Authored By: Sthandiwe Bhengu
North-West University
INTRODUCTION
In a republic known for its “scourge of gender-based violence,” the South African legal system is confronted with two challenges: the pressing need to safeguard survivors and the growing trend of legal procedures being used to “silence” them through protection orders and defamation.[1] Even though the frequency of false reports of sexual assault is still statistically low—between 2% and 10% worldwide—a person who is wrongly charged may face serious legal and social repercussions, including possible incarceration, reputational damage, and the waste of court resources.[2] As a result, some accused persons have gone to court to get “gag-orders” under the Protection from Harassment Act. Critics claim this trend weaponizes the law against real victims, who are already discouraged by the 8.6% conviction rate for reported rapes.[3]
This article explores the conflict between ensuring victims of crime have unobstructed access to justice and bringing false accusers accountable. While South Africa’s current legal system, which includes common law offenses like perjury and undermining the administration of justice, offers tools for accountability, it is argued that these must be weighed against the constitutional rights to dignity and a fair trial to prevent them from having a “chilling effect” on reporting.[4] The article is divided into four sections. The South African legal framework pertaining to false reports is outlined in Section II, with particular attention to perjury, crimen injuria, and the delictual conditions for malicious prosecution. Section III examines how courts recognize the “misuse” of legal procedures by analyzing recent case law, notably the seminal S v. P ruling.[5] A comparison viewpoint with jurisdictions such as Canada and the UK is given in Section IV. Lastly, Section V provides suggestions for legislative changes that would preserve the legal system’s integrity without jeopardising victim protection.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal system in South Africa combines common law offences with delictual remedies to deal with false allegations. These safeguards are intended to preserve the integrity of the legal system as well as the accused’s individual rights, such as their physical freedom (corpus), reputation (fama), and dignity (dignitas).[6]
OFFENCES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The main criminal methods used to bring false accusers accountable are offences like perjury and resisting or obstructing the administration of justice. Perjury is known as the unlawful and deliberate making of a false statement under oath or in a manner similar to an oath during a court procedure.[7] Crucially, the state must demonstrate that the accused acted with the particular intent to mislead the court in order for a conviction to occur.[8] The common law offence of defeating or obstructing the administration of justice has a wider scope than perjury, which is restricted to statements made under oath. It includes actions that deliberately and illegally undermine or obstruct the administration of justice.[9] According to South African courts, there is a possibility to commit this crime by making a false statement to the police, even if it is not done under oath, as long as the intention is to obstruct a criminal investigation or start legal action against an innocent person.[10]
OFFENCES AGAINST REPUTATION AND DIGNITY
The criminal law offers criminal defamation and crimen iniuria when false allegations violate someone’s personality rights. The deliberate and illegal violation of another person’s privacy or dignity is known as crimen iniuria.[11] False allegations of nefarious crimes like rape or robbery are usually deemed sufficient to reach this criterion because this offence involves a “serious” harm of dignity.[12] In contrast, criminal defamation is more concerned with harming someone’s fama (reputation) than with their personal sentiments. It is described as the deliberate and illegal publication of information about another person that has the potential to damage that person’s reputation.[13] The Supreme Court of Appeal has maintained its constitutionality despite many challenges that it violates the right to freedom of expression, pointing out that it is essential for safeguarding the right to dignity.[14]
MALICIOUS PROSECTION AND CIVIL REMEDIES
A person hurt by a false accusation may file a civil lawsuit under the actio iniuriarum in addition to facing criminal penalties. A malicious prosecution action is the most pertinent remedy. A plaintiff must assert and demonstrate four crucial components in order to prevail:
That the prosecution has failed (ended in favour of the plaintiff);
That the defendant behaved with “malice” (animus iniuriandi);
That the defendant set the law in motion (instigated or initiated the proceedings); and
That the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause.[15]
