Authored By: Verdha Sabeeh
Harlal School of law, HIMT
1. Citations
Case Title: Himanshu Kr. Pathak @ Mithiya Pathak v. The State of Bihar
Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna (Single Bench)
Case Number: Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 775 of 2013
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Purnendu Singh
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. Ajay Mukherjee and Mr. Ganesh Sharma, Advocates[1]
Counsel for the Respondent (State): Mr. Abhay Kumar, Additional Public Prosecutor
Date of Reservation of Judgment (CAV): June 29, 2026
Date of Pronouncement: July 9, 2026
Statutes Involved: Sections 342, 354, 375, 376, and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
2. Introduction
Seeking justice for gender-based violence in India often collides with the fixed technicalities of criminal procedure and with hyper-technical judicial reasoning that privileges statutory categorisation over the lived experience of the survivor. The Patna High Court’s order in Himanshu Kr. Pathak v. State of Bihar is a troubling illustration of this tension. First registered as an FIR in January 2008, the prosecution travelled through investigation, trial, conviction and a thirteen-year appellate pendency before it was finally adjudicated in July 2026, almost eighteen years after the alleged assault[2]. This extraordinary delay, produced by both systemic docket congestion and a narrow, doctrinally rigid mode of judicial reasoning, culminated in a survivor of a violent sexual assault being left without either a conviction or a meaningful sense of closure. The Court did not dispute that the appellant had used criminal force against the victim; it disputed only the statutory label that force deserved. In converting a 2013 trial court conviction into a complete acquittal, discharging the appellant’s bail bonds, and ordering a refund of the fine he had deposited, the High Court’s ruling raises difficult questions about how Indian courts distinguish between offences that share a common factual matrix but carry vastly different penal consequences, and about whether procedural delay of this magnitude is compatible with substantive justice for survivors of sexual violence[3].
3. Facts
The incident occurred on 19 January 2008 in Amarpur village, Banka district, Bihar. The victim accompanied her father to a photo studio called “Chhaya Studio” to have her photographs printed. The studio’s owner, Himanshu Kr. Pathak (the appellant), asked the victim’s father to remain in the outer room to view a digital preview of the photographs on a computer monitor, thereby separating the father from the inner room where the victim was seated. While the father waited outside, the appellant locked the studio door from the inside. The prosecution’s case was that the appellant then used criminal force against the victim, attempted to remove her salwar, and pressed her chest despite her resistance. When the victim raised an alarm, her father forced the locked door open, upon which the appellant fled the scene. A formal First Information Report was lodged with the police the following day, on 20 January 2008. The case thus arose out of a single, continuous transaction confined to a matter of minutes inside a locked room, with the victim’s testimony and her father’s account of the locked door and the appellant’s flight forming the principal evidentiary basis for the prosecution.
4. Procedural History
Following investigation by the local police, a charge sheet was filed and the case was committed for trial before the Court of the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge-I, Banka[4]. On 31 October 2013, the trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 376/511 IPC (attempt to commit rape) and Section 342 IPC (wrongful confinement), sentencing him to three years’ rigorous imprisonment on the principal charge, together with a separate term of imprisonment and fine on the confinement charge. The appellant challenged this conviction by filing Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 775 of 2013 before the Patna High Court. The appeal remained pending for nearly thirteen years. It was finally heard and reserved for judgment on 29 June 2026, and Justice Purnendu Singh delivered the appellate verdict on 9 July 2026, setting aside the conviction in its entirety and acquitting the appellant of all charges. The Court also noted that the appellant had already undergone approximately three and a half months in judicial custody at the trial stage, a factor that appears to have coloured its view of the equities in an already long-delayed matter.
5. Arguments Presented
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the prosecution’s own evidence, even if accepted in its entirety, fell short of establishing an attempt to commit rape within the meaning of Sections 376 read with 511 IPC. Counsel argued that there was no medical evidence on record to corroborate penetration or any attempt at penetration, that the Investigating Officer had not been examined at trial, and that the prosecution’s narrative, at its highest, disclosed only the use of criminal force with intent to outrage modesty, an offence squarely within Section 354 IPC rather than the graver charge of attempted rape. It was submitted that convicting a person of the higher offence without an unequivocal overt act directed at penetration would collapse the statutory distinction that Parliament had deliberately drawn between the two provisions. On behalf of the State, it was argued that the totality of the circumstances, the appellant luring the father away on a pretext, locking the door, using force to remove the victim’s clothing, and fleeing the moment the door was opened, demonstrated both the intention to commit rape and a proximate act going beyond mere preparation, satisfying the test for attempt laid down in Abhayanand Mishra[5]. The State further relied on the well-established principle that a survivor’s testimony, if credible, requires no independent corroboration[6], and urged that the absence of medical evidence, particularly in a case where the victim was rescued before the assault could be completed, could not by itself be read as fatal to the prosecution’s case[7].
