Authored By: Mpolokeng Dludlu
1. Case Citation and Basic Information
Case: Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another
Citation: [2004] ZACC 17; 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC)
Court: Constitutional Court of South Africa
Date: 15 October 2004
Judgment: Langa DCJ, with Chaskalson CJ, Madala J, Mokgoro J, Moseneke J, O’Regan J, Sachs J, Skweyiya J, Van der Westhuizen J and Yacoob J concurring. Ngcobo J delivered a separate judgment.1
2. Introduction
Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others is a landmark Constitutional Court judgment concerning the relationship between customary law and constitutional rights in South Africa. The case challenged the customary-law rule of male primogeniture as it operated within the statutory system governing intestate succession. The Court was required to determine whether a succession system that preferred male heirs and excluded women and certain children was compatible with the Constitution. It also had to consider the constitutionality of the statutory framework that subjected African intestate estates to a separate succession regime.2
The judgment is significant because the Court affirmed that customary law is recognised within South Africa’s legal system but remains subject to constitutional supremacy. The Court therefore invalidated the discriminatory succession regime while providing an interim framework for affected estates.3
3. Facts of the Case
The Bhe matter concerned the estate of Vuyo Elius Mgolombane, who died intestate in October 2002. He had lived with Nontupheko Maretha Bhe from approximately 1990, and they had two daughters, Nonkululeko and Anelisa. The family lived in an informal dwelling in Khayelitsha and was economically disadvantaged. The deceased had obtained a housing subsidy, purchased the property on which the family lived and acquired building materials for a permanent home, but died before construction was completed. He supported Ms Bhe and the children, who were dependent upon him.4
After Mgolombane’s death, the Khayelitsha Magistrate appointed his father, Maboyisi Nelson Mgolombane, as representative and sole heir of the estate. This occurred under section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the regulations made under it. The two daughters were consequently prevented from inheriting their father’s estate. Mgolombane’s father indicated that he intended to sell the immovable property to meet funeral expenses. Ms Bhe feared that this would leave her and the children without their home and challenged the administration of the estate.5
The matters were heard together with Shibi v Sithole and the application brought by the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women’s Legal Centre Trust. In Shibi, Charlotte Shibi was excluded from inheriting her deceased brother’s estate because the customary-law rule of male primogeniture preferred male relatives. The consolidated matters therefore raised a broader constitutional challenge to the statutory and customary-law succession regime.6
4. Legal Issues
The principal issues before the Constitutional Court were whether section 23 of the Black Administration Act and the regulations made under it were constitutionally valid, and whether the customary-law rule of male primogeniture was constitutionally valid in the context of intestate succession.7
The Court also had to determine whether the succession regime infringed the constitutional rights to equality and human dignity, whether the exclusion of the minor children was compatible with the constitutional protection afforded to children, and what remedy would be appropriate if the impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional.8
5. Arguments Presented
5.1 Applicants’ Arguments
The applicants challenged the statutory framework and the customary-law rule of male primogeniture. They argued that regulation 2(e), read with section 23 of the Black Administration Act, gave legal effect to customary rules that preferred male heirs and excluded women and certain children from intestate succession. They relied particularly on the constitutional rights to equality and dignity and on the protection afforded to children.9
The applicants argued that the discrimination was not merely an incidental consequence of succession but was inherent in male primogeniture. In Bhe, the deceased’s daughters were excluded from inheriting while their grandfather became the sole heir. In Shibi, a male cousin inherited instead of the deceased’s surviving sister. The applicants therefore argued that the succession regime entrenched unequal treatment based on sex and gender.10
The applicants further challenged the separate statutory regime applicable to African estates. They argued that constitutional recognition of customary law did not protect rules that were inconsistent with the Constitution. They therefore sought a remedy addressing the wider statutory framework rather than relief limited to the individual estates.11
5.2 Respondents and Other Participants
There was no substantial opposing constitutional argument from the State. The Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development supported confirmation of the High Court orders. The deceased’s father in Bhe did not make submissions before the Constitutional Court, and the respondents in Shibi likewise did not make submissions. The Commission for Gender Equality participated as amicus curiae and supported the constitutional challenge.12
6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by recognising that customary law forms part of South Africa’s legal system but is subject to the Constitution. Sections 30, 31, 39(2) and 211 recognise customary law while requiring courts to interpret and develop law consistently with constitutional values. The Court therefore did not approach customary law as either automatically valid or inferior to common law. Instead, the relevant customary rule had to be tested against the Constitution.13