According to South African law, there is a clear distinction between malicious prosecution, which necessitates proof of a particular improper intention or bad faith, and unlawful arrest, where culpability is stringent.[16] The law’s attempt to strike a balance between accountability and the need to prevent citizens from being dissuaded from reporting crimes to the authorities is reflected in this high evidentiary burden.[17]
III. ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW AND CURRENT EVENTS
The practical implementation of South Africa’s judicial system exposes a pervasive conflict between safeguarding the accused’s reputations and making sure that the very system intended to protect them doesn’t silence victims. Legal procedures including protection orders and defamation claims are increasingly being used as “gag-orders” to prevent disclosures of criminal acts, according to recent court rulings.[18]
PROTECTION ORDERS TURNED INTO WEAPONS: S v P
The Western Cape High Court addressed the increasing practice of accused offenders exploiting the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 to silence survivors in the historic ruling of S v. P.[19] In this case, the court a quo issued a final protection order against a woman (S) following the social media disclosure of her rape claims against the respondent (P) by third parties.[20] The High Court reversed this ruling, concluding that the lower court had overlooked the “gendered purpose” of the Act, which was intended to safeguard victims of assault rather than give accused offenders a quicker way to obtain emotional damages or quiet their accusers.[21] The court observed that because of the “scourge of gender-based violence” and the high attrition rate in the criminal justice system, where only around 8.6% of recorded rapes result in a conviction, survivors frequently opt for informal disclosure via social media.[22] As a result, the court decided that disclosing a survivor’s truth should not be classified as “harassment” or “emotional abuse” just because it makes the accused person uncomfortable or damages their reputation.[23]
CREDIBILITY AND THE IMPEDIMENT OF POSTPONED REPORTING: Gallie v. Mdlekeza
The case of Mdlekeza v. Gallie serves as an example of the significant obstacles survivors must overcome in order to present their claims years after the tragedy.[24] The survivor’s Twitter disclosure was deemed defamatory by the court, in part because she had not filed a criminal complaint for six years.[25] The lack of a “feminist lens” that takes into consideration trauma, shame, and the “culture of silence” that discourages victims from reporting right away has led to harsh criticism of this method.[26] In contrast, the court rejected an urgent interdict intended to silence a survivor in Booysen v. Major, calling the idea that an accused rapist should have “editorial rights” over a victim’s story “astounding.”[27] These cases show how the civil law of defamation can obstruct access to justice in the absence of a contextual understanding of trauma.
Kruger v. NDPP: THE EVIDENTIARY BURDEN IN MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Survivors encounter obstacles to disclosure, but in civil law, those who want to be held accountable for genuinely false claims must meet equally strict requirements. The Constitutional Court made it clear in Kruger v. National Director of Public Prosecutions that merely dropping criminal charges does not prove intentional prosecution.[28] The plaintiff must demonstrate that the prosecutor acted without “reasonable and probable cause” and with animus iniuriandi, or the intent to harm.[29] The court stressed that “reasonable and probable cause” entails both an objective evaluation of whether a reasonable person would have started legal proceedings and a subjective belief in the accused’s guilt.[30] Even if a case finally fails due to a lack of evidence rather than falsity, this high hurdle guarantees that legitimate complainants and prosecutors are not discouraged from carrying out their duties by the possibility of ongoing litigation.[31]
FALSE EVIDENCE AND POLICE MISCONDUCT: Minister of Safety and Security v. Tyokwana
Severe cases of false allegations might also come from the governmental apparatus. In Minister of Safety and Security v. Tyokwana, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered a case in which police personnel beat witnesses and purposefully manufactured evidence in order to coerce them into making false statements.[32] The prosecution that followed was deemed malicious by the court because the officials were fully aware that there was no reliable evidence.[33] This case highlights the need for stringent responsibility for state actors who “set the law in motion” based on known falsehoods, as such activities constitute a flagrant violation of the individual’s constitutional right to freedom and security.[34]
ANALYTICAL VIEWS
By contrasting South Africa’s strategy with that of other jurisdictions, one can gain important insight into different approaches to striking a balance between justice and accountability. The United States’ statutory models and the common law traditions of the United Kingdom and Canada provide a variety of frameworks for mitigating the harm caused by false allegations without discouraging real victims.
