Authored By: Harry Morrow
University of Sussex
Introduction
Intimate partner violence is a grey area in civil law. It is not easily definable, as one can classify it as another tort, such as assault. The Supreme Court of Canada recognised this in a landmark decision in Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, where it made it possible for victims to bring a claim for a new tort which specifically addresses the coercive nature of intimate partner violence[1]. This decision was made as previous torts only provided remedies for damages of physical and psychological nature. These torts did not recognise the element of coercive control and the distinct harm that it brings since it is non-physical and non-psychological. This unique harm is distinct from other torts as it is classified as of a loss of dignity and equality within an intimate relationship. While this decision should serve as some relief for victims of domestic abuse, it is not a perfect remedy. Since it is a unique harm, it is more difficult to prove than torts such as assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, or IIED, which can be applied more flexibly[2] . Therefore, this article will examine the criteria of the tort of intimate partner violence and evaluate whether it is an effective tool for victims of domestic abuse to pursue in court.
Legal Framework:
The decision in Ahluwalia serves as the principal legal authority for this tort. What separates the tort of intimate partner violence in Ahluwalia from other torts is that there must be an element of coercive control. This is defined as an interference with an intimate partner’s dignity, autonomy, and equality within the relationship[3]. Similar torts such as assault and battery are only concerned with the physical aspects of the harm and do not consider the manipulative tactics used to cause it. To prove intimate partner violence, additional steps must be taken. Such elements are not easy to prove; however, they are essential to illustrating the loss suffered by the victim.
Requirements for the Tort
First, the plaintiff must prove that the harm or wrongful conduct occurred during, or after, an intimate relationship[4]. This is needed to prove that the harm or wrongful conduct was the product of an intimate relationship. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally engaged in abusive conduct[5]. If this can be proven, then it will likely demonstrate a pattern that will aid the victim. Third, the plaintiff must show that the conduct objectively amounts to coercive control[6]. As the key step, the plaintiff must show that the defendants’ conduct diminished their dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship[7].
Evaluation of Requirements
The first requirement seems basic; however, it must be made clear as the remedy cannot be made available to all victims of abuse. For example, in Scalera, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by several bus drivers[8]. She was entitled to damages; however, she was not entitled to damages stemming from the coercive nature of the abuse. This is because the relationship was not an intimate one, as the defendants were similar to that of strangers. In terms of effectiveness for victims, this is not a good sign, as it limits potential claims. Further complicating the issue is that there are some romantic relationships that could be qualified as abusive, but not necessarily intimate. For example, the loverboy method of human trafficking employs methods of creating a romantic relationship for the purposes of exploitation[9]. Since the dynamic of the relationship is exploitative and not intimate, the victim will endure the abuse without being able to qualify for this tort, as it is not technically an intimate relationship. This does not reflect well for most victims of intimate partner violence if they must distinguish what type of relationship they were in.
While the second requirement presents as a difficult hurdle for victims to overcome, it is not as trying as it appears. This component is not a subjective one, meaning the plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant truly believed that they were engaging in coercive behaviour. They only need to prove that it was reasonable that the defendant intended to engage in the coercive behaviour[10]. This is still difficult, as coercive control in an intimate relationship is at its very core, deceptive, and difficult to prove. Moreover, the defendant can claim that they were genuinely unaware of any wrongdoing in matters of sexual abuse in an intimate relationship, as outlined in Pappajohn[11]. However, this doubt only goes so far. Where the defendant wilfully blinds themselves to the facts and persists in behaviour that is objectively known to cause harm, their immunity via unawareness of harm will not be valid during litigation[12]. Therefore, this requirement is not entirely unreasonable for victims to prove if they can demonstrate that the intention to cause harm was obvious.
As for the third requirement, this is not too difficult, as most forms of physical abuse will generally be regarded as an act that diminishes respect in an intimate relationship[13]. However, defining what is a reduction of equality in a relationship is difficult to prove. Obviously, if the plaintiff incurred violence, then that lessens their equality in the relationship[14]. On the other hand, reduction of equality may be disguised under differences in relationship dynamics. One of the acts that proved Mr. Ahluwalia’s coercive behavior was his purposeful collection of Ms. Ahluwalia’s earnings, as well as the termination of her own credit card[15]. This financial control was used as a coercive control mechanism[16]. However, control of financial assets on the part of the husband is not entirely uncommon. There are different structures of marriage where the husband controls the finances, and the wife is unfamiliar with the amount[17]. This could be a viable defence to establish normality in the relationship. However, where it is clear that the control of finances is to the detriment of the victim, this defence will not work. The same can be said in regard to disguising the diminished autonomy of the victim as standard religious practice. In theory it may work, but in law, it is invalid as the court in Humaid stated that a husband cannot use religious beliefs as a defense for causing harm to their spouse[18]. Even if the husband was provoked, he is not harming his spouse because he lost control of his emotions. He is harming her out of anger combined with following a belief system which entitles him to punish his spouse[19]. Therefore, defences relating to social and cultural differences are unlikely to mask the coercive conduct as they hold little precedent. The result for the plaintiff is that this element is not very difficult for victims to prove and is not a major disadvantage to them.
