Beyond Visibility: Intersectional Feminism, Media Representation and the Limits of UK Equality Law

Introduction

For years, women’s progress in equality could be measured by their visibility. Women gained the vote, entered previously excluded professions and secured legal protection against discrimination. However, simply being visible is not enough. The deeper question is whether women are able to exist, speak and behave without being judged according to stereotypes connected to both race and sex.

Intersectional feminism is crucial here. Kimberlé Crenshaw challenged the idea that race and sex can always be treated as separate experiences of discrimination. A woman’s race and sex do not exist independently; they interact to create experiences that may differ from racism or sexism considered separately. ¹

This is significant for equality law because legislation categorises discrimination into legal types. The Equality Act 2010 protects characteristics including race and sex and provides causes of action for direct and indirect discrimination. ² However, section 14, which was designed to recognise direct discrimination based on a combination of two protected characteristics, has never been implemented. ³ This is changing, with the Government committing in 2026 to introducing section 14 and seeking evidence on how combined discrimination should be addressed. ⁴

This article argues that the problem is not simply the existence of discrimination, but the difficulty of recognising intersectional discrimination within traditional legal categories. Media representation gives a useful example. The recent public discussion surrounding Love Island contestant Jasmine Müller, analysed by British Vogue in July 2026, raises questions about whether women of colour face the same standards of femininity as white women. ⁵

The argument is not that every unfair portrayal is unlawful or that the state should regulate opinions. Rather, equality law should accurately reflect how people experience discrimination. If the law treats race and sex as separate categories while discrimination occurs at their intersection, important aspects of that experience may be overlooked.

1. From Women’s Equality to Intersectional Feminism

Feminism’s history is partly about challenging the idea that women’s social position is natural or inevitable. The suffrage movement challenged women’s exclusion from political participation, while later feminist movements questioned inequalities that remained even after women gained formal political rights.

Radical feminism further explored inequality through concepts of patriarchy and power structures. From this perspective, changing discriminatory laws is important, but may not be sufficient if wider social systems continue to favour men.

Media is relevant because ideas about femininity are rarely neutral. Women are often expected to be attractive but not vain, confident but not intimidating, ambitious but not aggressive. This creates a contradiction: women are encouraged to be confident, but that confidence can become socially unacceptable when it challenges established ideas about womanhood.

The concept of hegemonic masculinity helps explain this wider structure. Connell and Messerschmidt describe hegemonic masculinity as a culturally dominant form of masculinity that legitimises and reproduces gender hierarchies. ⁶ It does not mean that all men consciously exercise power over women. Instead, it explains how particular ideas about masculinity and femininity become normalised.

Intersectional feminism asks: are these expectations experienced equally by all women?

Crenshaw’s analysis is particularly important because she demonstrated how Black women could be marginalised by legal approaches that treated race and sex separately. A sex-based claim could fail to capture the particular experience of a Black woman, while a race-based claim could overlook its gendered nature. ⁷

Intersectionality therefore does more than argue that someone can experience racism and sexism at the same time. It argues that the interaction between characteristics can create a distinctive experience.

This matters for law because people do not experience their identities as separate legal categories. Someone may experience treatment as both a woman and a member of a particular racial or ethnic group, while the law may require her to establish whether the treatment was caused by sex or race.

2. The Equality Act 2010 and the Problem of Separate Categories

The Equality Act 2010 is a cornerstone of UK equality law. Section 13 addresses direct discrimination, while section 19 addresses indirect discrimination. Race and sex are both protected characteristics. ²

The basic principle is straightforward: individuals should not receive less favourable treatment because of a protected characteristic. However, discrimination is not always straightforward.

Consider a hypothetical situation where an employer treats White women and Black men positively but treats Black women less favourably. It may be difficult to describe this as discrimination against women or Black people alone. The distinctive treatment arises from the combination of being both Black and female.

This is the situation section 14 was designed to address.

Section 14 provides for combined discrimination involving two protected characteristics. It allows discrimination where a person is treated less favourably because of a combination of two relevant protected characteristics, without requiring the claimant to establish discrimination based on each characteristic separately. ³

However, the provision has remained dormant.

This has become particularly significant in 2026. The Government has announced its commitment to strengthening protection against combined discrimination and introducing section 14. It has acknowledged that the current framework can require people experiencing combined discrimination to bring separate claims based on each protected characteristic, even where the alleged discriminatory treatment is one indivisible experience. ⁴

This supports the argument that intersectionality should be taken seriously within legal education and legal reform. The issue is no longer purely theoretical; the Government itself recognises a longstanding gap within the existing framework.

However, section 14 should not be presented as a complete solution. It addresses direct discrimination based on two characteristics but does not cover every form of intersectional disadvantage. In particular, it does not provide a general solution for indirect discrimination or harassment based on the interaction between characteristics.