THE UK AND SCOTLAND: CORRUPTING THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The common law crime of perverting the course of justice is a powerful instrument used to uphold the integrity of the judicial system in the United Kingdom, especially in Scotland.[35] This wide crime includes any behaviour that “tends to obstruct or hinder the course of justice.”[36] The Scottish offence has proven resilient in its ability to punish a wide range of conduct, such as fabricating precedents, hiding documents from the police, or avoiding being cited as a witness, in contrast to the more narrow South African definition of perjury, which is strictly limited to false statements made under oath.[37] A crucial distinction between “perverting the course of justice” and the specific charge of wasting police time is also acknowledged by the Scottish system.[38] This distinction is crucial for accountability: the crime of squandering police time explicitly targets the waste of law enforcement resources through false reports, whereas perverting the course of justice contains heavy penalties for activities that result in a miscarriage of justice.[39]
CANADA: THE EQUILIBRIUM OF RIGHTS AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Commonwealth rules for malicious prosecution have been greatly impacted by Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in decisions such as Proulx v. Quebec that although prosecutors and complainants need some protection to carry out their duties, this cannot be absolute when they act knowing that evidence has been falsified or concealed.[40] This “Commonwealth update” upholds the idea that safeguarding the fundamental right to liberty requires holding governmental actors and complainants responsible for malicious acts.[41] Additionally, Canada has struggled with the “gendered credibility” of reports of sexual assault. The necessity to abandon “myths and stereotypes” that previously resulted in the automatic rejection of delayed reports is highlighted by recent reforms and court rulings like R v. Kruk.[42] This is similar to the Western Cape High Court’s stance in S v. P, which recognises that social hurdles sometimes keep survivors from reporting right away and that their revelations shouldn’t be used against them as “harassment.”[43]
THE UNITED STATES: FALSE REPORTING STATUTORY MODELS
State-specific laws, many of which are based on the Model Penal Code, control liability for false accusations in the United States.[44] The two types of injury that these statutes usually classify are “falsely incriminating another” and “fictitious reports.”[45] Some states, like Texas, require the prosecution to prove a specific purpose to deceive rather than just a general intent in order to avoid a “chilling effect” on victims.[46] To make sure that the regulation targets behaviour that actually consumes court resources, several jurisdictions have adopted tight tailoring. For example, remarks that prompt law enforcement to launch a criminal investigation are explicitly punishable under Nevada’s false reporting legislation.[47] In order to ensure that the legal system protects both the accused and the reporter, some U.S. jurisdictions have also established “good faith” immunity for reporters in delicate situations, such as child abuse, while also establishing special divisions to look into reports made in bad faith.[48]
EVALUATION AND SUGGESTIONS
The sections above highlight South Africa’s delicate legal balance. On the one hand, the state is required under the constitution to defend the honour and character of people who are wrongfully accused of grave crimes. On the other hand, survivors frequently choose informal disclosure over formal channels due to the “scourge of gender-based violence” and the criminal justice system’s structural shortcomings, which are demonstrated by the 8.6% conviction rate for reported rapes.[49] The regulation runs the risk of generating a “chilling effect” that further silences real victims if it overcorrects by making unsuccessful complaints illegal.[50]
ASSESSING SOUTH AFRICA’S PRESENT FRAMEWORK
