Authored By: Madanambedu Haripriya
Padala Rama Reddi Law College
Introduction
The publication of the Digital Competition Bill for consultation in 2024 prompted Big Tech companies to object to the Bill[1], raising concerns over negative consequences such as increased prices and reduced range of services. India’s domestic startups and the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL) itself maintained that digital markets showed signs of dominance.[2] Despite the evidence of a dominance-driven market, the Bill has been delayed for almost two years now, suggesting the hesitation is not just due to industry pressure alone. Anti-competitive conduct is governed by the Competition Act, 2002[3] It was strengthened by the latest Amendment in 2023, [4]which enforces compliance after the harm has occurred and been proven. Although the Digital Competition Bill addresses market dominance, the framework overlaps with the Competition Act, 2002, which creates ambiguity.[5] This article argues that this regulatory friction, rather than industry lobbying alone, offers a compelling explanation for the continued delay of the Bill. The investigation of both regimes relies on the same Director General and the same appellate body through the NCLAT[6] which could raise the risk of parallel scrutiny under two different legal processes. This article outlines the existing legal framework governing the digital markets and further analyses the recent enforcement practice by the Competition Commission of India to see if the existing tools are sufficient to tackle these digital harms. The paper highlights how the resulting regulatory overlap explains the delays in passing the Bill.
Main Body
Legal Framework
The Competition Act, 2002 is the principal legislation regulating anti-competitive conduct in India through three primary pillars, which are anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and combinations. Section 3 prohibits anti-competitive agreements that are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.[7] Section 4 prohibits the abuse of dominant position by restricting enterprises from engaging in unfair or discriminatory conditions, limiting or restricting consumers, denying market access, and using dominance in one market to protect the other.[8] Key sections for Big Tech companies are Sections 5 and 6, which regulate and prohibit combinations by defining when an acquisition, takeover of control, merger, or amalgamation becomes a combination, and establishing the basic prohibition.[9]
The latest amendment to the Competition Act in 2023 strengthened the framework by introducing mechanisms that specifically focused on digital markets. It expanded the scope of Section 3 to recognise hub-and-spoke arrangements[10] that cover situations where intermediaries facilitate anti-competitive coordination. It enabled the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to scrutinise high-value acquisitions through the Deal Value Threshold, [11]which ensured they could not escape, unlike traditional asset- or turnover-based thresholds. The significant amendment was the settlement and commitment mechanisms under Sections 48A and 48B, facilitating a quicker resolution of competition concerns. [12]The penalties provision also underwent a significant shift by considering global turnover for calculating a penalty[13]. Furthermore, the Leniency Plus mechanism[14] encourages enterprises to report other existing cartels in return for incentives, which was one of the key reforms of the 2023 Amendment.
To address the concerns over market concentration among large digital enterprises, the Committee on Digital Competition Law[15] proposed an ex-ante regime in 2024, which formed the Digital Competition Bill, 2024.[16] It regulates Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs)[17] that meet prescribed financial and user thresholds and provide specific ‘Core Digital Services.’ The Bill pivots upon practices such as self-preferencing, misuse of non-public business-user data, restricting third-party applications, and tying or bundling services to curb anti-competitive behaviour. [18]It also designates the corporate group entities whose activities are closely linked to SSDEs as Associate Digital Enterprises (ADEs).[19] These obligations proactively ensure that anti-competitive activities are prevented before they are solidified and cause any irreparable damage to the competition. This framework works as a supplement to the existing Competition Act, 2002. However, this Bill’s overlap with the existing regulatory framework is substantial and extends beyond procedural mechanisms. The substantive obligations such as self-preferencing, misuse of non-public business-user data, restricting third-party applications, and tying or bundling services, closely align with Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. Procedurally, this Bill does not introduce any new enforcement mechanism; rather, it relies on the existing statutory framework by choosing to utilise the Director General for investigations and adopting the established settlement and commitment procedures under Sections 48A and 48B, as well as the same penalty-calculating structure of the Competition Act, 2002.
