Authored By: Praise Komolafe
University of IIorin, IIorin, Kwara State
Introduction
Nigeria has consistently ranked low globally for registering property (ranked 184 out of 190 economies in the World Bank’s final Doing Business 2020 report)[1]. Obtaining the Governor’s consent makes up the largest chunk of this time and cost. The land tenure system in Nigeria combines statutory law and customary traditions, governed primarily by the Land Use Act of 1978, which vests all urban land in state governors and rural land in local governments.
The Land Use Act (LUA) of 1978 is one of the most transformative pieces of legislation governing land administration in Nigeria. Its principal aim is to rationalize the fragmentation and complexity of land tenure systems inherited from colonial and customary frameworks, establish a unified system for land use, and promote equitable access to land as a key economic resource. Central to this framework is the requirement that land transactions must obtain the Governor’s Consent, a provision that has generated significant legal and practical implications for landowners, investors, and the real estate sector as a whole.
This article argues that while the Land Use Act sought to centralize land governance under executive custody to prevent land speculation and ensure equitable distribution, the mechanism of mandatory Governor’s Consent has ironically undermined land tenure security. Executive oversight has morphed from a protective public trust into an administrative bottleneck that invalidates legitimate property transactions, weaponizes legal technicalities, and stifles economic growth. Therefore, to achieve true tenure security, Nigeria must shift from a discretionary authorization model to a streamlined regulatory registration framework.
The Legal Structure of Executive Oversight
Section 1 of the Land Use Act vests all lands in each state in the Governor, who holds it in trust for the people, to be administered for their use and common benefit.[2] This section effectively transfers ownership from individuals or communities to the state government for public use and development. Those who owned lands before the enactment of the 1978 Act were divested of their ownership of land whether occupied or not. The Governor is thereby charged with the responsibility for the allocation and administration of land in all urban areas to individual residents in the State and to corporate bodies for residential, agricultural, commercial, and other lawful purposes, while corresponding powers in respect of non-urban areas are conferred on the Local Governments
Consequently, irrespective of the mode of acquisition, whether by inheritance, purchase, customary grant, or long possession no individual, family, or community retains absolute ownership of land in Nigeria. What subsists in their favor is merely a right to use and enjoy the land, subject to compliance with the conditions and regulations imposed by the Governor. It is for this reason that Nigerian courts have consistently held, in a plethora of cases, that the highest proprietary interest recognizable under the Land Use Act is a right of occupancy, and not ownership
The holder of a right of occupancy pursuant to section 5, 34 or 36 of the land use Act requires the prior consent of the Governor before he can transfer, mortgage or otherwise dispose of his interest in the right of occupancy[3]. Section 21 of the Land Use Act 1978 provides that it shall not be lawful for any customary right of occupancy or any part of it to be alienated by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or otherwise however without the consent of the Governor.[4] Section 22 (2) of the Land Use Act takes cognizance of cases where some form of written agreement executed in evidence of a transaction is submitted to the Governor in order to obtain his consent as required by the section.[5] e.g for a transaction in the nature of conveyance to be valid the parties to it must first enter into a binding agreement to alienate subject to the consent of the Governor.
While S.21 provides that it shall not be lawful for any customary right of occupancy or any part thereof to be alienated by assignment, mortgage transfer of possession, sub-lease without the approval of the appropriate local government, S.22 equally makes it mandatory for the consent of the Governor to be sought and obtained by the holder of a statutory right of occupancy who wishes to alienate it or any part thereof, through the above mentioned means. This is only on condition that the said right is granted by the local government or governor respectively. The practical implication of this statutory arrangement is that a person can no longer validly assert that “this land is mine forever.” Any interest held in land is conditional, defeasible, and subject to revocation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, such interest cannot be freely alienated, whether by assignment, mortgage, lease, sublease, or transfer of possession, without the prior consent of the Governor. Any transaction carried out in the absence of consent is deemed inchoate and confers no legal interest until the Governor’s consent is sought and obtained. Consequently, no alienation of land interests is recognized until the Governor’s Consent is “first had and obtained”.