For today’s legal environment, the current reliance on broad common law charges like perjury and undermining the objectives of justice is inadequate. Although these tools enable accountability, they are frequently unsuited to handle the subtleties of “naming and shaming” on social media. As demonstrated in Mdlekeza v. Gallie, the civil law of defamation can be used as a weapon to punish survivors for their “bad” witness behaviour or fractured memory in the absence of a “feminist lens” that takes trauma and delayed reporting into consideration.[51] Additionally, the National Prosecuting Authority’s integrity is crucially protected by the high evidence standard for malicious prosecution, which was reiterated in Kruger v. NDPP.[52] For those who suffer from “police-instigated” falsehoods—where officials deliberately manufacture evidence to achieve incarcerations—it does, however, leave a sizable justice gap.[53] The Tyokwana case serves as a reminder that false accusations that are entrenched inside the governmental apparatus itself are the most hazardous.[54]
SUGGESTIONS FOR JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The following reforms should be taken into consideration by South Africa in order to attain the “balance” mentioned in the article’s title:
Need for Particular Intent: Any future legislation that particularly targets “false police reports” must require proof of dolus directus (specific intent) to deceive or initiate legal action against an innocent individual, in accordance with the legislative models of Nevada and Texas.[55] This guarantees that survivors won’t face criminal penalties if they report in “good faith” but don’t reach the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard in court.[56]
Safeguarding the Protection from Harassment Act: In order to prevent protection orders from being used as “gag-orders,” the judiciary must closely follow the precedent established in S v. P.[57] In order to prevent the Act from being used as a weapon against the exact class of people it was intended to protect, presiding officers should be trained to recognise “counter-applications” that accused perpetrators employ to silence survivors.[58]
Integrating Restorative Justice: South African courts should abandon merely retributive or compensating methods in situations where a disclosure was inaccurate but not necessarily malicious. The use of amende honourable (retraction and apology) should be prioritised in the Ubuntu spirit in order to “knit together shattered relationships” without the harshness of criminal records or crippling civil damages.[59]
Specialised Investigative Units: South Africa should set up separate units to look into allegations of sexual violence in order to lessen the “systemic distrust” of victims noted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.[60] To prevent the “witch-hunt” narrative and guarantee that both the accused and the accuser are treated fairly, these units should be manned by officers who have received training in “trauma-informed” interviews.[61]
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the delicate balance between making false charges illegal and guaranteeing that victims of crime can still use South Africa’s legal system. Although the frequency of false allegations is modest (statistically estimated at approximately 2% to 10%), the legal and societal repercussions for those wrongfully charged are severe, requiring strong accountability procedures.[62] This On the other hand, valid disclosures are frequently silenced by the danger of retaliatory lawsuits, as evidenced by the structural impediments that genuine survivors face, as evidenced by the rape conviction rate of 8.6%.[63]
Although South Africa’s existing legal system includes essential common law elements like perjury and crimen iniuria, it is argued that its application needs to be more nuanced. In accordance with the standard established in S v. P, which acknowledges the gendered context of disclosure in South African society, the judiciary must continue to be watchful against the “weaponization” of protection orders and defamation lawsuits.[64] As reiterated in Kruger v. NDPP, holding people accountable for malicious prosecution must maintain a high evidentiary burden to avoid the “chilling effect” that would occur if each rejected complaint led to a counter-charge.[65]
The legislature should think about formalising a particular intent requirement for false reporting, following worldwide statutory models that safeguard “good faith” reporters, in order to strike a real constitutional balance.[66] Additionally, incorporating restorative justice techniques—like the amende honorable—offers a way to uphold reputation without resorting to the harshness of the criminal court system.[67] The ability of the South African legal system to discern between the “misuse” of its processes and the frantic pursuit of justice by people for whom the system has historically failed is ultimately what determines the system’s integrity.