The Court then examined the operation of male primogeniture. The rule preferred male heirs and excluded women from inheriting in circumstances in which male relatives would inherit. In Bhe, the deceased’s daughters were prevented from inheriting their father’s estate, while in Shibi a male cousin inherited instead of the deceased’s sister. The Court regarded the discrimination as inherent in the rule itself.14
The Court connected this discrimination to human dignity. The succession system reinforced the position that women were subordinate to men and denied them equal recognition in relation to family property. The consequences were particularly serious in Bhe, where the exclusion of the daughters placed the family’s home at risk. The Court therefore considered the practical consequences of the rule alongside the formal distinction created by the succession system.15
The Court also considered the position of children. The two daughters were minors and dependent upon their deceased father. Their exclusion demonstrated that the succession system could produce serious consequences for vulnerable children. The Court considered these consequences together with the constitutional requirements of equality and dignity.16
Finally, the Court examined the statutory framework. Section 23 of the Black Administration Act and its regulations created a separate system for the administration and distribution of certain African estates, while section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act excluded estates governed by section 23 from that Act. The Court concluded that the statutory system could not be separated from the discriminatory succession rules it enforced.17
7. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
The Constitutional Court declared section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. It also declared the Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks invalid and declared section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. The Court further declared the rule of male primogeniture, as it applied in customary law to the inheritance of property, inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it excluded or hindered women and extra-marital children from inheriting property.18
The Court ordered that section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act would apply to intestate estates that had previously been governed by section 23 of the Black Administration Act, subject to specific provisions dealing with estates involving more than one spouse. In the Bhe estate, the Court declared Nonkululeko and Anelisa Bhe the sole heirs. In Shibi, Charlotte Shibi was declared the sole heir.19
The ratio decidendi was that male primogeniture, insofar as it excluded or hindered women and extra-marital children from inheriting property, was inconsistent with the Constitution, particularly the rights to equality and dignity. The statutory framework that gave effect to this discriminatory succession system was consequently also unconstitutional.20
The judgment did not invalidate customary law as a whole. Rather, it established that customary law must operate within the constitutional framework. The application of the Intestate Succession Act was a remedial measure designed to prevent a legal vacuum and provide an immediate framework for affected estates; it was not itself the ratio decidendi.21
8. Critical Analysis
The strength of Bhe lies in its recognition that the constitutional problem extended beyond an individual inheritance dispute. The rule of male primogeniture disadvantaged women and children, while the statutory framework gave the rule formal legal and administrative effect. By addressing both dimensions, the Court recognised that the inequality was structural rather than merely the result of the conduct of an individual heir.22
The Court’s treatment of equality and dignity is particularly persuasive. Inheritance was not treated as an abstract allocation of property. The Court considered the consequences for vulnerable family members, including the risk that Ms Bhe and her daughters could lose their home. The judgment therefore illustrates how formal succession rules can have broader consequences for dignity, family security and substantive equality.23
The judgment is also significant because the Court did not reject customary law simply because it differed from common law. Instead, it affirmed the constitutional recognition of customary law while making clear that customary rules remain subject to constitutional rights. This approach preserves the legal status of customary law while preventing customary recognition from becoming a justification for discrimination.24
The principal area for criticism concerns the remedy. The Court selected the Intestate Succession Act as an interim framework after invalidating the discriminatory regime. This provided an immediate and workable solution, but it did not itself constitute a permanent development of a constitutionally compliant customary succession system. The judgment therefore left an important question for Parliament: how should customary succession be developed after discriminatory rules have been removed while retaining the constitutional recognition of customary law?25
An alternative approach would have been to develop the relevant customary succession rules more directly in accordance with section 39(2), while removing the discriminatory element. Ngcobo J’s separate judgment illustrates this alternative judicial approach and emphasises the possibility of developing customary law rather than simply invalidating the offending rule.26
This disagreement is important because it highlights a continuing tension between constitutional transformation, judicial intervention and the preservation and development of customary law.
