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Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo

Authored By: Abdullateef Ayodeji Ogunmuyiwa

Univeristy Of Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria

CASE CITATION AND BASIC INFORMATION

  • Case: Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo

  • Citation: (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305 (SC)

  • Court: Supreme Court of Nigeria, on appeal from the Court of Appeal

  • Bench: Obaseki JSC (presided and read the lead judgment), Nnamani JSC, Karibi-Whyte JSC, Belgore JSC, Agbaje JSC, Craig JSC

  • Parties: Savannah Bank and David Oni Orisan (defendants in the original action) as the appellants, and Ammel O Ajilo and Ammels Photo Industries Ltd (plaintiffs in the original action) as the respondents.

INTRODUCTION

The decision in Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd & Anor v Ajilo & Anor (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305 is an important authority on the interpretation and application of the Land Use Act 1978, particularly the relationship between sections 22 and 34 of the Act. The case arose from a dispute over whether a holder of a right of occupancy deemed to have been granted under section 34(2) was required to obtain the Governor’s consent before mortgaging or otherwise transferring his interest in the land. The Supreme Court was therefore required to determine whether the consent requirement in section 22 applied only to rights of occupancy actually granted by the Governor or also extended to deemed grants arising from interests in land that existed before the commencement of the Act.¹

In resolving this question, the Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of the Act and held that a deemed grant carries the same legal consequences as an actual grant. The Court further relied on a reading of the Land Use Act as a whole and considered the purpose of the legislation in determining the scope of section 22. The decision has remained significant in Nigerian land law because it established that holders of deemed rights of occupancy are subject to the Governor’s consent requirement when dealing with their interests in land.²

FACTS OF THE CASE

The background to this action is that the first respondent held land situated at the Mushin area of Lagos, by a deed of conveyance dated 23 June 1965, which he purchased and held before the commencement of the Land Use Act 1978. His right of occupancy was not granted by the Governor, but, pursuant to section 34(2) of the Act, the first respondent’s right of occupancy was deemed granted.³

The first respondent was the managing director of the second respondent company. The first respondent mortgaged the land, by a deed of mortgage dated 5 September 1980, as collateral for a loan to the second respondent company, to the first appellant (Savannah Bank). The first respondent defaulted on the loan. The first appellant then instructed the second appellant, an auctioneer, to sell the property in order to recover the loan sum, under the power of sale. The second appellant, in following this instruction, published an Auction Notice, which came to the notice of the first respondent. The first respondent then filed an action at the High Court of Lagos seeking to stop the sale of the property. The reliefs sought by the respondents in this suit were a declaration that the mortgage was void ab initio for failing to seek the consent of the Governor as required by section 22 of the Act, and a perpetual injunction restraining the sale, or any other dealings, of the land, by the appellants.⁴

The trial court agreed with this view and held that the mortgage transaction was void ab initio for failing to seek the consent required by the Act. On appeal, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with the trial court by reiterating that the learned judge’s judgment was unassailable, and so the appeal was dismissed. The appellants then brought the case before the Supreme Court for determination.⁵

LEGAL ISSUES

The Supreme Court identified and addressed the following legal issue:

Whether a person deemed to be a holder of the right of occupancy, pursuant to section 34(2) of the Land Use Act, requires, solely by virtue of this fact, the consent of the Governor before he can transfer, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of his interest in the right of occupancy.⁶

ARGUMENTS

Appellants’ Arguments

The main contention of the appellants was that the consent of the Governor, in writing, being a prerequisite to any valid transaction involving land only pertains to statutory right of occupancy granted by the Governor, and not to land vested in the holder of a statutory right of occupancy deemed issued to him by the Governor by virtue of the title to the land, and vested in him prior to the commencement of the Land Use Act and section 34(2) of the Act.⁷

Counsel to the appellants also invoked the presumption against implied repeal, relying on the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Decree” in section 1, then referred to the state of land in the country before the Land Use Act, and on the book Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 1st edn p 317, which, according to him, emphasized that laws should not be subject to casual change, and argued that pre-existing laws (Common law, statute law, or customary law) could not be taken to have overridden absent express words to that effect.⁸

Counsel further submitted that sections 34(7)–(8) and 36(5), which impose their own express consent and prohibition requirements on land transfer or subdivision, would be rendered a tautology if section 22 already governed deemed right holders of a right of occupancy. On this basis, he argued that sections 34(7)–(8) and 36(5), being special provisions, should not be read as subsumed within the general terms of section 22.⁹

Respondent’s Arguments

On the other hand, the main contention of the respondents was that the consent of the Governor, in writing, is a prerequisite to any valid transaction pertaining to the mortgaged property. It was submitted that the key to the proper interpretation of section 22 is not to be found in section 39 of the Act, but rather through a reading of the Act as a whole against the general intention of the policy behind the promulgation of the Act and the purposes and objectives for which the Act was designed, of which the broad interpretation is that section 22 applies both to the holder of certificate of occupancy actually granted by the Governor and deemed holders of certificates by virtue of section 34(2) of the Act.¹⁰

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court unanimously determined the appeal against the appellants.¹¹

