Home » Blog » Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 11, Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, decided 11 March 2015.

Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 11, Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, decided 11 March 2015.

Authored By: Biata Simpeh

London School Of Economics and Political Science

Introduction

This case is an appeal to the Supreme Court concerning medical transparency and risk. Dr McLennan was found to be negligent when it came to providing her patient, Mrs Montgomery, with the appropriate details concerning risk. This is a landmark case, as it provided significant changes to what constitutes a patient’s consent and what information they are entitled to.

Facts of the Case 

This case details the experience of Nadine Montgomery (the Appellant), her pregnancy and subsequent birth of her child, performed by Dr Dina McLellan, with the Respondents being Lanarkshire Health Board. In 1999, Montgomery was expecting her first child whilst also suffering from Diabetes Mellitus. With women who also suffer from the same condition, it is usual for the baby to be larger than usual, with weight tending to be concentrated in the shoulders of the baby. Because of this, Montgomery’s pregnancies were classified as high risk, and she was monitored by Dr McLellan, where she experienced both obstetric and diabetic care at Bellshill Maternity Hospital in Scotland. Described by Dr Phillip Owen, an expert witness, the phenomenon of shoulder dystocia is “a major obstetric emergency associated with a short-term and long-term neonatal and maternal morbidity [and] an associated neonatal mortality”[1] where the shoulders of the baby can not pass through the mother’s vagina without mechanical assistance.

When the labour was induced, labour became arrested after several hours. To ensure the baby could be delivered, a general anaesthetic was given to enable the Zavanelli manoeuvre (ie pushing the baby back into the uterus, to perform an emergency caesarean section). Dr McLellan was able to pull the baby’s head; the delivery was eventually completed at 5.57 pm. During the 12 minutes between the baby’s head appearing and the delivery, the umbilical cord was completely or partially occluded, depriving him of oxygen. This led to the baby being born with both cerebral palsy, affecting all four limbs and Erb’s palsy. Nadine Montgomery argued in court that Dr McLellan’s inability to inform Mrs Montgomery of the risk of shoulder dystocia was not the proper medical practice. This had already been brought to court. 

The claim was initially dismissed by Lord Bannatyne in the Outer House. Montgomery’s appeal was dismissed by the Inner House. She then appealed to the UK Supreme Court, where a seven-Justice panel unanimously allowed her appeal.

Legal Issues

Issue 1: Whether Dr McLellan was negligent in failing to advise Mrs Montgomery of the risk of shoulder dystocia and the possibility of delivering her child via caesarean section. 

Issue 2: Whether Mrs Montgomery would have chosen to have a caesarean section had she been advised of such a risk

Arguments presented

Montogomery

Her concerns about the baby should have resulted in a discussion surrounding risk

  • Montgomery sustained that she had made it clear to Dr McLallen that she had concerns about both the size of the baby as well as her ability to successfully deliver her child vaginally. Montgomery argues that despite this, information about shoulder dystocia was withheld from her, which had severe impacts on both her and her child. If she had considered that it was a significant risk to her, she would have asked the doctor to perform a caesarean section.

Sidaway did not apply to disclosure. 

  • In previous court stages, the Appellant applied Lord Scarman’s perspective to medical negligence, which relied less on the Bolam[2] test, where if the actions of doctors are found to be in line with professional medical opinion, they are considered not negligent. He argued that if “(1) the patient suffers damage, (2) as a result of an undisclosed risk, (3) which would have been disclosed by a doctor exercising reasonable care to respect her patient’s right to decide whether to incur the risk, and (4) the patient would have avoided the injury if the risk had been disclosed, then the patient will in principle have a cause of action based on negligence.”[3] or in other words, that there was a duty for a medical practioner, who was aware of the risks present in medical treatment to communicate such risk, which could have a detrimental impact on the patient, who was especially vulnerable in such a circumstance.. 

Lanarkshire Health Board

No duty to warn about risk since Montgomery had not asked a specific question

    • Lanarkshire Health Board argued that Dr McLellan’s decision not to warn Montgomery about shoulder dystocia was consistent with accepted medical practice. Since Montgomery had expressed general concerns about the size of her baby and whether she could deliver vaginally, rather than specifically asking, negligence did not occur on the part of Dr McLellan. 
    • Sidway was an important case in upholding the respondent’s defence, particularly Lord Diplock’s approach, which favoured the traditional application of the Bolam test.

The failure to warn itself did not directly cause any injury

    • If Dr McLellan had provided details about both the risk and allowed her to perform, Montgomery would have been told about the risks associated with caesarean section as well. The risk of a serious outcome from shoulder dystocia was very small. Dr McLellan would still have recommended vaginal delivery. Therefore, Montgomery would not necessarily have chosen a caesarean. If she had continued with vaginal delivery, the failure to warn would not have made a difference to the outcome.

Court Reasoning and Analysis

Interpretation of Law

  • The Court reflected on the aspects of common law which, although not explicitly related to medical negligence, were still relevant, such as the “respect for private life protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights”[4]. 

