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Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264

Authored By: Đặng Nguyễn Đăng Khoa

Ho Chi Minh City University of Law

  1. Case Citation and Basic Information

Case: Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264

Court: General Division of the High Court of Singapore

Judge: Lee Seiu Kin J

Originating Claim: No 41 of 2022

Summons: No 1800 of 2022

Hearing: 13 May 2022

Grounds of Decision: 21 October 2022

Area of Law: Civil Procedure; Property Law; Crypto-assets; Proprietary Injunction

  1. Introduction

The growth of blockchain-based assets has challenged conventional concepts of personal property. Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) are particularly difficult because the token, the underlying digital content and associated rights may not be legally identical. In Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”), the Singapore High Court considered whether an NFT used as collateral in a DeFi loan could attract proprietary protection. The Court held that the NFT was capable of being property under the Ainsworth criteria and granted interlocutory relief. The case is significant because it shows both the capacity of traditional property doctrine to accommodate blockchain assets and the limits that remain when collateral, ownership and enforcement are at issue.

  1. Facts of the Case

The claimant, Janesh s/o Rajkumar, held a Bored Ape Yacht Club NFT, identified as BAYC ID #2162 (“Bored Ape NFT”). He used NFTs as collateral for cryptocurrency loans through NFTfi, a platform facilitating blockchain-based lending. NFTfi used an escrow smart contract to hold collateral while the loan remained outstanding. In his dealings, Janesh sought contractual terms protecting his NFT from immediate foreclosure and disposal by the lender[2].

On 19 March 2022, Janesh entered into a loan with an individual known as “chefpierre.eth” for 150,000 DAI, secured by the Bored Ape NFT. As repayment approached, Janesh sought an extension. The lender initially agreed but later withdrew it and warned that the NFT would be foreclosed if the loan was not repaid by the specified deadline. The arrangement therefore linked the contractual obligations of the parties with the automated operation of NFTfi’s digital infrastructure[3].

Janesh failed to repay the loan in full. The lender then exercised NFTfi’s “foreclose” function, transferring the NFT from escrow to his cryptocurrency wallet. After Janesh attempted partial repayment, the lender stopped communicating and listed the NFT for sale on OpenSea. Because the NFT was unique, a transfer to a third party risked making recovery difficult or impossible. This prospect was central to the request for urgent proprietary relief[4].

Janesh commenced proceedings in Singapore and sought a proprietary injunction restraining dealings with the NFT. As the defendant’s identity and location were unknown, he also sought substituted service through the defendant’s Twitter and Discord accounts and the relevant cryptocurrency wallet. The procedural application thus raised issues not only of property protection but also of adapting service mechanisms to pseudonymous blockchain transactions[5].

  1. Legal Issues

The principal issues were:

Issue 1: Whether the Singapore High Court could exercise jurisdiction and grant relief against an unknown defendant identified through digital accounts.

Issue 2: Whether the Court could grant interlocutory relief against an unknown defendant under the Rules of Court 2021.

Issue 3: Whether the Bored Ape NFT was capable of constituting property and whether the claimant had established a seriously arguable proprietary claim warranting a proprietary injunction.

  1. Arguments Presented

5.1 Claimant’s Arguments

Janesh submitted that Singapore was an appropriate forum because he was based there and the dispute had a sufficient connection with Singapore. He argued that the Bored Ape NFT was property, relying on the blockchain record, transaction history and his control of the relevant wallet. Because of the NFT’s uniqueness, he contended that damages would be inadequate if it were transferred. He also argued that procedural rules should be applied purposively so that an unknown defendant could be identified and served through the relevant pseudonymous accounts and wallet[6].

5.2 Respondent’s Arguments

The defendant did not participate. The application was therefore heard ex parte, and the Court had no adversarial submissions challenging the NFT’s proprietary status, the loan arrangements or the relief sought. This limited the extent to which the Court’s broader observations could be treated as definitive[7].

