CLIMATE CHANGE LAW IN NIGERIA: STRENGHTENING ENFORCEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, the Federal High Court in Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd recognised that gas flaring could implicate fundamental rights to life and human dignity and linked environmental pollution to climate-related harm. Nearly two decades later, Nigeria has moved from addressing climate-related harm largely through general environmental and human-rights law to having a dedicated Climate Change Act 2021. Yet the existence of a statute does not necessarily mean that climate obligations are clear, enforceable or effectively implemented.

Climate change presents Nigeria with a distinctive legal problem. Its effects extend across environmental protection, public health, agriculture, energy, land use, infrastructure, finance and human rights, while responsibility is distributed among governments, corporations and communities. Nigeria is also attempting to reconcile climate mitigation and adaptation with economic development, energy access and continued dependence on petroleum resources.

The Climate Change Act 2021 establishes a national framework for low greenhouse-gas emissions, climate-resilient development, carbon budgeting, climate planning and institutional coordination. Nevertheless, important questions remain about enforcement, judicial remedies, corporate accountability, institutional capacity and the relationship between climate obligations and existing environmental legislation.

This article argues that Nigeria’s climate-change framework provides an important statutory foundation but remains insufficiently enforceable unless climate targets are translated into measurable sectoral obligations, transparent reporting duties and accessible remedies. The article first examines the existing legal framework, then analyses Nigerian environmental cases relevant to climate governance, evaluates weaknesses in the present regime, and finally considers comparative approaches from the Netherlands and Germany before proposing reforms.

Legal Framework

Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and Others (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC), Suit No FHC/B/CS/53/05 (Federal High Court, Benin Division, 14 November 2005).

Nigeria’s climate law operates within a wider body of constitutional, statutory and international rules. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides in section 20 that the State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria. Although section 20 appears in Chapter II and is generally treated as a directive principle rather than an independently enforceable fundamental right, it provides a constitutional foundation for environmental governance.

Other constitutional rights may become relevant when environmental degradation causes serious harm. Sections 33 and 34 protect the rights to life and dignity of the human person. Section 37 protects privacy, while section 17(2)(d) directs that suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food, a national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions, unemployment and sick benefits and welfare of disabled persons should be provided. Climate impacts may intersect with these constitutional interests, although the justiciability of Chapter II remains subject to constitutional limitations.

The Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 is another important part of the framework. It requires environmental effects of specified public and private projects to be considered before implementation. The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act 2007 established NESREA and provides an institutional basis for environmental standards and enforcement. These laws remain relevant because many climate-related disputes arise from activities such as petroleum operations, industrial development, mining and infrastructure projects.

The central statutory development is the Climate Change Act 2021. Section 1 establishes a framework for achieving low greenhouse-gas emissions, inclusive green growth and sustainable economic development. The Act also establishes the National Council on Climate Change and assigns it a coordinating role in national climate policy. The Council is intended to facilitate a coordinated governmental response because climate change cannot be confined to a single ministry.

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 20.

Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992.

Climate Change Act 2021, ss 3–18.

The Act introduces carbon budgeting as a legal planning mechanism. Section 19 provides for the setting of a carbon budget for Nigeria and links the budget to Nigeria’s nationally determined contributions and international obligations. The Act also provides for a National Climate Change Action Plan, intended to operate in five-year cycles and address mitigation, adaptation, climate risks, infrastructure, energy efficiency and related matters.

The Act further requires public institutions to mainstream climate considerations into their activities and provides for climate-related responsibilities of public and private entities. It also establishes a Climate Change Fund intended to support climate action. These provisions are significant because they move climate governance beyond general policy statements and towards statutory planning and institutional duties.

Nigeria’s international obligations provide an additional layer. Nigeria is a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. Under the Paris framework, Nigeria communicates nationally determined contributions that guide its mitigation and adaptation commitments. International commitments do not automatically operate as domestic legislation in the same manner as an Act of the National Assembly, but they remain important interpretive and policy reference points when domestic climate law expressly connects national targets to international obligations.