Case Analysis
WhatsApp LLC v. CCI/ NCLAT Order (Nov. 2025)
The proceedings against WhatsApp LLC and Meta Platforms[20] highlight both limitations and capabilities of the existing statutory framework. In January 2021, WhatsApp introduced changes to its Privacy Policy that required users to accept expanded data collection and sharing with Meta companies for purposes beyond WhatsApp services without providing any opt-out mechanism. In November 2024, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) held that WhatsApp maintained a dominant position in the Indian market, which it used to expand data collection and share it with Meta companies without a meaningful opt-out. It also further held that the data was shared for purposes beyond providing WhatsApp services, which obstructed other competitors from advertising. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) found this violated Sections 4 (2) (a) (i), 4 (2) (c) and 4 (2) (e) of the Competition Act, 2002[21] and imposed a penalty of ₹213.14 crore; as a remedial measure, it directed WhatsApp not to share data with other Meta Companies for a period of five years for any advertising purposes, and to ensure better transparency and provide an opt-out mechanism for users for non-service-related data sharing.
Furthermore, WhatsApp and Meta appealed twice to the NCLAT for two different reasons: initially, they contended that the dispute was about privacy and data protection, which does not fall under the ambit of the Competition Law, and secondly, they alleged that the Competition Commission of India (CCI) could not establish actual anti-competitive effects and contended that data-sharing could generate actual benefits to users and businesses. However, NCLAT held that data protection laws and Competition laws work complementarily and affirmed the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) jurisdiction over data protection cases. The Tribunal partially allowed both appeals and upheld the other violations under Section 4 but set aside Section 4 (2) (e)[22]. It also set aside the five-year prohibition but justified the other measures of mandatory user transparency, opt-out mechanisms, and non-coercive terms. Significantly, the ₹213.14 crore penalty imposed on Meta was upheld.
Since the policy update, the outcome of the final appellate ruling took nearly 4 years, which illustrates the capacity of the existing framework to identify the abusive conduct and penalise accordingly, as well as the prolonged timeline and dilution of remedies that this process involved.
Google Android TV Order (April, 2025)
The case initiated by the Competition Commission of India by Kshitiz Arya and Purushottam Anand against Google LLC, Google India, Xiaomi Technology India and TCL India Holdings [23]held that Google abused its dominant position by imposing anti-competitive restrictions on smart TV manufacturers through the Television App Distribution Agreement (TADA) and Android Compatibility Commitments (ACC). The informants contended that Google mandated Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to sign the Android Compatibility Commitments (ACC) to pre-install the Google Play Store, thereby restricting them from developing, distributing or selling devices with other Android versions. Furthermore, they alleged that Google also bundled the Play Store with other applications, especially “YouTube”, and imposed obligations on manufacturers. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) directed the Director General to initiate a formal investigation upon finding prima facie evidence that it violated Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.[24]
The Director General, upon investigation, found that the mandatory pre-installation and tying of YouTube and other applications to the Play Store amounted to unfair conditions and abuse of dominance, violating Section 4 of the Act. Google sought to settle the matter under Section 48A[25] which was introduced under the 2023 Amendment, agreeing to a settlement of ₹20.24 Crore alongside commitments under the ‘New India Agreement.’ This case underscored how the 2023 Amendment settlement regime concluded the case within a single year. However, this also received criticism, as a Competition Commission of India (CCI) member stressed the point regarding the settlement’s efficacy of the agreed terms and whether that would fully address the anti-competitive conduct.
The Big Tree Entertainment order (March 2026)
Vijay Gopal, the founder of Showtyme, a rival ticketing platform to Big Tree Entertainment Pvt.Ltd. (BookMyShow), initiated the case before the Competition Commission of India against Big Tree Entertainment Pvt.Ltd.,[26] alleging abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002[27] claiming the company used interest-free deposits to enforce exclusive agreements with the cinemas. This was found to be a prima facie case by the Competition Commission of India (CCI), and it directed the Director General to investigate, as it defined this relevant market as “online intermediation services for booking of movie tickets in India.
Upon investigation by the Director General, violations were found, including unfair conditions and denial of market access. However, in March 2026, the Commission closed the case, concluding that although BookMyShow held market dominance, it had not abused it, considering the company’s justifications over the Director General’s contrary findings. In contrast to the Android TV case, this case proceeded under an unnamed effects-based standard, which stresses how the 2023 Amendment left this issue unaddressed, underscoring the absence of a clear framework for accountability, despite adverse conclusions by the Director General and a lengthy four-year proceeding.
Critical Evaluation
The question is whether Android TV and Showtyme prove that the ex-post regime is coping with the digital market or failing to prevent the harm before it becomes irreversible. The evidence clearly points towards the inadequacy of the regime in preventing the harm, validating the substantial concern of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL),[28] and justifying the introduction of an ex-ante regime for investigating before the harm becomes irreversible. Android TV precedent [29]is the strongest evidence that affirms the robustness of the 2023 Amendment, which efficiently resolved the issue under the Section 48A mechanism, validating that ex-post provisions are sufficient. However, this was merely effective because Google voluntarily chose to settle, bypassing the Committee’s scope to resolve the issue.
