Authored By: Nafeesah Rahman
SOAS, University of London
Introduction
In January 2023, the High Court of England and Wales was asked to consider whether a child’s rejection of a parent was the product of manipulation or a rational response to that parent’s conduct. In Re C (Parental Alienation; Instruction of Expert[1], Cobb J acknowledged that alienating behaviour could cause genuine harm to children whilst cautioning explicitly against treating parental alienation as a clinical label or quasi-diagnosis. That caution has not translated into a consistent judicial approach. Family courts across England and Wales continue to rely upon parental alienation as a basis for some of the most consequential decisions in private law proceedings, including the transfer of a child’s primary residence, despite the concept’s rejection by both the World Health Organisation’s ICD-11 and the DSM-5[2] as a recognised psychological disorder.
Parental alienation describes the process by which one parent allegedly manipulates a child into rejecting the other without justified cause. Its application in family proceedings has attracted significant controversy. Research has demonstrated that parental alienation claims are disproportionately raised against mothers and frequently deployed in proceedings where domestic abuse is also alleged, raising serious concerns about the doctrine’s capacity to silence protective parents and endanger vulnerable children.
This article argues that parental alienation has functioned as an unreliable and potentially harmful doctrine in English family courts, and that its continued uncritical application risks prioritising contact over child safety. Courts must adopt the Australian behavioural model as a template for reform, replacing the contested diagnostic label with a structured, evidence-based inquiry into specific conduct and its demonstrable impact on the individual child. To substantiate this argument, this article examines the legal framework governing private law proceedings, analysing how the welfare principle and the presumption of parental involvement under the Children Act 1989 have created conditions in which parental alienation claims thrive. It then analyses the leading case law, scrutinising decisions including Re C and Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult)[3] to identify the inconsistencies and evidential weaknesses that characterise the current judicial approach. Having established those weaknesses, this article critically evaluates the risks they generate, particularly for victims of domestic abuse, before drawing on comparative experience to assess what an evidence-based alternative would look like in practice and proposing concrete reforms to place the doctrine on a sounder and more principled footing.
The Legal Framework
The foundational principle governing all private law proceedings concerning children in England and Wales is the welfare principle, enshrined in section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989[4], which provides that the child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration. In determining what welfare requires, courts must have regard to the statutory checklist in section 1(3)[5], which includes the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings, harm suffered or at risk of being suffered, and the capability of each parent to meet the child’s needs. On its face this framework appears well-equipped to address the dynamics of high-conflict custody disputes. In practice, its application has been significantly complicated by a legislative development that has shifted the presumptive weight courts bring to contact proceedings.[6]
The Children and Families Act 2014 inserted section 1(2A) into the Children Act 1989[7], introducing a presumption that the involvement of each parent furthers the child’s welfare unless the contrary is shown. Whilst Parliament’s stated intention was to reinforce the importance of both parents maintaining relationships with their children following separation, the Harm Panel convened by the Ministry of Justice concluded in its 2020 report[8] that the presumption had, in at least some cases, reinforced a pro-contact culture that detracted from focus on the child’s individual welfare and safety, and recommended it be reviewed urgently. The Harm Panel Implementation Plan update of 2023[9] confirmed that this review remained outstanding. The result of this law is very significant. When section 1(2A) is part of the system it creates a situation, in the courts where a parent who wants to limit time with the parent must explain why. On the hand a parent who says the other parent is turning the child against them gets the benefit of the doubt before the court even looks at the evidence. This is why parental alienation claims have become so common. Parental alienation claims have really taken off in this kind of system.
The concept has no statutory definition in English law. It enters proceedings through two principal routes: expert evidence under Part 25 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 [10], and safeguarding reports prepared by CAFCASS. The case of K v K (Children: Parental Alienation) [2022][11] illustrates how CAFCASS’s use of alienation language in safeguarding reports can shape the framing of a dispute before any substantive hearing has begun. Without a legally defined threshold, there is no consistent standard against which allegations can be measured and no principled basis for distinguishing genuine alienating behaviour from a parent’s reasonable and protective response to the other’s conduct.
This problem is compounded by the position of the scientific community. Neither the ICD-11 nor the DSM-5 recognises parental alienation as a psychological disorder. [12]English family courts are therefore routinely making decisions of the utmost gravity on the basis of a concept the medical community has declined to validate — a divergence with direct implications for the reliability of expert evidence and the fairness of proceedings in which it is deployed.
III. Case Law Analysis
The divergence between legal practice and scientific consensus manifests concretely in the reasoning of English family courts, where parental alienation has been invoked with increasing frequency but without consistent analytical rigour. An examination of the leading authorities reveals not merely inconsistency, but a structural inability to engage meaningfully with the concept’s evidentiary limitations.
