In re: Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025; Asaduddin Owaisi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

1. Case Citation

Full Case Name: In re: Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025; Asaduddin Owaisi & Ors. v. Union  of India & Ors. 

Citation: 2025 INSC 1116 | W.P.(C) No. 269/2025 

Court: Supreme Court of India 

Date of Decision: 15 September 2025 

Bench Composition: B.R. Gavai, CJI and A.G. Masih, J. (Division Bench) Note: This section is excluded from the word count. 

2. Introduction

The legislative structure governing waqf properties in India underwent significant  modifications when the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 was passed by Parliament and approved  by the President in April of that same year. The Waqf Act of 1995 controlled waqf, an Islamic  institution of permanent property dedication for religious or philanthropic purposes. The 2025  modifications changed the eligibility requirements for establishing a waqf, reorganized dispute  resolution procedures, changed the long-standing “waqf by user” tenet, and changed the  makeup of Waqf Boards. The Supreme Court received more than 72 petitions contesting the  statute’s constitutionality on the grounds that it violated fundamental rights protected by  Articles 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, and 300A of the Constitution. The case is constitutionally  significant as it sits at the intersection of religious freedom, minority rights, property law, and  the limits of legislative intervention in the internal governance of religious institutions.

3. Facts of the Case

A Muslim can permanently donate property to God for religious, pious, or philanthropic  reasons through the centuries-old Islamic legal system known as waqf. The Mussalman Wakf  Validating Act, 1913, the Wakf Act, 1954, and most recently the Waqf Act, 1995, as revised  in 2013, have all been used in India to administer waqf holdings. To supervise and manage  waqf properties, the 1995 Act created Central and State Waqf Boards with only Muslim  members. Additionally, it acknowledged “waqf by user,” which allows a property’s waqf  character to be established through long-standing religious use without official registration.  The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, also known as the Unified Waqf Management,  Empowerment, Efficiency and Development (UMEED) Act, was passed by Parliament on  April 8, 2025. The amendment brought about a number of significant changes: The Central  Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards were reorganized to include non-Muslim members; the  concept of “waqf by user” was essentially eliminated with regard to unregistered properties  going forward; Section 3(r) mandated that a person establishing a waqf must have practiced  Islam for at least five years; Sections 3C and 3D changed how disputes concerning government  ownership of alleged waqf properties would be resolved, vesting authority in revenue officers;  and Section 3E prohibited the declaration of land owned by Scheduled Tribes.  The Act became operative in April 2025 after receiving presidential approval. In preparation  for potential legal challenges, the Union of India filed a caveat Members of Parliament,  religious organizations such as the Indian Union Muslim League, Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind, the  All India Muslim Personal Law Board, and civil society organizations filed more than 72  petitions following that. The case was first heard by a three-judge bench that included CJI  Sanjiv Khanna, Justices P.V. Sanjay Kumar, and K.V. Viswanathan. Later, it was moved to a  Division Bench that included CJI B.R. Gavai and Justice A.G. Masih. The interlocutory order  was reserved in May 2025 after five days of hearings on the temporary stay. On September 15,  2025, the contested ruling regarding the application for an interim stay was made. 

4. Legal Issues

The following primary legal questions fell for determination by the Court at the interim stage:

1. Whether the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 is prima facie unconstitutional as being  violative of Articles 14, 25, and 26 of the Constitution of India, warranting a stay of the  entire statute at the interlocutory stage? 
2. Whether Section 3(r) of the Amended Act, mandating a minimum five-year practice of  Islam before a person may create a waqf, is arbitrary and violates the right to freedom  of religion under Article 25? 
3. Whether Sections 3C and 3D, which vest authority in revenue officers to determine  disputed ownership between government and waqf, violate the principle of separation  of powers and constitute arbitrary state action? 
4. Whether the inclusion of non-Muslim members in the Central Waqf Council and State  Waqf Boards under Sections 9 and 14 violates the right of religious denominations to  manage their own affairs under Article 26(b)? 
5. Whether the abolition of ‘waqf by user’ in respect of unregistered ancient waqf  properties is constitutionally valid, given that many such properties have no formal  deeds? 

