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1. Case citation and Basic Information
Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment), High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts), delivered on 23 July 2026, by Githua J.
2. Introduction
The judgement arose in one of the most watched criminal cases in Kenya. The former governor of Migori County Zachariah Obado together with two other accused were charged with the murder of Sharon Otieno in May 2018.[1] The proceedings lasted almost eight years, with three judges conducting the case prior to Githua J giving her verdict.[2] This is a significant decision because the prosecution relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence as no witnesses saw the crime being committed. The case focuses on how Kenyan courts apply the doctrine of common intention in terms of making a principal culpable for a murder they did not personally commit.
3. Facts of the case
Sharon Belyne Otieno, a second year university student, was in an intimate affair with Zacharia Obado, the Governor of Migori County at the time in November 2017.[3] She got pregnant in early 2018 and the first accused tried to force her to terminate the pregnancy, but she declined and kept it.[4] After which, the Governor stopped supporting her financially and Sharon sought help from an acquaintance, Mr Lawrence Obonyo Owuor. He then introduced her to a journalist who was willing to report her case in order to apply pressure on the Governor to give Sharon the attention she wanted.[5]
The first accused then met the journalist and Mr Owuor, admitted the affair and pregnancy. He told him that all future correspondence should be done through his personal assistant, the second accused, Michael Juma Oyamo.[6] Over the following weeks, the second accused made payments to Sharon following orders of the first accused. He also fraudulently obtained a mobile line using stolen identity and using a third party’s mobile money line to conceal his communication.[7]
The second accused organized a meeting between himself, Sharon, and the journalist at a hotel in Rongo on 3rd September 2018. The vehicle used belonged to the third accused’s wife. Later, Sharon and the journalist were led into the vehicle where two unidentified persons joined them and interrogated them on their association with the first accused.[8] The journalist was assaulted but managed to escape the ordeal after jumping out of the moving vehicle. He immediately informed the authorities about his kidnapping.[9] Unfortunately, Sharon’s body was found the next day along with that of her unborn child. A post-mortem revealed that she was killed through stabbing and manual strangulation. The fatal stab wound also claimed the life of her twenty-eight-week-old Foetus.[10]
Investigations linked the vehicle, phone records, and a car-tracking device disabled that day to the three accused, while DNA confirmed the first accused as the unborn child’s father.[11] Additionally, the second accused made a fake report regarding his kidnapping and obtained fake medical reports with the third accused’s assistance.[12] They were charged with two counts of murder. On the ruling dated 30th January 2025, the court had acquitted them of Count 2 (unborn baby)[13], leaving Count 1 which the judgement delivered on 23 July 2026 resolves.
4. Legal Issues
Issue 1: Whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of Sharon was caused by an unlawful act.
Issue 2: Whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence that the three accused were involved in the murder of Sharon.
Issue 3: Whether the common intention doctrine is applicable to the first accused, despite being physically absent during the time of the crime.
5. Arguments Presented
5.1 The Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution’s case relied on the principle of common intention based on section 21 of the Penal Code.[14] It suggested that the three accused jointly planned and executed the crime together and playing certain roles in Sharon’s abduction and killing. The role of the first accused, who was motivated to end the relationship in order to prevent damage while the second accused, organized the fatal meeting and blocked his communications. Lastly, the third accused switched off the tracking system in the car and helped to create a false alibi.[15] The prosecution argued that, taken together, these circumstances pointed to the guilt of all three accused, despite no witness having seen the killing.