Even if section 14 is implemented, therefore, there will remain situations where the law does not fully reflect the complexity of an individual’s experience.

3. Jasmine Müller and the Problem of Being Visible but Judged Differently

The debate surrounding Jasmine Müller provides a contemporary example of why intersectionality matters.

In July 2026, British Vogue published an article exploring the public “vilification” of confident Brown women on Love Island. The article examined the 2026 cast, including South Asian contestants, and questioned whether increased visibility necessarily resulted in equal treatment. Müller has Iranian, Danish and Indian heritage, and British Vogue discussed the strong reactions to her confidence and outspoken personality. ⁵

The example should not be exaggerated. A negative reaction from an individual viewer does not automatically amount to discrimination. People are entitled to criticise public figures and dislike television contestants without that reaction necessarily being motivated by racism or sexism. Similarly, the British Vogue article does not establish that Love Island or its producers unlawfully discriminated against Müller.

However, the broader question remains important: why can the same behaviour be interpreted differently depending on who displays it?

Confidence is not inherently connected to race or gender. Yet social expectations about race and femininity can influence how confidence is interpreted. One woman may be described as confident and assertive, while another displaying similar behaviour may be labelled aggressive, difficult or unlikeable.

If racialised expectations influence this difference, the issue becomes intersectional.

This demonstrates the important distinction between unfairness and illegality. Something can be unfair without satisfying the legal requirements for discrimination. This does not make the unfairness meaningless; it simply reflects the threshold that equality law must apply before legal intervention is justified.

Equality law should not attempt to make every unpleasant experience unlawful. However, it should also avoid making genuine patterns of disadvantage invisible merely because they are difficult to fit within existing legal categories.

4. The Double Standard: When Femininity Is Racialised

The concept of a double standard is central to intersectional discrimination.

Women are increasingly encouraged to be confident, independent and ambitious. However, women may also face criticism when they appear too dominant or assertive. Intersectional feminism asks whether this contradiction affects women from different racial backgrounds in the same way.

Expectations surrounding femininity can become racialised. An ethnic minority woman may face assumptions about how she is expected to behave because of both her gender and her perceived cultural background. If she challenges these expectations, the criticism directed towards her may carry both racial and gendered meanings.

This does not necessarily involve conscious prejudice.

A person does not need to deliberately think, “I am going to treat this woman differently because she is both a woman and a member of this racial group.” Social stereotypes can influence judgments without the individual fully recognising them.

The law, however, has to determine causation. A court or tribunal cannot simply decide that an outcome feels unfair; it must determine whether the statutory requirements have been satisfied.

There is strength in this discipline. Clear legal standards prevent equality law from becoming unpredictable. However, there is also a danger if discrimination must always be separated into distinct categories.

If the distinctive feature of the treatment is the combination of characteristics, requiring the claimant to prove separate discrimination based on each characteristic may fail to capture what actually happened.

That is where section 14 becomes significant.

5. Representation Is Not the Same as Equality

It is tempting to view increased representation as evidence that society is becoming more equal. There is undoubtedly value in seeing women from ethnic minority backgrounds represented in mainstream media. Visibility can challenge assumptions about who belongs in particular spaces.

However, representation alone cannot guarantee equality.

A person can be visible without having equal power. A woman can appear on television without having influence over how women like her are portrayed.

Ofcom’s 2025 data illustrates this distinction. Women accounted for 44 per cent of senior management roles across the broadcasting industry, while people from minority ethnic groups accounted for 9 per cent of senior management roles.⁸ Ofcom has also identified continuing underrepresentation among certain groups in senior and decision-making positions.⁹

These figures do not prove that media representation is discriminatory. They do, however, raise a broader question about who has the power to make decisions about representation.

There is a significant difference between being represented and being involved in deciding what representation looks like.

If an industry becomes more diverse on screen but remains less diverse in the rooms where programmes are commissioned, edited and produced, numerical visibility may conceal deeper structural inequalities.

Therefore, the answer cannot simply be to demand “more diversity”. The more difficult question is what kind of diversity is being created.

Are women from ethnic minority backgrounds being included because they fit existing expectations of femininity? Or are they genuinely allowed to be complicated, outspoken, imperfect and different?

That distinction matters because visibility without meaningful equality can reproduce the same stereotypes that greater representation was intended to challenge.

6. Should the Law Regulate Representation?

There is an obvious temptation to argue that the law should intervene whenever media representation is harmful. However, that would create significant problems.

Freedom of expression is fundamental to a democratic society. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects freedom of expression, although the right is subject to restrictions that must be prescribed by law and necessary for legitimate purposes. ¹⁰

There is a genuine danger in allowing the state to decide which portrayals are sufficiently progressive or feminist.