The most authoritative recent treatment is Cobb J’s judgment in Re C [2023][13]. The court acknowledged the concept’s absence from the ICD-11 and DSM-5 and cautioned against its use as a diagnostic label, yet proceeded to make findings framed in alienation language for want of an alternative analytical framework. The tension is structural rather than personal: the legal framework requires courts to adjudicate complex psychological dynamics without providing reliable instruments for doing so.
The reliability of expert evidence was addressed directly in Re H (Parental Alienation) [2019][14], where Keehan J highlighted that alienation experts frequently exceed their proper function by straying into conclusions that are properly matters for the court. This concern was confirmed at appellate level in Re A (Children) [2020][15], where the Court of Appeal emphasised that courts must scrutinise expert methodology rather than accepting conclusions at face value. Read together, these authorities acknowledge the evidentiary problem without prescribing a remedy, leaving practitioners without principled guidance on how to instruct and evaluate alienation experts.
The consequences of that gap are stark in Re S [2020][16], where the Court of Appeal upheld a transfer of residence from mother to father on the basis of alienating behaviour. The judgment contains no discussion of the applicable evidentiary standard, no engagement with the scientific controversy, and no consideration of whether the mother’s conduct might constitute a protective response to perceived risk. The contrast with F v M (Parental Alienation) [2021][17] is telling: HHJ Wildblood QC criticised the deployment of untested alienation claims and insisted on rigorous evidentiary scrutiny as a precondition for any finding. The divergence between Re S and F v M has no principled basis — it reflects the individual approach of the judge and the expert instructed rather than any consistent legal standard, undermining the rule of law in proceedings where the stakes for children could scarcely be higher. Re L (A Child) (Custody: Parental Alienation) [2020][18] further illustrates the tension, demonstrating how courts struggle to balance the child welfare imperative against the contact presumption when alienation is alleged, without consistent criteria to guide that balance.
Women’s Aid’s Two Years Too Long report (2022)[19] confirmed that women continued to be accused of parental alienation when raising valid concerns about domestic abuse and child safety — a pattern the case law reflects and that no reported authority has yet addressed with a principled distinguishing framework.
Critical Evaluation
The law cases we looked at show three problems that are all connected: the science is not used correctly the evidence is not good enough and the people in charge are not doing a good job of protecting everyone. These problems make each other worse. The differences in the way the law was applied in Re S, F v M and Re C are not minor issues. They show that the law is not being followed properly in a very important area. When the same situation happens but the outcome is different depending on which judge’s, in charge and which expert is giving advice it means that the child’s well-being is not being taken care of consistently. The people who are already most vulnerable are the ones who are hurt the most by this. The child’s welfare is supposed to be the important thing, but it is not being protected in a consistent way. This is a problem because the law is supposed to be fair and apply to everyone in the same way but that is not happening in these cases.
The most serious substantive risk is that parental alienation operates not as a protective tool for children but as a mechanism available to abusive parents seeking to neutralise allegations made against them. The Harm Panel’s 2020 report identified deep-seated systemic failings that, in the worst cases, put victims of domestic abuse and their children at risk, with allegations of domestic abuse too readily disbelieved alongside an undue emphasis on contact[20]. Women’s Aid’s Two Years Too Long report (2022) confirmed that despite some legislative progress following the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, women continued to be disbelieved, and children forced into unsafe contact arrangements[21]. Research further confirms that parental alienation allegations are utilised to portray mothers as unfit parents, are gendered in their deployment and effect, and that courts are disinclined to explore them when raised by mothers. The welfare principle is thereby subverted: the court focuses on the quantity of contact rather than its safety and quality[22].
The expert evidence underpinning alienation findings is structurally compromised by the absence of any standardised assessment tool. As Keehan J observed in Re H[23], expert evidence in alienation cases frequently strays beyond its proper limits, and as the Court of Appeal confirmed in Re A[24], courts must scrutinise expert methodology rather than accepting conclusions uncritically. Yet in practice, alienation assessments are conducted without any equivalent to the structured frameworks that govern other psychological evaluations in family proceedings. Women’s Aid has highlighted the growth of so-called parental alienation experts who style themselves as psychologists, currently an unregulated term, and who influence court proceedings without appropriate qualification or oversight[25]. Without a standardised assessment protocol, the expert evidence in alienation cases cannot meet the standard of reliability that decisions of this gravity demand.