6. Issues
The Court considered three principal questions of law: first, whether locking a victim inside a studio, attempting to strip her salwar, and physically molesting her constitutes an “attempt to commit rape” under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC, or merely an act of outraging modesty under Section 354 IPC; second, whether the absence of medical corroboration and the non-examination of the Investigating Officer vitiates a conviction for attempted sexual assault; and third, whether it is judicially justified to grant a complete acquittal after an eighteen-year delay attributable to procedural and technical shortcomings in the framing and proof of the prosecution’s charges, rather than to any finding that the underlying assault did not occur.
7. Holding / Decision
The Patna High Court held that the proved conduct of the appellant, confining the victim, attempting to remove her salwar, and pressing her chest, constituted criminal force used with intent to outrage a woman’s modesty under Section 354 IPC, but did not cross the higher threshold required for an “attempt to commit rape” under Sections 376/511 IPC. The Court reasoned that the doctrine of criminal attempt, as applied in Indian law, requires proof of an unequivocal overt act directed toward the actual commission of the substantive offence, an act that goes beyond preparation and points unmistakably toward penetration[8]. In the Court’s assessment, the prosecution evidence, read at its highest, did not establish any such act, and this evidentiary gap was compounded by the complete absence of medical corroboration and the prosecution’s failure to examine the Investigating Officer. Because the appellant had been tried, charged and convicted only for attempted rape and wrongful confinement, and not in the alternative for outraging modesty, the Court held that it could not simply substitute a conviction under Section 354 IPC without reopening the trial. It therefore set aside the 2013 conviction in its entirety, acquitted the appellant of all charges, discharged his bail bonds, and directed the refund of any fine he had deposited.
8. Ratio Decidendi
In the absence of direct evidence of physical penetration, even to the slightest extent, or of an unequivocal overt act pointing unmistakably toward the commission of sexual intercourse, the higher statutory ingredients of an “attempt to commit rape” under Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC are not attracted, particularly where that evidentiary gap is compounded by the absence of medical corroboration and by the non-examination of the Investigating Officer. Acts of criminal force falling short of this threshold, however grave, fall instead within the ambit of Section 354 IPC, and a conviction for the graver offence cannot be sustained where the accused was never tried, in the alternative, for the lesser one.
9. Analysis / Critique
The judgment reflects a doctrinally defensible but practically troubling application of the preparation-attempt distinction to a case of sexual violence. Doctrinally, Indian criminal law has long distinguished mere preparation from attempt by asking whether the accused, having completed preparation, took a step directly toward the commission of the offence with the requisite intention; the test does not require the penultimate act, only an unequivocal step in that direction. Applying that framework, the High Court’s conclusion that locking a room, attempting to strip a victim, and molesting her fell short of an overt act toward penetration is a defensible, if narrow, reading of settled attempt doctrine. The difficulty lies less in the doctrine itself than in how the Court weighed the evidence available to it and in the practical message the outcome sends.
First, the Court’s insistence on medical corroboration sits uneasily with the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence on sexual offences. In Gurmit Singh[9], the Supreme Court held that the reliable and confidence-inspiring testimony of a survivor requires no corroboration as a matter of law, and cautioned trial and appellate courts against approaching such testimony with suspicion merely because independent corroboration is unavailable. More recently, in Shailendra Kumar Rai[10], the Supreme Court went further, holding that the absence of medical evidence does not, by itself, disprove that a sexual offence occurred, and criticising the continuing over-reliance on medical examination as a substitute for credible testimonial evidence. Read against this body of precedent, the Patna High Court’s approach, treating the absence of a medical report and the non-examination of the Investigating Officer as effectively dispositive, appears to reintroduce precisely the kind of corroboration requirement that the Supreme Court has repeatedly disavowed. It is also worth noting that the facts, as accepted by the Court itself, describe a survivor who was rescued mid-assault; a demand for medical proof of an act that was interrupted before completion risks penalising the victim for the very fact that her father’s intervention prevented the assault from escalating further.
Second, the failure to examine the Investigating Officer was a lapse attributable to the prosecuting agency, not to the victim, and treating that lapse as a ground for wiping out the conviction effectively transfers the cost of institutional failure onto the survivor. A more victim-centric approach would have distinguished between gaps in evidence that undermine the credibility of the survivor’s account and gaps that reflect nothing more than administrative or prosecutorial shortcomings unrelated to the truth of what occurred.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the outcome exposes a structural weakness in how the prosecution framed its charges. Because the appellant was tried only for attempted rape and wrongful confinement, and not in the alternative for outraging modesty, the High Court considered itself unable to convert the conviction rather than acquit outright. This is a criticism more properly directed at the charge-framing stage of the trial than at the survivor herself, yet it is the survivor who bears the consequence, an assailant whose use of force the Court itself acknowledged is now not merely regarded as having committed a lesser offence, but entirely absolved of criminal liability. Finally, the eighteen-year journey of this case, from FIR to final acquittal, itself illustrates how procedural delay degrades the very evidence a court later finds wanting; witnesses’ memories fade, investigating officers are transferred or retire, and medical evidence that was never gathered at the time can never be reconstructed decades later. The delay and the evidentiary gaps that ultimately proved fatal to the prosecution are, in this sense, not unrelated phenomena but two faces of the same systemic failure.