Available Torts
Though the tort of intimate partner violence possesses some difficult requirements, it remains the best tort for victims to file a claim. This is because there are similar torts that may compensate the victim for the physical and psychological harm suffered. However, they do not encapsulate the coercive control element in intimate partner violence, or the harm it causes. To demonstrate, torts of trespass to the person, such as assault, are torts for which victims can file claims to seek damages for harm suffered. However, the harm is only physical, as the act itself is only concerned with the intention to cause harm and the application of force[20]. Therefore, victims cannot recover for the harm caused by coercive control under this tort[21]. The same can be said for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Unlike assault, this tort provides remedies for harms that are psychological[22]. Intimate partner violence may have damaging psychological effects; however, this tort provides no remedies for damage from coercive control. Moreover, the victim must prove that they suffer a visible illness to receive damages[23]. Not every victim is afflicted with such an illness and can therefore not access damages.
Available Legislation
While common law provides a useful remedy for intimate partner violence, available legislation does not cover as much ground. This is because the statutes in place serve to minimize the economic effects on the parties in the event of a breakdown of the relationship[24]. However, they do not describe any pertinent reasons for the breakdown. The Divorce Act has no useful instructions, as the only reference to family violence pertains to parenting dynamics[25]. Moreover, the Family Law Act does not provide anything more substantive. The only section of relevance would be spousal support, in which it makes no mention of instances of family violence[26]. It only lists factors that determine spousal support, of which family violence is not once of them[27]. Moreover, statute law is not designed to decide these matters due to its lack of deterrence. Tort law gains its effectiveness from demonstrating fault and liability in establishing precedent for how future decisions should be made[28]. Whereas statutes, in these cases, serve as guidelines for allocating finances for the separation of marriages[29]. Therefore, the tort of intimate partner violence from Ahluwalia serves as a better tool for victims in seeking remedies than statutory provisions.
Conclusion
The tort of intimate partner violence, as outlined in Ahluwalia, serves as a novel tool for victims. The need for its creation was highlighted by the fact that similar torts do not cover the coercive control area of harm. Likewise, the legislation in place does not have a clear description of coercive control or any abuse for that matter. While the steps themselves are not simple, they remain the most effective tool for victims of intimate partner violence whose harm was caused by coercive and manipulative means. The primary recommendation for future change would be statutory amendments. Expanding the terminology of intimate partner violence in legislation such as the Divorce Act would allow for a clearer understanding of the harms of intimate partner violence, as well as compensatory mechanisms to go alongside it.
Cases
Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16
Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] SCC 24, [2000] 185 DLR (4th) 1
PappaJohn v. The Queen [1980] SCC 13, [1980] 2 SCR 120
R v. Humaid [2006] CanLII 12287, 81 OR (3d) 456
Sansregret v. The Queen [1985] SCC 79, 17 DLR (4th) 577
Legislation
Criminal Code of Canada 1985
The Divorce Act 1985
Family Law Act 2011
Secondary Sources
Camille Carney, ‘Domestic Violence Torts, Righting a Civil Wrong’ (2014) 62 UNMSL
Körner Mascha, ‘Police Investigations in “Loverboy” Cases. The modus operandi of “loverboys”- challenges of law enforcement in dealing with the offence of trafficking in human beings’ (2022) 12 SIAK Journal JPSP
Jan Pahl, ‘Patterns of Money Management within Marriage’ (1980) 9 JSP
Reference(S):
[1] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 [181]
[2] Ibid [291]
[3] Ibid [184]
[4] Ibid [206]
[5] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 [207]
[6] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 [208]
[7] Ibid
[8] Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London v Scalera [2000] SCC 24, [2000] 185 DLR (4th) 1 [56]
[9] Körner Mascha, ‘Police Investigations in “Loverboy” Cases. The modus operandi of “loverboys”- challenges of law enforcement in dealing with the offence of trafficking in human beings’ (2022) 12 SIAK Journal JPSP 77.
[10] Ibid
[11] PappaJohn v. The Queen [1980] SCC 13, [1980] 2 SCR 120, 162-164
[12] Sansregret v. The Queen [1985] SCC 79, 17 DLR (4th) 577 [25]
[13] Camille Carney, ‘Domestic Violence Torts, Righting a Civil Wrong’ (2014) 62 UNMSL 695, 699.
[14] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 [127]
[15] Ibid [142]
[16] Ibid
[17] Jan Pahl, ‘Patterns of Money Management within Marriage’ (1980) 9 JSP 313, 317.
[18] R v. Humaid [2006] CanLII 12287, 81 OR (3d) 456 [85]
[19] Ibid
[20] Criminal Code of Canada 1985, s 265(1)
[21] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 [160]
[22] Ibid [155]
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid [211]
[25] Ibid [79]
[26] Family Law Act 2011, s 162
[27] Ibid
[28] Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia [2026] SCC 16 [215]
[29] Ibid [211]
