Authored By: Ayesha Salma Yusoof
Middlesex University Dubai
Introduction
The assertion that “trials are a fundamental part of a democratic settlement, and criminal trials without juries are a bad idea”,[1] as highlighted by David Lammy (now Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice) in 2000, contradicted the recommendations of the subsequent independent review of the criminal justice system. Published in July 2025 and discussed in Parliament in December 2025,[2] this review acknowledged significant delays and backlogs within the justice system. It subsequently proposed abolishing jury trials for offences carrying sentences under three years, replacing them with single-judge proceedings in expedited courts.[3]
This raises the question of whether the reform introducing juryless trials for such offences constitutes a proportionate and effective response to the Crown Courts’ escalating procedural inefficiencies.
Theoretical Perspectives on Jury Legitimacy
Historically, jury trials have no explicit statutory origin. Their authority under common law has conferred a symbolic value of democratic legitimacy. From a theoretical standpoint, the legitimacy of the jury can be understood through several core perspectives. The democratic standpoint highlights the jury as an instrument of civic participation, allowing ordinary citizens to exercise a direct role in the administration of justice.
In contrast, the rule of law’s perspective focuses on procedural justice and the consistency of legal outcomes, which often favours the expertise of professional judges but recognises that including laypersons serves as a safeguard against institutional overreach and potential abuses of power. The Magna Carta of 1215 established that no free person’s liberty should be taken away without the lawful judgement of peers and the law of the land.[4] This highlights a distinction between the reasonable verdict of a jury panel of 12 ordinary people and the legal verdict handed down by a trained legal professional. It reflects a deliberate constitutional choice about who should hold the power to convict the individual. Lord Devlin illustrates jurors as “a lamp showing freedom lives”.[5] This resembles a chance for citizens to exercise statutory power over the fate of fellow citizens on trial. Every jury’s verdict may not always be legally accurate. However, Bushell’s Case (1670) reinforces that the independence of jurors is essential.[6] Jurors must be able to freely reach verdicts without fear of institutional retaliation, especially in high-profile criminal cases.
European Convention Perspective and the Framework of the Reform
On the contrary, Part 1 of Sir Brian Leverson’s Independent Review of Criminal Courts argues that neither the Magna Carter or European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) establishes an absolute right to a jury trial.[7] Whilst this narrow interpretation may prove potentially defenceless, Article 6 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, does not specify the mechanism through which fairness must be achieved.[8] Therefore, the normative questions of a fair trial before whom and under what conditions the trial is conducted may scrutinise the outcome of achieving justice, especially for lower-sentence cases. Hence, a professional judge working through case lists in swift courts, which is 20% faster than having jury trials, would likely shift towards speeding proceedings to avoid backlogs and potentially hinder delivering the principle of fairness for sentences of less than 3 years under Article 6.[9]
Additionally, the December 2025 reform suggested magistrates’ sentencing extension powers of a maximum of 18 months (with a provision of two years if circumstances permit) and judge-only trials for complex fraud trials.[10] Consequently, taking such measures of redirecting a bulk of cases, which would previously have gone before a jury, potentially eases the administrative burden of backlogs but at the cost of structural dismantling in small-scale offence proceedings.
Why Lay Scrutiny Matters
As for the systematic failures of institutions, Regina v McIlkenny & Others [1991] (also referred to as the Birmingham Six) highlighted that the conviction of the Irishmen was based on discredited forensic evidence and coerced testimony presented to the jury during the trial.[11] The quashing of the conviction following external journalistic investigation highlighted that the failure was not in the lay deliberation of the jurors, but in the reliance on the fabricated evidence and political momentum surrounding the IRA activity.[12] However, the question arises whether, in a single-judge swift court, is there more or less protection against such a kind of institutional pressure. With the 12 individuals each having their own personal perspectives and judgments, applying scrutiny collectively without any career-driven incentive to accept the prosecution’s argument represents a qualitatively different standpoint as compared to a professional judge who would be working under systemic pressures to proceed to the next pending cases on the list.
Similarly, in the case of the Guildford Four (1989), the conviction was quashed due to a coerced confession and suppression of evidence by police officers.[13] These events not only display miscarriages of justice but also public actors potentially holding greater influence in judge-only courts. Removing lay deliberation does not directly eliminate the risks those public actors represent, but may provide a mechanism for public actors to uphold the credibility of their duty in order to maintain public assurance.
However, R v Jogee [2016] indicated a different dimension where the application of a wrong legal test created a generationally flawed understanding of secondary liability.[14] This judicial error of applying and later disagreeing with the doctrine of the application caused a disproportionate conviction pattern that targeted a certain ethnicity who did not legally commit the offence. Given the dynamic nature of common law, the authority of sole judicial trials over lay participation does not guarantee the certainty of accurate decisions concluded from a single perspective. Therefore, such errors found in applying a legal test could entrench flawed and misleading convictions for decades if not corrected.
