Authored By: Dzikratul Husna
Andalas University
Introduction
The Land and Maritime Delimination adn Sovereignity over island (Gabon/Equatorial Guninea) case, decided by the Internasional Court of Justice 9ICJ) on 19 May 2025, constitutes an important jurisprudential development in public international law, particularly in relation to territorial disputes, the law of treaties, and State succession. Rooted inthe colonial history of French and Spanish possessions in Central Afrika, the dispute concerns the land boundary, maritime delimitation, ann sovereignity over these startegically located islands in the Corisco Bay, namely Mbanie/Mbane, Cocotiers/Cocoteors, and Conga.
A crucial aspect of the case lies in the scope of the jurisdiction confered upon the Court by the 2016 Special Argument. The ICJ was not requested to physically draw or determine the territorial or maritime boundary. Rather, it was specially asked to determine th elegal validity and force of the legal instruments and titles relied upon by the two States.
Facts of the Case
The dispute arose between the Republic of Gabon and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, two neighbouring States in Central Africa. It essentially concerns the land and maritime boundaries between the two States and soverignty over three island in Crisco Bay (Mbanie/Mbane, Cocotiers/Cocoteors, and Conga). The origins of the dispute lie in the colonial history of the two States. Before independence, the territory that subsequently became Gabon was under French colonial rule, while Equatorial Guinea was undeR Spanish colonial rule. Consequently, the boundaries between the respective territories were initially established through arrangements concluded between the colonial powers.
On 27 Juni 1900, France and Spain concluded the Conventioan on the Delimitation of French and Spanish Possessions in West Africa, on the Coast of the Sahara and the Gulf of Guinea (hereinafter the 1900 Convention). The Convention established arrangements cocncerning the boundary between territories under French and Spanish control, including territories that subsequently became part of Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Gabon gained independence from France on 17 August 1960, while Equatorial Guinea gaine independence from Spain on 12 October 1968. Upon independence, the two State succeded to yje territories and torritorial tittles previosly held by their respective colonial powers. However, questions concerning the territorial boundary and the status of several island in the Corisco Bay remained a source of disagreement between the two State.
The dispute subsequently became closely associated with a document known as the 1974 Bata Convention. The document, referred to as the Convention delimiting the land and maritime frontiers of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, was relied upon by Gabon as one of the legal bases supporting its claims concerning the territorial and maritime boundaries. Equatorial Guinea, by contrast, disputed the document’s legal force as a binding treaty between the two States. This issue was significant because the legal status of the historical instruments determined which legal bases could be relied upon in establishing the boundary and sovereignty over the disputed areas. Thus, the dispute between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea was not merely concerned with factual control over territory, but principally with the identification of the valid legal titles and legal instruments possessing binding force between the two States.
In addition to the questions concerning the land boundary and sovereignty over the islands, developments in the law of the sea were also relevant to the relationship between the two States. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal framework governing maritime delimitation and subsequently became relevant to the determination of the applicable law between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Against the background of disagreements concerning the relevant legal titles, the status of the 1974 Bata Convention, and the applicable legal framework governing the boundary and the islands, a legal dispute arose between the two States concerning the land boundary, maritime boundary, and sovereignty over Mbanié/Mbañe, Cocotiers/Cocoteros, and Conga. This dispute ultimately led Gabon and Equatorial Guinea to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice.
Legal Issues
The principal issue before the ICJ was not to directly establish the land or maritime boundary, nor to independently carry out the delimitation of the disputed areas. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Special Agreement, the ICJ was requested to determine whether the legal titles, treaties, and international conventions relied upon by the parties possessed legal force in the relations between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.
The issues before the Court included:
Whether the 1974 Bata Convention constituted a treaty possessing legal force and binding effect between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea;
Which legal title or legal basis governed the common land boundary between the two States;
Which legal title or legal basis governed sovereignty over Mbanié/Mbañe, Cocotiers/Cocoteros, and Conga;
Whether the 1900 Convention constituted a relevant legal title for the resolution of the dispute; and
Whether the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) possessed legal force between the two States with respect to the delimitation of their maritime boundary.