The most crucial aspect of section 21 and 22 is the fact that the consents must be obtained before any valid alienation can be effected. Therefore an alienation of customary or statutory right of occupancy without the approval or consent of the appropriate authority is null and void.[6]
III. The Validity Spectrum: Case Law Analysis
In Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305,[7] the Supreme Court determined whether the mandatory Governor’s consent under Section 22 of the Land Use Act 1978 applies to a “deemed grant” of a right of occupancy (pre-existing land ownership) and if omitting it renders a mortgage transaction null and void.
Chief Ajilo mortgaged his registered Lagos property to Savannah Bank in 1980 to secure a loan facility. Upon default in 1985, the bank advertised the property for public auction. Chief Ajilo sued to void the mortgage deed and halt the sale, arguing that neither party obtained the prior written consent of the Lagos State Governor as required by Section 22 of the Act.
Savannah Bank defended its action by arguing that Section 22 applied strictly to express grants of rights of occupancy issued by the Governor, not to “deemed grants” under Section 34 which recognized land held prior to the Act’s enactment.
The High Court ruled for Chief Ajilo, declaring the mortgage null and void ab initio for lack of consent and revoking the bank’s power of sale. The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgment, holding that Sections 21 and 22 apply universally to all landholders (including deemed grants) and that Section 26 renders any transfer executed without executive approval legally void on its face.
However, in the case of Yakubu & Anor v. Obaje (2020) LPELR-49822(SC),[8] the issue was whether the absence of the Minister’s consent under Section 22 of the Land Use Act invalidates a private land transfer and defeats a purchaser’s claim against a trespasser.
Simon Obaje (Respondent) purchased Plot F96 in Abuja from Mr. Otitoju Bonte via an irrevocable Power of Attorney and began building. The Appellants disrupted and destroyed the construction. Obaje sued for trespass and damages. The Appellants challenged his ownership, arguing the land transfer was invalid because the Minister of the FCT had not granted consent to the transaction under Section 22 of the Land Use Act. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Respondent, holding that: Non-Contentious Transfers: Section 22 of the Land Use Act does not void private, good-faith land transactions simply because executive consent has not yet been obtained, Protection Against Trespass: An irrevocable Power of Attorney granted for value confers valid possessory rights. A third party cannot commit acts of trespass and then rely on the lack of official consent to escape liability.
The decisions in Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Ajilo (1989)[9] and Yakubu & Anor v. Obaje (2020)[10] mark a dramatic evolution in how the Nigerian Supreme Court interprets the executive consent requirement under Section 22 of the Land Use Act. While both cases center on transactions where the required administrative perfection, Governor’s consent in Ajilo and FCT Minister’s consent in Obaje, was completely omitted, the Supreme Court moved away from a rigid, literal application of the statute toward a pragmatic, equity-driven doctrine designed to prevent injustice.
In Savannah Bank v. Ajilo,[11] the Supreme Court adopted a strict legalistic approach to Sections 22 and 26 of the Act.[12] The Court held that any transaction executed without the Governor’s prior written consent was strictly void ab initio (invalid from the beginning) and conferred no legal rights whatsoever. This rigid ruling created a dangerous loophole: a mortgagor who freely entered into a loan agreement was able to use his own deliberate failure to secure consent as a legal shield to block the bank from selling his property upon default. Under Ajilo, the lack of consent automatically invalidated the contract, regardless of good faith or commercial fairness.
By the time Yakubu v. Obaje[13] reached the Supreme Court in 2020, the judiciary actively sought to curb this weaponization of Section 22. Instead of treating an unconsented transaction as a complete nullity, the Court applied a pragmatic lens, viewing the transfer via an irrevocable Power of Attorney as an inchoate (incomplete) agreement that nonetheless conferred immediate possessory rights. The fundamental distinction lay in the nature of the dispute: while Ajilo involved a direct party to a contract trying to void his own agreement, Obaje involved third-party trespassers attempting to rely on the missing ministerial consent to justify destroying a buyer’s physical building.
