Reform Without Reach: Indonesia’s Four-Decade Lesson for Nigeria’s 2025 Tax Reform Acts

Introduction

A group of four laws, the Nigeria Tax Act, the Nigeria Tax Administration Act, the Nigeria Revenue Service (Establishment) Act and the Joint Revenue Board (Establishment) Act, were passed by Nigeria’s National Assembly in June 2025 and dubbed by the federal government the “most comprehensive and radical reforms in the nation’s tax architecture since the introduction of VAT in 1993”.¹ President Bola Tinubu has asserted that, in the wake of the reforms, Nigeria’s tax-to-GDP ratio has risen to 13.5 per cent and is already on its way to 15 per cent.²

A useful counterpart is Indonesia. There have been at least six separate tax reforms in Indonesia since 1983, all with more or less the same intent and all, at the time, claiming to provide a lasting boost to state revenues.³ Over the past 40 years, however, Indonesia’s tax-to-GDP ratio has followed a pattern of rapid initial increases, then levelling off, then decline. It rose from around five per cent in the early 1980s to above ten per cent by the late 1990s, reached a peak of almost 12.5 per cent in 2012, and fell back to around 11 per cent in 2019, despite a steady stream of tax law reforms in between.⁴

This article maintains that the recurrent shape of Indonesia’s reform curve holds a lesson that Nigeria’s 2025 Acts cannot afford to overlook: the revenue effects of tax legislation are constrained not by the ambition of the law but by the administrative capacity of those who must enforce it. Taxation that is more ambitious than the means to enforce it is only a temporary achievement. The article is divided into four parts: the legal foundations of reform in both countries; a detailed comparison of revenue trends; the identification of administrative capacity as the determining variable; and an analysis of the distributional and political-economy pressures that make implementation difficult.

I. The Legal Architecture of Reform, in Full

Indonesia’s reform experience was not limited to 1983. It is best understood as a series of statutory waves, each surfacing in response to the fiscal constraints of its time. The 1983 reform of the tax system (Pembaruan Sistem Perpajakan Nasional) introduced a new tax system built on five tax laws, covering general tax procedure, income tax, value added tax and luxury goods tax, land and building tax, and stamp duty, and adopted self-assessment in place of the previous official-assessment method.⁵ Refinements followed: four amending laws were enacted in 1994 to clarify definitions, revise exemptions and enhance audit rules in the general procedure, income tax, value-added tax and land-tax laws, respectively.⁶ A second package, in 1997, the year of the Asian financial crisis, established a Tax Dispute Settlement Board (Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa Pajak), transferred taxing powers to regional governments and enhanced collection and enforcement procedures.⁷

In 2000, a post-Reformasi package streamlined exemptions and clarified the distribution of taxing powers between the central and regional governments, following Indonesia’s political decentralisation.⁸ Further changes to the income tax law between 2007 and 2009 gradually reduced the corporate income tax rate from 30 to 26 per cent, adjusted personal income tax brackets and clarified fiscal incentives such as accelerated depreciation.⁹ The most recent changes are the Cipta Kerja Law of 2020, which reduced the corporate tax rate to 22 per cent, and the Tax Harmonisation Law of 2021, which raised the VAT threshold, brought digital services into the VAT base and provided for a carbon tax. A Core Tax Administration System, which digitises tax filing, was only started in 2023–2024.¹⁰

The Nigerian legislative process has been more gradual, but it has followed a similar path. Value added tax arrived only in 1994, when a sales tax, based on a narrower and less consistent range of transactions, was replaced by decree.¹¹ More recently, in 2007, federal corporate tax law was merged into a single act (the Companies Income Tax Act 2007), but petroleum profits tax continued to be administered separately, and state governments continued to levy personal income tax under a parallel regime.¹² In the Finance Act 2019, the VAT rate was increased from five to seven and a half per cent, the definition of small companies was changed, and a broader scope of imported services was brought within VAT.¹³

