M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

1. Case Citation and Basic Information

Case Name: M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:14042

Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 824 of 2026 (CNR No. KLHC010017432026; E-File No. EF HCK-2026-001928)

Court: High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam (Single Bench)

Date of Decision: 17 February 2026

Date of Filing: 7 January 2026 (registered 8 January 2026)

Bench: Justice Gopinath P. (Single Judge)

Counsel for Petitioners: Anand B. Menon, Vijayakumar K., A. Abdul Nabeel, Advocates

Counsel for Respondents: Vishnu J. (CGC), AR L. Sundaresan (ASGI), Liju V. Stephen,  Indu Susan Jacob, Jiji Joy, Sanjay Johnson Mathew, Preethi Ramakrishnan, Pratap Abraham  Varghese, Manojkumar G., Ashok Menon, Advocates

2. Introduction

M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. is a significant judgment delivered by the  High Court of Kerala in February 2026, arising from a challenge to the constitutional validity  of a Central Government notification issued in the wake of the commencement of the Industrial  Relations Code, 2020 (hereinafter, “the Code”). The case raises fundamental questions at the  intersection of labour law, administrative law, and constitutional interpretation, specifically  concerning the legality of a removal-of-difficulties order that permitted pre-existing Labour  Courts and Industrial Tribunals, constituted under the now-repealed Industrial Disputes Act,  1947, to continue adjudicating industrial disputes after the Code came into force.

The judgment is significant for two principal reasons. First, it represents the first judicial  pronouncement on the constitutional and statutory validity of the transitional notification (S.O.  5683(E) dated 8 December 2025) at the High Court level in the country. Second, it  authoritatively settled the scope of Section 103 of the Code—the removal-of-difficulties  power—and clarified the limits of executive action during legislative transitions. At a time  when the entire framework of Indian labour adjudication was undergoing unprecedented  restructuring, this case has become a cornerstone reference in the ongoing legal discourse  surrounding the IRC transition.

3. Facts of the Case

The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 is a landmark piece of consolidating legislation that  subsumed three earlier labour statutes: the Trade Unions Act, 1926, the Industrial Employment  (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Code was brought into  force on 21 November 2025 by way of a notification (S.O. 5320(E)) issued by the Central  Government under Section 1(3) of the Code. However, no corresponding notification  simultaneously repealing the three subsumed enactments was issued under Section 104 of the  Code, which requires an express notification for repeal. This created a peculiar statutory  interregnum: the new Code was operative, yet the old laws formally remained on the statute  book.

In this ambiguous legislative setting, the Central Government, through the Ministry of Labour  and Employment, issued the Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2025  on 8 December 2025 (Notification No. S.O. 5683(E)). The notification purported to clarify that  existing Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals, and National Industrial Tribunals constituted  under the repealed enactments would continue to exercise jurisdiction for the adjudication of  industrial disputes, even after the commencement of the Code. This was presented as a measure  of administrative necessity to ensure that the transition to the new institutional framework did  not result in a complete halt of labour dispute resolution.

The petitioners, M.K. Suresh Kumar and another, challenged this notification before the High  Court of Kerala by way of a writ petition filed on 7 January 2026, registered as W.P.(C) No.  824 of 2026. The petitioners were workers or parties to ongoing industrial disputes who had a  direct interest in the composition and constitution of the adjudicatory bodies determining their  disputes. Their grievance was that by permitting the old Labour Courts—constituted as single member bodies under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—to continue functioning, the Central  Government had effectively bypassed the institutional safeguards built into the 2020 Code,  which requires Industrial Tribunals to have both a Judicial Member and an Administrative  Member under Section 44(7).

During the pendency of the writ petition, the Central Government issued two further  notifications on 2 February 2026 (S.O. 464(E) and S.O. 465(E)), which retrospectively repealed  the subsumed enactments with effect from 21 November 2025, and directed that existing  adjudicatory bodies would continue to function until new corresponding bodies under the Code  were constituted. Subsequently, Parliament enacted the Industrial Relations Code  (Amendment) Act, 2026 on 16 February 2026, introducing Section 104(1A) into the Code, which expressly authorised existing tribunals and statutory authorities to continue functioning  during the transitional phase. The writ petition was ultimately decided by Justice Gopinath P.  on 17 February 2026.

4. Legal Issues

The following principal legal issues arose for determination before the Court:

Issue 1: Whether the notification dated 8 December 2025 (S.O. 5683(E)) issued under  Section 103 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 was ultra vires the provisions of the Code,  specifically Sections 103, 44(7), and 55(1) thereof?

