Authored By: Priya Bharati
GOPAL NARAYAN SINGH UNIVERSITY
Case Name: Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi)
See Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 1 S.C.R. 911 : 2025 INSC 100 (decided January 22, 2025).
This case examines whether an undertrial prisoner contesting an election can be granted interim bail specifically to campaign, or whether such relief falls outside the scope of “humanitarian ground” bail traditionally recognized by Indian courts. The Supreme Court’s order offers important guidance on the limits of purpose-based bail during election season.
Bench
- Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
Facts of the Case
The petitioner, Mohd. Tahir Hussain, sought interim bail to campaign ahead of the 2025 Delhi Legislative Assembly election. A former councillor with the Aam Aadmi Party, he was contesting the election on an AIMIM ticket from the Mustafabad constituency.
The petitioner had been in custody since March 2020 in connection with the 2020 Delhi riots.
The Delhi High Court had granted him custodial parole to enable him to file his nomination papers, but it declined to grant interim bail for the purpose of canvassing.
The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, arguing that custodial parole alone was inadequate, as effective representation to the electorate required physical campaigning. The State opposed the plea, contending that if the Court granted interim bail, the petitioner might misuse it for election-related activities beyond legitimate campaigning.
Issues Raised
- Can a court grant interim bail for the purpose of contesting an election?
- Does the right to contest an election encompass a right to campaign and canvass while in custody?
- Can prolonged incarceration and the pendency of trial, by themselves, justify purpose-based interim bail to enable electoral campaigning?
Delhi High Court’s Stance
The High Court had granted the petitioner custodial parole to allow him to file his nomination papers but declined further relief for electioneering. It held that the law does not recognize campaigning as a separate fundamental or constitutional right.
Justice Mithal’s View
Justice Mithal observed that interim bail is an extraordinary measure, typically granted on humanitarian grounds such as attending a family funeral or wedding, and not for the purpose of political campaigning. He cautioned that permitting interim bail for election campaigning could open the door to misuse by accused persons more broadly.
Justice Amanullah’s View
Justice Amanullah noted that final adjudication of the case was not in sight and that the petitioner remained presumed innocent. He observed that a restricted interim bail granted under stringent conditions could represent a reasonable middle ground. In his view, a short-term release for canvassing would not automatically violate any statutory bar, provided the Court imposed appropriate protective conditions, such as restrictions on travel and a prohibition on contact with witnesses.
Final Order (January 22, 2025)
The Supreme Court granted the petitioner limited custodial parole, permitting him to leave custody for twelve hours each day from January 29 to February 3, 2025, specifically for the purpose of campaigning and canvassing.
Reasoning
The majority emphasized that while the right to vote or contest an election is a statutory entitlement, a candidate’s ability to campaign outside prison is not independently protected as a fundamental right. Justice Mithal reiterated that interim bail could be granted only on humanitarian grounds, and noted that allowing interim bail for electoral campaigning as a general practice could raise broader public-policy concerns.
Justice Amanullah, drawing on the presumption of innocence and the petitioner’s lengthy detention, took the view that a short period of conditional freedom could uphold constitutional norms without undermining the prosecution’s case. In his assessment, this approach appropriately balanced the petitioner’s liberty interests against the State’s prosecutorial concerns.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s order in this case carves out a narrow, fact-specific exception: while campaigning is not recognized as an independent fundamental right, an undertrial candidate may, in appropriate circumstances and under strict conditions, be granted limited custodial release to campaign. The split rationale between the two judges underscores that such relief remains exceptional rather than a general entitlement, and is likely to be closely scrutinized in future cases involving incarcerated candidates.