       5. Arguments Presented

5.1 Petitioners’ Arguments 

The following main arguments were made by senior attorneys representing the petitioners,  including Kapil Sibal, Rajeev Dhavan, and Abhishek Manu Singhvi:  First, the petitioners claimed that Article 25, which protects the right to freedom of religion,  was infringed and that Section 3(r)’s requirement that a waqf founder have practiced Islam for  at least five years was discriminatory. They argued that the clause unnecessarily singled out  Muslims and that no other religious community’s ability to establish religious endowments was  subject to such proof of practice. The petitioners further contended that the clause was arbitrary  and unenforceable because there was no workable way to confirm if a person has actually  followed Islam for the necessary amount of time. 

Second, the petitioners objected to the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards having  non-Muslim members. Counsel made a sharp analogy to Christian, Sikh, and Hindu religious  endowment organizations, all of which are run solely by adherents of the appropriate faith.  Article 26(b), which provides religious denominations the ability to administer their own religious affairs, was allegedly violated by the inclusion of non-Muslims in Waqf management.  Under the pretense of reform, the petitioners described this as state meddling in Muslim  religious sovereignty. 

Third, the petitioners argued that Sections 3(1) and 3(2) were unconstitutional because they  gave a tax officer below the level of collector the authority to decide disputed titles between  the government and waqf. They contended that an executive revenue officer could not have  such adjudicatory authority over property rights; instead, it had to be used by a court or quasi judicial body. It was claimed that the clause declaring property non-waqf while the  investigation was ongoing would hurt current waqf holders irreversibly. Fourth, the petitioners contended that because the dedication was so old, the elimination of  “waqf by user” retroactively deprived old mosques, dargahs, and cemeteries of their protected  status. The absence of a document, they contended, was a function of history and not an  indication of illegitimacy. Requiring registration within prescribed periods would effectively  extinguish centuries-old waqf endowments. 

5.2 Union of India’s Arguments 

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the Union, advanced the following contentions  in support of the Act: 

The Union maintained that Section 3(r)’s requirement of a minimum five-year practice of Islam  fulfilled a legitimate legislative objective, namely to avoid exploitation of the waqf institution  by people who convert to Islam simply to protect their property from creditors or debt  procedures. Citing previous legislative acknowledgement of the exploitation of waqf as a  ‘clever artifice’ to dodge legal obligations dating back to 1923, the Union maintained that the  provision had a legitimate relationship with the goal sought to be attained. 

The Union argued that the inclusion of a small number of non-Muslims did not deny the  Muslim community effective authority over waqf operations, and that the majority of members  of the Central Waqf Council and State Waqf Boards remained Muslim. In front of the Court,  the Solicitor General promised to limit the number of non-Muslim members to no more than  four in the Central Waqf Council and three in each State Waqf Board. 

In reference to “waqf by user,” the Union argued that formal registration was a necessity that  had existed in waqf legislation since 1923 and was not a new imposition. It argued that the  mutawallis (caretakers) of old waqfs had more than a century to register their properties but had not done so, and that registered waqfs prior to 2025 would not be disrupted. The Union  contended that in several instances, this was a purposeful tactic to evade regulatory inspection  rather than just a failing. 

On the revenue officer provision, the Union submitted that such officers were empowered only  to inquire and submit reports, and that the ultimate adjudication would rest with the Waqf  Tribunal. No final adverse determination of title was made at the inquiry stage. 

6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis 

In its 128-page ruling, written by Chief Justice Gavai, the Division Bench granted selective  stays on certain sections of the act but declined to suspend the entire statute. The following  analytical framework guided the Court’s thinking 

The Court began by reiterating the well-established rule that judicial intervention through an  interim stay of legislation is a tool that should be used very carefully. Only in rare and extreme  circumstances either the legislature clearly lacked the authority to pass the bill or the provisions  appear to violate fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution—can an interim stay be  granted. As a result, the petitioners had a difficult burden throughout the interlocutory stage. 

