Authored By: Lindiwe Mashaba
Introduction
South Africa is currently facing one of the biggest anti-migrant protests the world has ever seen. These protests were initially labelled as “peaceful marches” but gradually tension escalated and they turned violent. Amidst all these protests there is one recurring word being shouted that stands out, ‘Abahambe’ which translates to ‘they must go’ reflecting the protesters demand for the removal of those perceived to be responsible for the prevailing grievances. What began as a simple word has turned into a widespread movement gaining recognition internationally, and being featured in global News coverage.[1]
South Africa’s post apartheid’s history has been repeatedly marked by episodes of violence directed at foreign nationals. Similar events has happened before like in 2009, outbreaks Of anti-migrant violence were seen from Western Cape, to Johannesburg, and Durban approximately 3000 foreigners were chased from their homes, this resulted in deaths and displacement of foreign nationals across South Africa.[2] While the country is known for having one of the most progressive constitutional framework in the world there has not been any big preventive measures to combat this issue, hence we are here again.
Xenophobia vs Afro phobia
These incidents shows a recurring social pattern that emerges in context of economic pressure and weak governance around migration-related grievances, one of the biggest question still arise from these demonstration, are we using the correct term describing these outbreaks, is Xenophobia the correct term?. The attacks in 2009 at the Western Cape was mainly directed at Zimbabweans leaving 3000 of them without home, in 2015 – 2019 Somaliland and Ethiopian business were vandalized and looted from.[3] These protests are said to demand illegal immigrants to go back home, but it seems like only African migrants are getting the short end of the stick. So one might argue that instead of these being called Xenophobic attacks they should be called Afro phobia attacks.
A number of grievances are raised by these protesters thing like high unemployment rate amongst the youth in South Africa, most of the believe foreign nationals are competing with them for low-skilled jobs because employers favour undocumented immigrants since they are illegal they are more open to accept inadequate wages, other concerns about public services such as healthcare, education, and housing are brought up believing that undocumented immigrants strains the already limited state resources.
Perception vs Reality
Public perceptions of immigrants in South Africa are often characterised by beliefs that foreign nationals are responsible for unemployment, crime, and pressure on public services. However, empirical evidence challenges these assumptions. The Helen Suzman Foundation has found that a significant proportion of the public associates immigration with economic and social decline, despite data indicating that immigrants contribute positively to economic growth and are not disproportionately associated with criminal activity. The OECD estimates that immigrants contribute between 8.9% and 9.1% of national GDP, while labour market studies suggest that migrants are often concentrated in informal or self-employed sectors rather than directly displacing South African workers.[4] These findings demonstrate a clear divergence between public perception and empirical reality, suggesting that anti-migrant sentiment may be driven more by structural insecurity and political discourse than by factual conditions.
South African constitution provides legal protection to Everyone it is not limited to citizens. Guaranteeing equality before the law and prohibits unfair discrimination on grounds including race, ethnicity, of social origin, and nationality.[5]
Legal Framework
Section 27 of the constitution confirms that access to healthcare, food water, and social security is not restricted to citizens but applies to all people.[6] The protests have progressed to civilians going door to door looking for foreign nationals them assaulting them, this is a violation of section 10 and 12 which protects the inherent dignity of all person and protects freedom and security of all people.[7]
While the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act 16 of 2023 provides a legal framework for addressing Xenophobic violence and criminalized both hate speech and hate Crimes.[8] The immigration Act 13 of 2002 controls the administration, residence, and departure of foreign nationals. The Act operates within a broader constitutional framework and requires immigration enforcements to be carried out in a lawful and right-compliant manner.[9]
Which all these legal framework put in place we still see demonstration groups rising like Operation dudula and March and March, the question still stands are these demonstration fighting for valid reasons or is it just hate?. The judgement in Kopanang Africa against Xenophobia and others vs Operation dudula and others provides a somewhat judicial response. The High Court was confronted with conduct that closely mirrors the broader social dynamics captured in public rhetoric such as “Abahambe,” where foreign nationals are constructed as illegitimate occupants of public space and economic opportunity.[10] In this case, civil society applicants challenged the actions of Operation Dudula, which had engaged in the identification, harassment, and removal of foreign nationals from informal trading spaces, as well as interference with access to essential services such as healthcare and education. The Court’s engagement with section 41 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 is particularly significant, as it clarified that immigration enforcement powers are not open-ended and must be exercised within strict constitutional limits.[11] The Court further confirmed that such enforcement cannot be privatised or delegated to informal actors, even where they claim to be responding to perceived state failure. This is directly relevant to the xenophobia debate because it demonstrates how anti-migrant sentiment, when translated into action, often operates outside the boundaries of lawful authority and risks undermining the rule of law, even in situations where they assert that they are reacting to perceived state failure. This indicates how anti-immigrant sentiment frequently acts outside the bounds of legitimate power and runs the risk of undermining the rule of law, which makes it directly relevant to the xenophobia argument.
