Authored By: Charlie Smith
I. Case Citation and Basic Information
For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16
Court: Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
Date: 16 April 2025
Bench: Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lady Rose and Lady Simler
II. Introduction
For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 is a significant Supreme Court decision regarding the interpretation of ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ under the Equality Act 2010. It also considers the relationship of this Act with the Gender Recognition Act 2004. A key issue was whether a person holding a full Gender Recognition Certificate, recognising their acquired gender as female, should be treated as a ‘woman’ for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. The case required the Supreme Court to determine the meaning Parliament intended these terms to have within equality law. The judgment is significant because it provides an authoritative interpretation of these terms. It also clarifies the extent to which a Gender Recognition Certificate affects a person’s legal status under the Equality Act. Therefore, the decision has important implications for applying sex-based protections, as well as protection against discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment.
III. Facts of the Case
The Equality Act 2010 sets out a variety of protected characteristics, including sex and gender reassignment. It defines a ‘woman’ as ‘a female of any age.’ Under the Gender Recognition Act 2004, a transgender person may be eligible to apply for a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC). Section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 states that ‘where a full Gender Recognition Certificate is issued to a person, the person’s gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender.’ However, section 9(3) makes this subject to provision made by this Act or any other enactment. This created the question of whether a person holding a GRC recognising their acquired gender as female was a ‘woman’ for the purposes of the Equality Act.
In 2018, the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 was enacted to improve representation of women on public boards. It originally defined ‘woman’ to include a person with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. For Women Scotland challenged the definition, and the Inner House held that defining terms within the Equality Act was reserved to the UK Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998.
Following this ruling, the Scottish Ministers issued fresh statutory guidance in April 2022. This defined ‘woman’ consistently with the Equality Act while recognising a person with a full GRC as a woman. For Women Scotland again challenged the guidance, but the Outer House and Inner House dismissed the challenge.
For Women Scotland subsequently appealed to the UK Supreme Court. The Court heard the appeal in November 2024 and delivered its judgment on 16 April 2025, determining the meaning of ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 and the effect of a GRC within that statutory framework.
IV. Legal Issues
Issue 1: Whether the terms ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex or whether they can include acquired sex following the issue of a full Gender Recognition Certificate under the Gender Recognition Act 2004.
Issue 2: How sections 9(1) and 9(3) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 interact, and whether the Equality Act 2010 contains provisions that qualify the general rule in section 9(1), under which a person’s acquired gender becomes their gender ‘for all purposes.’
V. Arguments Presented
For Women Scotland argued that the term ‘sex’ in the Equality Act 2010 meant biological sex of a person, with ‘man’ and ‘woman’ referring to biological men and women. They argued that obtaining a GRC did not alter the meaning of the term ‘sex’ in the Equality Act. In their view, interpreting the terms ‘sex’ and ‘man’ or ‘woman’ in accordance with the Gender Recognition Act 2004 would lead to problems in applying other provisions of the Equality Act. In particular, they argued that treating sex as acquired rather than biological could undermine the operation of provisions relating to pregnancy and maternity. For Women Scotland also relied on the relationship between sections 9(1) and 9(3) of the Gender Recognition Act. They argued that the ‘for all purposes’ rule in section 9(1) was explicitly subject to other enactments under section 9(3), and that the Equality Act contained provisions requiring ‘sex,’ ‘man’ and ‘woman’ to be interpreted as their biological meanings.
In contrast, the Scottish Ministers argued that section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 allows acquired gender to be used ‘for all purposes.’ Therefore, where a person’s GRC recognised their acquired gender as female, they should be legally recognised as a woman for the purposes of the Equality Act. They argued that the Equality Act should be interpreted in the context of the existing Gender Recognition Act.
The Scottish Ministers’ interpretation was supported by lower courts. The Outer House held that the language in the Gender Recognition Act was clear and concluded that ‘sex’ in the Equality Act included the acquired sex of a person with a GRC. The Inner House agreed. Therefore, the Supreme Court had to determine which interpretation was legally correct, and how the two legislative frameworks should operate together.
VI. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court clarified that the case was not about deciding the definition of ‘woman’ generally. Instead, it was to determine the meaning that Parliament intended the terms ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ to have within the Equality Act 2010. The Court emphasised the importance of consistency and predictability.
The Court first considered the language, structure and historical context of the Equality Act. Under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the terms ‘man’ and ‘woman’ had been used to distinguish people according to biological sex. The Court considered this relevant for determining how Parliament intended the terms to operate within the Equality Act. Section 11 of the Equality Act identifies sex as a protected characteristic and refers to ‘a man or a woman,’ whilst section 212 defines ‘man’ as ‘a male of any age’ and ‘woman’ as ‘a female of any age.’ The Court considered these provisions together, rather than interpreting the definition of ‘woman’ in isolation. From the wording, structure and historical context of the legislation, the Court concluded that ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ referred to biological sex for the purposes of the Equality Act.