Ultimately, Yakubu v. Obaje refines the legacy of Savannah Bank v. Ajilo without outrightly overturning the statutory requirement for executive approval. While Ajilo established that formal legal title cannot fully pass without state consent, Obaje ensures that third-party wrongdoers cannot exploit that administrative delay to invalidate private, good-faith property transactions or defeat a purchaser’s right to possession.
Economic and Socio Legal Friction
The requirement for the Governor’s Consent under Section 22 of the Act[14] stands as one of the most contentious aspects of Nigerian property law. Designed to vest control of land within state borders in the Governor for the public interest, this administrative mechanism has instead become a source of major legal disputes, commercial vulnerability, and systemic delay across the country. These challenges include:
High Costs and Revenue Misuse
The statutory consent requirement has transformed into an exorbitant revenue-generating tool for state governments, creating significant economic friction for property owners and investors. States impose heavy consent fees, stamp duties, tax clearances, and administrative charges that collectively consume a substantial percentage of a property’s market value or mortgage loan. Higher courts and legal scholars have condemned these inflated fees as illegal, ultra vires applications of statutory power. By weaponizing consent fees for income tax collection and state revenue, the framework inflates transaction costs, weakens housing finance systems, and prevents individuals from leveraging real estate assets for capital and commercial growth.
Bureaucratic Bottlenecks and Administrative Delays
Excessive bureaucracy and undefined executive discretion introduce deep operational and social friction into land transfers. Obtaining consent is plagued by cumbersome administrative demands, such as requiring approved building plans for undeveloped land, and a total absence of statutory time limits. Because the process is governed by administrative lethargy and political bias, approvals can be delayed indefinitely or withheld from political opponents. This institutional inefficiency degrades Nigeria’s global standing for property registration and routinely forces desperate transacting parties into the informal land market or into backdating documents to bypass the state’s slow machinery.
Judicial Weaponization and Credit Risks:
The requirement generates acute legal uncertainty within the financial sector by exposing lenders to severe security risks. Because the legal burden of seeking consent traditionally rests on the transferor, dishonest mortgagors intentionally omit obtaining consent when securing bank loans. When they subsequently default, these borrowers turn around and rely on their own deliberate omission in court, using Section 26 of the Land Use Act[15] to declare the mortgage null and void. By allowing bad-faith actors to benefit from their own wrongdoing to block foreclosure, the consent requirement severely threatens commercial lending and destabilizes institutional trust in real estate collateral.
Comparative Perspective
Nigeria’s land transfer model, governed by the Land Use Act of 1978, relies on a discretionary state authority model that creates severe socio-economic friction. Under Section 22 of the Act,[16] every property transaction, whether a sale, lease, or mortgage, requires the express written consent of the state Governor to be legally valid. This discretionary oversight has created an expensive, bureaucratic tollbooth where obtaining consent frequently takes between 6 and 18 months, while property registration fees (encompassing consent fees, stamp duties, and capital gains taxes) can devour 10% to 15% of a property’s market value. By contrast, countries like Rwanda operate a digitalized, administrative registration model that treats land transfer as a ministerial verification process rather than a political privilege. In Rwanda, property rights are secured through a centralized, online land registry system (the Land Administration Information System, LAIS), eliminating discretionary executive approval and drastically lowering friction for landowners and financial institutions.[17]
The operational contrast between the two models highlights how administrative design impacts economic productivity and land tenure security. While Nigeria’s system forces transacting parties into informal markets, backdating documents, or navigating legal pitfalls, such as defaulting borrowers weaponizing the lack of consent to void mortgages under the precedent of Savannah Bank v. Ajilo, Rwanda has streamlined land administration into one of the most efficient systems globally. Under Rwanda’s Land Law (Law N° 27/2021), land transfers are processed transparently via localized land offices or integrated digital portals (like Irembo) within an average of 7 to 30 days, incurring nominal flat administrative fees rather than percentage-based punitive taxes. This shift from a discretionary authorization framework (Nigeria) to a streamlined registry verification model (Rwanda) unlocks “dead capital,” enabling property owners to seamlessly use land as bank collateral without the risk of executive delays or contractual invalidation.