References and Bibliography
Table of Cases
Booysen v Major (WCHC) (unreported) case number 5043/2021 (30 August 2012)
Kruger v National Director of Public Prosecutions ZACC 13; 2019 (1) SACR 365 (CC)
Le Roux v Dey ZACC 4; 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC)
Mdlekeza v Gallie (WCHC) (unreported) case number 15490/2020 (20 April 2021)
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko ZASCA 43; 2009 (2) SACR 585 (SCA)
Minister of Safety and Security v Tyokwana 2015 (1) SACR 597 (SCA)
Proulx v Quebec (Attorney General) 2001 SCC 66, 3 SCR 9
R v Kruk 2024 SCC 7
Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe ZASCA 162; 2007 (1) All SA 375 (SCA)
S v Adendorff 2004 (2) SACR 185 (SCA)
S v Burger 1975 (2) SA 601 (C)
S v Hoho ZASCA 101; 2009 (1) SACR 276 (SCA)
S v P 2022 (2) SACR 81 (WCC)
Table of Legislation
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
Nevada Revised Statutes (Nev Rev Stat Ann § 207.280)
Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011
Texas Penal Code (Texas Penal Code Ann § 37.08)
Bibliography
Ampleman-Tremblay Sandrine, ‘False Accusations of Sexual Assault: Between Myths, Stereotypes, and Evidentiary Foundation’ (2024) 48 Manitoba Law Journal 1 De Zutter A and others, ‘The Prevalence of False Allegations of Rape in the United States from 2006-2010’ (2017) 2 Journal of Forensic Psychology 119 Joslin Kristina, ‘The Harmful Effects of Expansive Immunity Protections for Child Abuse Reporters and the Lack of Justice for Those Who Are Falsely Accused’ (2023) 44 Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice 117 McBratney Luke William, ‘Perverting the Course of Justice’ (LLM thesis, University of Glasgow 2018) McQuoid-Mason DJ, ‘Medicine and the Law: Is it ever justified for doctors to sue their patients whose allegations have been dismissed by the courts or the Health Professions Council of South Africa?’ (2015) 105(12) South African Medical Journal 1010 Meyersfeld Bonita, ‘Sexual Harassment and Disciplinary Procedures: Never the Twain Shall Meet’ (2020) 31(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 1 Midgley J and Van der Walt A, Principles of Delict (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2018) Okpaluba Chuks, ‘Between Reasonable and Probable Cause and Malice in the Law of Malicious Prosecution: A Commonwealth Update’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 Plesac Kelsie, ‘Remedying Cursory Police Investigation of Sexual Assault and the False Reporting Charges that Result’ (2019) 53 Valparaiso University Law Review 509 Snyman CR, Criminal Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2020) Swemmer Sheena, ‘S v P – The Abuse of Protection Orders to “Gag” Victims of Rape’ (2023) 26 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1
[1] Sheena Swemmer, ‘S v P – The Abuse of Protection Orders to “Gag” Victims of Rape’ (2023) 26 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Jounal 1, 3.
[2] Sandrine Ampleman-Tremblay, ‘False Accusations of Sexual Assault: Between Myths, Stereotypes, and Evidentiary Foundation’ (2024) 48 Manitoba Law Journal 1, 15; A De Zutter and Others, ‘The Prevalance of False Allegations of Rape in the United States from 2006-2010’ (2017) 2 Journal of Forensic Psychology 119, 1.
[3] Swemmer (n 1) 12; Protection from Harassment Act 17of 2011.
[4] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 10; C R Snyman, Criminal Law (7th edn, LexisNexis 2020) 339.
[5] S v P 2022 2 SACR 81 (WCC).
[6] Snyman (n 4) 657.
[7] Ibid 608.
[8] S v Adendorff 2004 2 SACR 185 (SCA).
[9] Snyman (n 4) 607.
[10] S v Burger 1975 2 SA 601 ©.
[11] Snyman (n 4) 664.
[12] Ibid 649.
[13] S v Hoho 2009 1 SACR 276 (SCA).
[14] Ibid .
[15] Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko ZASCA 43; 2009 (2) SACR 585 (SCA).
[16] Relyant Trading (Pty) Ltd v Shongwe 2007 1 All SA 375 (SCA).
[17] D J McQuoid-Mason, ‘Medicine and the Law: Is it ever justified for doctors to sue their patients whose allegations have been dismissed by the courts or the Health Professions Council of South Africa?’ (2015) 105(12) South African Medical Journal 1010, 1010.
[18] Swemmer (n 1) 3.
[19] Ibid; Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011.
[20] S v P 2022 2 SACR 81 (WCC) para 11.
[21] Swemmer (n 1) 4.
[22] Ibid 12.
[23] S v P (n 20) para 51.
[24] Mdlekeza v Gallie (WCHC) (unreported) case number 15490/2020 (20 April 2021).
[25] Ibid para 19.
[26] Swemmer (n 1) 19.
[27] Booysen v Major (WCHC) (unreported) case number 5043/2021 (30 August 2012) para 18.
[28] Kruger v National Director of Public Prosecutions ZACC 13; 2019 (1) SACR 365 (CC) para 85.
[29] Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko ZASCA 43; 2009 (2) SACR 585 (SCA) para 8.