Overall, Bhe was constitutionally significant because it established that cultural recognition cannot justify legally enforced inequality. Its strongest contribution was to affirm that customary law has a legitimate place within South Africa’s plural legal system while remaining subject to constitutional supremacy. Its limitation is that the immediate remedial solution did not settle the longer-term question of how a constitutionally compliant system of customary succession should be developed.
9. Conclusion
Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others is a foundational Constitutional Court judgment concerning the relationship between customary law and constitutional rights in South Africa. The Court confirmed that customary law is recognised within the South African legal system, but that recognition does not place customary rules beyond constitutional scrutiny. Male primogeniture, when applied in a manner that excluded or hindered women and extra-marital children from inheriting property, was therefore incompatible with the Constitution.27
The importance of the judgment lies in the Court’s recognition that the problem extended beyond the individual estates before it. The statutory framework created a separate system for African estates and gave administrative effect to the relevant customary succession rules. The Court therefore invalidated both the discriminatory rule and the statutory machinery through which it operated.28
The judgment demonstrates that customary law and constitutional rights need not be treated as mutually exclusive. The Court did not reject customary law as a whole; it required customary law to operate consistently with the Constitution. The interim application of the Intestate Succession Act provided immediate protection while leaving the development of a permanent framework to the legislature.29
Ultimately, Bhe should be understood not as a rejection of customary law, but as a rejection of legally enforced inequality. Its lasting significance lies in establishing that customary law can retain its place within South Africa’s plural legal system only within the framework of constitutional equality, dignity and human rights.
Reference(S):
Cases
Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others [2004] ZACC 17, 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
Legislation
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (repealed).
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.
Regulations for the Administration and Distribution of Estates of Deceased Blacks, GN R200, Government Gazette 10601, 6 February 1987.
Secondary Sources
Knoetze E and Olivier M, ‘To Develop or Not to Develop the Customary Law: That is the Question in Bhe’ (2005) 26(1) Obiter 1.
Grant E, ‘Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Customary Law in South Africa’ (2006) 50(1) Journal of African Law 2.
Footnote(S):
1 Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others [2004] ZACC 17, 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (‘Bhe’) para 136. The official Constitutional Court record identifies Langa DCJ as author of the majority judgment and Ngcobo J as author of the separate judgment.
2 Bhe (n 1) paras 1–7. SAFLII: Bhe judgment
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 2, 30, 31, 39(2) and 211; Bhe (n 1) paras 53–65.
4 Bhe (n 1) paras 10–14. SAFLII: Bhe judgment
5 Bhe (n 1) paras 15–20.
6 Bhe (n 1) paras 5–7, 21–28.
7 Bhe (n 1) paras 1–3.
8 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 9, 10 and 28; Bhe (n 1) paras 53–65.
9 Bhe (n 1) paras 30–34, 46–52.
10 Bhe (n 1) paras 88–92, 97–104.
11 Bhe (n 1) paras 30–34, 53–65.
12 Bhe (n 1) paras 20, 28; see also para 11 regarding the Commission for Gender Equality.
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 30, 31, 39(2) and 211; Bhe (n 1) paras 53–65.
14 Bhe (n 1) paras 88–92 and 176–177.
15 Bhe (n 1) paras 90–95, 100–104.
16 Bhe (n 1) paras 96–104.
17 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 s 23; Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 s 1(4)(b); Bhe (n 1) paras 1–3, 35–45. The Black Administration Act is now repealed.
18 Bhe (n 1) para 136(2)–(5).
19 Bhe (n 1) para 136(6)–(11).
20 Bhe (n 1) paras 90–104, 156–170.
21 Bhe (n 1) paras 131–136.
22 Bhe (n 1) paras 156–170.
23 Bhe (n 1) paras 90–104.
24 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ss 30, 31, 39(2) and 211; Bhe (n 1) paras 53–65.
25 Bhe (n 1) paras 124–136.
26 Bhe (n 1) Ngcobo J, paras 137–176. See also Elmarie Knoetze and Morné Olivier, ‘To Develop or Not to Develop the Customary Law: That is the Question in Bhe’ (2005) 26(1) Obiter 1. The article specifically discusses the majority’s decision not to develop the offending customary rule under s 39(2) and Ngcobo J’s alternative approach.
27 Bhe (n 1) para 136(4).
28 Bhe (n 1) paras 1–3, 136(2)–(5).
29 Bhe (n 1) paras 131–136.

