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Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd

Authored By: Boladale Bolarinde Adelowo

KolaDaisi University

Case Citation

Case Name:

Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd

Citation:

[1897] AC 22

Court:

House of Lords, United Kingdom

Date of Judgment:

16 November 1897[1]

Bench:

Lord Halsbury LC, Lord Watson, Lord Herschell, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Morris, and Lord Davey

Area of Law:

Company law, particularly corporate personality and limited liability

Facts

Aron Salomon had for many years carried on business alone as a leather merchant and manufacturer of boots and shoes in Whitechapel, London.[2] In 1892 he decided to convert his sole proprietorship into a company with limited liability, incorporated under the Companies Act 1862, the legislation then governing company formation in England and Wales.[3] The company, A Salomon and Co Ltd, was formed with seven subscribers to the memorandum of association, being the statutory minimum then required.[4] The seven subscribers were Salomon himself, his wife, and five of his children, each of whom took one share.[5]

Salomon then sold his existing business to the newly formed company for a price of about thirty eight thousand seven hundred and eighty two pounds, a sum substantially above the true market value of the business.[6] The price was satisfied by an allotment to Salomon of twenty thousand and one fully paid ordinary shares of one pound each, out of a total of twenty thousand and seven shares issued, by the issue to Salomon of debentures worth ten thousand pounds secured by a floating charge over the whole of the company undertaking and assets, and by the balance in cash. The remaining six shares were taken up, one each, by Salomon’s wife and five of his children. Salomon thereby became, at once, the company principal shareholder, its managing director, and its major secured creditor.

Shortly afterward the boot trade suffered a general depression and the company fell into serious financial difficulty.[7] Salomon assigned his debentures to a Mr Broderip in exchange for an advance of funds, and when the company defaulted on the interest due, Broderip sought to enforce his security. The company was subsequently placed into liquidation, and its assets proved insufficient to satisfy both the secured debenture debt and the claims of the ordinary trade creditors.[8] The liquidator, acting for the unsecured creditors, counterclaimed against Salomon, arguing that the company had at all times been a mere agent, alias, or trustee for Salomon personally, so that Salomon should indemnify the company against its trading debts and his debenture claim should be postponed behind those of the unsecured creditors.

Issues

The case raised three central questions of company law. First, whether A Salomon and Co Ltd had been validly incorporated notwithstanding that six of the seven subscribers held only a single share each and were, in substance, nominees of Salomon rather than independent investors. Second, whether Salomon, given his dominant shareholding, his position as managing director, and his control over the company affairs, could properly be treated as identical with the company such that he ought to bear personal liability for its debts. Third, whether the debenture held by Salomon, secured by a valid floating charge, should nonetheless be subordinated to the claims of the unsecured trade creditors on the footing that the incorporation was tainted by impropriety or fraud.

Arguments

Counsel for the liquidator and the unsecured creditors argued that the company was nothing more than a sham or an alias through which Salomon continued to conduct his own business under a different name.[9] It was submitted that the six family members who took shares did so purely as a formality, without any genuine independent interest in the enterprise, and that Parliament, in requiring seven subscribers under section six of the Act, must have contemplated members holding a real and substantial stake in the company rather than nominal holders acting at the direction of a single dominant individual. On this footing it was contended that the corporate veil ought to be disregarded, that Salomon and the company should be treated in law as one and the same person, and that his debentures, having been procured in circumstances amounting to a fraud upon the general creditors, should rank after their claims.

Counsel for Salomon responded that the company had been formed in strict compliance with every requirement of the Companies Act 1862. The statute prescribed no minimum shareholding for individual members beyond one share each, imposed no requirement that subscribers hold independent or substantial interests, and contained no provision permitting a court to look behind the register of members to inquire into their motives for taking shares. It was argued that once a company had been regularly incorporated it became, as a matter of law, a legal person separate and distinct from its subscribers, possessing rights and obligations of its own, and that the propriety or otherwise of the motives underlying its formation was legally irrelevant to the question of its separate existence.

Reasoning

At first instance, Vaughan Williams J held that the company was a mere agent or trustee for Salomon, who was accordingly bound to indemnify it against its liabilities, and this conclusion was upheld, with somewhat different reasoning, by the Court of Appeal in Broderip v Salomon.[10] Lindley LJ considered the six family shareholdings to be a mere device to enable Salomon to continue trading with the protection of limited liability, contrary to what he regarded as the true intent of the legislature.