  1. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first considered the requirements for an interlocutory proprietary injunction: whether there was a serious question to be tried concerning the claimant’s proprietary interest and whether the balance of convenience favoured interim protection. At this stage, the claimant did not have to establish title conclusively; a seriously arguable proprietary claim was sufficient. The Court therefore approached the property question as a threshold issue rather than as a final adjudication of ownership[8].

The central substantive question was whether an NFT could constitute property. The Court rejected the view that an NFT should be treated simply as information because the underlying image may be stored off-chain. That approach, it reasoned, overlooked the technological system through which the token is uniquely identified and controlled, transferred on a blockchain and traded for value. The fact that the associated artwork could exist separately did not deprive the token itself of proprietary characteristics[9].

The Court relied on National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth, which identifies four relevant characteristics: the subject matter must be definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and sufficiently permanent or stable. Earlier crypto-asset decisions, including AA v Persons Unknown, had applied these characteristics to digital assets despite their imperfect fit with traditional categories of personal property. The Court used this existing doctrine rather than attempting to create a wholly new category of digital property[10], [11].

Applying the criteria, the Court considered the NFT definable because its metadata distinguished it from other tokens; identifiable by third parties because control of the relevant wallet provided a basis for identifying its holder; capable of assumption by third parties because it could be transferred and had market value; and sufficiently permanent or stable because the blockchain maintained a persistent record. The Court also noted that alternative classifications, including choses in action, remained contestable. Its conclusion was reached on an urgent ex parte and interlocutory application, so the issue was not finally determined after adversarial argument[12].

The Court’s reasoning therefore combined established property criteria with the technological characteristics of NFTs. It did not treat blockchain control as automatically equivalent to legal title, but regarded the existence of an identifiable and transferable token as sufficient, at the interlocutory stage, to support proprietary protection.

Finally, the balance of convenience favoured preservation. The NFT was unique, and transferring it to a third party could defeat effective proprietary relief. An injunction was therefore appropriate pending determination of the parties’ substantive rights. The urgency was reinforced by the fact that the NFT had already been listed on an open marketplace where further transfers could occur quickly[13].

  1. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi

The High Court granted a proprietary injunction restraining dealings with the Bored Ape NFT and permitted substituted service through the defendant’s Twitter and Discord accounts and the relevant cryptocurrency wallet[14].

The Court held, for the purposes of the interlocutory application, that an NFT was capable of constituting property under Singapore law where it satisfied the characteristics identified in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth.

  1. Critical Analysis

8.1 Significance of the Decision

The principal contribution of Janesh is its pragmatic treatment of technological novelty. Rather than concluding that an NFT falls outside property law because it consists of digital information, the Court examined the functional characteristics that make the asset identifiable, exclusive and transferable. This approach is consistent with the wider common-law tendency to recognise crypto-assets as property without necessarily creating an entirely new legal category[15].

The decision is particularly important because the NFT was being used in a DeFi lending transaction. It therefore moves the discussion beyond the abstract question of whether digital assets can be “property” and towards the practical question of how proprietary concepts operate when crypto-assets are used in secured finance. Chan and Low identify Janesh as an especially important early judicial encounter with the interaction between NFTs, smart contracts and crypto-backed lending[16].

8.2 Implications and Impact

Recognition of NFTs as property potentially strengthens the legal basis for injunctions, tracing and other proprietary remedies. It also provides greater legal confidence for transactions in which digital assets are pledged or otherwise used to support financial obligations.

However, proprietary recognition does not itself resolve the separate questions of security creation, perfection, priority, enforcement or insolvency. The distinction is important in DeFi lending because the technological execution of a “foreclosure” function does not necessarily determine the legal rights of the parties. As Mandhan observes in his analysis of cryptoasset-backed lending, uncertainty surrounding the legal treatment of collateral creates material risks where participants rely on technological mechanisms without a sufficiently clear legal framework[17].

The decision also confirms that ownership of an NFT should not automatically be equated with ownership of the intellectual-property rights in the underlying digital content. The NFT, the tokenised record and the underlying artwork may involve legally distinct rights[18].

8.3 Critical Evaluation

The strongest aspect of Janesh is its refusal to allow technological form to become a barrier to legal protection. The Court correctly recognised that blockchain architecture creates a form of exclusivity and verifiable control that cannot be fully understood by treating NFTs as ordinary information.