Issue 2: Whether permitting existing Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, constituted  under the repealed Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to adjudicate disputes amounted to  sidestepping the institutional framework mandated by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020  and thereby defeated the purposes of the legislation?

Issue 3: Whether the power under Section 103 of the Code—the removal-of-difficulties  clause—could legitimately authorise the continued jurisdiction of adjudicatory bodies  constituted under a statute that had ceased to operate, or whether such exercise amounted to  an impermissible usurpation of legislative power?

5. Arguments Presented

5.1 Petitioners’ Arguments

The petitioners, represented by Advocate Anand B. Menon, submitted that the impugned  notification was ultra vires on three distinct grounds drawn from the text of the Code itself.

First, they contended that the notification violated Section 103 of the Code, which empowers  the Central Government to issue orders for removal of difficulties arising in giving effect to  the provisions of the Code. They argued that Section 103 authorises only incidental or  transitional facilitation, and cannot be deployed to sidestep express statutory mandates.  Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar  Das and Others, (2022) 16 SCC 318, wherein it was held that removal-of-difficulty powers  cannot be exercised to overcome statutory limitations or to dilute legislative intent.

Second, the petitioners urged that Section 44(7) of the Code mandated a specific composition  for Industrial Tribunals—comprising a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member— whereas the pre-existing Labour Courts under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were single member bodies presided over by only one person. Permitting the single-member courts to  adjudicate under the guise of the notification amounted to a circumvention of the legislative  guarantee of a two-member adjudicatory body.

Third, the petitioners submitted that Section 55(1) of the Code contains a specific provision  dealing with the transfer of pending proceedings, which reflects a considered parliamentary  intent on how transitional adjudication was to be managed. By issuing a blanket notification  retaining the old courts in operation, the executive had effectively supplanted this legislative  framework, thereby acting beyond the limits of delegated power.

5.2 Respondents’ Arguments

The respondents, represented by Vishnu J. (Central Government Counsel) and the Additional  Solicitor General L. Sundaresan, defended the notification primarily on grounds of  administrative necessity and functional continuity.

They argued that the Code came into force without the new Industrial Tribunals having been  constituted under Section 44. No new appointments had been made; no new infrastructure was  in place. In this circumstances, a strict application of the Code’s institutional framework would  have resulted in a complete stalemate, with thousands of pending industrial disputes having no  forum for adjudication. The notification was thus not a circumvention of the law but a practical  necessity to prevent the collapse of labour dispute resolution in the country.

The respondents further pointed out that similar notifications had been issued following the  commencement of related Labour Codes, and that Division Benches of the Delhi High Court  and the Madras High Court had considered and declined to interfere with analogous  notifications in those jurisdictions. These coordinate precedents lent persuasive force to the  Union’s position that the notification was a valid exercise of transitional power.

The respondents also relied upon Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1974) 1 SCC 596, for  the principle that removal-of-difficulty clauses are meant to facilitate implementation and  prevent disruption, and that such clauses should be construed broadly in the interests of the  smooth functioning of legislation. They submitted that Section 103 incorporated inherent  safeguards—a three-year limitation on the duration of any order, and the requirement that every  such order be placed before Parliament—which ensured adequate legislative oversight.

6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

Justice Gopinath P. upheld the validity of the notification after a careful examination of the text  and purpose of Section 103 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, the nature of removal-of difficulties clauses in Indian statutory law, and the practical consequences of the interpretation  advanced by each party.

On the first issue, the Court examined the scope of Section 103 and found that the provision  empowers the Central Government to issue orders to remove difficulties that may arise in  giving effect to the provisions of the Code. The Court held that allowing existing adjudicatory  bodies to continue functioning during the transitional phase—while new bodies under the Code  had not yet been constituted—presented a genuine difficulty in the implementation of the  Code’s institutional framework. Permitting the continued jurisdiction of existing Labour Courts  and Tribunals was, in the Court’s view, a legitimate exercise of the removal-of-difficulties  power and did not amount to overriding or diluting any positive provision of the Code.

Addressing the petitioners’ reliance on State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das and  Others, the Court drew a distinction between the exercise of a removal-of-difficulty clause to  escape or circumvent statutory obligations—which would indeed be impermissible—and the  use of such a clause to ensure institutional continuity during a phase where new obligations  had not yet become practically realisable. The Court observed that permitting existing  adjudicatory mechanisms to continue until new mechanisms were put in place could not be  equated with sidestepping the provisions of the Code or seeking to overcome statutory  restrictions. The Code’s institutional architecture had simply not yet been operationalised.