10. Broader Implication
The ruling sits within a wider and increasingly visible pattern of appellate decisions that draw fine statutory distinctions between molestation and attempted rape in ways that place a heavy evidentiary burden on survivors. By requiring near-conclusive proof of an act directed at penetration before the graver offence can be sustained, such rulings risk allowing perpetrators whose conduct falls just short of that threshold to escape meaningful accountability, even where a court accepts that criminal force was used with sexual intent. The decision attracted swift criticism at the highest level: the Supreme Court, while hearing an unrelated suo motu matter concerning a similarly reasoned Allahabad High Court order, was reported to have expressed serious concern over the Patna High Court’s reasoning in this very case, observing that greater care was warranted before arriving at such conclusions in cases of sexual violence[11]. That reaction underscores how contested the doctrinal line between Sections 354 and 376/511 IPC remains, even among constitutional courts, and suggests that the Patna High Court’s approach may not survive scrutiny if tested further. Beyond the immediate case, the near two-decade delay in reaching any final outcome is itself a significant institutional failure. When delays of this magnitude are attributable to systemic docket congestion rather than to any complexity in the facts, and when they end not in a considered reappraisal of the evidence but in a technical acquittal, public confidence in the capacity of the criminal justice system to deliver timely and substantive justice to survivors of sexual violence is significantly eroded.
11. Conclusion
The decision in Himanshu Kr. Pathak v. State of Bihar is, on balance, a step backward in the evolution of victim-centred jurisprudence in India. An eighteen-year odyssey through the criminal justice system, culminating in the complete exoneration of a man whose use of criminal force against the victim was never seriously in dispute, and in the return of the fine he had paid, illustrates a form of structural apathy that goes beyond the facts of this single case. The judgment is doctrinally coherent on the narrow question of what separates preparation from attempt, but it is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s own insistence that survivors of sexual violence should not be made to bear the burden of corroboration requirements the law does not impose, or of prosecutorial and investigative failures not of their making. Going forward, it is important that appellate courts exercise the power they undoubtedly possess to look beyond hyper-technical statutory boundaries where doing so would allow gender-based crime to escape meaningful accountability, and that legislative or prosecutorial reform address the charge-framing gap that made a technical acquittal, rather than a conviction on a lesser charge, the only outcome available to this Court.
Bibliography / Footnote(S):
Himanshu Kr. Pathak @ Mithiya Pathak v. The State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 775 of 2013, High Court of Judicature at Patna (Decided on July 9, 2026).
Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 342, 354, 375, 376, and 511.
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384.
State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, (2022) 16 SCC 293.
Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1698.
(Footnotes with source URLs appear at the foot of the relevant pages.)
[1]Patna HC Acquits Studio Owner Of Attempt To Rape Charge, Converts Conviction To Outraging Modesty, LawStreet, https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/patna-hc-acquits-studio-owner-of-attempt-to-rape-charge-converts-conviction-to-outraging-modesty, accessed 9 september 2026 (for details of counsel, the CAV date and the period of custody undergone by the appellant).
[2]Himanshu Kr. Pathak @ Mithiya Pathak v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 775 of 2013, 2026 Supreme(Online)(Pat) 14423, https://supremetoday.ai/lack-of-evidence-for-rape-attempt-at-patna-high-court-20260715008, accessed 9 september 2026.
[3]Himanshu Kr. Pathak v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 775 of 2013 (Patna HC, 9 July 2026), https://www.barandbench.com/news/removing-womans-salwar-pressing-her-chest-amounts-to-outraging-modesty-not-attempt-to-rape-patna-hc, accessed 9 september 2026.
[5]Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1698, distinguishing ‘preparation’ from ‘attempt’ and holding that an attempt begins the moment an accused, after completing preparation, does an act with the requisite intention that is a step toward the commission of the offence, even if it is not the penultimate act.
[6]State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, holding that the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, if found to be reliable and inspiring confidence, requires no corroboration as a matter of law, and cautioning courts against a hyper-technical approach in sexual offence trials.
[7]State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, (2022) 16 SCC 293 / 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1494, deprecating undue reliance on medical examination in sexual offence adjudication and holding that the absence of corroborative medical evidence does not, by itself, disprove the prosecution case.
[11]Supreme Court Slams Patna High Court Over Its Verdict, LawBeat, https://lawbeat.in/top-stories/supreme-court-slams-patna-high-court-over-pressing-womans-chest-trying-to-remove-salwar-not-attempted-rape-verdict-1612541, accessed 9 September 2026.