Authored By: Simmi Sonali
ILS Law College,Pune
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India held, by a 4:1 majority, that the centuries-old practice of prohibiting women between the ages of ten and fifty from entering the Sabarimala temple in Kerala was unconstitutional.1 The majority ruled that such exclusion violated women’s fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, cautioning against judicial interference in matters of religious faith. Following a wave of review petitions, the matter was referred to a nine-judge Constitution Bench, which commenced arguments in April 2026, eight years after the original verdict. This article critically examines the 2018 judgment, the doctrines it tested, the competing judicial views, the arguments of Senior Advocates J. Sai Deepak and Indira Jaising, and the questions that remain open before the Supreme Court.
The Sabarimala temple in Kerala, dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, attracts millions of pilgrims annually. Traditionally, women aged 10–50 were excluded based on the belief that the deity is a celibate (Naishtika Brahmachari). This practice went largely unchallenged until 2006, when the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a writ petition under Article 322 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court, arguing that the exclusion violated the fundamental rights of women devotees. What followed was a legal battle that shook the country, producing a landmark 2018 verdict, widespread protests across Kerala, a 3:2 referral to a larger bench, and a nine-judge constitutional examination still underway as of April 2026. At its core, the case raises a fundamental constitutional question: how to reconcile the guarantees of equality and religious freedom, and whether they can truly coexist.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The Sabarimala temple in Kerala, believed to have divine origins, is associated with Lord Ayyappa. The Mandala-Makaravilakku pilgrimage involves a forty-one-day Vratham marked by celibacy and austerities. The exclusion of women of menstruating age was traditionally justified by the celibate nature of the deity and the discipline expected of devotees.
This exclusion was first formally challenged in court in 1991, when the Kerala High Court in S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board3 upheld the practice. The High Court held that restricting women between ten and fifty years of age was a valid custom and did not violate Articles 15, 25 or 26 of the Constitution. It further upheld Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965,4 framed under Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965,5 which allowed religious denominations to exclude certain categories of persons by custom.
The statutory framework reveals a key tension: while Section 3 of the 1965 Act ensures access to all sections of Hindus, Rule 3(b) creates an exception allowing exclusion based on usage or custom. This inconsistency formed the central statutory issue in the case.
III. THE 2018 JUDGMENT: WHAT THE FIVE JUDGES DECIDED
A. Chief Justice Dipak Misra (and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar)
CJI Dipak Misra, writing for himself and Justice Khanwilkar, held that religion must be understood as a way of life intrinsically connected to individual dignity.6 He found that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa, the Ayyappans, were not a “religious denomination” as understood in constitutional law. Since the Ayyappans are simply Hindus worshipping the idol Ayyappa, the protection available under Article 267 to religious denominations did not apply to them. Accordingly, the temple’s exclusionary practice could not be justified on the basis of denominational rights. He further held that the practice of excluding women was not an essential religious practice, and therefore not protected under Article 25.8 Rule 3(b) was struck down as both unconstitutional and ultra vires the parent Act, since the Act was enacted specifically to open public Hindu places of worship to all sections and classes of Hindus.
B. Justice R.F. Nariman (Concurring)
Justice Nariman concurred but rested his reasoning primarily on the statutory ground.9 He held that Rule 3(b) was ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act, a conclusion that alone was enough to strike down the restriction. He agreed that the Ayyappans did not form a separate denomination and that the exclusion violated Article 25(1) of women devotees. His opinion was more measured and less broad in its constitutional sweep than that of Justice Chandrachud.
C. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (Concurring — The Most Expansive Opinion)
Justice Chandrachud wrote what is perhaps the most far-reaching opinion in the case.10 He held that excluding women on the basis of menstruation is not a religious practice. It is systemic discrimination rooted in notions of purity and pollution. Physiological characteristics bear no bearing on constitutional entitlements, and treating a woman as impure because of her bodily cycle amounts to untouchability prohibited under Article 1711 of the Constitution.