Another instructive precedent is the Showtyme case[30] which spanned nearly four years and, despite the findings of violations by the Director General, the Committee determined a no-abuse ruling, which left the dominance of BookMyShow unchecked. This precisely reflects the Committee on Digital Competition Law’s (CDCL) critique about the market tipping during the prolonged proceedings, leaving smaller competitors to be foreclosed, and it reflects how the existing framework is incapable of stepping in before irreparable harm.
The Android TV case certainly strengthens the argument that the 2023 Amendment addresses the dynamics of digital market competition. However, it misses a crucial flaw, that the case was settled before it proceeded to litigation. In the Showtyme case, the ex-post regulation failed to prevent the harm. The overlap between the Amendment and the Bill does not imply that either of them is unnecessary. It highlights that there is a need to address the regulatory shortfall in dealing with anti-competitive conduct proactively and preventing it before it damages the market. Set against this, the critiques of the Bill forefront the Amendment’s success while overlooking the loopholes in the Showtyme case.
Comparative Perspectives
Three distinct regimes and major jurisdictions across the world, which are the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Germany, have adopted different approaches for ex-ante regulation. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act introduced ex-ante rules for designated “gatekeepers” to avoid framework overlap. [31]The United Kingdom imposes conduct-specific rules on firms with ‘Strategic Market Status,’ through the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024[32] alongside the Competition Law. Germany follows a similar approach by identifying undertakings of “paramount significance for competition” and allows it to prohibit certain conduct without finding dominance in every case.[33] These three jurisdictions demonstrate how ex-ante rules can work as supplementary measures to the existing competition laws.
Similarly, the Digital Competition Bill and the 2023 Amendment address the same conduct in different ways, which indicates whether either of them is unnecessary. They must not be considered as substitutes; rather, they must be considered as complementary frameworks addressing the post-occurrence of anti-competitive conduct and the other preventing such conduct prior to the damage caused in the market.[34]
Conclusion
This Article has contended that the continued digital-market dominance, as recognised by the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL)[35]and the Indian startups, cannot be addressed solely by the Competition Act, 2002, although it is strengthened by the 2023 Amendment. While the Android TV case [36]exemplified that the amended Act addresses the issues, it also underscores the reality that the issue is resolved only when the respondent settles, failing to address the core legal issue of market abuse. On the flip side, the four-year litigation in Showtyme[37] brings into focus the inadequacy of the regime despite the findings of the Director-General and the application of the amended Act. The Committee’s order in the Showtyme case indicates how the existing regulatory framework treats market-tipping practices as legitimate commercial conduct. This outcome brings to light the inadequacy of the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, which mainly focused on procedural changes. This observation underscores the need for an ex-ante framework that would foresee and prevent any market damage before it occurs, keeping designated SSDEs alert rather than reactive. The Bill’s procedural overlap with the existing Act should be resolved alongside enactment, and not used to delay it further.
References and Bibliography
Cases
WhatsApp LLC v Competition Commission of India, Competition Appeal (AT) Nos. 1 & 2 of 2025, NCLAT, order dated 4 November 2025.
Kshitiz Arya and Purushottam Anand v Google LLC, Case No. 19 of 2020, CCI, prima facie order dated 22 June 2021, and settlement order dated 21 April 2025.
Showtyme (Vijay Gopal) v Big Tree Entertainment Pvt Ltd, Case No. 46 of 2021, CCI, prima facie order dated 16 June 2022, and final order dated March 2026.
Legislation
Competition Act 2002 (India).
Competition (Amendment) Act 2023 (India).
Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 (India).
Digital Markets Act (EU) 2022.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (UK).
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Germany), as amended.
Reports
Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 12 March 2024).
Secondary Sources
Hetzner C, ‘Big Tech Groups Warn India’s Antitrust Bill Threatens to Curb Investment, Raise Prices and Cut Consumer Choice’ Fortune (28 May 2024) https://www.fortune.com/2024/05/28/india-digital-competition-bill-eu-digital-markets-act-big-tech-lobbyists accessed 3 September 2026.
Ganesh A, Yadav M and Pathak G, ‘The Indian Draft Digital Competition Bill and Report: A Critical Perspective’ (2025) 9(1) Indian Law Review 193.
‘The Competition Act, 2002: A Comprehensive Analysis’ (IJLLR) https://www.ijllr.com/post/the-competition-act-2002-a-comprehensive-analysis accessed 4 September 2026.