Application of precedents

  • The court considered Bolam v Friern Hospital[5], Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital[6], Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare[7].
  • Bolam v Friern Hospital[8]: Initially used to rule against Montgomery in previous court stages, use the use of the Bolam test was applied by the respondent, arguing that Dr McLennan had acted in accordance with  the professional medical opinion that there was not a significant risk to either Montgomery or her child, the same way it had been applied in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
  • Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital[9]: This case was referred to as the most credible application of the Bolam test and justification as to why the rulings against Montgomery had been credible. Since there was not a “substantial risk of grave adverse consequences”[10], Dr McLennan did not have a duty to disclose risks that had not explicitly been requested to elaborate on. This perspective was deemed “unsatisfactory”[11] by the Supreme Court, which argued that the application of the Bolam test in this context did not need to be perpetuated further, as it ignored not only the vulnerability of the patient, but also the need for them to be aware of any risk posed to them through medical interference due to their ”bodily integrity”[12].
  • Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare: This case involved a woman whose baby had not been delivered at term, with her obstetrician advising that the best thing to do was wait until “nature took its course”[13], which resulted in the baby dying in utero. The response of Lord Woolf that “ it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk”[14] was treated as the correct position by the Supreme Court, as it further upheld the principal idea that the adult has a right to knowledge about the risks that are involved with medical treatment. 

Evaluation of arguments

  • The Supreme Court rejected the Health Board’s argument that the doctor’s disclosure could simply be judged according to responsible medical opinion under Bolam. It also rejected the idea that doctors should decide what risks patients ought to know about. Instead, it accepted Montgomery’s argument that patients are entitled to make informed decisions about their own treatment. 
  • Using contemporary medical documents such as Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (2008), which emphasised the importance of the doctor explaining the full picture of medical care, including the risks and burdens of such treatment[15] , underlines the importance of informing the patient, which was neglected by Dr McLennan. 

Legal reasoning

  • The Court’s reasoning went from patient autonomy to recognition of the duty of the doctor to give adequate information (“material” risks and reasonable alternative treatments). Applying these principles to the facts, the Supreme Court argued that Montgomery should have been told of the material risk of shoulder dystocia and caesarean section as an alternative treatment. If she had been properly informed, she would have chosen a caesarean delivery, and her child would not have been injured. So the failure to provide adequate information was causally connected with the injury and Montgomery’s appeal was allowed.

Judgement and Ratio Decidendi

The Court concluded that if Montgomery had been educated about the risks of her delivery, she would most likely have chosen for her child to be delivered via caesarean section, where the baby would have been born unharmed. The appeal was ultimately accepted by the court, and Dr McLennan was found to be negligent. 

Doctors cannot decide for patients which risks are important enough to disclose based only on medical opinion. Patients must be given information about material risks and reasonable alternatives so that they can make an informed decision about their health.

Critical evaluation

The ruling made by the judges is significant as it now recognises the relationship dynamics between the medical professional and the patient that was not as deeply considered before. Under the Bolam test, the professional was treated as a wholly neutral individual who was always able to decide on the best outcome for their patient. However, under this test, the patient’s personal desires, such as long-term health, appearance or choice over the treatment itself, could not be taken into account effectively. With the conclusion that the Court reached, there can be collaborative effort between the patient and the professional that is not made from an entirely professional opinion. For example, Chester v Afshar[16], who was unaware of the impact that undergoing an elective surgery would have had on her, could not be provided with a lot more information to make a sound decision on whether to undergo the surgery or not. Although not directly applicable to pregnancy, through which delivery has to eventually occur, the very principle that this judgment establishes is widely applicable. The Court’s reasoning strongly protects patient autonomy. It recognised that patients have different values and priorities, meaning a doctor cannot always determine what information is important to a patient. A possible weakness is that the concept of a “reasonable person in the patient’s position” can be difficult to apply consistently due to the personal desires that can differ so greatly. Different patients may attach very different levels of significance to the same risk, so the reaction to a small risk may in fact become detrimental to a patient who could have otherwise been treated.

Conclusion

In the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, Dr McLellan was found negligent for not detailing the material risk that her patient would go through, as well as for not providing alternative treatments. This case showed that patient autonomy is central to informed consent. A doctor cannot rely solely on professional medical opinion to determine what risks should be disclosed; the patient has a right to make an informed decision about their own health. In future, there will be less reliance on the Bolam test, and rather a more pressing question to be asked would be whether or not a patient makes a reasonable decision and what the threshold for that is.

Bibliography

Table of Cases

Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582

Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134

Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] 1 AC 1430

Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR P 53

Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871

[1] Montgomery [2015] UKSC 11, [8}

[2] Ibid [41]

[3] Ibid [44]

[4] Ibid [80]

[5] Ibid [26]

[6] Ibid [40]

[7] Ibid [80]

[8] Ibid [26]

[9] Ibid [40]

[10] Ibid [52]

[11] Ibid [86]

[12] Ibid [87]

[13] Ibid [89]

[14] Ibid [64]

[15] Ibid [78]

[16] Ibid [37]

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top