one who introduces a dangerous thing upon his land and gathers it, must retain it at his own peril, and is responsible of any harm it can cause in escaping.  The ruling of House of Lords was a decisive shift to the strict liability in relation to some torts, which greatly increased remedy to victims in accidents.  Even though modern times have limited its use (particularly by Cambridge Water and Transco which applied the case as a sub-tort of nuisance ), the fundamental holding of the case highlighted an essential legal precedent; the burden of containing and regulating activities that are inherently dangerous lies with the risk manufacturer.  In that regard, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a beacon of the tort law that shows the dedication of the law to safeguard neighbours in the unintended effects of non-natural land use of each other.

Reference(S):

• Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 (HL).
• Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1 (QB).
• Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway [1917] AC 556 (HL).
• Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 (HL).
• Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 264 (HL).
• Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 AC 357 (HL).
• Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520 (HC Aust).
• AWB Simpson, ‘Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v Fletcher’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 209.
• FH Newark, ‘Non-Natural User and Rylands v Fletcher’ (1961) 24 Modern Law Review 557.
• Donal Nolan, Private Nuisance in English Law (Clarendon Press 2011) Ch 4.