Authored By: Nabihat Ahuoiza Sadiq
Middlesex University Mauritius
Introduction
In a world increasingly marked by armed conflict, mass displacement, and the routine destruction of civilian life, international human rights law (IHRL) has come under global scrutiny. IHRL is often regarded as a safeguard of human dignity, yet it repeatedly proves unable to prevent the very abuses it condemns. The promise of universal protection is at odds with a global legal order still shaped by state sovereignty, geopolitical influence, and selective enforcement. Although international law was developed to restrain power and preserve humanity in moments of crisis, its capacity to do so has remained deeply constrained by the structure of the international system itself. The primary sources of IHRL include foundational instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[1] and binding treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which together articulate and, in the case of treaties, impose obligations on states to respect and protect fundamental rights.[2] This article argues that the failure of IHRL during armed conflicts lies not in the absence of legal norms, but in the structural conditions that prevent those norms from being meaningfully enforced. It examines the overlap between IHRL and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the limitations of international adjudicatory bodies, and the political realities that allow sovereignty and power politics to outweigh human rights protections. Ultimately, it contends that while international law continues to affirm the value of human rights, its present framework has proven insufficient to secure them when they are most under threat.
The Intersection of the IHRL and IHL
Historically, IHRL was viewed as applying primarily during peacetime, while (IHL) governed wartime. Contemporary international law, however, increasingly recognises that both regimes operate concurrently during armed conflict. In such situations, courts often treat IHL as lex specialis, given its specificity in regulating warfare.[3] Tensions arise where IHL permits lethal force against lawful targets under certain conditions,[4] while IHRL broadly prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life.[5] Although IHRL expansively protects all persons regardless of circumstance, IHL seeks to regulate rather than eliminate violence. It is therefore concerning that, where the two regimes coincide, IHL often prevails as the more specific body of law, thereby prioritising wartime rules over human-rights principles and raising questions about the scope of lawful derogation from IHRL during conflict.
Critics may counter that IHRL and IHL are complementary regimes that together form a robust framework for protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure.[6] The ICJ has likewise affirmed that IHRL remains applicable in conflict, although subject to IHL’s special rules.[7] Yet, the complementarity of this dual framework is challenged when the legal justifications for wartime violence effectively normalizes civilian suffering. IHL concepts such as the principle of distinction and the protection of non-combatants may appear protective, but they also permit civilian deaths to be framed within legal doctrines such as proportionality and collateral damage. This is evident in Sudan, where over 14 million people have been displaced amid the world’s largest internal displacement crisis,[8] and in Gaza, where hospitals and schools have repeatedly come under attack.[9] These examples suggest that the combined framework of IHRL and IHL remains insufficient in practice, even where both regimes formally apply. This complementarity falters further when IHL’s thresholds for incidental harm permit disproportionate outcomes.[10] Under the principle of proportionality, attacks may be considered lawful if expected civilian casualties or damage are not excessive in comparison to the anticipated military gain.[11] Resultantly, conduct that would amount to a serious violation under IHRL may still be described as lawful under IHL, provided it is framed as proportionate to military necessity.
The Challenge of Jurisdiction
A major impediment to IHRL’s effectiveness lies in the courts’ complete lack of enforcement power, such as that of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC). Given that international law hinges on individual states’ prior ratification and consent before these bodies can adjudicate disputes,[12] as seen with the United States’ refusal to ratify the Rome Statute, thereby evading ICC jurisdiction.[13] This structural flaw directly undermines the ICC’s mandate, rendering international law’s enforcement mechanisms dependent on voluntary state cooperation. Consequently, accountability becomes unevenly distributed as weaker states are more readily subjected to international scrutiny, whilst politically and militarily influential states often retain the ability to circumvent legal consequences. Such selectivity raises troubling questions regarding the universality of international justice and whether international law genuinely operates as an impartial legal order, or rather as a system constrained by global power hierarchies.
Yet even when jurisdiction exists, geopolitical realities further erode judicial authority. In South Africa v Israel, where Israel was accused of genocide in Gaza, the Court issued provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent genocidal acts and ensure humanitarian aid. Israel, however, has continued its military operations, highlighting the absence of binding coercive mechanisms.[14] Currently, implementation rests solely on states’ political willingness.[15] The ICJ’s authority thus falters against powerful non-compliance, exposing international law’s fragility when confronting entrenched geopolitics. The Court may pronounce legal obligations, yet it possesses no independent mechanism through which compliance can be compelled. Instead, enforcement remains mediated through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or UN Security Council action, which will be further discussed consequently.