5.2 The Defence Case
The accused persons all denied their involvement in the murder of Sharon and argued that the case of evidence built against them was insufficient. The first accused argued that the act of impregnating a consenting adult is not illegal, that he had been supporting Sharon financially. He added that the affair was widely known and therefore lacked motive for murder since there was nothing to hide. Additionally, he was in Nairobi, not Migori when the alleged crime took place.[16] The second accused was a messenger and gave alternative explanations to the mobile line and mobile money transactions that the prosecution treated as concealment of evidence. Further, he called an expert witness to challenge the journalist’s narrative of jumping out of a moving vehicle.[17] Lastly, the third accused denied all personal interaction with Sharon and fabricating medical records.[18] Counsel for all three jointly accused argued that inconsistencies from two of the main prosecution witnesses prove that their testimonies were unreliable and should be excluded completely.[19]
6. Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
First, the court set out the elements of murder as stipulated in Anthony Ndegwa Ngari v Republic. These include the death of the deceased, causation by an unlawful act and the accused acting with malice aforethought.[20] Applying the reasoning in Miller v Minister of Pensions, the court found that Sharon’s death and its unlawfulness was firmly established beyond reasonable doubt by the pathologist’s evidence.[21]
Therefore, the main issue to be resolved was whether the accused had acted with malice aforethought. The prosecution could only answer this by relying on circumstantial evidence. the use of circumstantial evidence as there were no direct witnesses to the crime. In doing so, the court applied the test set out in Republic v Ahmad Abdolfadhi Mohammed & another and Sawe v Republic. The test requires circumstantial evidence to lead to a chain so complete that only guilt can explain it.[22] The court also reiterated the reasoning in Libambula v Republic and Robert Onchiri Ogeto v Republic that proof of motive for the murder is not an essential element of murder.[23] In this case, there was a strong motive. The first accused’s political status and reputation would have been ruined had his relationship with the deceased come to light.
On liability, the court adopted the doctrine of common intention under Section 21 of the Penal Code as elucidated in Njoroge v Republic.[24] This doctrine provides that there is no need for an express agreement. It can be established from the parties’ conduct, presence and participation prior to, during and after the crime. Consequently, the court found that the first accused supplied the motive, instigation and funds for the crime. On the other hand, the second accused executed the crime by luring Sharon into the car. Lastly, the third accused assisted in the logistics of the crime, which included disabling the tracking system and help in creating a false alibi.[25] The first accused’s alibi of being in Nairobi was insufficient to absolve him of liability.[26] Common intention liability extends to everyone who participates in committing the offence not just the individual who physically executes the act.
Finally, the court addressed the contradictions between the two prosecution witnesses as far as minor aspects of the case are concerned. Based on Erick Onyango Ondeng’ v Republic and Richard Munene v Republic, only contradictions that touch the fundamentals of a case are fatal.[27] The inconsistencies in this case were immaterial as both the witnesses converged on the decisive point and that the second accused was with Sharon just before her death.
7. Judgement and Ratio Decidendi
The Court found the three accused guilty of murder after finding that the prosecution had proved their case beyond reasonable doubt. Sentencing was reserved pending a pre-sentence and victim impact report.[28] The ratio decidendi is that under the doctrine of common intention, an accused is still liable for murder despite not personally executing it or being present at the crime scene. Liability arises where the individuals have a common unlawful purpose and the crime is an inevitable result of this common purpose. Further, the Court held that circumstantial evidence may sustain a murder conviction where it forms a complete chain leading only to the accused’s guilt.
8. Critical Analysis
8.1 Significance of the Decision
This judgment is significant as it involves the first conviction of a former Kenyan county governor for murder. Additionally, it demonstrates that common intention liability applies to a principal who orchestrates a killing entirely through intermediaries without ever being physically present at the crime scene. It also offers a detailed, modern application of Kenya’s circumstantial evidence doctrine to a case. Rather than strictly relying on traditional physical evidence, the case was built on digital and forensic evidence such as phone records, DNA, and vehicle tracking data.
8.2 Implications and Impact
This conviction demonstrates judicial readiness to hold influential public figures liable through derivative liability doctrines, even in the absence of direct evidence. For Sharon’s family, it marks the end of eight years of waiting for a verdict although sentencing remains pending.[29] It also illustrates how difficult it can be to apply the court’s previous decision regarding the born-alive principle. This is because the killing of Sharon’s unborn child cannot be treated as murder and also no charge was brought against the suspect under section 228 of the Penal Code.[30] Despite occurring in the same act, that death was completely disregarded in this judgement.
8.3 Critical Evaluation
The judgment considers circumstantial evidence in a thorough and systematic way. It analyzes each piece of evidence in detail before determining their cumulative effect. Additionally, its application of the rule of contradiction in view of inconsistencies between two key witnesses is well reasoned. Moreover, the judgment carefully applied the common intention doctrine to the established facts rather than relying on mere assertions.
Nonetheless, a conviction based on only circumstantial evidence for a crime of such magnitude will certainly attract judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny would focus mainly on whether the inference drawn has ruled out all other reasonable hypothesis. The eight-year trial duration, involving 3 judges and 16 interlocutory applications raises a fair-trial issue which the judgement is silent on. Most importantly, Baby Sharon’s death remains legally unaccounted for. This is a gap the court itself criticized at the no-case-to-answer level but neither the prosecution nor this judgment addressed it.