The 2025 Acts are much more comprehensive than any of these predecessors. They eliminate over sixty overlapping federal, state and local taxes and replace them with a few broad taxes; levy a four per cent development levy on company profits and require a minimum effective tax rate of fifteen per cent for large companies; increase the personal-income-tax exemption level for low-income earners; and create two new institutions, the Nigeria Revenue Service and the Joint Revenue Board, to oversee the new tax system.¹⁴ On paper, the ambition of the 2025 Acts resembles the 1983 Indonesian package more closely than any of the Nigerian reforms that preceded them. The revenue data, however, point to a clearer, if less comfortable, question: did either country’s administrative capacity ever match its legislative ambition?

II. Divergent Revenue Trajectories: A Comparative Case Analysis

The initial dividend of Indonesia’s 1983 reform is clearly apparent. The share of value-added-tax revenue in GDP increased by almost 2.4 per cent in the first year of operation, and the share of tax revenue in the state budget rose from approximately 24 per cent to nearly 30 per cent.¹⁵ The growth was not exponential, however. The average tax-to-GDP ratio remained fairly stable in the teens throughout the 1994 and 1997 amendments, and the 1997 package coincided with the Asian financial crisis, without any apparent short-term revenue boost.¹⁶ The 2000 package brought tax effort back up to around 11 to 12 per cent of GDP in the mid-2000s, and the 2007–09 amendments (lower statutory rates and a wider tax base) brought it to its historical high of around 12.5 per cent by 2012.¹⁷ Despite successive tax incentives, special economic zones and other legislative amendments, the ratio turned downward from that peak, declining throughout the decade to around 11 per cent in 2019.¹⁸

The pattern becomes clearer, however, when the data are examined over a longer period. Indonesia’s tax revenue averaged about 16 per cent of GDP from 1972 to 2009 and has since declined to around 11 to 12 per cent in the 2010s, a trend that predates, and is not solely attributable to, any single piece of legislation.¹⁹ The ratio rose slightly, to around 11.6 per cent in 2022, with the reforms of 2020–2021 and the start of digitised administration.²⁰

Nigeria’s path, though beginning from a lower level, follows a similar but scaled-down shape. In just one generation since its introduction, VAT was expected to become the largest single source of non-oil revenue to the federal government by 2019, contributing a total of ten to fifteen trillion naira.²¹ But aggregate tax-to-GDP growth over the same period has been low. Independent analysis of Nigeria’s tax effort in the 2010s suggests that it stood at around six to seven per cent of GDP, one of the lowest ratios in the world, with the Finance Act 2019 projected to add only about half a percentage point of GDP in 2020.²² So far, so good: early signs since the passage of the 2025 Acts are more positive, with VAT generating about 2.28 trillion naira in the third quarter of 2025 alone, and the federal government linking the VAT’s performance to a rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio to a claimed 13.5 per cent.²³ That figure, however, should be treated with some caution, as it has been claimed by the government that proposed the reform and has not been substantiated by an independent evaluation of the kind that exposed the overly optimistic early estimates of the Indonesian government.²⁴

The comparative pattern that emerges is instructive. In both countries, a broad-based consumption tax (Indonesia’s VAT, introduced in 1983, and Nigeria’s, in 1994) generated the single biggest revenue gain of all the reform phases, with subsequent legislative changes generating increasingly smaller and less enduring gains. The argument advanced here is that the 2025 Acts will be limited not by the sophistication of their drafting, which is high, but by the capacity of the administering institutions to sustain the initial dividend once the novelty wears off.