It is submitted, however, that acknowledging the reality of alienating behaviour does not require accepting the current framework as fit for purpose. The question is not whether one parent can damage a child’s relationship with the other; plainly they can. The question is whether parental alienation as currently applied provides a reliable, consistent, and safe mechanism for identifying and responding to that harm[26]. The evidence examined in this article demonstrates that it does not. As the Harm Panel observed, the pro-contact presumption has in some cases reinforced a court culture that detracts from focus on the child’s individual welfare[27]. Where the diagnostic label displaces factual inquiry, the welfare principle, the paramountcy of which is non-negotiable under s 1(1) of the Children Act 1989, is subverted by the very mechanism intended to serve it[28].
Comparative Perspectives
The difficulties identified above are not unique to English law, and an examination of how other jurisdictions have confronted the same tensions demonstrates that workable alternatives exist — alternatives that speak directly to the reforms proposed in this article.
Australia provides the most instructive model. The Family Law Act 1975 does not recognise parental alienation as a distinct legal concept. Instead, Australian courts apply an inquiry into whether a parent’s conduct poses an unacceptable risk to the child, focusing on specific demonstrable behaviours and their impact rather than on a syndrome or label. The structural difference is significant: by grounding the inquiry in statute rather than expert diagnosis, Australia removes the dependence on unvalidated psychological concepts and replaces it with an evidential question — what conduct occurred, what harm did it cause, and what orders are warranted. This approach does not prevent courts from responding to genuine alienating behaviour; it simply requires that behaviour to be proved through evidence rather than inferred from a contested label. That is precisely the distinction English courts currently lack the tools to draw, and the Australian framework offers a scientifically defensible legislative template for reform. The Australian approach is codified in s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975[29] which requires courts to consider ‘any family violence’ and ‘any relevant inferences’ arising from a parent’s behaviour but does not list ‘alienation’ as a factor. The High Court of Australia in Isles v Nelissen [2022][30] confirmed that risk assessment must be grounded in observable conduct rather than diagnostic labels. This stands in marked contrast to the position in several US states. California Family Code § 3044[31] creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated abuse is not entitled to joint custody, yet no equivalent statutory provision governs alienation claims. The result is that California courts routinely adjudicate alienation allegations without statutory guidance, leaving expert evidence as the sole anchor — precisely the position English courts should avoid. The contrast between a statutory behavioural framework (Australia) and a common law diagnostic framework (England) is not merely technical; it determines whether the court’s inquiry centres on what the parent did or what the expert labels the parent.
The United States demonstrates why inaction is dangerous. Parental alienation is deeply embedded in American family courts, with some states treating it as grounds for custody modification, and a significant unregulated expert industry has developed around it. Unlike Australia, the United States has no equivalent statutory behavioural framework to anchor the judicial inquiry, leaving courts reliant on the same contested expert opinion model that afflicts England and Wales. The predictable result is documented cases of children transferred to rejected parents following alienation findings who subsequently disclosed abuse. England and Wales retain the opportunity to adopt the Australian model before the doctrine becomes similarly entrenched, but the growth of an unregulated alienation expert industry identified by Women’s Aid suggests that window is narrowing[32].
At the international level, Articles 3 and 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child require that the child’s best interests be primary and that children be protected from harm[33]. Where parental alienation reasoning operates to silence protective parents and prioritise contact over safety, English courts’ current approach sits in tension with both provisions. The Australian behavioural framework, precisely because it centres demonstrable harm to the individual child, offers a more reliable path to compliance with these international obligations — and that observation directly supports the reforms proposed below.
Conclusion
This article has argued that parental alienation has functioned as an unreliable and potentially harmful doctrine in English family courts. The system is biased towards letting parents have contact with their children, which can lead to accusations of alienation. The case law reveals a doctrine applied inconsistently, without defined evidentiary standards, and without meaningful engagement with the scientific controversy surrounding it. The Harm Panel’s findings of deep-seated systemic failures, confirmed as insufficiently remedied by Women’s Aid in 2022, demonstrate that these are not theoretical concerns but documented failures with real consequences for real children[34].
The counterargument that genuine alienation causes real harm has been acknowledged. It does not justify the current framework. Identifying a real phenomenon and reliably detecting it are distinct propositions, and the Australian experience demonstrates that courts can respond to genuine alienating conduct through a statutory behavioural inquiry without recourse to an unvalidated diagnostic concept[35].
Three reforms are therefore proposed. First, Parliament should amend the Children Act 1989 or associated Practice Directions to require a defined evidentiary threshold — modelled on the Australian unacceptable risk framework — before parental alienation reasoning can found a judicial finding or inform a remedy. Second, CAFCASS should adopt standardised, behaviourally grounded assessment tools in place of the discretionary application of alienation language in safeguarding reports; since CAFCASS shapes the framing of proceedings from their earliest stage, reform at that level would prevent the contamination of judicial reasoning before the substantive hearing begins. Third, expert witnesses in alienation cases should be required to address the scientific status of the concept explicitly in their reports and to demonstrate compliance with the evidentiary scrutiny demanded in Re A[36], bringing alienation expert evidence into conformity with standards applied to other psychological assessments in family proceedings.