Justice Chandrachud held that Article 17 is not a narrow provision limited to caste-based untouchability. The framers deliberately left the term undefined to allow it an expansive interpretation, covering all forms of social exclusion rooted in notions of purity. He asserted that constitutional morality must prevail over popular morality and social convention. The exclusion of women through purity taboos subverts their equal citizenship and violates the dignity guaranteed under Article 21.12
D. Justice Indu Malhotra (Dissent)
Justice Indu Malhotra delivered the lone dissent, and it is a dissent that deserves serious attention.13 She did not dispute that the petition was maintainable. However, she firmly held that courts should not interfere in matters of religious belief and practice. She argued that essential religious practices must be defined by the faith’s followers, not the judiciary. The beliefs around purity and the deity’s celibacy are sincerely held by Sabarimala devotees, and overriding them in the name of constitutional morality risks imposing judicial views on religion and inviting excessive scrutiny of longstanding religious practices across communities.
IV. KEY LEGAL DOCTRINES AT STAKE
A. The Essential Religious Practice (ERP) Doctrine
The Essential Religious Practice doctrine traces its origin to the Constitution Bench decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt14 (1954), commonly called the Shirur Mutt case. The doctrine holds that only those practices which are essential and integral to a religion are constitutionally protected under Article 25. Practices that are not essential can be regulated or even abolished by the state.
In the Sabarimala case, the majority held that the exclusion of women of menstruating age was not an essential religious practice. It was neither scripturally mandated nor so fundamental that the religion would cease to exist without it.15 Critics of the doctrine — including Solicitor General Tushar Mehta in the 2026 hearings — argue that the ERP test is inherently flawed because it asks secular courts to decide what is or is not “essential” to a faith. That, they say, is a task courts are not competent to perform.
B. Constitutional Morality vs. Popular Morality
One of the most important and most contested concepts in the Sabarimala judgment is the idea of “constitutional morality.” Justice Chandrachud distinguished sharply between popular morality (what a majority of society believes at any given time) and constitutional morality (the values embedded in the Constitution itself i.e. equality, dignity, and liberty).16 The majority held that constitutional morality must prevail over popular morality, even when the latter is reinforced by religious practice.
This approach has been criticized both inside and outside the courtroom. In the 2026 nine-judge proceedings, the Union of India argued that “constitutional morality” is vague and subjective, urging the Court to reconsider its use as a ground for judicial review.17 The Solicitor General urged the bench to abandon constitutional morality as a ground for judicial review altogether. This remains one of the core unsettled questions before the nine-judge bench.
C. What Is a ‘Religious Denomination’?
Article 2618 protects the rights of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion. To qualify as a denomination, the group must satisfy the test laid down in the Shirur Mutt case and refined in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India19 — the group must have a common faith, a common organization, and be designated by a distinct name.
The 2018 majority held that Ayyappans are not a separate denomination but Hindus worshipping Ayyappa. This remains contested, with respondents citing distinct practices like the Vratham to claim denominational status — an issue central to the ongoing nine-judge reference.20
V. THE REVIEW PETITIONS AND THE NINE-JUDGE REFERENCE
Following the September 2018 judgment, the streets of Kerala saw some of the most intense protests the state had witnessed in recent memory. Over fifty review petitions were filed by various organizations including the Nair Service Society, the All Kerala Brahmin’s Association, and the National Ayyappa Devotees (Women’s) Association. On 14 November 2019, a five-judge bench — now headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi after CJI Misra’s retirement — delivered a 3:2 majority opinion keeping the review petitions pending and referring several overarching constitutional questions to a larger bench.21
Justices Nariman and Chandrachud dissented from the referral, arguing that the constitutional questions exceeded the scope of a review petition and that the 2018 judgment should simply have been upheld or overturned, not expanded into a broader exercise. The referral was nonetheless upheld by a nine-judge bench on 10 February 2020, and the matter was tagged alongside three related cases concerning the entry of Muslim women into mosques and dargahs, the entry of Parsi women married outside their community into Fire Temples, and the legality of female genital mutilation within the Dawoodi Bohra community.22
Seven constitutional questions have been placed before the nine-judge bench, including: What is the scope of judicial review over religious practice under Article 25? Does the word ‘morality’ in Articles 25 and 26 include constitutional morality? Whether essential religious practices are protected under Article 26? And whether a person outside a religious denomination can challenge its practices through a public interest litigation?23
VI. THE APRIL 2026 HEARINGS: WHAT THE ADVOCATES ARGUED
A. For the Review Petitioners
Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Union of India in support of the review, launched a direct challenge to the framework of the 2018 judgment.24 He argued that secular courts lack the “scholarly competence” to judge matters of faith, as their role is to interpret law, not assess religious beliefs. He urged abandoning the doctrine of constitutional morality and returning to Shirur Mutt, where religious communities define their own practices.