An examination of the breadth of each country’s tax base confirms this diagnosis. Indonesia’s VAT is by design very broad, with few exemptions and very few thresholds. That breadth was progressively narrowed in the years following the 1983 legislation through exemptions, thresholds and sector-specific exemptions found in the 1994, 2000 and 2007 to 2009 amendments, a pattern that the International Monetary Fund has identified as a material constraint on revenue performance despite the law’s apparent breadth.²⁵ Nigeria’s VAT base has been similarly eroded: initial registration thresholds were too high to ensure proper coverage of the informal sector, and successive Finance Acts introduced exemptions for particular goods and services without commensurate changes in other parts of the base.²⁶ The 2025 Acts seek to tackle this head-on by rationalising dozens of overlapping levies and by zero-rating essentials rather than exempting them permanently. This is a technical difference with significant revenue implications: where VAT is zero-rated, there is no barrier to input tax credits being passed along the supply chain, whereas where a supply is exempt there is.²⁷ Whether this improvement in base design will lead to ongoing revenue, however, depends on the same administrative variable discussed below: a well-designed base does not generate any revenue without an authority that can enforce it.

III. Administrative Capacity as the Missing Variable

The clearest and strongest basis for this argument lies in what Indonesia’s reforms invested in, if anything, alongside changes in the law. The 1983 package was not just a new set of rates and bases. It transferred primary responsibility for assessment from the tax office to the taxpayer, trained a new cadre of tax auditors and gave them a wide range of verification powers, and imposed a significant surcharge on under-reported tax liabilities to make self-assessment a credible option for the taxpayer.²⁸ The 1997 package was more concerned with dispute resolution and enforcement machinery, through a dedicated dispute-settlement body and enhanced collection powers, and the crisis of that year exposed the weakness of the administrative machinery developed a decade earlier.²⁹ Despite this, meaningful digitisation of tax administration, in the form of the Core Tax Administration System (CTA), did not start until 2023–24, which is more than 40 years after the enactment of the initial 1983 laws, and after a high revenue ratio had been reached and had started to decline.³⁰ That lag is not a marginal issue in Indonesia’s experience; it is the main explanatory variable for the plateau that can be seen in the data.

Nigeria’s 2025 Acts are in danger of repeating the pattern, over a shorter timeframe. The reforms introduce the Nigeria Revenue Service to replace the old Federal Inland Revenue Service and the Joint Revenue Board to coordinate the collection of federal and state revenue, but at the time the reforms were passed, the restructuring and staff reassignment of these institutions were still in their infancy.³¹ Commentary on the reform process has also highlighted that its outcome relies not only on the text of the Acts but also on institution building: filling positions, implementing technology and coordinating the previously fragmented federal and state revenue authorities.³² Indonesia’s experience shows that such a sequencing error is likely to lead to the plateau that halted Indonesia’s reform after 2012: legislating an ambitious base and rate structure while the bureaucracy to enforce it is still being built. Finally, the development levy, the minimum tax on multinationals and the consolidation of federal, state and local levies will create sustainable revenue gains for Nigeria only if implementation is based on institutional readiness, and not on a fixed legislative timeline.

The one thing that Nigeria has and Indonesia did not is the chance to develop electronic invoicing and a unified taxpayer identification system at the same time as it reforms its legislation, and not decades afterwards.³³ Some of the building blocks for that concurrent approach are already in place, at a fledgling stage. Nigeria has implemented a Taxpayer Identification Number system and has been piloting electronic invoicing since the 2010s, well before any thought was given to the Acts planned for 2025, but both efforts grew slowly and were implemented largely at the federal level, with only limited connections to state-level revenue authorities.³⁴ These tools are now at the heart of a single administrative directive rather than being used as peripheral pilots, a change that Indonesia’s digitisation programme needed for most of its history. One of the major factors determining whether the 2025 Acts will meet their revenue targets will be whether Nigeria can complete, in a few years, an administrative development that took Indonesia 40 years.