A fourth reform is proposed beyond those enumerated above. The Ministry of Justice should commission a Practice Direction under FPR 2010, Pt 12[37], requiring any report that uses the term ‘parental alienation’ to include a statement addressing: (a) whether the term is used descriptively or diagnostically; (b) the scientific status of any claimed syndrome; and (c) the factual basis for distinguishing alienating behaviour from protective response. This mirrors the transparency obligations imposed in Re A for expert evidence generally and would impose minimal cost while producing significant accountability.
The welfare of the child cannot be reliably secured by a doctrine that outpaces the science behind it. What is now required is legislative and institutional action adequate to solving a problem the courts have acknowledged but cannot, within the current framework, resolve alone.
Bibliography:
Cases
F v M (Parental Alienation) [2021] EWFC 4
Isles v Nelissen [2022] HCA 52
K v K (Children: Parental Alienation) [2022] EWFC 80
Re A (Children) [2020] EWCA Civ 74
Re C (Parental Alienation; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam)
Re H (Parental Alienation) [2019] EWHC 2723 (Fam)
Re L (A Child) (Custody: Parental Alienation) [2020] EWHC 867 (Fam)
Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568
Legislation
Children Act 1989
Children and Families Act 2014
Domestic Abuse Act 2021
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955
California Family Code (West 2023)
International Instruments
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3
Official Reports and Command Papers
Ministry of Justice, Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases (Harm Panel Report, 2020)
Ministry of Justice, Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases: Implementation Plan — Delivery Update (2023)
Secondary Sources
Meier J and others, ‘Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations’ (2019) 52 Family Law Quarterly 701
Women’s Aid, Two Years Too Long: Mapping Action on the Harm Panel’s Findings (Women’s Aid 2022)
Women’s Aid, The Family Justice Response to Domestic Abuse (Women’s Aid 2024)
World Health Organisation, International Classification of Diseases (11th edn, WHO 2019)
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th edn, APA 2013)
[1] Re C (Parental Alienation; Instruction of Expert) [2023] EWHC 345 (Fam)
[2] World Health Organisation, International Classification of Diseases (11th edn, WHO 2019); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th edn, APA 2013)
[3] Re S (Parental Alienation: Cult) [2020] EWCA Civ 568.
[4] Children Act 1989, s 1(1).
[5] Children Act 1989, s 1(3).
[6] Children and Families Act 2014, s 12
[7] Children Act 1989, s 1(2A).
[8] Ministry of Justice, Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases (Harm Panel Report, 2020) 7–8.
[9] Ministry of Justice, Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases: Implementation Plan — Delivery Update (2023) 4.
[10] Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955, Pt 25.
[11] K v K (Children: Parental Alienation) [2022] EWFC 80.
[12] WHO (n 2); APA (n 2).
[13] Re C (n 1) [28]–[31].
[14] Re H (Parental Alienation) [2019] EWHC 2723 (Fam) [44].
[15] Re A (Children) [2020] EWCA Civ 74 [53].
[16] Re S (n 3) [29]–[35].
[17] F v M (Parental Alienation) [2021] EWFC 4 [19]–[22] (HHJ Wildblood QC).
[18] Re L (A Child) (Custody: Parental Alienation) [2020] EWHC 867 (Fam).
[19] Women’s Aid, Two Years Too Long: Mapping Action on the Harm Panel’s Findings (Women’s Aid 2022) 14
[20] Ministry of Justice (n 8) 5–6.
[21] Women’s Aid (n 19) 3–4
[22] Joan Meier and others, ‘Child Custody Outcomes in Cases Involving Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations’ (2019) 52 Family Law Quarterly 701, 718.
[23] Re H (n 14) [44].
[24] Re A (n 15) [53].
[25] Women’s Aid, The Family Justice Response to Domestic Abuse (Women’s Aid 2024) 18.
[26] Re L (n 18)
[27] Ministry of Justice (n 8) 7.
[28] Children Act 1989, s 1(1)
[29] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC.
[30] Isles v Nelissen [2022] HCA 52 [41]
[31] California Family Code § 3044 (West 2023).
[32] Women’s Aid (n 25) 18.
[33] UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, arts 3, 19.
[34] Ministry of Justice (n 8); Women’s Aid (n 19).
[35] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60CC.
[36] Re A (n 15).
[37] Family Procedure Rules 2010 (n 10), Pt 12.