Competition Commission of India, ‘Legal Framework’ https://www.cci.gov.in/legal-framwork/act accessed 4 September 2026.
Competition Policy International, Europe Column (May 2021) https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Europe-Column-May-2021-Full.pdf accessed 4 September 2026.
Tewari A, ‘A Critical Evaluation of India’s Proposed Digital Competition Act’ (2024) 5(1) CCI Journal on Competition Law and Policy 79.
Kumar R and Soni M, ‘Competition in Digital Markets in India and the Proposed Ex-Ante Regulatory Framework: A Legal Analysis of the Draft Competition Bill, 2024’ (2024) 6(2) Cahiers Magellanes-NS 4887.
MediaNama, Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024 https://www.medianama.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/DRAFT-DIGITAL-COMPETITION-BILL-2024.pdf, accessed 4 September 2026.
Chitravanshi R, ‘Govt to Bring Digital Competition Bill After Due Process: Harsh Malhotra’ Business Standard (New Delhi, 16 March 2025) https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/govt-to-bring-digital-competition-bill-after-due-process-harsh-malhotra-125031600240_1.html accessed 5 September 2026.
CUTS International, Comments on the Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024 (2024).
[1] Christiaan Hetzner, ‘Big Tech Groups Warn India’s Antitrust Bill Threatens to Curb Investment, Raise Prices and Cut Consumer Choice’ Fortune (28 May 2024), https://www.fortune.com/2024/05/28/india-digital-competition-bill-eu-digital-markets-act-big-tech-lobbyists, accessed 3 September 2026.
[2] Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 12 March 2024)
[3] Competition Act, 2002 (India).
[4] Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 (India).
[5] See Section IV below.
[6] Competition Act, 2002 (India), s 16 (Director General); s 53T (appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal).
[7] Competition Act 2002, s 3 (prohibition of anti-competitive agreements).
[8] Competition Act 2002, s 4 (abuse of dominant position).
[9] Competition Act 2002, ss 5–6 (definition of “combination” and regulation of combinations).
[10] Competition (Amendment) Act 2023, s 3 (amending s 3(3) of the Competition Act 2002 to include “hub and spoke” arrangements).
[11] Competition Act 2002, s 5(d), as inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023.
[12] Competition Act 2002, ss 48A–48B, as inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023 (settlement and commitment mechanisms) as inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023.
[13] Competition Act 2002, s 27(b), as inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023.
[14] Competition Act 2002, s 46, as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023.
[15] Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 12 March 2024).
[16] Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024 (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 12 March 2024).
[17] Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024, s 3.
[18] Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024, Schedule I.
[19] Draft Digital Competition Bill 2024, s 3(3).
[20] WhatsApp LLC v Competition Commission of India, Competition Appeal (AT) Nos. 1 & 2 of 2025, NCLAT, order dated 4 November 2025.
[21] Competition Act 2002, s 4(2)(a)(i), (c) and (e).
[22] Competition Act 2002, s 4(2)(e).
[23] Kshitiz Arya and Purushottam Anand v Google LLC, Case No. 19 of 2020, CCI, prima facie order dated 22 June 2021, and settlement order dated 21 April 2025 under s 48A(3) of the Competition Act, 2002.
[24] Competition Act 2002, s 4 (abuse of dominant position).
[25] Competition Act 2002, s 48A, as inserted by the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023 (settlement).
[26] Showtyme (Vijay Gopal) v Big Tree Entertainment Pvt Ltd, Case No. 46 of 2021, CCI, final order dated March 2026.
[27] Competition Act 2002, s 4.
[28] Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 12 March 2024)
[29] Kshitiz Arya and Purushottam Anand v Google LLC, Case No. 19 of 2020, CCI, prima facie order dated 22 June 2021, and settlement order dated 21 April 2025.
[30] Showtyme (Vijay Gopal) v Big Tree Entertainment Pvt Ltd, Case No. 46 of 2021, CCI, prima facie order dated 16 June 2022; final order dated March 2026.
[31] Digital Markets Act (EU) 2022, arts 5–7.
[32] Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (UK).
[33] Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), s 19a, as amended by Germany’s 10th Amendment.
[34] Ganesh, Yadav and Pathak, ‘The Indian Draft Digital Competition Bill and Report: A Critical Perspective’ (2025) 9(1) Indian Law Review 193.
[35] Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law (n 28).
[36] Android TV (n 23)
[37] Showtyme (n 26).