This reveals that the issue is not the law itself, but the weight accorded to it amid power politics, casting doubt on whether ICJ rulings are merely symbolic gestures. Critics counter that such judgments retain influence beyond direct enforcement because they shape normative trends, mobilize diplomatic pressure, and stigmatize violators in the “court of global opinion.”[16] For instance, post-ruling, states like the UK and Germany urged Israel toward restraint, while United Nations bodies amplified calls for compliance,[17] demonstrating indirect efficacy through soft power rather than coercion. Yet this optimism proves unsustainable, as the persistence of unchecked civilian deaths in Gaza directly undermines the claim that symbolic pressure suffices. Such influence often proves performative, allowing violations to continue while courts issue unenforced orders. International law therefore risks becoming trapped in a position where it appears rich in normative aspiration, but remains destitute in practical enforcement.
The Implication of the Veto
While decisions of the ICJ are generally binding upon the parties to the dispute and the responsibility of implementation is on the Security Council. This brings us to the next flaw of IHRL; the veto power held by the 5 permanent (P5) members of the Security Council. The veto power grants China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States each, the unilateral ability to block any substantive resolution brought before the Council.[18] These states have repeatedly leveraged the veto to protect themselves and their allies from accountability at the international level.[19] This is popularly known as the Security Council “deadlock.”[20] Such paralysis severely undermines the enforcement capacity of IHRL, as even the gravest humanitarian crises may fail to trigger meaningful collective action where geopolitical interests are at stake. In the Rohingya refugee crisis, armed attacks and gross human rights violations forced millions of Rohingya to flee from Myanmar into Bangladesh.[21] Proposals for intervention have been raised before the Security Council, yet it is always effectively blocked by China. This is because China has significant economic interests which it seeks to protect by supporting the military junta regime in Myanmar.[22] This is a textbook example of how the P5 member states utilize the State’s selfish interest regardless of its impact on global peace and security. Similarly, the misuse of veto power is evident in the Gaza war crisis where thousands of lives have been lost, and those alive have been subject to shortages of food, water and other human essentials.[23] Recently, 14 out of 15 members of the Security Council proposed a ceasefire in Gaza for global peace and security, but the US vetoed it, rendering the proposal ineffective. In this case, although a staggering majority agreed on the need for a ceasefire, the veto nullified this collective will.”[24] This demonstrates that the veto of the P5 members in the Security Council is persistently misappropriated to circumvent international action against human rights violations.[25] The veto therefore transforms humanitarian protection into a politicised process contingent not upon the severity of human suffering, but upon whether action aligns with the strategic interests of the P5.
In contrast, supporters of the veto argue that this power legitimizes the Security Council’s actions through consensus, by making its approved measures more credible and implementable.[26] Additionally, it is contended that the veto power protects minorities from unbridled democratic majorities in the Council, balancing power realities with equality.[27] However, this perspective fails to consider the real-world practical exercises of the veto which portray otherwise. Rather than leading the P5 to make fair and balanced decisions in the global interest, it has led to the facilitation of impunity, as is evident in the Gaza vetoes.[28] As remarked by Brazil at the Security Council meeting, “Council paralysis in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe is not in the interest of the international community.”[29] The Security Council, which was originally entrusted to serve as the guarantor of international peace and security, risks becoming incompetent. Consequently, IHRL is left void of a principal body to uphold and enforce its principles.
Sovereignty versus Human Rights
Building on the limitations of the Security Council’s capacity to enforce IHRL, another major obstacle lies in the continued prioritization of state sovereignty over human-rights obligations. Sovereignty is grounded in the Westphalian norm of non-interference and consent-based treaty law. States often resist binding human-rights measures by arguing that these principles intrude on their domestic authority.[30] This helps explains why international Courts, such as the ICJ, rely on state consent, and why powerful states are often able to evade accountability. The deteriorating human rights situation in South Sudan has gone insufficiently addressed because the international community has repeatedly privileged state sovereignty and geopolitical interests over timely humanitarian intervention.[31] The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar offers a parallel example; despite documented atrocities and a 2019 Gambia‑initiated ICJ case alleging genocide, Myanmar’s assertions of sovereignty and the regional insistence on non‑interference have limited robust collective action, allowing mass displacement and abuse to continue.[32] These cases illustrate how sovereignty can function as a shield for perpetrators even where rights are grossly violated.
Conversely, critics of this view argue that respect for sovereignty prevents external imposition and preserves international order, and allows domestic political contexts to be addressed through locally grounded solutions rather than universal interventions imposed by outsiders.[33] This position is not without merit since international intervention without consent can generate instability, and accusations of neo-colonialism. However, the argument becomes unconvincing where sovereignty is invoked to protect or excuse grave violations of fundamental rights. Contemporary international law increasingly recognizes that sovereignty is not absolute, but instead conditional on states’ respect for fundamental rights. The responsibility to protect (R2P) and jus cogens norms suggest that extreme abuses strip states of the political legitimacy that shields them from intervention.[34] While sovereignty remains central to the structure of international law, it offers no legal justification for impunity.