IV. Distributional and Political-Economy Dimensions

An administrative history of these reforms would be incomplete without acknowledging who pays the price of reform, and why the political will for reform emerges when it does. VAT is widely recognised as bearing more heavily on lower-income groups, and both countries have made efforts to mitigate its impact: the 2025 Nigerian Acts broadened VAT relief for education, healthcare and other essential goods and services, while the Nigerian government has consolidated VAT and other levies.³⁵ Meanwhile, headline corporate tax rates are being cut, as in Indonesia, which has now lowered its rate from 30 per cent to 22 per cent over the last six years, and in Nigeria, where a minimum effective tax rate was introduced on top of relief for small companies. This has a more complex distributional profile than either government’s public communication acknowledges.³⁶

There are also political-economy considerations. The most important reforms, such as the Suharto government’s fiscal reform in 1983 and President Joko Widodo’s omnibus tax legislation of 2020–2021, were always accompanied by technocratic tax administration programmes, and despite the periodic efforts of domestic actors to weaken elements of these reforms, they were consistently maintained.³⁷ Nigeria’s experience with the reform process reflects this: previous attempts at consolidation failed under less committed administrations, and the current government’s financial difficulties have produced an unprecedentedly strong and rapid legislative drive.³⁸ The lesson for Nigeria is that political will is not insignificant (Indonesia’s experience shows it is a precondition for reform of this magnitude), but political will alone, without durable investment in the administrative institutions that must outlast any single government, has not been enough to keep Indonesia’s revenue effort from stalling. Nigeria’s 2025 Acts have a political momentum that has been missing from earlier Nigerian reforms. Whether that momentum translates into permanent institutional capacity-building, or is lost once the fiscal pressures fade, will determine the country’s destiny: to plateau like Indonesia, or to avoid it.

Conclusion

When Indonesia’s four decades of tax reform are seen as a continuous process rather than a single event, a pattern emerges: each wave of reform produced a revenue dividend proportional to the capacity of tax administration at the time, and the size of the dividend declined as tax administration failed to keep up with statutory ambition. Nigeria’s 2025 Tax Reform Acts are, at their core, the most significant package of tax legislation in Nigeria’s history, akin to the package of reforms enacted in Indonesia in 1983. But the comparative record summarised in this article indicates that, by itself, a statute’s comprehensiveness is not a good predictor of lasting revenue, as the experience of Indonesia and, less clearly, Nigeria demonstrates.

It is recommended that Nigeria’s National Assembly and the newly established Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS) incorporate measurable administrative capacity benchmarks, such as audit staffing ratios, the level of electronic-invoicing coverage and taxpayer registration, into the phased commencement provisions of the 2025 Acts. Progress should be reported annually against these benchmarks, and the development levy and minimum tax thresholds should be tied to institutional readiness, not to the calendar. This would enable Nigeria to capture as much of the first “dividend” as Indonesia did in 1983, but without the 40-year time lag between vision and action that ultimately stunted the process of reform in Indonesia.

Footnote(S):

¹ Nigeria Tax Act 2025; Nigeria Tax Administration Act 2025; Nigeria Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2025; Joint Revenue Board (Establishment) Act 2025 (Nigeria); PwC, ‘The Nigerian Tax Reform Acts’ (PwC Nigeria, 2025) <https://www.pwc.com/ng/en/publications/the-nigerian-tax-reform-acts.html> accessed 4 August 2026.

² ‘Tinubu: Tax-to-GDP Ratio Has Increased to 13.5%, Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio Down to 50%’ TheCable (Abuja, 2025) <https://www.thecable.ng/tinubu-tax-to-gdp-ratio-has-increased-to-13-5-debt-service-to-revenue-ratio-down-to-50/> accessed 4 August 2026.

³ ‘The Urgency of Reforming Indonesia’s Tax Law in the Face of Economic Digitalization’ (ResearchGate) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/375876527_The_urgency_of_reforming_Indonesia’s_tax_Law_in_the_face_of_economic_digitalization> accessed 4 August 2026.

