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INTERNET SHUTSDOWN AND THEIR LEGALITY UNDER ARTICLES 19 AND 21

Authored By: Alynah Sanjay Miranda

LORD'S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE OF LAW

Introduction

Picture waking up one morning and discovering that your phone has no internet, no news, no banking app, no way to check on relatives, no way to run your online business. For millions of people in India, this has not been a hypothetical scenario but a lived reality, as the country has repeatedly ordered regional internet shutdowns, often citing law-and-order concerns. This article explains, in plain terms, how the Indian Supreme Court has approached the legality of these shutdowns and what rights are at stake.

The Legal Basis for Shutting Down the Internet

Internet suspensions in India are not carried out on the government’s whim alone; they are meant to follow the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017,1 framed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. These rules allow specified government officers to order suspension of telecom or internet services during a public emergency or in the interest of public safety. In practice, however, many shutdowns in the past were also ordered under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,4 a much older and more general provision meant for preventing unlawful assembly, which was never designed with the internet in mind.

Anuradha Bhasin: The Turning Point

The most important case on this subject is Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India,2 decided by the Supreme Court in January 2020. The petitioner, the executive editor of the Kashmir Times, challenged the prolonged communication blockade imposed in Jammu and Kashmir, arguing that it violated the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom to carry on trade or a profession under Article 19(1)(g). The Supreme Court made several important findings:

  • First, it held that freedom of speech and expression through the medium of the internet is a fundamental right protected under Article 19(1)(a), and that carrying on trade or business through the internet is protected under Article 19(1)(g).
  • Second, any restriction on these rights must satisfy the reasonable-restriction tests laid out in Articles 19(2) and 19(6), and must pass the doctrine of proportionality, meaning that it must be necessary, suitable to achieve its stated aim, and no more restrictive than required.
  • Third, and very significantly, the Court held that an order suspending internet services indefinitely is simply not permitted under the 2017 Suspension Rules; any suspension must be temporary and must be reviewed periodically by a Review Committee.
  • Fourth, the Court held that suspension orders must be made public, so that affected citizens can know the reasons for the restriction and, if necessary, challenge it in court.

It is worth noting what the Court did not do: it stopped short of ordering the immediate restoration of internet services in Jammu and Kashmir, choosing instead to direct the government to review its orders in light of the principles it had laid down. Critics have pointed out that this made the judgment strong on principle but comparatively weak on immediate relief.

Article 21 and the Human Cost of Shutdowns

While Anuradha Bhasin focused mainly on Article 19, the human consequences of internet shutdowns connect closely to Article 21, the right to life and personal liberty, which the Supreme Court has long read to include the right to live with dignity. Prolonged shutdowns cut people off from online education, telemedicine, banking, and emergency information, and disrupt the livelihoods of workers and small businesses who depend on connectivity. Scholars and courts examining more recent shutdowns, such as the prolonged restrictions during unrest in Manipur, have argued that shutdowns lasting many weeks or months are difficult to justify under either Article 19 or Article 21, since a measure that drags on indefinitely can rarely still be called “proportionate” to a temporary law-and-order concern.

The Gap Between Law and Practice

Despite the clear principles set out in Anuradha Bhasin, India has continued to experience frequent and sometimes lengthy internet shutdowns in different states. Reports have noted that suspension orders are still often not published, review committees do not always meet on schedule, and shutdowns are sometimes ordered for reasons as routine as preventing cheating in examinations, a far cry from the “public emergency” standard envisioned by the 2017 Rules. In 2024, the Supreme Court stepped in again,3 directing that even where the internal deliberations behind a shutdown order can remain confidential, the final order itself must be published. This shows that turning a good judgment into consistent practice on the ground remains an ongoing struggle.

Conclusion

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India stands as a landmark recognition that access to the internet is not a luxury but a gateway to the exercise of fundamental rights—the right to speak, to earn a living, and to live with dignity. The judgment gave India a clear legal test: shutdowns must be lawful, necessary, proportionate, temporary, and transparent. Yet the persistence of shutdowns across the country shows that a well-reasoned judgment is only the first step. Making constitutional principles a lived reality requires governments to follow the rules they are given, courts to keep holding them accountable, and citizens to keep asking why the internet went dark in the first place.

When the internet goes dark, constitutional accountability must shine brighter.

REFERENCES:

A. Relevant Case Laws

  • Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 S.C.C. 637 (India) (the leading case establishing that internet access enjoys constitutional protection under Article 19, and laying down the proportionality and periodic-review requirements).
  • Found. for Media Prof’ls v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, (2020) 5 S.C.C. 746 (India) (a follow-up order enforcing the Anuradha Bhasin directions and constituting a special review committee).
  • Found. for Media Prof’ls v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, Order dated Jan. 30, 2024 (Supreme Court of India) (directing publication of internet suspension orders).
  • K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1 (India) (laying down the four-fold proportionality standard applied to restrictions on fundamental rights, including internet shutdowns).
  • Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 2976 (Kerala High Court) (holding the right to access the internet to be part of the right to privacy and education under Article 21).
  • Modern Dental College & Rsch. Ctr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 S.C.C. 353 (India) (articulating the structured proportionality test relied upon in Anuradha Bhasin).

B. Statutes, Rules & Constitutional Provisions

  • Constitution of India, arts. 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2), 19(6), 21.
  • Indian Telegraph Act, No. 13 of 1885, § 7 (India).
  • Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017 (India).
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 2 of 1974, § 144 (India).
  • Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 69A (India).

C. Websites & Other Online Sources

FOOTNOTE(S):

1 Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017, Gazette of India, pt. II sec. 3(i) (India), framed under the Indian Telegraph Act, No. 13 of 1885, section 7 (India).

2 Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 S.C.C. 637, 2-10 (India).

3 Found. for Media Prof’s v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, Order dated Jan. 30, 2024 (Supreme Court of India)

4 Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 2 of 1974, § 144.

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