Alternatively, the Crown Court case against Alan Blythe (1998) displayed that the defendant, who cultivated cannabis for his terminally ill wife, was held not guilty by the jury despite the evidence of cannabis cultivation being sufficient for conviction.[15] Despite the purpose of the defendant solely to relieve suffering for his terminally ill wife, a judge’s interpretation would greatly contrast with the decision made by the jury, since a judge is legally bound to apply the law as written.[16] With jury equity likely to be inconsistent and heavily context dependent, the ability for twelve citizens to signal that the law does not produce a just outcome helps create a democratic correction mechanism. Consequently, swift courts would likely eliminate this mechanism as the law would be mechanically applied and unlikely to take into consideration particular human situations during Crown Court proceedings.
The Disproportionate Impact on Individuals
The reforms are likely to have an impact on the underserved communities within the justice system, mainly minority communities, as highlighted by MPs in the December 2025 Hansard debate.[17] With acquittal rates likely higher in the Crown Court,[18] the shift to swift courts would likely remove the benefit of jury verdicts, which in turn removes protection for the population that most needs them. Conducting shorter proceedings reflects limited access to legal advice and less time committed to each case due to the structural pressures of being efficient more likely to hinder the credibility of the overall decision.
Scrutiny of the Procedural Reforms’ efficiency claim
With the government claiming that outstanding cases have risen by 10% and average case duration has increased by 15 days, the scope for effective intervention lies in identifying the cause of the backlog rather than diagnosing the impact of the crisis.[19] According to Hansard records of Parliament’s December 2025 debate, jury trials account for only 3% of criminal cases in England and Wales.[20] Therefore, removing a mechanism used in three per cent of proceedings is arithmetically unlikely to create a credible solution to resolve the greater issue of case delays accumulated over the years.
On the contrary, the poor maintenance of administrative and procedural systems in courts, which is estimated to cost billions, does not provide a reasonable justification when compared to the savings from restricting jury trials. Therefore, the solution lies in improving the underfunded infrastructure to accommodate the backlog. Alternatively, the short-term solution of diverting cases from Crown Courts to Magistrate Courts is likely to ease the burden of case backlogs. However, even if numerical values indicate less case congestion, this remedy is unlikely to be effective and guarantee procedural efficiency in the long run.
Conclusion
The issue of the Crown Court’s backlog is a genuine emergency posing significant constitutional and democratic barriers to the government’s reform of juryless trials. Despite the term jury not being explicitly highlighted under Article 6 of the ECHR, the logic of peer adjudication represents a generational procedure of being judged by one’s peers. However, the reality of eliminating jury trial for offences under three years as a remedy to resolve the issue of backlogs is unlikely to be a feasible solution, given the efficiency decline and chronic underinvestment in the criminal justice system. Alternatively, landmark cases relating to national security and judicial errors highlight that a single judge’s decision-making left unchecked by lay participation is not a superior system but a more dangerous one, which could deter the quality of justice served. With swift courts unlikely to contribute significantly towards resolving the greater problem, assessing the impact of restructuring the system funded by more investment, could be a viable long-term solution to restabilise backlogs whilst maintaining public participation within criminal trials.
Reference(S):
[1] ‘Jury Trials are fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.’ A statement from all the Silks in 36 Crime (36 Group, 26 November 2025) <“Jury Trials are fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.” A statement from all the Silks in 36 Crime – 36 Group> accessed 2 May 2026.
[2] HC Deb 2 December 2025, vol 776, Criminal Court Reform (David Lammy) para 2.
[3] HC Deb 2 December 2025 (n.2) para 7-8.
[4] Magna Carta 1297, cl 39.
[5] Patrick Devlin, Trial by Jury (8th series, Stevens & Sons 1956) 164.
[6] Bushell’s Case (1670) 89 ER 2.
[7] Sir Brian Leveson, Independent Review of the Criminal Courts: Part 1 (Ministry of Justice, July 2025) 278.
[8] Human Rights Act 1998, art 6.
[9] Sir Brian Leverson, Independent Review (n.7),298.
[10] HC Deb 2 December 2025 (n.2) para 10.
[11] R v McIlkenny and Others (1991) LRC (Crim) 196.
[12] Ibid.
[13] ‘The jury and the Guildford Four’ (1989) 139 NLJ 1556, para 5.
[14] R v Jogee (2016) UKSC 8.
[15] Kathy Marks, ‘Jury Clears Man Accused of Growing Cannabis’ The Independent (4 April 1998) <Jury clears man accused of growing cannabis | The Independent | The Independent> accessed 2 May 2026.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Criminal Court Reform – Hansard (n.2) para 67.
[18] Esther Hartley, ‘Juries More Likely to Acquit in Speech-Related Cases’ (Free Speech Union, 1 December 2025) <Juries More Likely to Acquit in Speech-Related Cases — FSU Archive> accessed 2 May 2026.
[19] Ministry of Justice, Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: April to June 2025 (Ministry of Justice, 30 September 2025) <Criminal court statistics quarterly: April to June 2025 – GOV.UK> accessed 2 May 2026.
[20] HC Deb 2 December 2025 (n.2) para 11.