Conclusion
Land is a life asset that requires to be tinkered with regularly to bring it in conformity with present day realities. Efforts may be made to suggest practical solutions to the Act, there is a lot in the Act which requires a second look, a review of the Act is most urgent. It cannot be right that a statute so hurriedly prepared which can lead to stagnation in land transactions and general development should be allowed to govern our lives for almost 39 years now.
The requirement for mandatory Governor’s Consent under the Land Use Act of 1978 has transformed state oversight from a protective public trust into an administrative bottleneck that undermines land tenure security in Nigeria. By imposing discretionary executive vetoes, high fees, and bureaucratic delays, the statutory framework weaponizes legal technicalities, as seen in the legacy of Savannah Bank v. Ajilo, and locks billions of Naira in real estate as “dead capital.” While recent judicial shifts like Yakubu v. Obaje offers equitable relief for good-faith purchasers, judicial remedies cannot replace fundamental statutory reform.
To achieve genuine tenure security, the National Assembly must amend the Land Use Act to transition from a discretionary permission model to a streamlined, digital verification system. The law should establish a mandatory 30-day statutory window where consent is deemed automatically granted if the state raises no objective legal objections. Furthermore, transaction fees must be standardized to nominal flat rates rather than percentage-based assessments to prevent revenue extraction. Shifting from political discretion to transparent, technology-driven land governance will protect property rights, restore confidence in credit markets, and unlock Nigeria’s vast economic potential.
Bibliography
Table of Cases
Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305
Yakubu v Obaje (2020) LPELR-49822 (SC)
Table of Legislation
Land Use Act 1978, ss 1, 5, 21, 22, 26, 34, 36
Law N° 27/2021 Governing Land in Rwanda
Secondary Sources
National Open University of Nigeria, Land Use Act https://nou.edu.ng accessed 4 August 2026.
‘Governor’s Consent in Nigeria Land Law: Issues and Challenges’ (ResearchGate) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/386342446_GOVERNOR%27S_CONSENT_IN_NIGERIA_LAND_LAW_ISSUES_AND_CHALLENGES accessed 4 August 2026.
SSRN eLibrary, [Requirement of Governor’s Consent In Land Transactions In Nigeria: Does Savannah Bank v. Ajilo Still Reign?] https://www.ssrn.com accessed 5 August 2026.
Center for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, Housing Finance in Africa Yearbook (CAHF 2023) https://housingfinanceafrica.org/resources/yearbook/ accessed 5 August 2026
Food and Agriculture Organization, Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) – Rwanda Case Study (FAO 2021) https://www.fao.org/land-water/land/land-governance/en/ accessed 5 August 2026
World Bank, Doing Business 2020 (World Bank Group 2020) https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32436 accessed 5 August 2026
[1] World Bank, “Doing Business 2020” (World Bank 2020) 184.
[2] Land Use Act 1978, s 1.
[3] Land Use Act 1978, s 5, 34 and 36.
[4] Ibid s 21.
[5] Ibid s 22.
[6] Ibid s 26.
[7] Savannah Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Ajilo [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305.
[8] Yakubu v Obaje [2020] LPELR-49822 (SC).
[9] Savannah Bank v Ajilo (n 7)
[10] Yakubu v Obaje (n 8)
[11] Savannah Bank v Ajilo (n 7)
[12] Land Use Act 1978, s 22(2) and s 26
[13] Yakubu v Obaje (n 8)
[14] Land Use Act 1978, s 22
[15] Land Use Act 1978, s 26
[16] Ibid s 22
[17] Law N° 27/2021 Governing Land in Rwanda 2021.