More significantly, the Court’s reasoning reinforces that foreign nationals are still bearers of fundamental rights regardless of their legal status by grounding immigration enforcement regulations within a rights-based constitutional framework. The Court essentially rejected the notion that undocumented status justified less protection for human rights by interpreting section 41 in accordance with constitutional provisions, especially those related to freedom, privacy, dignity, and the child’s best interests. The judiciary’s recognition that xenophobic behaviour is not just a social grievance but a legally cognisable violation of constitutional norms is demonstrated by the interdicts granted against Operation Dudula, which prohibit harassment, the forced removal of traders, and hate speech based on nationality. The ruling supports the claim that xenophobia in South Africa is sustained by illegal activities that the courts have now clearly declared to be incompatible with the Constitution and the rule of law, in addition to being motivated by economic insecurity or views of state failure, when read in conjunction with your discussion of “Abahambe” and alternative explanations for anti-immigrant violence.
The South African Constitutional Court rendered also a significant decision in Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development (2004).[12] The Court ruled that the fundamental rights to equality, human dignity, and social security are violated when permanent residents are excluded from the social welfare system due to their citizenship.
Comparative Analysis: Xenophobia Beyond South Africa
Even if anti-immigrant violence in South Africa is not as severe as some of the most catastrophic instances of identity-based conflict in history, it nevertheless raises significant questions about the ramifications of labelling some populations as outsiders. The experience in South Africa is hardly the only one. Throughout history, communities that have faced social unrest, economic hardship, or political unpredictability have often vented their resentment toward specific groups. Therefore, comparative instances offer important insight into the risks associated with letting identity-based divisions widen unchecked. The Partition of India in 1947 is one such instance that shows how political mobilisation, fear, and the creation of a “other” may lead to widespread bloodshed and relocation.
After British India was split into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan in 1947, India was partitioned. There was severe intercommunal violence between Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus during the partition. It was one of the biggest forced migrations in history, with an estimated 15 million displaced people and between 200,000 and 2 million fatalities, according to historians.[13]
Growing political and social divides, with communities seeing one another as threats to their identity, security, and means of subsistence, fanned the violence. As hostilities grew, common people were singled out just for being members of a specific social or religious group. Widespread relocation, property damage, and fatalities were the outcomes.[14]
Similar trends can be seen in the experience of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. Despite empirical research demonstrating that many of these beliefs are overstated or unsubstantiated by data, foreign nationals are frequently held responsible for unemployment, crime, and pressure on public services. There is little proof that immigrants are to blame for disproportionately high rates of crime, and they have a good economic impact on South Africa. However, the portrayal of migrants as threats to local communities persists, leading to the normalisation of violence and marginalisation. The Partition of India serves as a reminder that social and economic frustrations should be addressed through lawful and democratic processes rather than through the scapegoating of groups perceived as outsiders.
My opinion
Viewing anti-migrant violence solely through a xenophobic or afrophobic lens may be oversimplified, even while the idea of afrophobia offers a significant explanation for victimisation patterns. Numerous occurrences take place in environments that are marked by poverty, unemployment, inequality, poor service delivery, and competition for scarce economic opportunities. Foreign nationals are frequently the target of community resentment because they are seen, whether correctly or not, as rivals for public services, employment, and housing.
Violence is not justified by this. Instead, it implies that a mix of socioeconomic grievances and prejudice may give rise to anti-immigrant attitudes. The phrase “Abahambe” exemplifies this intricacy. Some people interpret it as an expression of animosity toward foreigners because they are outsiders. For others, it represents discontent with alleged shortcomings in employment laws, economic governance, and immigration enforcement. The problem is that valid concerns about immigration policy are often voiced through illegal actions that compromise the rule of law and violate constitutional rights.