Nevertheless, the reasoning is limited by its reliance on the Ainsworth criteria. Chan and Low argue that these criteria do not provide a satisfactory normative explanation of why a crypto-asset should be treated as property or, more importantly, what specific proprietary rights should follow from that classification[19]. This criticism is significant because the recognition of an NFT as property is only the first step. It does not by itself determine who has title, whether the lender obtains a security interest or ownership, how competing claims should be prioritised, or how the asset should be dealt with in insolvency.

The ex parte and interlocutory character of Janesh also reduces the precedential weight that should be placed on its broader conceptual observations. The Court itself acknowledged that a fuller adversarial argument could produce a different result. Accordingly, the decision is best understood as an important juridical opening for recognising NFTs as property rather than as a comprehensive doctrine governing all forms of tokenised assets.

  1. Conclusion

Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) represents an important step in the development of Singapore’s legal response to blockchain-based assets. The High Court held that an NFT could satisfy the Ainsworth criteria and therefore support proprietary protection through an injunction. The decision is particularly significant because the NFT had been employed as collateral in a DeFi loan, linking the recognition of digital property directly to the operation of crypto-backed finance.

The judgment’s greatest strength lies in its pragmatic adaptability: it applies established property principles to new technological circumstances without immediately creating a separate legal regime. Yet its limitations are equally important. Because the ruling arose from an ex parte interlocutory application, and because the Ainsworth criteria leave unresolved fundamental questions concerning the nature and incidents of digital proprietary rights, Janesh should not be treated as a complete solution. Its enduring significance instead lies in establishing a foundation upon which more precise rules concerning ownership, security interests, priority and enforcement of TSMH may subsequently be developed.

  1. Reference(S):

Table of Cases

  • AA v Persons Unknown who demanded Bitcoin on 10 and 11 October 2019 and others [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm).
  • CLM v CLN [2022] SGHC 46.
  • Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264.
  • National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175.

Bibliography

  • Timothy Chan and Kelvin FK Low, ‘DeFi Common Sense: Crypto-backed Lending in Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”)’ (2023) 86(5) Modern Law Review
  • Sameer Mandhan, ‘Confronting the DeFi Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of New Zealand’s Personal Property Securities Act 1999 to Cryptoassets’ (2024) 55 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 199.
  • Corinne Tan, ‘Rights in NFTs and the flourishing of NFT marketplaces’ (2024) 32 International Journal of Law and Information Technology eaae018.

[1] Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.

[2] Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”) [2022] SGHC 264 [10] – [11].

[3] ibid [17] – [20].

[4] ibid [21] – [24].

[5] ibid [25] – [26].

[6] ibid [29] – [30].

[7] ibid [25], [50].

[8] ibid [44] – [45].

[9] ibid [48] – [55].

[10] National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, 1248.

[11] AA v Persons Unknown who demanded Bitcoin on 10 and 11 October 2019 and others [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm) [59].

[12] Janesh s/o Rajkumar (n 1) [53] – [61].

[13] ibid [67] – [71].

[14] ibid [89] – [90].

[15] See generally David Fox and Sarah Green (eds), Cryptocurrencies in Public and Private Law (OUP 2019); Kelvin FK Low and Ernie GS Teo, ‘Bitcoins and Other Cryptocurrencies as Property?’ (2017) 21 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 330.

[16] Timothy Chan and Kelvin FK Low, ‘DeFi Common Sense: Crypto-backed Lending in Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person (“CHEFPIERRE”)’ (2023) 86(5) Modern Law Review 1278, 1278 – 1293.

[17] Sameer Mandhan, ‘Confronting the DeFi Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of New Zealand’s Personal Property Securities Act 1999 to Cryptoassets’ (2024) 55 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 199, 209 – 218.

[18] Corinne Tan, ‘Rights in NFTs and the flourishing of NFT marketplaces’ (2024) 32 International Journal of Law and Information Technology eaae018.

[19] Chan and Low (n 16), 1286 – 1290.

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