Arguments Presented
Gabon’s Arguments (Applicant)
Gabon argued that the 1974 Bata Convention constituted a valid international agreement possessing legal force between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Accordingly, Gabon requested the Court to recognise the Convention as a legal title governing the land and maritime boundaries between the two States, as well as sovereignty over Mbanié/Mbañe, Cocotiers/Cocoteros, and Conga. According to Gabon, the 1900 Paris Convention also remained a legal title concerning the land boundary, insofar as it had not subsequently been modified by the Bata Convention. Gabon interpreted the term “legal title” in the Special Agreement as referring to a legal instrument that directly constituted the source of international rights and obligations. In support of its position, Gabon relied upon the principle of pacta sunt servanda, under which treaties in force are binding upon the parties and must be performed in good faith. Gabon also referred to the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) and the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) cases in explaining the concept of territorial title. Gabon rejected the proposition that changes to the boundary could have occurred through effectivites or administrative practices during the colonial period in the absence of a valid legal basis for such changes.
Equatorial Guinea (Respondents)
Equatorial Guinea rejected the claim that the Bata Convention possessed binding legal force. It argued that the document did not constitute a treaty or valid legal title. Instead, Equatorial Guinea relied upon the 1900 Paris Convention, the principle of State succession, and the continuity of territorial titles inherited from Spain upon independence.
According to Equatorial Guinea, the determination of the boundary and sovereignty should be based upon the legal titles existing prior to independence, including any changes lawfully effected under international law. In the proceedings, Equatorial Guinea also invoked the principles of uti possidetis juris and effectivites. With respect to the maritime boundary, it relied upon UNCLOS 1982 and customary international law, including the principle that maritime entitlements derive from sovereignty over land territory.
The Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
In deciding the case, the International Court of Justice focused on the interpretation of the Special Agreement, the legal force of the instruments relied upon by the parties, and the identification of the legal titles governing the disputed boundaries and islands.
Interpretation of the Law
The Court first interpreted Article 1 of the Special Agreement of 15 November 2016. The ICJ emphasised that its task was not to directly determine the physical course of the land or maritime boundary or to technically determine sovereignty, but rather to identify the legal titles, treaties, and international conventions possessing legal force in the relations between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. This interpretation defined the scope of the judgment and demonstrated that the Court’s inquiry was principally concerned with the legal foundations of the parties’ claims.
The Court also distinguished between documents possessing historical or evidentiary value and instruments capable of constituting sources of territorial rights. On that basis, the Court concluded that the 1974 Bata Convention did not constitute a treaty possessing legal force and could not be regarded as a legal title. The existence of a document alone, therefore, was insufficient to create territorial rights where its status as a legally binding instrument could not be established.
Application of Precedents
In determining the applicable legal titles, the Court’s approach was consistent with principles developed in cases including the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, and Kasikili/Sedudu Island.[1] These precedents emphasise the importance of territorial title, the principle of uti possidetis juris, and the continuity of territorial rights following independence.
Applying this approach, the Court considered that Gabon and Equatorial Guinea succeeded to the territorial titles previously held by France and Spain, respectively. Furthermore, the relationship between legal title and effectivités demonstrated that factual control or conduct on the ground did not automatically override an existing legal basis for territorial sovereignty, as was also affirmed by the Court in the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia) case.[2]
Evaluation of the Arguments and Legal Reasoning
The Court rejected Gabon’s argument concerning the legal force of the 1974 Bata Convention. Instead, the Court accepted the 1900 Paris Convention as an important legal basis for determining the relevant territorial titles.
With respect to the land boundary, the Court held that the titles possessed by France at the time of Gabon’s independence on 17 August 1960 and by Spain at the time of Equatorial Guinea’s independence on 12 October 1968, as established by the 1900 Convention, constituted the relevant legal titles and were lawfully succeeded to by the respective States.
