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The Madlanga Commission and the struggle against corruption in Government; The Constitution

Authored By: Ennie

University of South Africa

Introduction

The honour of the South Africa’s criminal justice system faces a groundbreaking constitutional turning point following the sudden testimony of State Advocate Drushantha Ramsamy before the Madlanga Commission of Integrity.[1] Testifying on the 30th of July 2026 Ms. Ramsamy revealed an alarming pattern of inquisitorial abuse, falsified official records and targeted institutional conflict.[2]

In this article we will use Ms. Ramsamy’s appearance before the Madlanga Commission to examine the legal and institutional struggle against corruption in government , making use of  relevant legislation and court cases.

Ms. Ramsamy’s testimony and the inquisitorial abuse mandates

In Ms. Ramsamy’s testimony before the commission she reported a workplace in which investigative dockets were allegedly tardy following interference from political principles.[3] Testifying before the commission on Thursday, Ramsamy denied former independent Directorate Against Corruption (IDAC) head Andrea Johnson’s claims that she depended on investigator’s briefings and was not directly involved in routine decisions.[4] She stated that Johnson directed every important step in the investigations, including matters relating to Crime intelligence and Medicare.[5]

Moreover, Ms. Ramsamy stated to the commission that Johnson had assigned herself as the Supervisor of the investigations and mastered complete control over the process.[6] She further claimed that Johnson and senior official Perumal were in constant communication , always updating each other on developments and influencing decisions.[7]

Furthermore, in her testimony concerning IDAC’s handling of section  27 referral submitted by National coloured Congress Member of Parliament (MP), Fadiel Adams.[8]  A section 27 referral falls under the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act 32 0f 1998, “this Act allows individuals to submit criminal complaints directly to IDAC without having to open a standard case file through the South African police first”[9] however Ms. Ramsamy reported that the investigations was done carelessly and in a hurry as if they were just searching around with no purpose and there was no evidence to back it up.[10] When she constantly provided formal warnings to Ms. Johnson that the claims unsuccessfully did not meet the criteria to press criminal charges, her warnings were overlooked .[11] When Ms. Ramsamy rejected to jeopardize her work ethic she was then removed from the case[12], emphasizing an extremely dangerous dynamic within the IDAC work environment.

Undermining the Commission though pretence

In her testimony Ms. Ramsamy provided a secretly recorded phone call between herself and her former boss Advocate Andrea Johnson that opposed Ms. Johnson’s testimony before the Madlanga Commission.[13]  In Ms. Ramssamy’s secretly recorded phone call and screenshots from both her email and WhatsApp revealed that Ms. Johnson  was directly managing operations, hand-selecting investigative targets and directly communicating with senior investigators.[14] Even more incriminating is that she tried coming up with a plan to block Ms. Ramsamy from testifying before the Commission,[15] which is seen as a criminal offense and defeating the ends of justice under South African law.

Constitutional and Statutory laws

Section 179(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of  South Africa states that “National legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.”[16] However  this section was violated in the following ways by removing Ms. Ramsamy from a case for pointing out the red flags within the case violated section 179(4) by instilling fear within the working environment, it also promotes unethical conduct within the workplace and violated Ms. Ramsamy’s duty to act lawfully under the National Prosecuting Act 32 of 1998.

Moreover, the mentions of investigative dockets being allegedly tardy following interference from political principles also violates section 179(4) of the constitution. Interference from third parties directly damages the truthfulness and integrity of the documents.

Secondly, in Section 1(c) of the constitution explains that “ The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”[17]  by using government to unjustly target people destroys equality and violates the law.

Abuse of power

In the case the of “ Pikoli v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (2009)”[18] Vusi Pikoli was the National Director of the Public Prosecutions (NDPP) who was suspended by the President, Thabo Mbeki for rejecting to stop a corruption investigation against Jackie Selbie a police commissioner.[19] The President dismissed Mr. Pikoli even though the Ginwala Commission cleared Mr. Pikoli found him fit for work. Mr. Pikoli approached the High court and stated that the President did not have the power to dismiss in that way.[20]

The issue the court faced was whether they can issue an interim interdict to prevent the President from appointing a new NDPP while examining the dismissal of Mr. Pikoli.[21] They questioned whether the Presidents use of power violate section 179(40)  of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa?[22]

Moreover , this case concluded that political standards cannot just dismiss the NDPP for political reasons.[23] There must be a clear and just procedure to be followed., The case also highlighted that the independence of prosecuting decisions is important in fighting corruption and the rule of law.[24] However, the case was finalised out of court for a financial payout .[25] The court did not deliver a final ruling on the limits of firing powers, this proofed that the President can still use his power to dismiss the leadership of the NDPP.[26]

Furthermore, this case is like Ms. Ramsamy’s  testimony at the Madlanga Commission because both cases reveal the consequences of rejecting unlawful and political interference. When state prosecutors  do their duty which is to act lawfully those in power within the justice system attempt to silence or remove them from their positions.

In conclusion, the information provided Ms. Ramsamy shed light on the corruption happening in the government and how easily information or evidence can be manipulated to benefit those in power within the justice system.  Although investigations are still ongoing , the Madlanga Commissions job should focus on restoring integrity and strict measures within the justice system to avoid corrupt officials from abusing their power.

Reference(S):

Legislation

Constitution of the republic of South Africa 1996, s179(4)

Constitution of the republic of South Africa 1996, s1(c)

Court cases

Pikoli v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2009] ZAGPPHC 99

Other Sources

SMWX,”Ms Ramsamy testifies at the Madlanga Commission”( YouTube,30 July 2026)

eNCA, “Straight lie”: Ramsamy tells Madlanga about Andrea Johnson’s testimony (eNCA, 30 July 2026)

eNCA, “Andrea Johnson’s Madlanga Commission testimony enters second day” (eNCA, 30 July 2026)

[1] SMWX,”Ms Ramsamy testifies at the Madlanga Commission”( YouTube,30 July 2026)

[2] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[3] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[4]  eNCA, “Straight lie”: Ramsamy tells Madlanga about Andrea Johnson’s testimony (eNCA, 30 July 2026)

[5] eNCA, “Straight lie” (n1)

[6] eNCA, “Straight lie” (n1)

[7] eNCA, “Straight lie” (n1)

[8]SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[9] eNCA, “Andrea Johnson’s Madlanga Commission testimony enters second day” (eNCA, 30 July 2026)

[10] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[11] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[12] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[13] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[14] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[15] SMWX, “Ms Ramsamy testifies” (n1)

[16] Constitution of the republic of South Africa 1996, s179(4)

[17] Constitution of the republic of South Africa 1996, s1(c)

[18] Pikoli v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another [2009] ZAGPPHC 99 (11 August 2009)

[19] Pikoli (n 1)

[20]Pikoli (n 1)  

[21] Pikoli (n 1)

[22] Pikoli (n 1)

[23] Pikoli (n 1)

[24] Pikoli (n 1)

[25] Pikoli (n 1)

[26] Pikoli (n 1)

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