The Court further emphasised the internal safeguards embedded within Section 103 itself. The  power to issue orders under this provision is subject to a three-year limitation period, beyond  which the Government cannot sustain the continuation of arrangements under the notification.  Moreover, every order made under Section 103 must be laid before each House of Parliament,  which ensures legislative oversight and prevents the executive from indefinitely displacing the  statutory framework through subordinate legislation. These structural safeguards, the Court  reasoned, were sufficient to prevent the removal-of-difficulties power from being misused as a  device to evade parliamentary intent.

The Court also examined the context in which the notification had been issued. When the Code  came into force on 21 November 2025, the new Industrial Tribunals mandated under Section  44 had not been constituted, no judicial or administrative members had been appointed, and no  institutional infrastructure was in place. In these circumstances, a strict mechanical application  of the Code’s institutional provisions would have produced the absurd consequence of leaving  all pending and incoming industrial disputes without any forum for adjudication. The Court  applied the purposive rule of construction to avoid such a result, holding that the legislative intent behind the Code could not have been to paralyse labour dispute resolution during the  transitional phase.

Finally, the Court noted that by the time of the hearing, the Central Government had issued  retrospective repeal notifications dated 2 February 2026 and Parliament had enacted the  Industrial Relations Code (Amendment) Act, 2026 on 16 February 2026, which expressly  inserted Section 104(1A) to provide statutory continuity for existing tribunals and statutory  authorities. While the Court did not rest its reasoning solely on these developments—which  post-dated the filing of the petition—it treated them as consistent with and confirmatory of the  legal position it had independently arrived at through construction of the Code.

7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

7.1 The Decision

The High Court of Kerala dismissed the writ petition and upheld the validity of the notification  dated 8 December 2025 issued by the Ministry of Labour and Employment under Section 103  of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The Court held that the notification was neither ultra  vires the provisions of the Code nor an attempt to sidestep the statutory framework. Existing  Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals, and National Industrial Tribunals constituted under the  repealed enactments were held entitled to continue adjudicating disputes until the new  adjudicatory mechanisms mandated under the Code were put in place. No costs were awarded.

7.2 Ratio Decidendi

The ratio decidendi of the case is that a removal-of-difficulties clause—such as Section 103 of  the Industrial Relations Code, 2020—may validly be exercised by the executive to ensure the  continued functioning of pre-existing adjudicatory mechanisms during a transitional phase, so  long as the new adjudicatory bodies mandated by the statute have not yet been constituted and  the exercise of the power is consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute and subject to  the safeguards inherent in the clause.

The further principle established is that institutional continuity during legislative transitions is  a legitimate and cognisable ground for invoking removal-of-difficulties powers, and that  permitting existing mechanisms to function pending the operationalisation of new statutory  forums does not amount to sidestepping or circumventing the statutory framework.

8. Critical Analysis

8.1 Significance of the Decision

This judgment is the first High Court ruling to authoritatively address the legality of the  transitional notification issued upon the commencement of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020  in India. It resolves a question of considerable uncertainty: whether Section 103 of the Code, a  removal-of-difficulties clause, could sustain the continued functioning of pre-existing  adjudicatory bodies in the absence of newly constituted forums under the Code.

The decision contributes to Indian labour law by providing an authoritative interpretive  framework for the transition from the tripartite legislative structure of the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947, Trade Unions Act, 1926, and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act,  1946, to the consolidated regime of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. It affirms that removal of-difficulties clauses, when properly construed, serve a vital constitutional function: they  allow the executive to bridge gaps between the parliamentary intention of a statute and the  practical constraints of its implementation, without crossing the boundary into executive  lawmaking.

8.2 Implications and Impact

The immediate practical consequence of the judgment is significant: thousands of pending  industrial disputes before Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals across the country retain their  institutional validity, and those forums continue to exercise jurisdiction. Without this judicial  endorsement, the retrospective repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with effect from 21  November 2025 could have placed in question every reference, proceeding, and order made  under the old Act during the transitional interregnum between 21 November 2025 and 2  February 2026.