9. Conclusion
This judgement convicted a former governor and his two accomplices of murder based on circumstantial evidence and the common intention doctrine. What emerges clearly from this judgement is that it does not matter whether an accused was physically present at the crime scene. The evidence just needs to establish a shared unlawful purpose among all those involved. It is the contemporary and precise manner in which the principles of circumstantial evidence have been applied to digital and forensic evidence in this judgement that makes it highly relevant. Nonetheless, sentencing remains pending and any subsequent appeal will likely test the existence of a complete circumstantial chain that excludes all other explanations besides guilt. Additionally, the killing of Sharon’s unborn child remains unresolved. This illustrates how a charging gap identified at the beginning of a case can remain unaddressed until the end.
Reference(S):
Cases
Anthony Ndegwa Ngari v Republic [2014] KLR.
Erick Onyango Ondeng’ v Republic [2014] KLR.
Libambula v Republic [2003] KLR 683.
Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372.
Njoroge v Republic [1983] KLR 197.
Republic v Ahmad Abdolfadhi Mohammed & another [2019] KESC 48 (KLR).
Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2025] KEHC 2436 (KLR) (Crim) (30 January 2025) (Ruling).
Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment).
Robert Onchiri Ogeto v Republic KECA 148 (KLR).
Sawe v Republic [2003] KLR 364.
Statute
Penal Code (Cap 63)
Secondary sources
‘Guilty as Charged: Obado Co-accused Convicted in Sharon Otieno Murder’ The Standard (23 July 2026) https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001553566/guilty-as-charged-obado-co-accused-convicted-in-sharon-otieno-murder
‘Sharon Otieno Murder Case: Obado, Co-accused Placed in Police Custody as Bond Cancelled after Conviction’ Citizen Digital (23 July 2026) https://citizen.digital/article/sharon-otieno-murder-case-obado-co-accused-placed-in-police-custody-as-bond-cancelled-after-conviction-n386985
[1] Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [1]-[3], [11].
[2] ibid [4]-[7].
[3] ibid [11], [70].
[4] ibid [12]-[13].
[5] ibid [14]-[16].
[6] ibid [17]-[20].
[7] ibid [21]-[24], [27]-[28], [156]-[160].
[8] ibid [31]-[35].
[9] ibid [36]-[39].
[10] ibid [54], [56]-[57].
[11] ibid [41], [60]-[65].
[12] ibid [49]-[53], [204]-[206].
[13] Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2025] KEHC 2436 (KLR) (Crim) (30 January 2025) (Ruling).
[14] Penal Code (Cap 63) s 21.
[15] Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [8]-[9], [216].
[16] ibid [70]-[75].
[17] ibid [76]-[91].
[18] ibid [92]-[94].
[19] ibid [177].
[20] Anthony Ndegwa Ngari v Republic [2014] KLR, applied in Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [99].
[21] Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372, applied in Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [105], [109]-[115].
[22] Republic v Ahmad Abdolfadhi Mohammed & another [2019] KESC 48 (KLR); Sawe v Republic [2003] KLR 364, both applied in Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [121]-[123].
[23] Libambula v Republic [2003] KLR 683; Robert Onchiri Ogeto v Republic KECA 148 (KLR), applied in Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [128]-[131], [151].
[24] Njoroge v Republic [1983] KLR 197, applied in Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [132]-[135].
[25] Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [151]-[153], [164]-[165], [201]-[210], [216].
[26] ibid [217].
[27] Erick Onyango Ondeng’ v Republic [2014] KLR; Richard Munene v Republic [2018] KECA 186, applied in Republic v Obado & 2 others (Criminal Case 46 of 2018) [2026] KEHC 11351 (KLR) (Crim) (23 July 2026) (Judgment) [179]-[189].
[28] ‘Sharon Otieno Murder Case: Obado, Co-accused Placed in Police Custody as Bond Cancelled after Conviction’ Citizen Digital (23 July 2026) https://citizen.digital/article/sharon-otieno-murder-case-obado-co-accused-placed-in-police-custody-as-bond-cancelled-after-conviction-n386985
[29] ‘Guilty as Charged: Obado Co-accused Convicted in Sharon Otieno Murder’ The Standard (23 July 2026) https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001553566/guilty-as-charged-obado-co-accused-convicted-in-sharon-otieno-murder.
[30] Penal Code (Cap 63) s 228.