With respect to the three disputed islands, the Court concluded that the title held by Spain as of 12 October 1968, and subsequently succeeded to by Equatorial Guinea upon independence, constituted the applicable legal basis for sovereignty over the islands.
The Court’s reasoning therefore reflects a title-based approach: it first determined the scope of its jurisdiction, identified the relevant instruments, assessed their legal validity and force, and then determined the applicable territorial titles. With respect to maritime delimitation, the Court also recognised the relevance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982.[3] The judgment thus prioritised legal certainty based on objective legal titles over factual possession or the respective political interests of the States.
Judgement and Ratio Decidendi
The Decision
The Court decide that:
The Bata Convention was not a treaty having the force of law between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea and did not constitute a legal title within the meaning of the Special Agreement;
The legal titles governing the common land boundary were the titles held by France at Gabon’s independence and Spain at Equatorial Guinea’s independence, based on the 1900 Convention;
The legal title concerning sovereignty over the islands of Mbanié/Mbañe, Cocotiers/Cocoteros, and Conga was the title held by Spain and succeeded to by Equatorial Guinea;
The 1900 Convention constituted a legal title establishing the terminus of the land boundary and the starting point for the maritime boundary; and
UNCLOS 1982 had the force of law between the Parties with respect to the delimitation of their maritime boundary.
Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta
Ratio Decidendi (Binding of Decision)
The Court’s analysis of the nota bene clause and the parties’ failure to invoke the Bata Convention during negotiations between 1979 and 2003 as evidence of the absence of an intention to be legally bound, thereby undermining the Convention’s claimed binding character.
The evidence of Spain’s exercise of authority (effectivités) before 1968 over Corisco Island and its dependencies, together with France’s recognition of such authority, as relevant to determining the succession of territorial title to Equatorial Guinea.
Obiter Dicta
The Court’s observations concerning the technical validity or operational shortcomings of the 1901 boundary commission, including alleged inaccuracies relating to timekeeping or chronometric measurements in geographical surveys.
The discussion and historical observations by judges concerning the evolution of nineteenth-century colonial legal doctrine, including Jus Publicum Europaeum, as expressed in separate or dissenting opinions.
Critical Analysis
The judgment makes several important contributions to the development of international law.
Clarification of the Formal and Substantive Requirements for Treaty Formation
The case reinforces principles of customary international law concerning the law of treaties, as reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.[4]
Intention to be Bound: The mere existence of a written document signed by a Head of State does not automatically transform the document into a binding treaty. The ICJ emphasised that the intention to be legally bound must be assessed not only from the text of the instrument but also from the circumstances surrounding its conclusion and the subsequent conduct of the parties.
Subsequent Conduct: The fact that both States subsequently left the document unused and did not invoke it in negotiations for several decades constituted significant evidence concerning the absence of a binding character and the parties’ lack of an intention to be legally bound.
Conceptual Clarification of “Legal Title” and Framework Instruments
The ICJ drew an important distinction between a legal title, as a source of territorial rights, and an instrument that provides a procedural or substantive legal framework. Status of UNCLOS 1982: The judgment clarifies that the law of the sea, including UNCLOS, establishes rules and mechanisms governing maritime entitlements and delimitation. However, UNCLOS does not itself constitute a territorial title independently creating sovereignty over a specific maritime area. Maritime entitlements derive from sovereignty over land, reflecting the principle that “the land dominates the sea”.
Application of Uti Possidetis Juris and State Succession
The case reaffirms the importance of the principle of uti possidetis juris in African boundary disputes. The ICJ gave priority to the legally established colonial boundaries existing at the time of independence, which constituted the relevant framework for determining the territorial titles inherited by the newly independent States.