Case Law Analysis

Nigerian climate jurisprudence remains comparatively limited, and many relevant cases concern environmental pollution rather than climate change as a standalone cause of action. Nevertheless, these decisions provide important foundations for future climate litigation.

Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd

In Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd, the applicant, representing the Iwherekan community in Delta State, challenged continuous gas flaring and alleged that it polluted the environment, harmed health and contributed to climate change. The Federal High Court held that the activities violated rights to life and human dignity and recognised the connection between those rights and a clean, healthy and pollution-free environment. The court also found that the failure to conduct an environmental impact assessment was unlawful and ordered steps towards ending the gas flaring complained of.

The significance of Gbemre is greater than its immediate facts. The decision demonstrates that environmental harm can be framed through enforceable fundamental rights rather than solely through regulatory offences. It also shows that climate-related arguments may succeed where the claimant can connect emissions to concrete environmental and human consequences.

However, Gbemre has limitations as a foundation for modern climate litigation. It was decided before the Climate Change Act 2021 and therefore did not interpret the current statutory architecture. Its reasoning was also rooted primarily in gas flaring, environmental pollution and fundamental rights rather than a comprehensive legal duty to reduce national greenhouse-gas emissions. Its value today is therefore principally doctrinal: it illustrates how Nigerian courts may connect environmental harm with constitutional rights.

Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v NNPC

The Supreme Court’s decision in Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v NNPC is also important. The case concerned oil pollution affecting streams and the surrounding environment in Acha community in Abia State. The Supreme Court considered whether an environmental NGO possessed sufficient standing to sue for remediation and protection of the affected environment. It held, in substance, that the appellant had sufficient interest in the environmental matter and recognised the importance of allowing appropriate public-interest environmental litigation.

The decision is significant for climate governance because standing is often a preliminary obstacle in environmental litigation. Climate harms are diffuse and may affect communities beyond the immediate location of an emitting activity. By adopting a more accommodating approach to standing in environmental matters, Centre for Oil Pollution Watch potentially provides a procedural foundation for NGOs and affected communities seeking enforcement of environmental obligations.

The case, however, should not be overstated. It did not establish a general constitutional right to a stable climate, nor did it interpret the Climate Change Act. Its contribution is procedural and environmental: it supports the possibility that public-interest organisations can approach the courts where legislation creates duties relating to environmental protection.

Taken together, Gbemre and Centre for Oil Pollution Watch demonstrate two important features of Nigerian environmental jurisprudence: substantive protection may be linked to fundamental rights, while procedural rules can be interpreted to facilitate legitimate public-interest environmental claims. These principles could become increasingly relevant as climate disputes become more common.

Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2019] 5 NWLR (Pt 1666) 518 (SC).

Critical Evaluation

The existence of the Climate Change Act represents substantial progress, but four problems limit its effectiveness: the translation of national targets into enforceable obligations, institutional fragmentation, limited climate litigation mechanisms and inadequate accountability for private actors.

First, carbon budgeting can be ineffective if national targets are not converted into measurable sectoral obligations. A national carbon budget provides a planning framework, but electricity generation, petroleum operations, transportation, agriculture, manufacturing and waste management produce emissions through different activities and require different regulatory techniques. Without clear sectoral targets and reliable measurement, it becomes difficult to determine which institution or private actor is responsible for a shortfall.

Second, climate governance is institutionally fragmented. The National Council on Climate Change has a coordinating role, but environmental regulation also involves federal ministries, NESREA and sector regulators. Energy regulation, petroleum operations, transportation, land administration and financial regulation each operate through separate institutions. Overlapping mandates can create uncertainty and weaken enforcement. Climate obligations should therefore be integrated into existing regulatory decisions rather than treated as an isolated environmental programme.

Third, the Act does not create a detailed standalone cause of action for every form of climate harm. This matters because climate litigation involves distinctive problems of causation, attribution and standing. A claimant may know that climate change contributed to flooding or heat-related harm but still face difficulty identifying which legal duty was breached by a particular defendant. Existing environmental torts, statutory duties and fundamental-rights procedures can provide remedies, but they were not designed specifically for cumulative global emissions.