Conclusion
In South Africa, xenophobic violence must be understood in the context of broader structural issues of inequality, unemployment, and unequal access to economic opportunities rather than as simple animosity toward foreigners. Although foreigners are frequently portrayed in public discourse as competitors for limited resources and jobs, this narrative oversimplifies a far more unequal economic reality. In South Africa, patterns of ownership, land distribution, and corporate control still reflect historical disparities that have not entirely changed in the post-apartheid era, and wealth and economic power are still heavily concentrated. Claims that foreigners are “taking jobs” frequently refer to insecure and marginal economic areas rather than steady employment because migrant labour is primarily found in low-wage and informal segments of the economy.
Comparatively, examples of widespread identity-based exclusion around the world show that social division rather than economic relief is frequently the outcome when political grievances and unfairness are directed towards migrant groups. In this way, xenophobia and afrophobia serve more as manifestations of underlying socioeconomic dissatisfaction than as reactions to migration per se. The enduring conflict between the lived reality of structural inequality and the constitutional aspirations of equality is reflected in the continuance of these patterns in South Africa.
The unequal distribution of economic power and opportunity that influences how competition for resources is seen and politicised ultimately poses a greater issue than the presence of foreign immigrants. Therefore, combating xenophobia involves both legal enforcement and a persistent dedication to socioeconomic change consistent with constitutional principles.
Bibliography
Cases
Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).
Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia and Others v Operation Dudula and Others (2023/044685) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1102.
Legislation
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Immigration Act 13 of 2002.
Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act 16 of 2022.
Journal Articles
Hågensen L and De Jager N, ‘Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa: The Case of De Doorns 2009’ (2016) 38(1) Strategic Review for Southern Africa 1.
Reports and Monographs
Crush J and Ramachandran S, Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism (Migration Policy Series No 66, Southern African Migration Programme and International Migration Research Centre 2014).
Online Sources
Ndadane B, ‘Caught Offside’ Africa Is a Country (22 June 2026) <https://africasacountry.com/2026/06/caught-offside> accessed 22 June 2026.
Helen Suzman Foundation, ‘Migration I: Public Opinion versus Reality on Immigrants in South Africa’(2019)https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/public-opinion-versus-reality-on-immigrants-in-south-africa accessed 22 June 2026.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Partition of India’ (2026) https://www.britannica.com/event/partition-of-India accessed 22 June 2026.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Partition of India’ (2026) https://www.britannica.com/event/partition-of-India accessed 22 June 2026.
South African Human Rights Commission, ‘SAHRC Welcomes Judgment in Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia & Others v Operation Dudula & Others’ (6 November 2025) https://www.sahrc.org.za accessed 22 June 2026.
[1] Bonginkosi Ndadane, Caught Offside, AFRICA IS A COUNTRY (June 22, 2026), https://africasacountry.com/2026/06/caught-offside.
[2] Live Hågensen & Nicola de Jager, Xenophobic Attacks in South Africa: The Case of De Doorns 2009, 38 STRATEGIC REV. FOR S. AFR. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v38i1.296.
[3] Jonathan Crush & Sujata Ramachandran, Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism, Migration Policy Series No. 66, at 6 (Southern African Migration Programme & International Migration Research Centre 2014).
[4] Tove van Lennep, Migration I: Public Opinion versus Reality on Immigrants in South Africa, Helen Suzman Foundation Brief (2019), https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/public-opinion-versus-reality-on-immigrants-in-south-africa.
[5] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 9.
[6] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 27.
[7] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 10, 12.
[8] Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Act 16 of 2023.
[9] Immigration Act 13 of 2002.
[10] Kopanang Africa Against Xenophobia and Others v Operation Dudula and Others (Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg High Court, 2025).
[11] Immigration Act 13 of 2002, s 41.
[12] Khosa vs minister of social development 2004.
[13] Rebecca M. Kulik, Partition of India, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (May 27, 2026), https://www.britannica.com.
[14] Rebecca M. Kulik, Partition of India, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (May 27, 2026), https://www.britannica.com.