Senior Advocate J. Sai Deepak, appearing for the Pandalam Royal Family and the organization People for Dharma, made perhaps the most memorable submission — arguing that the deity Lord Ayyappa himself has rights under Articles 21 and 25(1) of the Constitution.25 The deity’s vow of Naishtika Brahmacharya i.e. eternal celibacy, is the very character and identity of Lord Ayyappa as worshipped at this specific shrine. To compel the temple to admit women of menstruating age, Sai Deepak contended, is to force the deity to abandon his own nature. He further argued, following the principle that “what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly,” that the state cannot bring a religious practice under judicial scrutiny merely by enacting a law that touches upon it.
In response, CJI Surya Kant noted that judicial review applies wherever there is state action, to which Sai Deepak argued that Article 26 protects the autonomy of religious institutions from such interference. Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi added that the Sabarimala practice is not ordinary gender discrimination but a unique classification tied to this specific shrine, unlike other Ayyappa temples.
B. Against the Review
Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, appearing for two women who had entered Sabarimala following the 2018 verdict, argued that the Constitution is a living document and that fundamental rights must evolve over time.26 She stressed that the claim being pressed was simply one of access to a place of worship — not any claim to alter the rituals performed within it. The right to enter and offer prayers is a matter of religious freedom under Article 25(1), and cannot be curtailed on the basis of a physiological characteristic such as menstruation. She also argued that Article 25(2)(b),27 which empowers the state to enact laws throwing open Hindu places of public worship to all classes and sections, was directly applicable and that the 1965 Act was enacted precisely for this purpose.
The bench itself, across multiple days of hearing, appeared to be grappling with genuinely difficult questions.28 Justice Amanullah questioned how courts can determine the “correct” interpretation of a practice amid disagreement among followers. The bench also cautioned against “annihilating religion” in the name of reform, indicating that while judicial oversight is necessary, it must have clear limits.
VII. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: WHAT THE SABARIMALA CASE REALLY TELLS US
The Sabarimala case presents a genuine constitutional dilemma, with both the majority and dissent engaging with competing values. The majority rightly held that menstruation is not impurity and that state-linked bodies cannot enforce exclusion based on biological characteristics. It affirmed that equality and dignity extend to places of worship, and Justice Chandrachud’s expansive reading of Article 17 finds support in the Constituent Assembly’s deliberate choice to leave “untouchability” undefined.
However, Justice Malhotra raised a harder question — who is the petitioner, and what right is being claimed? The writ petition was filed not by a woman devotee turned away from Sabarimala, but by a lawyers’ association. Whether an outsider can challenge the internal practice of a religious group is a legitimate question of PIL standing and one among the seven questions now before the nine-judge bench.29
The ERP doctrine itself is increasingly being recognized as a problematic tool. To ask a court to determine whether a practice is “essential” to a religion requires the court to become a theologian, a role for which it is ill-suited. The Solicitor General’s critique — however politically motivated it may appear in context — contains a genuine jurisprudential point: courts applying the ERP doctrine have produced inconsistent, unpredictable results that have satisfied neither religious communities nor constitutional lawyers.30
The real unresolved issue is one of institutional competence. India’s Constitution genuinely does attempt to reconcile religious freedom with social reform. Article 25(2)(b)31 explicitly empowers the state to throw open Hindu places of worship to all sections — which is a form of constitutional permission for exactly what the 2018 judgment did. But Article 26 equally protects denominational autonomy, raising the difficult question of where to draw the line between reform and intrusion into religious freedom, an issue now before a nine-judge bench, which must deliver a clear and principled ruling.
The Sabarimala case has also expanded beyond its original scope, now encompassing issues involving Muslim women in mosques, Parsi women in Fire Temples, and the Dawoodi Bohra practice of female genital mutilation. The eventual decision will shape the constitutional balance between religion and gender for a generation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Sabarimala case posed a straightforward question: can a woman be barred from a public Hindu place of worship because of her age and biology? The majority in 2018 answered correctly — she cannot. Articles 14, 15, 17, and 25, read together, do not permit it, and the temple, as a statutory institution governed by a public board, cannot enforce such exclusion. That foundational answer must not be undone.