The judgment has also influenced the interpretation of parallel transitional notifications under  the other Labour Codes (the Code on Wages, 2019; the Code on Social Security, 2020; and the  Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020), which were brought into  force contemporaneously and faced similar institutional transition questions. The case further  serves as a reference point for the Karnataka High Court’s subsequent decision in Glastronix  LLP v. Glastronix Karmika Sangha & Ors. (NC: 2026:KHC:7984), which extended the concept  of institutional continuity to include Labour Courts within the expression “statutory authorities”  under Section 104(1A) of the amended Code.

8.3 Critical Evaluation

The judgment has several notable strengths. The Court’s reasoning is grounded in purposive  construction and is attentive to the practical consequences of rival interpretations, reflecting a  mature understanding of how transitional legislative regimes function in complex  administrative systems. The identification of internal safeguards within Section 103— particularly the three-year time limit and the parliamentary laying requirement—is analytically  precise and addresses the concern that removal-of-difficulties powers may be susceptible to  abuse.

However, the decision is not without analytical tension. The petitioners’ argument concerning  Section 44(7)—which mandates a two-member tribunal composition under the Code—raises a  concern that the judgment did not fully resolve. The Court upheld the continued functioning of  single-member Labour Courts without expressly grappling with whether such courts satisfy the  institutional guarantees of the Code. If the Code’s requirement of a Judicial Member and an  Administrative Member is understood as a statutory right of litigating parties—and not merely  an administrative arrangement—then the continued jurisdiction of single-member Labour  Courts may yet be vulnerable to challenge on fresh facts.

A further criticism is that the judgment, while correct in result, arguably leaves under-theorised  the precise constitutional limits of removal-of-difficulties clauses in the context of  consolidating legislation. The distinction drawn between “facilitating implementation” and  “sidestepping statutory provisions” is an important one, but the Court’s elucidation of where  that line lies remains somewhat impressionistic. Subsequent courts applying this judgment may  find it difficult to identify, from the reasoning alone, which governmental actions fall on one  side of that line and which fall on the other.

9. Conclusion

M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. is a landmark decision in India’s ongoing  transition to the consolidated labour law framework of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. By  upholding the Central Government’s notification permitting pre-existing Labour Courts and  Industrial Tribunals to continue functioning during the transitional phase, the Court preserved  institutional continuity in labour dispute adjudication and prevented a potential collapse of the  dispute resolution mechanism at a particularly critical moment in India’s labour law history.

The key takeaway from this case is that removal-of-difficulties clauses, when exercised within  their inherent temporal and parliamentary safeguards, constitute a legitimate and constitutionally permissible instrument of executive facilitation during periods of legislative  transition. The Court’s purposive approach to statutory construction reflects judicial wisdom in  declining to allow the perfect to become the enemy of the good.

This judgment will be remembered as the case that stabilised India’s transition to the new labour  code regime at its most vulnerable juncture. However, questions regarding the institutional  composition of adjudicatory bodies—specifically the tension between the existing single member Labour Courts and the two-member tribunal structure mandated by Section 44(7) of  the Code—remain insufficiently resolved and are likely to generate further litigation as the new  framework is operationalised. The precise scope of the “statutory authorities” expression in the  amended Section 104(1A), already the subject of the Glastronix decision, will also continue to  evolve through judicial interpretation.

10. References

Cases

1. M.K. Suresh Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 2026:KER:14042 (High Court of Kerala, 17 February 2026).
2. State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das and Others, (2022) 16 SCC 318 (Supreme Court of India).
3. Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1974) 1 SCC 596 (Supreme Court of India).
4. Glastronix LLP v. Glastronix Karmika Sangha & Ors., 2026:KHC:7984 (High Court of Karnataka).
5. Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India, 2005:INSC:369 (Supreme Court of India).
6. Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu, 2001:INSC:388 (Supreme Court of India).

Legislation and Notifications

1. Industrial Relations Code, 2020, No. 35 of 2020, §§ 44, 55, 103, 104.
2. Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2025, Notification No. S.O. 5683(E), Ministry of Labour and Employment (8 December 2025).
3. Industrial Relations Code (Removal of Difficulties) (Amendment) Order, 2026, Notification No. S.O. 464(E) (2 February 2026).
4. Industrial Relations Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II (16 February 2026).
5. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, No. 14 of 1947 (repealed).

Secondary Sources

1. Devesh, ‘Legislative Gaps, Judicial Grafts: The IRC Transition’, Live Law (21 March 2026).
2. Agatha Shukla, ‘Kerala High Court Upholds Centre’s Notification Allowing Existing Labour Courts & Industrial Tribunals to Function Under Industrial Relations Code 2020’, Verdictum (19 February 2026).