Additionally, the Court considered the consequences of interpretation based on certificated rather than biological sex. It examined provisions relating to pregnancy and maternity, single-sex services, schools, communal accommodation and armed forces. These examples demonstrated the difficulties that could arise from an interpretation based on certificated sex. The Court considered that such an interpretation would make various provisions of the Equality Act incoherent or impracticable and therefore could not have been Parliament’s intended interpretation.
The Supreme Court also considered the interaction with the Gender Recognition Act. Section 9(1) of the Gender Recognition Act states that ‘acquired gender of a person becomes his or her gender for all purposes.’ However, this is subject to provisions made by the Gender Recognition Act itself, or other enactments. The Court concluded that the Equality Act contains provisions to which section 9(3) applies. Therefore, the general rule in section 9(1) is qualified in its application to the Equality Act.
The Court rejected the Scottish Ministers’ interpretation that section 9(1) meant that a person holding a full GRC must be treated according to their acquired gender throughout the Equality Act. Instead, it held that the Equality Act’s provisions concerning sex operate within the qualification created by section 9(3). Therefore, the Court ruled that a GRC changes a person’s legal gender for the purposes of section 9(1), but does not alter the meaning of ‘sex’ within the Equality Act.
VII. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
The unanimous decision allowed the appeal. The joint judgment was delivered by Lord Hodge, Lady Rose and Lady Simler, with Lord Reed and Lord Lloyd-Jones agreeing.
The Supreme Court held that the terms ‘man’, ‘woman’ and ‘sex’ in the Equality Act 2010 refer to biological sex. Therefore, a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate recognising their acquired gender as female is not a ‘woman’ for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. The Scottish Ministers’ guidance was consequently found to be unlawful.
The ratio decidendi is that, for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010, these terms refer to biological sex. The Equality Act contains provisions to which section 9(3) of the Gender Recognition Act applies, meaning that obtaining a GRC does not alter a person’s sex for the purposes of the Equality Act. This ratio is specific to statutory interpretation of the Equality Act and should not be understood as a universal judicial definition of sex or gender.
VIII. Critical Analysis
A strength of this judgment is that it provides greater clarity over the definitions within the Equality Act 2010. Previously, the relationship between the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Equality Act appeared complex and potentially conflicting. The Supreme Court has now provided a definitive interpretation, confirming that ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ refer to biological sex for the purposes of the Equality Act. However, the judgment also demonstrates the limits of judicial interpretation, and the continued interaction between the Acts may indicate that clearer legislative drafting from Parliament would be preferable.
The judgment has caused controversy due to its practical consequences. Prioritising the coherence and operation of the Equality Act is useful where different provisions rely upon biological sex, and certificated sex could make consistent application difficult. However, this interpretation limits the effect of section 9(1) in the context of the Equality Act, because the ‘for all purposes’ wording does not require acquired gender to determine the meaning of ‘sex’ under that Act. The judgment therefore creates a distinction between acquired gender and sex.
The decision has also had wider implications. Following the judgment, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) updated its guidance to reflect the Court’s interpretation. This explains that a Gender Recognition Certificate does not change a person’s sex for the purposes of the Equality Act and provides guidance on when separate or single-sex services may be lawful. This demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation has consequences beyond the immediate dispute, particularly for organisations applying the Equality Act in practice.
The decision can be defended as it gives organisations and individuals greater certainty when applying sex-based provisions of the Equality Act. It also preserves the coherence of provisions which are structured around biological sex. However, this does not necessarily resolve all of the equality issues arising from the interaction between sex and gender reassignment protections. Although the Supreme Court confirmed that trans people remain protected under the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, the ruling may affect how transgender people access or experience certain services.
IX. Conclusion
Overall, the decision represents a significant development in UK equality law because it establishes an authoritative interpretation of the terms ‘sex’, ‘man’ and ‘woman’ under the Equality Act 2010. The Supreme Court’s reasoning was based on the wording and structure of the Equality Act, its historical development and the need for the legislation to operate coherently. Although the decision limits the relevance of a Gender Recognition Certificate when determining sex under the Equality Act, it does not remove the separate protection provided to trans people through the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. The judgment therefore provides greater legal certainty in the application of the Equality Act, particularly in relation to sex-based provisions, but does not resolve the wider tension between sex-based protections and protection from discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment. The decision ultimately clarifies the law while leaving the broader balance between these protections for Parliament and future legal development.