The Court initially determined that Section 3(r) and the five-year practice requirement were  not arbitrary. It agreed with the Union’s argument that a valid legislative concern was the  previous abuse of waqf endowments as a means of defeating creditors. Nonetheless, the Court  acknowledged a crucial implementational flaw: there was no way to determine if an individual  had truly practiced Islam for the necessary amount of time. The Court delayed Section 3(r) on  that specific procedural basis alone until the Union used its rule-making authority to establish  a verification process. 

The Court’s reasoning was more explicit with regard to Sections 3C(1) and 3C(2). Determining  who owns real estate is a judicial task. The separation of powers principle of the constitution  was violated by entrusting such a decision, even temporarily, to a revenue official. The Court  ruled that an executive revenue officer could not resolve property rights of this magnitude; only  judicial or quasi-judicial authorities could. As a result, Section 3C(2)’s proviso, which  established a statutory fiction declaring property non-waqf during inquiry, was stayed since it  was initially arbitrary and unsustainable. On the grounds that allowing revenue record modifications based on a non-judicial finding was likewise invalid, Sections 3C(3) and 3C(4)  were also halted. The Court, however, directed mutawallis not to create third-party interests in  disputed properties pending final Tribunal adjudication. 

The Court declined to stay the rule on the elimination of “waqf by user.” It reasoned that the  formal registration requirement could not be described as an abrupt imposition because it had  been in place continuously since 1923. It ruled that mutawallis could not now argue that formal  registration requirements were arbitrary if they had neglected to register waqf properties for  more than 102 years. The Court pointed out that registration applications could be submitted  with as little information as possible, without the need for official deeds.  The Court did not consider the substantive constitutional issue regarding non-Muslim  membership during the interlocutory phase. Accepting the Solicitor General’s assurances, the  Court directed that non-Muslim members would not exceed four out of 22 in the Central Waqf  Council and three out of 11 in each State Waqf Board. It further directed that the appointment  of the Chief Executive Officer should be from the Muslim community as far as possible. 

The Court also refused to stay Sections 3D (bar on declaring protected monuments as waqf)  and 3E (bar on declaring Scheduled Tribe land as waqf), finding that these provisions had  rational bases in protecting both heritage sites and one of India’s most marginalised  communities. 

7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi 

The Division Bench dismissed the prayer for a stay of the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 in its  entirety. However, by way of interim order, the following specific directions were issued: 

• Section 3(r) (five-year practice of Islam requirement) was stayed pending prescription  of a verification mechanism by the Union Government. 
• The proviso to Section 3C(2), and Sections 3C(3) and 3C(4) (revenue officer  determination of waqf-government title disputes and corrections to revenue records)  were stayed as prima facie arbitrary. 
• Non-Muslim membership in Waqf Councils and Boards was capped at four out of 22  (Central) and three out of 11 (State).
• Mutawallis were directed not to create third-party interests in properties where title was  in dispute under Section 3C pending Tribunal adjudication. 

Ratio Decidendi: The ratio decidendi of the judgment, at the interlocutory stage, may be stated  as follows: An interim stay of an Act of Parliament will not be granted unless the petitioner  demonstrates that the legislation is manifestly beyond legislative competence or ex facie  violative of fundamental rights. Specific provisions may be stayed where they are prima facie  arbitrary, such as where adjudicatory power over property rights is vested in a non-judicial  executive authority, or where a legislative requirement is immediately incapable of compliance  due to the absence of any prescribed mechanism for its implementation. 

8. Critical Analysis 

8.1 Significance of the Decision 

For a number of reasons, the ruling has constitutional significance. It is one of the Supreme  Court’s first significant rulings on the legislative parameters that allow Parliament to change  the way minority religious institutions are run. The Court made a significant distinction  between legislative policy decisions that may be questionable and measures that are prima facie  unconstitutional by refusing to halt the legislation in its entirety while keeping certain of its  components. The concept of legislative deference, which has been repeatedly upheld in  instances like State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) and more recently in the Court’s  jurisprudence on socio-economic legislation, is strengthened by this cautious approach. In an  era of greater executive determination of civil rights, the Court’s assertion that the  determination of property title must belong in a judicial or quasi-judicial authority reaffirms an  important constitutional norm. The idea stated in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)  that administrative action cannot completely replace the supervisory and adjudicatory  jurisdiction of constitutional courts is consistent with the stay of Sections 3C(2)–(4) on the  grounds of separation of powers. 