Yet the nine-judge reference has exposed real gaps in the 2018 reasoning. Justice Malhotra raised two unresolved questions: whether a lawyers’ association with no personal stake in Sabarimala worship has PIL standing to challenge a faith community’s customs, and whether a court is institutionally competent to determine what is essential to a religion. The argument that courts must never examine religious practice, however, carries its own danger. A judiciary that cannot test religious custom against constitutional rights would have been powerless against sati and the devadasi system. Clothing discrimination in religious justification cannot be permitted to strip away fundamental rights.
The deeper contradiction lies within the restriction itself. If a woman observes the same forty-one-day Vratham with equal sincerity, what remains of the justification for her exclusion? Those seeking entry are not challenging the deity, but are seeking to offer a prayer — a right that belongs to them equally as citizens. The nine-judge bench must now build a framework that affirms equality at the temple gate and ensures the constitutional promise of non-discrimination does not stop at the doors of a place of worship. Affirming the principle without coherent doctrine invites further discord; doctrine without the principle is a surrender of constitutional values.“Patriarchy in religion cannot be permitted to trump over the element of pure devotion borne out of faith.” — Chief Justice Dipak Misra
That statement must now be given a legal foundation firm enough to last — not just for Sabarimala, but for every woman, of every faith, who has been told that her devotion is less worthy than a man’s.
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Cases
Indian Young Lawyers Assoc. v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (India).
S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, AIR 1993 Ker 42 (India).
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 (India).
S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1 (India).
Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Assoc., (2020) 2 SCC 1 (India).
B. Constitutional Provisions and Legislation
India Const. arts. 14, 15, 17, 21, 25, 26, 32.
Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965, §§ 3, 4 (India).
Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, Rule 3(b) (India).
C. Online and Journal Sources
Supreme Court Observer, Sabarimala Reference Day 1: Union Challenges Essential Religious Practices Test, SUP. CT. OBSERVER (Apr. 2026), https://www.scobserver.in/reports/sabarimala-review-day-1-of-the-9-judge-constitution-bench-hearing.
Supreme Court Observer, Sabarimala Review — Background, SUP. CT. OBSERVER (last visited May 2, 2026), https://www.scobserver.in/cases/kantaru-rajeevaru-indian-young-lawyers-association-sabrimala-review-background.
Verdictum, Senior Adv. J. Sai Deepak in Sabarimala: CJI Surya Kant on Judicial Review, VERDICTUM (Apr. 2026), https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/senior-adv-j-sai-deepak-sabarimala-cji-surya-kant-judicial-review1612528.
Bar and Bench, Sabarimala Reference Hearing: Live Updates — Day 9, BAR & BENCH (Apr. 2026), https://www.barandbench.com/news/sabarimala-reference-hearing-live-updates-from-supreme-court-day-9.
The Federal, Sabarimala Case: Why Every Faith Has a Stake in the Nine-Judge SC Bench, THE FEDERAL (Apr. 26, 2026), https://thefederal.com/the-federal-special/sabarimala-9-judge-bench-supreme-court-women-rights-religion-240593.
iPleaders, Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): A Case Analysis, IPLEADERS (last visited May 2, 2026), https://blog.ipleaders.in/indian-young-lawyers-association-vs-the-state-of-kerala-2018-a-case-analysis.
Swarajya Magazine, Sabarimala Case: What the ‘People for Dharma’ Lawyer Had Argued, SWARAJYA MAG. (Apr. 2026), https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/sabarimala-case-what-the-people-for-dharma-lawyer-who-left-the-supreme-court-spellbound-had-argued.
Business Standard, SC Flags Limits of Reform, Says Courts Cannot ‘Annihilate Religion’, BUS. STANDARD (Apr. 29, 2026), https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/sc-sabarimala-hearing-limits-judicial-intervention-religion-126042901420_1.html.
The Indian Express, The Essential Religious Practices Test Is a Doctrine in Search of Its Own Limits, INDIAN EXPRESS (last visited May 2, 2026), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-essential-religious-practices-test-is-a-doctrine-in-search-of-its-own-limits-10664521/.