Proposals for Reform
In order to mitigate the enforcement deficiencies of IHRL, reforms targeting both judicial authority and Security Council paralysis are essential. First, all members of the Security Council must submit to ICC jurisdiction. Requiring all UNSC members to accept the Court’s jurisdiction would reduce the perception that international law only binds less powerful states. It would equally reduce the ability of powerful states to evade scrutiny. This reform would strengthen the credibility of international justice by ensuring that those entrusted with maintaining global peace are not exempt from judicial accountability.
Second, the use of veto power should be restricted in cases of human rights violations and genocide. Although the veto system has long been criticised for enabling Security Council paralysis and shielding powerful states from accountability, advocating for its complete abolition would likely prove unrealistic. As Hans J Morgenthau asserts, “if powerful states had not been granted special privileges, they would not have participated in the United Nations.”[35] Whilst the Security Council has clear structural flaws, it would be implausible to dismiss its role in maintaining international stability and restraining unilateral aggression. Nevertheless, regulating the exercise of veto in cases of human rights atrocities would help guarantee that civilians do not become collateral subjects of geopolitical conflict.
Third, Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, which obliges a party to a dispute to abstain from voting in the Security Council, on Chapter VI matters,[36] must be revitalized. The narrow interpretation of the term “dispute” allows states to claim that a matter involving them is merely a “situation,” and therefore outside the scope of the abstention rule.[37] It would be preferable to move away from this restrictive reading and require states named in a resolution to abstain in accordance with the obligatory abstention rule. This should apply whether or not the Security Council formally acknowledges the existence of a dispute. Such a reform would prevent states from voting on matters in which they have a direct interest and would reduce bias in the enforcement process.
Admittedly, these measures would face political resistance, particularly from states concerned with preserving their sovereignty, strategic autonomy and dominance in the geopolitical sphere. Notwithstanding, they remain significant in principle as they would reduce selective accountability and strengthen the vitality of human rights protection in practice.
Conclusion
International human rights law is a jus cogens area of law that demands the utmost protection and implementation by all stakeholders. Yet its persistent weakness lies in the inadequacy of its enforcement mechanism, a fundamental defect that cannot be ignored. In the present climate, civilian lives risk becoming subordinate to diplomatic alliances and power politics, revealing the extent to which the international legal order remains constrained by state sovereignty and geopolitical bargaining rather than by universal human rights protection.
This article has shown that the failure of international human rights law during armed conflict does not stem from a lack of legal principles, but from the structural inability of the international system to enforce them consistently and impartially. The overlap between IHRL and IHL, the limitations of international courts and the paralysis of the Security Council all demonstrate that legal protections are on as effective as the political will behind them. Where that will is absent, rights become vulnerable to selective application and impunity.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of international human rights law ultimately depends not only on the existence of legal norms, but upon the establishment of credible enforcement mechanisms capable of transcending geopolitical interests. Without such reform, the promise of universal human rights will remain largely aspirational, while those most in need of protection continue to bear the greatest cost of international inaction.
Bibliography
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Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3
Statute of the International Court of Justice
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III)
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Akter T, ‘United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Veto Dilemma: This Hidden Obstacle to World Peace and Justice: A Critical Analysis’ (2026) 9(3) SIJLCJ 83
Alter KJ, Helfer LR and Madsen MR, ‘How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts’ (2016) 79 Law and contemporary problems 1
Cassel D, ‘A Framework of Norms: International Human Rights Law and Sovereignty’ (2001) 22(4) Harv Int’l R 60
Fitriyah A, International Legal Analysis of Human Rights Violations and Alleged Genocide in Palestine: A Normative Juridicial Approach’ (2025) 3(1) SIJL 1
Jemirade D, ‘The Failure of Humanitarian Intervention and the role of NGOs in Darfur’ (2021) 13(1) AJHC 43
Kato A, ‘Revitalizing the Obligatory abstention rule in the UN Security Council: an interpretation of the Proviso in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter’, (2025) 30(1) JCSL 3
Voeten E, ‘The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force’ (2025) 59(3) IO 527
Waikhom M, ‘The United Nations Security Council Veto and Its Impact On Conflict-Related Resolutions (1990–2022)’ (2025) 11(9) International Education and Research Journal (IERJ), 11(9) 310
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‘Humanitarian situation in Sudan at ‘catastrophic levels’, says NGO’ AlJazeera (9 April 2026) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/humanitarian-situation-in-sudan-at-catastrophic-levels-says-ngo> accessed 11 May 2026
‘Myanmar and China’s Economic Interests’ (ISP Myanmar, 18 January 2022) <https://ispmyanmar.com/myanmar-and-chinas-economic-interests/> accessed 13 May 2025
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‘Security Council: US votes against resolution on Gaza ceasefire’ (UN News, 18 September 2025) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165881> accessed 14 May 2025
Droege C, ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2007), <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/interplay-between-IHL-IHRL-article-droege> accessed 11 May 2026
Guittard R, ‘National sovereignty v human rights’ (Amnesty International, 6 November 2014) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2014/11/national-sovereignty-vs-human-rights/> accessed 13 May 2026
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Mansour M, ‘State of war: Why Israel has escalated attacks in Gaza’ (AlJazeera, 26 April 2026) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/26/state-of-war-why-israel-has-escalated-attacks-in-gaza> accessed 13 May 2026
Ramallah, ‘UN Human Rights Office – OHCHR is alarmed at Israeli strikes on or in the vicinities of schools and hospitals in the north of Gaza’ (UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights report, 9 December 2023) <https://reliefweb.int/node/4021573> accessed 12 May 2026
[1] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR).