8.2 Implications and Impact 

The choice has important real-world ramifications. Section 3(r)’s stay precludes Muslim  converts or individuals who are unable to properly substantiate their Islamic practice from  being immediately barred from establishing waqf endowments. This safeguards religious  dedications that have already been made or are being formalized. Executive tax officers are prevented from effectively denying waqf status to contested properties pending adjudication  by the stay of Sections 3(2)–(4). This may have had an irrevocable chilling impact on waqf  claims against government property. The Court’s directives against non-Muslim membership  offer a numerical safeguard that guarantees Muslim representation stays predominant in the  entities tasked with waqf administration, even though they do not completely stay the  provision. Until the conclusion of the substantive hearing, these guidelines will control  appointments and reconstitutions. The case also indicates that the Court plans to hold a final  hearing to consider the substantive constitutional issues, especially those pertaining to Articles  25 and 26. The final decision made in that hearing will have long-term effects on minority  religious rights in India. 

8.3 Critical Evaluation 

Scholars have criticized the ruling for a number of reasons. The Leaflet’s commentary has  described the Court’s reasoning as flawed in a number of areas, such as issue framing and  adjudicatory reasoning, contending that the Court read conclusions into the legislation that  were not supported by its text and made assumptions that lacked foundation. Petitioners and  scholarly observers have criticized the failure to stay the “waqf by user” provisions as being  oblivious to the historical reality that there are no surviving deeds for innumerable ancient waqf  endowments throughout the Indian subcontinent that predate any formal registration process.  Administrative inaction and a surrender of property rights may be confused in the Court’s  argument that 102 years of non-registration amounted to an acknowledgment of invalidity. 

The Court’s interpretation of Section 3(r) is another point of contention. Rather than any  substantive judgment of constitutional infirmity, the stay was issued solely on procedural  grounds, including the lack of a verification mechanism. This indicates that without the Court  making a decision about the constitutionality of the underlying requirement, the provision  could be revived simply by the Union establishing a procedure. This has been viewed as a  partial solution that ignores the issue of fundamental rights. Defenders of the ruling, however,  contend that maintaining the status quo without interfering with the eventual decision is exactly  the proper function of an interlocutory court. Overall, the ruling ensures that the most  constitutionally vulnerable clauses be upheld while exhibiting judicial restraint suitable for the  interlocutory stage.

9. Conclusion

In re: Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 is a well-considered court reaction to one of the most  controversial legislative revisions in recent years, both politically and constitutionally. The  Supreme Court upheld the statute’s general application while suspending several clauses that  violated the separation of powers principles of the constitution or could not be immediately  implemented. A substantive hearing on the fundamental issues of legislative competence,  minority rights, and religious freedom will follow. The constitutional bounds of Parliamentary  power to restructure Muslim religious institutions’ internal governance and the degree to which  the State may get involved in the management of waqf properties will be decided by its final  ruling. The unresolved questions of ‘waqf by user’, the five-year practice requirement, and the  long-term composition of Waqf Boards ensure that this litigation will remain a landmark  chapter in India’s constitutional law for years to come. 

10. Reference(S):

Primary Sources: 

In re: Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, 2025 INSC 1116, W.P.(C) No. 269/2025, Supreme Court of India (B.R. Gavai CJI, A.G.  Masih J), 15 September 2025. 

Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Act No. ___ of 2025), as notified by the Government of India. 

Waqf Act, 1995 (Act No. 43 of 1995). 

Constitution of India, arts. 14, 15, 19, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 300A. 

Secondary Sources:

V. Venkatesan, ‘Constitutionality of the Waqf Amendment Act, 2025: Interim Plea Judgement Summary’, Supreme CourtObserver (17 September 2025), <https://www.scobserver.in>.

‘The Waqf Interim Judgement is a smokescreen: A (detailed) critique’, The Leaflet (9 October 2025), <https://theleaflet.in>.

‘Waqf Law: 10 Key Objections of Petitioners and Union’s Responses’, Supreme Court Observer (26 April 2025),<https://www.scobserver.in>.

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 (Supreme Court of India).

State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592 (Supreme Court of India).