The judgment further indicates that claims concerning changes to inherited colonial boundaries require a high evidentiary threshold. Such changes cannot simply be inferred from local administrative practices or factual conduct by colonial authorities where those practices do not satisfy the applicable requirements for the lawful modification of a treaty-based boundary.
The Use of Colonial Legal Doctrines: Jus Publicum Europaeum
As highlighted in Judge Yusuf’s Separate Opinion, the judgment raises broader critical questions concerning the continued reliance of the ICJ on nineteenth-century colonial legal concepts in disputes between African States.[5]
The Court’s continued reliance on concepts such as colonial effectivités and the colonial “display of authority” has been criticised by some judges and scholars as potentially reproducing elements of Jus Publicum Europaeum. This raises an important academic and practical debate concerning whether the ICJ should move away from colonial legal terminology and frameworks when adjudicating territorial disputes between post-colonial States.
Conclusion
The ICJ’s judgment in the Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon/Equatorial Guinea) case reaffirms the importance of legal certainty based on valid legal titles in resolving territorial and maritime disputes between post-colonial States. Through its approach to uti possidetis juris and State succession, the Court clarified the legal basis of the land boundary derived from the 1900 Paris Convention and confirmed Equatorial Guinea’s sovereignty over Mbanié/Mbañe, Cocotiers/Cocoteros, and Conga on the basis of the succession of the territorial title held by Spain prior to independence.
From a theoretical perspective, the case makes two principal contributions to international law. First, it clarifies the requirements for treaty formation. The Court established that the signature of a political instrument or document by a Head of State, such as the 1974 Bata Convention, does not automatically create a binding international agreement possessing legal force where the absence of an intention to be legally bound is demonstrated by the text of the instrument and the subsequent conduct of the parties
Second, it clarifies the distinction between maritime entitlements and territorial title. The Court confirmed that UNCLOS 1982 and the principle that “the land dominates the sea” operate as a legal framework governing maritime entitlements and delimitation, rather than as an independent legal title creating maritime sovereignty without a valid territorial title over the relevant land territory or islands.
Although the judgment leaves room for critical debate concerning the continued reliance on nineteenth-century colonial doctrines, particularly Jus Publicum Europaeum, the ICJ nevertheless resolved significant legal uncertainties concerning the bases of the parties’ territorial claims. The judgment provides a legal foundation for Gabon and Equatorial Guinea to pursue subsequent negotiations concerning the technical delimitation and peaceful determination of their physical land and maritime boundaries.
Reference(S):
Table of Cases
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 554
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 303
Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon v Equatorial Guinea) (Judgment) 19 May 2025, ICJ Rep 1
Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon v Equatorial Guinea (Judgment: Summary) 19 May 2025, ICJ Summary No 2025/3
Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon v Equatorial Guinea) (Judgment) 19 May 2025, ICJ Rep 1 (Declaration of Judge ad hoc Wolfrum)
Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon v Equatorial Guinea) (Judgment) 19 May 2025, ICJ Rep 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Tladi)
Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon/v Equatorial Guinea) (Judgment) 19 May 2025, ICJ Rep 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf)
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (Judgment) [1992] ICJ Rep 351
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v Malaysia) (Judgement) [2002] ICJ Rep 625
International Treaties and Conventions
Special Agreement between the Gabonese Republic and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to Submit to the International Court of Justice the Dispute Concerning Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (signed 15 November 2016, entered into force 5 March 2021)
Special Convention on the delimitation of French and Spanish possessions in West Africa, on the coasts of the Sahara and the Gulf of Guinea (signed 27 June 1900)
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331
[1] Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali) (Judgement) [1986] ICJ Rep 554; Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (Judgment) [1992] ICJ Rep 351; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 303; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia) (Judgment) [1999] ICJ Rep 1045
[2] Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v Malaysia) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 625
[3] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396 (UNCLOS)
[4] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT)
[5] Land and Maritime Delimitation and Sovereignty over Islands (Gabon v Equatorial Guinea) (Judgment) 19 May 2025, ICJ Rep (Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf)