FOOTNOTE(S):
1 Indian Young Lawyers Assoc. v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (India).
2 India Const. art. 32.
3 S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, AIR 1993 Ker 42 (India).
4 Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, Rule 3(b) (India).
5 Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965, § 4 (India).
6 Indian Young Lawyers Assoc. v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 75 (India).
7 India Const. art. 26.
8 India Const. art. 25, cl. 1.
9 Indian Young Lawyers Assoc. v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (per Nariman, J., concurring) (India).
10 Indian Young Lawyers Assoc. v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (per Chandrachud, J., concurring) (India).
11 India Const. art. 17.
12 India Const. art. 21.
13 Indian Young Lawyers Assoc. v. State of Kerala, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (per Malhotra, J., dissenting) (India).
14 The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 (India).
15 Supreme Court Observer, Sabarimala Reference Day 1: Union Challenges Essential Religious Practices Test, SUP. CT. OBSERVER (Apr. 2026), https://www.scobserver.in/reports/sabarimala-review-day-1-of-the-9-judge-constitution-bench-hearing.
16 Supreme Court Observer, Sabarimala Review — Background, https://www.scobserver.in/cases/kantaru-rajeevaru-indian-young-lawyers-association-sabrimala-review-background.
17 Supreme Court Observer, Sabarimala Review — Background, SUP. CT. OBSERVER (last visited May 2, 2026), https://www.scobserver.in/cases/kantaru-rajeevaru-indian-young-lawyers-association-sabrimala-review-background.
18 India Const. art. 26.
19 S.P. Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1 (India).
20 Verdictum, Senior Adv. J. Sai Deepak in Sabarimala: CJI Surya Kant on Judicial Review, VERDICTUM (Apr. 2026), https://www.verdictum.in/supreme-court/senior-adv-j-sai-deepak-sabarimala-cji-surya-kant-judicial-review1612528.
21 Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Assoc., (2020) 2 SCC 1 (India).
22 Bar and Bench, Sabarimala Reference Hearing: Live Updates — Day 9, BAR & BENCH (Apr. 2026), https://www.barandbench.com/news/sabarimala-reference-hearing-live-updates-from-supreme-court-day-9.
23 The Federal, Sabarimala Case: Why Every Faith Has a Stake in the Nine-Judge SC Bench, THE FEDERAL (Apr. 26, 2026), https://thefederal.com/the-federal-special/sabarimala-9-judge-bench-supreme-court-women-rights-religion-240593.
24 iPleaders, Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): A Case Analysis, IPLEADERS (last visited May 2, 2026), https://blog.ipleaders.in/indian-young-lawyers-association-vs-the-state-of-kerala-2018-a-case-analysis.
25 Swarajya Magazine, Sabarimala Case: What the ‘People for Dharma’ Lawyer Had Argued, SWARAJYA MAG. (Apr. 2026), https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/sabarimala-case-what-the-people-for-dharma-lawyer-who-left-the-supreme-court-spellbound-had-argued.
26 Business Standard, SC Flags Limits of Reform, Says Courts Cannot ‘Annihilate Religion’, BUS. STANDARD (Apr. 29, 2026), https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/sc-sabarimala-hearing-limits-judicial-intervention-religion-126042901420_1.html.
27 India Const. art. 25, cl. 2(b).
28 Bar and Bench, Sabarimala Reference Hearing: Live Updates — Day 9, BAR & BENCH (Apr. 2026), https://www.barandbench.com/news/sabarimala-reference-hearing-live-updates-from-supreme-court-day-9.
29 The Federal, Sabarimala Case: Why Every Faith Has a Stake in the Nine-Judge SC Bench, THE FEDERAL (Apr. 26, 2026), https://thefederal.com/the-federal-special/sabarimala-9-judge-bench-supreme-court-women-rights-religion-240593.
30 The Indian Express, The Essential Religious Practices Test Is a Doctrine in Search of Its Own Limits, INDIAN EXPRESS (last visited May 2, 2026), https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-essential-religious-practices-test-is-a-doctrine-in-search-of-its-own-limits-10664521/.
31 India Const. art. 25, cl. 2(b).