In the leading judgment delivered by Obaseki JSC, the Court acknowledged the distinction between a deemed grant and an actual grant, but held that both carry identical legal incidents.¹²

It was held that a deemed grant is to be treated as a grant made by the Governor with all the attendant consequences, and subject to the provisions in the Act for the control by the Governor of the use and transfer of the right.¹³

It was held that to ascertain the correct interpretation of the provision of section 34(2) vis-à-vis that of section 22 of the Act, the Land Use Act is to be read as a whole, and every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context of other clauses of the Act to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute, citing the cases of Lincoln’s College (1595) and Canada Sugar Refining Co Ltd v R (1898).¹⁴

The Court also held that a statute should not be given a construction that will defeat its purpose, and, if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, the construction that must be avoided is that which would reduce the legislation to futility, and rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that the legislature would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result, citing the case of Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014.¹⁵

The Court held that the purpose of the Land Use Act is apparent from its provisions, which confer the ownership, administration, and control of land on the Governor, while limiting the rights of existing landholders by making the Governor’s consent necessary for land transactions. These provisions indicate a clear legislative intention to alter or override pre-existing rights in land.¹⁶

The Court further held that the wording of section 34(7) was not tautologous. Rather, section 22 appears to regulate interests created after the commencement of the Act, while sections 34(7)–(8) are concerned with interests arising from property that existed before the Act came into force but were inconsistent with its provisions.¹⁷

DECISION

The appeal was unanimously dismissed with N500 costs to the respondents.¹⁸

The dismissal of the appeal thereby affirms the trial court’s declaration that the legal mortgage was void ab initio, and its injunction restraining the sale perpetually.¹⁹

RATIO DECIDENDI

A right of occupancy deemed granted under section 34(2) is treated as one actually granted by the Governor. Before concluding any transaction dealing with the land, such a holder must first secure the consent of the Governor under section 22. Failure to do so renders such a transaction void ab initio.²⁰

SIGNIFICANCE

Before the instant case, it was unsettled whether deemed holders of right of occupancy under section 34 of the Land Use Act required the consent of the Governor under section 22, as is the case with actual grantees of right of occupancy. However, it became settled law in this case that deemed and actual holders of right of occupancy carry the same legal incidents, effectively bringing every urban landholder with a vested interest before 1978 within the consent regime of the Land Use Act.²¹

One of the implications of this case was that lenders now had to verify from landholders purporting to use their property to secure loans and advances that such landholders had obtained the consent of the Governor for the transaction. This, in turn, raised the cost of transactions in terms of money and time.²²

In subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, such as Ayodele Ilori & 3 ors v Alhaja Risikat Ishola (2018), issues concerning the operation of the Governor’s consent requirement have been considered in different factual circumstances. However, Savannah Bank v Ajilo has not been overturned, and the Act has not been amended.²³

The Court’s distinction between the two sets of provisions strengthens its reasoning because it shows that s 22 applies to interests created after the Act came into force, while ss 34(7)–(8) apply to existing interests that conflict with the Act. This allowed the Court to give s 22 a broad meaning without making ss 34(7)–(8) unnecessary. Had the Court accepted the appellants’ narrower interpretation of s 22, the consent requirement would have applied to fewer interests than the Act intended.²⁴

This decision, however, left no room for equity, creating a structural weakness vulnerable to exploitation.²⁵

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd & Anor v Ajilo & Anor established that a deemed right of occupancy under section 34(2) carries the same legal consequences as an actual grant. Therefore, the holder must obtain the Governor’s consent under section 22 before dealing with the interest, or the transaction will be void ab initio. The Court’s broad interpretation gave effect to the purpose of the Land Use Act and preserved the distinct roles of sections 22 and 34. However, the strict application of the consent requirement has also created practical difficulties for landowners and lenders and leaves little room for equitable considerations.²⁶

FOOTNOTE(S):

  1. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305 (SC).

  2. ibid.

  3. Land Use Act 1978, s 34(2); Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  4. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  5. ibid.

  6. ibid.

  7. ibid.

  8. F Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (1st edn, Butterworths 1984) 317; Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  9. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  10. ibid.

  11. ibid.

  12. ibid.

  13. ibid.

  14. ibid; Lincoln’s College Case (1595) 3 Co Rep 58a; Canada Sugar Refining Co Ltd v R [1898] AC 735 (PC).

  15. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1); Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 (HL).

  16. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  17. ibid.

  18. ibid.

  19. ibid.

  20. ibid.

  21. ibid.

  22. Land Use Act 1978, s 22; Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  23. Ilori v Ishola (2018) 36 WRN 1 (SC); Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  24. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

  25. This is an evaluative observation concerning the practical effect of the decision rather than a proposition expressly stated by the Supreme Court.

  26. Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (n 1).

REFERENCE(S):

Cases

Canada Sugar Refining Co Ltd v R [1898] AC 735 (PC)

Ilori v Ishola (2018) 36 WRN 1 (SC)

Lincoln’s College Case (1595) 3 Co Rep 58a

Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd [1940] AC 1014 (HL)

Savannah Bank (Nig) Ltd v Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt 97) 305 (SC)

Legislation

Land Use Act 1978

Books

Bennion F, Statutory Interpretation (1st edn, Butterworths 1984)

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