The House of Lords unanimously reversed these findings. Lord Halsbury LC stated that once a company is legally incorporated it must be treated as an independent entity possessing rights and liabilities of its own, and that it was not open to the court to inquire into the motives of those who promoted it, since the statute itself imposed no such inquiry.[11] Lord Macnaghten, in the most frequently cited passage of the judgment, observed that the company is at law an entirely different person from the subscribers to the memorandum, and that although it may be that after incorporation the business remains precisely what it was before, with the same persons managing it and the same hands receiving the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or their trustee.[12] Lord Watson, Lord Herschell, Lord Morris, and Lord Davey each delivered concurring speeches to similar effect.[13]

Their Lordships emphasised that section six of the Act required only seven members each holding at least one share, and imposed no requirement that those members hold shares in any particular proportion or possess any independent commercial interest distinct from that of a dominant member. As Parliament had not enacted such a requirement, the courts were not entitled to read one into the statute merely because the resulting arrangement appeared to confer an unintended commercial advantage upon Salomon. Their Lordships further found no evidence of fraud in the formation of the company or in the issue of the debentures: the transaction had been conducted openly, was fully disclosed, and was not shown to have deceived any creditor who subsequently dealt with the company.

Decision

The House of Lords unanimously allowed the appeal and restored the position that the company had been validly incorporated as a legal person distinct from Salomon. Salomon was accordingly not liable to indemnify the company against its debts, and his debentures, being secured by a valid floating charge over the company assets, ranked in priority ahead of the unsecured trade creditors.[14] The decisions of Vaughan Williams J and of the Court of Appeal were both overturned.

Significance

Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd is regarded as the foundational authority for the doctrine of separate corporate personality in English company law and, by extension, across most common law jurisdictions.[15] It established definitively that a company, once validly incorporated, possesses a legal personality entirely distinct from that of its members, however small the company may be and however completely one individual may dominate its management and ownership. The decision confirmed that limited liability attaches to shareholders regardless of the degree of numerical or practical control exercised by any one of them, and it thereby legitimised what later became known as the single member or family controlled company, a structural form now central to modern commercial practice.

The judgment has, however, attracted sustained academic and judicial criticism for the opportunities it creates for the avoidance of creditor protection, prompting the description by one commentator of the decision as calamitous for the interests of unsecured creditors.[16] Subsequent case law has developed a narrow set of exceptions permitting courts to pierce or lift the corporate veil, including where a company is used as a mere facade to conceal the true facts and thereby evade an existing legal obligation, as in Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne and Jones v Lipman.[17] The Court of Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries plc confirmed the narrowness of these exceptions,[18] and the Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd reaffirmed that veil piercing remains an exceptional remedy of last resort, available only where a party improperly uses a company to evade an existing legal obligation and no other remedy suffices.[19] Parliament has also intervened to temper the harsher consequences of the Salomon principle for creditors, most notably through the wrongful trading provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, which impose personal liability on directors who continue trading when they knew or ought to have known that insolvent liquidation was unavoidable.[20]

Notwithstanding these qualifications, the central holding of Salomon has never been displaced. It remains the starting point for any analysis of corporate personality, limited liability, and the circumstances in which the corporate veil may exceptionally be set aside, and it continues to underpin the structural logic of modern corporate groups, holding companies, and single member companies recognised by contemporary company legislation.

Table of Cases

Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA)

Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA)

Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA)

Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 (Ch)

Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415

Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL)

Table of Legislation

Companies Act 1862

Insolvency Act 1986

Bibliography

Davies P and Worthington S, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2016)

Dignam A and Lowry J, Company Law (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2020)

Kahn Freund O, ‘Some Reflections on Company Law Reform’ (1944) 7 MLR 54

[1]Judgment date given as 16 November 1897, consistent with the official citation [1897] AC 22 and with Wikipedia. Some secondary sources instead give 16 November 1896, which appears to be an error carried over from the neutral citation [1896] UKHL 1 (the neutral citation year reflects the House of Lords sitting year, which can differ from the year of the published report).

[2]Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) 24 to 25.

[3]Companies Act 1862, s 6.

[4]ibid.

[5]Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd (n 1) 25.

[6]ibid 26.

[7]ibid 27.

[8]ibid.

[9]Broderip v Salomon [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA) 326 to 330.

[10]ibid 337 to 341 (Lindley LJ).

[11]Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd (n 1) 30 (Lord Halsbury LC).

[12]ibid 51 (Lord Macnaghten).

[13]ibid 38 to 40 (Lord Watson); ibid 40 to 43 (Lord Herschell); ibid 49 (Lord Morris); ibid 55 to 57 (Lord Davey).

[14]ibid 53 to 54.

[15]Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (10th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2016) 43 to 46.

[16]Otto Kahn Freund, ‘Some Reflections on Company Law Reform’ (1944) 7 MLR 54, 54.

[17]Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935 (CA); Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 (Ch).

[18]Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433 (CA) 536 to 544.

[19]Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415 [27] to [35] (Lord Sumption).

[20]Insolvency Act 1986, s 214.

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