A television programme can be offensive without being unlawful. A character can be stereotypical without the creator committing discrimination. A public figure can be criticised without becoming the victim of a legal wrong.

These distinctions must remain.

However, accepting this does not mean that the law has no role. Ofcom already regulates aspects of broadcasting, including harmful and offensive material and hate speech. ¹¹ The broadcasting industry is also subject to equality-related obligations and scrutiny concerning diversity. ⁸

The better approach is therefore not to police every representation, but to address structural discrimination where there is a clear legal basis.

This is why section 14 matters. If a person is directly discriminated against because of the combination of two protected characteristics, there is a strong argument that the law should recognise that experience as it occurred rather than requiring the claimant to divide it into separate categories.

That is a much narrower and more defensible proposition than giving the state power to decide whether a television programme is sufficiently representative.

7. Is Section 14 Enough?

Even if section 14 is commenced, the wider problem identified by intersectional feminism will not disappear.

The Government’s proposal recognises that section 14 would only address direct discrimination involving a combination of two protected characteristics. It would not cover every form of intersectional disadvantage, including indirect discrimination or harassment on a combined basis. ⁴

For example, an apparently neutral practice might disproportionately disadvantage a particular intersectional group without fitting neatly within section 14. Similarly, harassment may operate through racialised and gendered stereotypes without being reducible to a single characteristic.

There is therefore a risk of treating section 14 as a complete victory when it would actually be one step in a longer process.

Nevertheless, that does not make the reform unimportant.

Law does not have to solve every social problem to make meaningful progress. Bringing section 14 into force would recognise that discrimination can occur because of who a person is in combination, rather than because of one isolated characteristic.

This is particularly important for women whose experiences may historically have been overlooked by approaches that treat “women” and “racial minorities” as separate groups.

8. Towards Substantive Equality

Ultimately, this debate concerns the difference between formal and substantive equality.

Formal equality asks whether people are subject to the same legal rules. Substantive equality asks whether those rules are capable of addressing inequality as it actually operates.

Both are important.

The UK has made significant progress in formal equality, and the protections within the Equality Act 2010 should not be dismissed. However, equal rules do not necessarily mean that everyone experiences society equally.

A woman should not have to make herself less confident to avoid being labelled aggressive. She should not have to behave according to stereotypes about what an ethnic minority woman is “supposed” to be. Equally, she should not be reduced to her race or gender when she succeeds, fails or simply behaves imperfectly.

Intersectional feminism offers something valuable to legal thinking because it does not necessarily ask the law to give certain women special treatment. Instead, it asks the law to recognise when apparently neutral categories fail to capture the reality of a person’s experience.

That is ultimately a demand for accuracy.

Conclusion

The history of women’s equality demonstrates how far the law can change when society becomes willing to question assumptions once treated as normal. From the suffrage movement to the Equality Act 2010, legal developments have transformed women’s rights.

Yet equality cannot stop at formal recognition.

The experiences of women from ethnic minority backgrounds demonstrate that race and sex can interact in ways that are difficult to capture through separate legal categories. The current position under the Equality Act 2010 creates an uncomfortable contradiction: the law recognises both race and sex as protected characteristics, while the provision specifically designed to address their combination has remained unused.

The Government’s 2026 commitment to commence section 14 is therefore significant. It recognises that the existing framework may not fully reflect the reality of combined discrimination. ⁴

British Vogue’s discussion of the treatment of confident Brown women on Love Island raises difficult questions about whether women are always judged according to the same standards of femininity. It does not prove unlawful discrimination, but it demonstrates how social disadvantage can exist in a space that the law does not easily regulate. ⁵

The answer should not be censorship. Equality does not require the state to control every television programme, opinion or criticism. Freedom of expression remains essential.

But equality also cannot mean pretending that discrimination only exists when it fits neatly into a statutory category.

The real challenge for UK equality law is therefore not simply to make women more visible. It is to ensure that women are not required to change who they are in order to be treated equally.

Representation is valuable. Visibility matters. But neither is the same as equality.

If intersectional discrimination is experienced as a whole, perhaps the law should finally learn to see it as one.

Reference(S):

• Legislation:
  Equality Act 2010.
  Communications Act 2003.
  Human Rights Act 1998, sch 1 (ECHR art 10).
• Secondary sources:
  Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) 1989(1) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139.
  RW Connell and James W Messerschmidt, ‘Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept’ (2005) 19(6) Gender & Society 829.
• Government and regulatory materials:
  Government Equalities Office, Equality Law Call for Evidence (2026).
  Ofcom, Equity, Diversity and Inclusion in Broadcasting 2024–25 (2025).
  Ofcom, Broadcasting Code.
• Media:
  Issey Brunner, ‘“Love Island”: The Public Vilification Of Confident Brown Girls Is… Exhausting’ British Vogue (10 July 2026).