Fourth, private-sector accountability requires greater precision. Companies may have climate-related obligations, but effective enforcement requires reliable emissions reporting, verification, disclosure and consequences for non-compliance. Climate regulation should not depend solely on voluntary corporate commitments.

A counterargument is that stronger regulation could increase compliance costs, discourage investment and undermine energy security in a country where millions of people still lack reliable access to electricity. This concern is legitimate. Climate law should not impose identical obligations on all sectors regardless of economic circumstances. A better approach is proportionate regulation: high-emitting and high-risk activities should face stronger obligations, while smaller businesses should receive incentives, technical support and phased compliance requirements.

Another counterargument is that Nigeria’s contribution to global greenhouse-gas emissions is relatively small compared with the largest emitters. That argument does not eliminate the legal case for domestic climate action. Nigeria has domestic reasons to regulate climate risks because flooding, coastal erosion, drought and other impacts affect Nigerian communities irrespective of the country’s relative share of global emissions. Moreover, climate governance can generate domestic benefits through cleaner air, renewable energy, energy efficiency and resilience.

The stronger legal position is therefore not that every climate objective should be judicially enforceable. Courts should respect institutional competence and the limits of judicial power. However, where legislation establishes a clear statutory duty, courts should be able to review whether public authorities have complied with it. Climate law should not become merely aspirational because its subject matter is scientifically complex.

Comparative Perspectives

Comparative experience demonstrates how courts can influence climate governance while remaining within constitutional and statutory boundaries.

The Netherlands: Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands

In Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld a judgment requiring the State to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by at least 25 percent by the end of 2020 compared with 1990 levels. The Court relied on human-rights obligations, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, and accepted that the State had a positive duty to protect persons against serious environmental risks.

Urgenda is persuasive rather than binding in Nigeria. Its importance lies in demonstrating that climate obligations can be judicially examined where they intersect with established rights and legal duties. Nigerian courts would not simply transplant the Dutch approach because Nigeria has a different constitutional structure and does not operate under the European Convention. Nevertheless, the reasoning supports the proposition that climate change can become a rights-based legal issue when the evidence establishes serious threats to protected interests.

Germany: Neubauer v Germany

In Neubauer v Germany, the German Federal Constitutional Court held in 2021 that parts of Germany’s climate legislation were unconstitutional because they insufficiently specified emissions reductions after 2030, thereby risking the disproportionate restriction of fundamental freedoms of younger generations in the future.^¹² The Court’s reasoning is significant for the principle of intergenerational justice: postponing difficult climate decisions can transfer an excessive burden to future generations.

For Nigeria, Neubauer suggests that climate legislation should contain sufficiently clear long-term pathways rather than leaving future governments with an undefined regulatory burden. This is particularly relevant where infrastructure decisions have long lifespans, such as power plants, transport systems and major industrial projects.

The comparative cases also reveal a limitation. Judicial intervention cannot replace democratic climate policy. Courts are better placed to enforce existing legal standards than to design detailed national energy policy. Nigeria should therefore provide sufficiently clear statutory standards so that courts can review legality without assuming the policy-making functions of the executive and legislature.

Comparative experience consequently supports a restrained but meaningful judicial role: courts should enforce clear statutory and constitutional duties, require lawful decision-making and protect rights, while leaving technical policy choices to competent institutions.

Comparative Perspectives

Comparative experience demonstrates how courts can influence climate governance while remaining within constitutional and statutory boundaries.

The Netherlands: Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands

Urgenda is persuasive rather than binding in Nigeria. Its importance lies in demonstrating that climate obligations can be judicially examined where they intersect with established rights and legal duties. Nigerian courts would not simply transplant the Dutch approach because Nigeria has a different constitutional structure and does not operate under the European Convention. Nevertheless, the reasoning supports the proposition that climate change can become a rights-based legal issue when the evidence establishes serious threats to protected interests.