[2] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).
[3] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report, ‘Lex specialis’ <https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/lex-specialis> accessed 11 May 2025.
[4] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3, art 51(3).
[5] ICCPR, art 6.
[6] Cordula Droege, ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2007), <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/interplay-between-IHL-IHRL-article-droege> accessed 11 May 2026.
[7] Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) ICJ Rep 136.
[8] AlJazeera, ‘Humanitarian situation in Sudan at ‘catastrophic levels’, says NGO’ AlJazeera (9 April 2026) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/9/humanitarian-situation-in-sudan-at-catastrophic-levels-says-ngo> accessed 11 May 2026.
[9] Ramallah, ‘UN Human Rights Office – OHCHR is alarmed at Israeli strikes on or in the vicinities of schools and hospitals in the north of Gaza’ (UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights report, 9 December 2023) <https://reliefweb.int/node/4021573> accessed 12 May 2026.
[10] Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law’ in Andrea Bianchi and others (eds), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 120.
[11] Additional Protocol I (n 4) art 51(5) (b).
[12] Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 36(2).
[13] Aidatul Fitriyah, International Legal Analysis of Human Rights Violations and Alleged Genocide in Palestine: A Normative Juridicial Approach’ (2025) 3(1) SIJL 1, 10.
[14] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (2024) <https://icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240212-wri-01-00-en.pdf> accessed 12 May 2026.
[15] Fitriyah (n 13) 10.
[16] Karen J Alter, Laurence R Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts’ (2016) 79 Law and contemporary problems 1.
[17] ‘Germany urges Israel to show ‘restraint in Gaza’ (Middle East Eye, 29 October 2025) <https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/germany-urges-israel-show-restraint-gaza> accessed 12 May 2026.
[18] Melita Waikhom, ‘The United Nations Security Council Veto and Its Impact On Conflict-Related Resolutions (1990–2022)’ (2025) 11(9) IERJ 310.
[19] Tahmina Akter, ‘United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Veto Dilemma: This Hidden Obstacle to World Peace and Justice: A Critical Analysis’ (2026) 9(3) SIJLCJ 83, 86.
[20] Waikhom (n 18) 311.
[21] ‘Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained’ (UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, 23 January 2026) <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/> accessed 12 May 2025.
[22] ‘Myanmar and China’s Economic Interests’ (ISP Myanmar, 18 January 2022) <https://ispmyanmar.com/myanmar-and-chinas-economic-interests/> accessed 13 May 2025.
[23] Mohammad Mansour, ‘State of war: Why Israel has escalated attacks in Gaza’ (AlJazeera, 26 April 2026) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/26/state-of-war-why-israel-has-escalated-attacks-in-gaza> accessed 13 May 2026.
[24] Akter (n 19) 86.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Erik Voeten, ‘The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force’ (2025) 59(3) IO 527.
[27] Ibid.
[28] ‘Security Council: US votes against resolution on Gaza ceasefire’ (UN News, 18 September 2025) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165881> accessed 14 May 2025.
[29] UNSC Verbatim Record (18 October 2023) UN Doc S/PV/9442.
[30] Carl Wellman, ‘International Rights versus National Sovereignty’ The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford Academic, 2011) 101; Douglass Cassel, ‘A Framework of Norms: International Human Rights Law and Sovereignty’ (2001) 22(4) Harv Int’l R 60.
[31] Dele Jemirade, ‘The Failure of Humanitarian Intervention and the role of NGOs in Darfur’ (2021) 13(1) AJHC 43.
[32] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ Rep 3.
[33] Wellman (n 30) 60.
[34] Robin Guittard, ‘National sovereignty v human rights’ (Amnesty International, 6 November 2014) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2014/11/national-sovereignty-vs-human-rights/> accessed 13 May 2026.
[35] Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (5th edn, Alfred Knopf 1978).
[36] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 27(3).
[37] Akiro Kato, ‘Revitalizing the Obligatory abstention rule in the UN Security Council: an interpretation of the Proviso in Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter,’ (2025) 30(1) JCSL 3, 19.