⁴ International Monetary Fund, Indonesia: 2020 Article IV Consultation, Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Indonesia (IMF Country Report No 21/46, 2021) <https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2021/english/1idnea2021001.pdf> accessed 4 August 2026.

⁵ Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 tentang Ketentuan Umum dan Tata Cara Perpajakan (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 1983 tentang Pajak Penghasilan (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1983 tentang Pajak Pertambahan Nilai Barang dan Jasa dan Pajak Penjualan atas Barang Mewah (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 1985 tentang Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 13 Tahun 1985 tentang Bea Meterai (Indonesia).

⁶ Undang-Undang Nomor 9 Tahun 1994 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 1994 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 1983 (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 11 Tahun 1994 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1983 (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 1994 tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 1985 (Indonesia).

⁷ Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 1997 tentang Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa Pajak (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 1997 tentang Pajak Daerah dan Retribusi Daerah (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 1997 tentang Penagihan Pajak dengan Surat Paksa (Indonesia).

⁸ (n 3).

⁹ Undang-Undang Nomor 28 Tahun 2007 tentang Perubahan Ketiga atas Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1983 (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 36 Tahun 2008 tentang Perubahan Keempat atas Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 1983 (Indonesia).

¹⁰ Undang-Undang Nomor 11 Tahun 2020 tentang Cipta Kerja (Indonesia); Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2021 tentang Harmonisasi Peraturan Perpajakan (Indonesia); Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, ‘Embracing the Third Chapter of Indonesian Tax Reform’ <https://pajak.go.id/en/artikel/embracing-third-chapter-indonesian-tax-reform> accessed 4 August 2026.

¹¹ Value Added Tax Decree No 102 of 1993 (Nigeria); ‘Nigeria’s Journey Through Tax Reforms: Timelines and Milestones’ (International Centre for Investigative Reporting) <https://www.icirnigeria.org/nigerias-journey-through-tax-reforms-timelines-and-milestones/> accessed 4 August 2026.

¹² Companies Income Tax Act 2007 (Nigeria).

¹³ Finance Act 2019 (Nigeria); Baker Tilly Nigeria, ‘Highlights of 2019 Finance Act’ <https://www.bakertilly.ng/insights/highlights-of-2019-finance-act> accessed 4 August 2026.

¹⁴ (n 1).

¹⁵ (n 3).

¹⁶ (n 3).

¹⁷ (n 4).

¹⁸ (n 4).

¹⁹ TheGlobalEconomy.com, ‘Indonesia Tax Revenue, Data, Chart’ <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Indonesia/Tax_revenue/> accessed 4 August 2026.

²⁰ ‘Indonesia, Tax Revenue (% of GDP), 2026 Data 2027 Forecast 1972–2022 Historical’ (Trading Economics) <https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/tax-revenue-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html> accessed 4 August 2026.

²¹ (n 11).

²² ‘Nigerian President Nominates Tax Reform Chair Oyedele as Junior Finance Minister’ Reuters (3 March 2026) <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerian-president-nominates-tax-reform-chair-oyedele-as-junior-finance-minister-2026-03-03/> accessed 4 August 2026.

²³ Premium Times, ‘Nigeria’s VAT Revenue Rises to ₦2.28 Trillion in Q3 2025, NBS’ (Abuja, 2025) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/business/business-news/861084-nigerias-vat-revenue-rises-to-%E2%82%A62-28-trillion-in-q3-2025-nbs.html> accessed 4 August 2026.

²⁴ (n 2).

²⁵ (n 4).

²⁶ (n 11).

²⁷ (n 1).

²⁸ ‘UU No 6 Tahun 1983’ (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan Republik Indonesia) <https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/46986/uu-no-6-tahun-1983> accessed 4 August 2026.

²⁹ (n 7).

³⁰ (n 10).

³¹ (n 1).

³² (n 22).

³³ (n 1).

³⁴ (n 13).

³⁵ (n 1).

³⁶ (n 9).

³⁷ (n 3).

³⁸ (n 22).

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