Germany: Neubauer v Germany

For Nigeria, Neubauer suggests that climate legislation should contain sufficiently clear long-term pathways rather than leaving future governments with an undefined regulatory burden. This is particularly relevant where infrastructure decisions have long lifespans, such as power plants, transport systems and major industrial projects.

The comparative cases also reveal a limitation. Judicial intervention cannot replace democratic climate policy. Courts are better placed to enforce existing legal standards than to design detailed national energy policy. Nigeria should therefore provide sufficiently clear statutory standards so that courts can review legality without assuming the policy-making functions of the executive and legislature.

Comparative experience consequently supports a restrained but meaningful judicial role: courts should enforce clear statutory and constitutional duties, require lawful decision-making and protect rights, while leaving technical policy choices to competent institutions.

III. CONCLUSION

Climate change law has moved from the margins of Nigerian environmental regulation into an emerging field with consequences for constitutional rights, public administration, corporate responsibility and economic policy. The Climate Change Act 2021 provides a significant statutory foundation through the National Council on Climate Change, carbon budgeting, climate planning and climate-finance mechanisms. Yet the analysis demonstrates that the principal weakness is implementation rather than the complete absence of legislation.

Nigerian jurisprudence already provides useful building blocks. Gbemre demonstrates that serious environmental harm can engage fundamental rights, while Centre for Oil Pollution Watch shows that the courts can facilitate legitimate public-interest environmental litigation. Neither case creates a comprehensive climate cause of action, but both provide principles that may support future climate claims.

Nigeria should therefore strengthen the existing framework rather than rely on broad policy commitments. Carbon budgets should be translated into measurable sectoral targets; major emitters should face standardised reporting and verification duties; climate considerations should be integrated into environmental impact assessment and major infrastructure decisions; and regulators should coordinate their climate mandates. The law should also clarify avenues for judicial review and provide accessible remedies where statutory climate duties are breached.

Comparative experience from Urgenda and Neubauer demonstrates that courts can protect climate-related interests without replacing elected institutions. Nigeria can adopt the underlying principles while adapting them to its constitutional and developmental context. The central task is to make climate commitments legally meaningful, institutionally coordinated and practically enforceable. That is the point at which climate change law can develop from an emerging field into an effective instrument of environmental governance and intergenerational justice.

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Footnote(S):

Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and Others (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC), Suit No FHC/B/CS/53/05 (Federal High Court, Benin Division, 14 November 2005).

Climate Change Act 2021, s 1.

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), s 20.

Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992.

Climate Change Act 2021, ss 3–18.

ibid s 19.

ibid s 20.

ibid ss 21–24.

Gbemre (n 1).

Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2019] 5 NWLR (Pt 1666) 518 (SC).

State of the Netherlands v Stichting Urgenda, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Case No 19/00135 (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 December 2019).

Neubauer et al v Germany, 1 BvR 2656/18, 1 BvR 78/20, 1 BvR 96/20 and 1 BvR 288/20 (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 24 March 2021).

Bibliography

CASES

Centre for Oil Pollution Watch v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2019] 5 NWLR (Pt 1666) 518 (SC).

Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd and Others (2005) AHRLR 151 (NgHC).

Neubauer et al v Germany, 1 BvR 2656/18, 1 BvR 78/20, 1 BvR 96/20 and 1 BvR 288/20 (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 24 March 2021).

State of the Netherlands v Stichting Urgenda, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Case No 19/00135 (Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 December 2019).

LEGISLATION

Climate Change Act 2021.

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992.

National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency Act 2007.

INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS

Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016).

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994).

SECONDARY SOURCES

Louis J Kotzé, ‘Neubauer et versus Germany: Planetary Climate Litigation for the Anthropocene?’ (2021) 22 German Law Journal 1423.

Tobiloba Awotoye and Tawakaltu Queen Oyinloye, ‘Legal Framework for Climate Change and Climate Change Litigation in Nigeria’ (2024) 18(2) Jus & Justicia 83.