[30] Kruger (n 28) para 50.
[31] B Meyersfeld, ‘Sexual Harassment and Disciplinary Procedures: Never the Twain Shall Meet’ (2020) 31(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 1, 105.
[32] Minister of Safety and Security v Tyokwana 2015 (1) SACR 597 (SCA).
[33] Chuks Okpaluba, ‘Between Reasonable and Probable Cause and Malice in the Law of Malicious Prosecution: A Commonwealth Update’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1, 273.
[34] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 12(1).
[35] Luke William McBratney, ‘Perverting the Course of Justice’ (LLM thesis, University of Glasgow 2018) 1.
[36] Ibid 47, citing Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia.
[37] McBratney (n 35) 1, 23, 34.
[38] Ibid 29.
[39] Ibid 107.
[40] Proulx v Quebec (Attorney General) 2001 206 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC).
[41] Chuks Okpaluba, ‘Between Reasonable and Probable Cause and Malice in the Law of Malicious Prosecution: A Commonwealth Update’ (2016) 19 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1, 273 (n 33).
[42] R v Kruk 2024 SCC 7.
[43] S v P (n 20) para 51.
[44] Kelsie Plesac, ‘Remedying Cursory Police Investigation of Sexual Assault and the False Reporting Charges that Result’ (2019) 53 Valparaiso University Law Review 509, 523.
[45] Ibid
[46] Texas Penal Code Ann § 37.08.
[47] Nevada Rev Stat Ann § 207.280.
[48] Kristina Joslin, ‘The Harmful Effects of Expansive Immunity Protections for Child Abuse Reporters and the Lack of Justice for Those Who Are Falsely Accused’ (2023) 44 Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice 117, 138–140.
[49] Sheena Swemmer, ‘S v P – The Abuse of Protection Orders to “Gag” Victims of Rape’ (2023) 26 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1, 12 (n 1).
[50] Ibid 3.
[51] Ibid 19.
[52] Kruger v National Director of Public Prosecutions ZACC 13 para 85 (n 28).
[53] Minister of Safety and Security v Tyokwana 2015 (1) SACR 597 (SCA) (n 32).
[54] Ibid .
[55] Texas Penal Code Ann § 37.08; Kelsie Plesac, ‘Remedying Cursory Police Investigation of Sexual Assault and the False Reporting Charges that Result’ (2019) 53 Valparaiso University Law Review 509, 523 (n 44).
[56] Ibid 539.
[57] S v P 2022 2 SACR 81 (WCC) para 51 (n 20).
[58] Swemmer (n 1) 4, 10.
[59] Le Roux v Dey ZACC 4; 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 202; Midgley and Van der Walt, Principles of Delict (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 459.
[60] Plesac (n 44) 529.
[61] Bonita Meyersfeld, ‘Sexual Harassment and Disciplinary Procedures: Never the Twain Shall Meet’ (2020) 31(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 1, 105.
[62] Sandrine Ampleman-Tremblay, ‘False Accusations of Sexual Assault: Between Myths, Stereotypes, and Evidentiary Foundation’ (2024) 48 Manitoba Law Journal 1, 15 (n 2); A De Zutter and others, ‘The Prevalence of False Allegations of Rape in the United States from 2006-2010’ (2017) 2 Journal of Forensic Psychology 119, 1 (n 2).
[63] Sheena Swemmer, ‘S v P – The Abuse of Protection Orders to “Gag” Victims of Rape’ (2023) 26 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1, 12 (n 1).
[64] S v P 2022 2 SACR 81 (WCC) para 51 (n 20); Swemmer (n 1) 4.
[65] Kruger v National Director of Public Prosecutions ZACC 13; 2019 (1) SACR 365 (CC) para 85 (n 28).
[66] Texas Penal Code Ann § 37.08 (n 55); Kelsie Plesac, ‘Remedying Cursory Police Investigation of Sexual Assault and the False Reporting Charges that Result’ (2019) 53 Valparaiso University Law Review 509, 523 (n 44).
[67] Le Roux v Dey ZACC 4; 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 202 (n 59).
