Authored By: Most Sumaiya Afrin
University of Rajshahi
Introduction
Returning Sheikh Hasina from India to Bangladesh stopped being a purely political story some time ago. What we’re watching now is really a test case in international extradition law. Bangladesh’s interim government formally asked India for her extradition back in December 2024, invoking the two countries’ bilateral treaty.[1] India’s Ministry of External Affairs has repeated, as recently as August 2026, that the request remains “under examination” in line with established procedures — without giving any real sense of when that examination might end.[2]
The legal groundwork here is the India-Bangladesh Extradition Treaty, signed in Dhaka on January 28, 2013.[3] New Delhi’s own foreign ministry still lists Bangladesh among the countries it holds an active extradition treaty with.[4]
What the Treaty Actually Says
Article 1 lets either country extradite someone accused of, on trial for, or already convicted of an extraditable offence, so long as certain conditions hold. Under Article 2, the offence has to be punishable in both countries by at least a year in prison — though notably, it doesn’t need to be called the same thing in both legal systems. What counts is the conduct itself, not the label attached to it.[5] So Bangladesh classifying something differently than India does isn’t, on its own, a dealbreaker.
Article 5 closes off an obvious escape route too: nationality alone won’t protect anyone. Simply being a Bangladeshi citizen inside India offers no automatic shield, whatever some might assume.
Is India Actually Bound to Hand Her Over?
Here’s where it gets murkier. A treaty on paper doesn’t mean extradition happens automatically, and it definitely doesn’t mean it happens without conditions attached.
Article 6 gives India room to refuse if it decides the offence is political in nature. But the treaty doesn’t let that clause swallow everything — murder, culpable homicide, serious assault, kidnapping, and several terrorism-related offences are carved out and explicitly barred from counting as “political.”[6] Which raises the real question for Bangladesh: how will India end up classifying the charges against Hasina? Framed as political dissent, the exception has legs. Framed as the serious criminal conduct the treaty specifically excludes, it doesn’t hold up nearly as well.
Then there’s Article 8, which piles on more grounds for refusal — extradition can be denied if it would be unjust or oppressive given the circumstances (say, a trivial offence, or too much time having passed), or if the accusation itself wasn’t “made in good faith in the interests of justice.” India isn’t just going to check a box confirming it received Bangladesh’s request. It’s going to weigh whether the request actually holds up under its own terms.
What About the Death Penalty?
This is probably the most sensitive piece of the whole case. On November 17, 2025, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal convicted Hasina of crimes against humanity — tied to the deadly crackdown during the 2024 student-led uprising — and sentenced her to death in absentia, alongside former home minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal.[7]
If that factors into India’s calculus, the possibility of an eventual execution becomes a genuine human rights concern, not a footnote to be waved away. Still, nothing in the treaty says a death sentence automatically kills the extradition request. India’s own extradition law, its treaty commitments, and its courts will all weigh in together on that one.
Does Fair Trial Actually Matter Here?
It does — a great deal, honestly. Extradition isn’t just paperwork moving a person from one jurisdiction to another; due process and judicial independence sit right at the centre of it. If India concludes that Hasina’s right to a fair trial would be seriously undermined by sending her back, that alone could shape the outcome.
And this is where Bangladesh’s case gets genuinely tricky. Trying a former head of state is never politically neutral terrain, and if the process reads as retribution dressed up as justice, the extradition request weakens for it. But if Bangladesh can point to an independent tribunal operating on established law, real evidence, and due process, its legal footing improves considerably.
How the Request Actually Works
Article 10 requires extradition requests to travel through diplomatic channels, backed by the person’s identity, the facts of the alleged offence, the applicable law, and the maximum penalty on the table. Where someone hasn’t yet been convicted, an arrest warrant and supporting evidence are usually needed as well. Bangladesh sent its request via a note verbale through its High Commission in New Delhi; India acknowledged receiving it the same day.[8]
Where Things Stand Now
Three outcomes seem realistic. India could follow the treaty and hand her over. It could lean on one of the refusal grounds and decline. Or — and this is largely where things sit nearly two years in — the whole matter could just keep drifting through legal and diplomatic review, with Indian officials repeating “under examination” without offering any timeline.[9]
There’s a wrinkle worth flagging here: Hasina has called the tribunal’s verdict “biased and politically motivated,” even as she’s separately vowed, more than once in 2026, to return to Bangladesh on her own terms and face the courts — arrest or execution included.[10] But volunteering to come back and being formally extradited through India are two completely different legal processes. Her public statements don’t substitute for either one.
The Real Test for Bangladesh
The question isn’t just “how do we get her back.” It’s whether Bangladesh can make this process internationally credible and legally airtight. Frame it purely as a political homecoming, and international support thins out fast. Ground it instead in treaty obligations, evidence, and due process, and the case holds up far better.
It’s a test for India too, caught between its treaty commitments and the broader norm of cooperating against impunity on one side, and its own domestic law, human rights obligations, and diplomatic relationship with a key neighbour on the other.
Conclusion
The 2013 treaty gives Bangladesh a real legal framework — but no country is bound to extradite unconditionally, and this one is no exception. The extradition duties laid out in Articles 1 and 2 matter just as much as the refusal grounds in Articles 6 and 8, and the procedural requirements in Article 10. Bringing Sheikh Hasina back was never going to be settled by diplomatic pressure alone. It’s a test of rule of law, of fair trial standards, and ultimately of Bangladesh’s own judicial credibility. Getting the extradition is the easy part to want. Building a process that can actually survive scrutiny — at home and abroad — is the harder, and far more important, one.
Reference(S):
[1] ‘Bangladesh’s Interim Government Asks India to Extradite Sheikh Hasina’ Deccan Herald (23 December 2024) <www.deccanherald.com/world/bangladesh-sends-note-verbale-asking-india-to-send-back-deposed-pm-sheikh-hasina-3329370> accessed 23 August 2026.
[2] ‘India Examining Sheikh Hasina Extradition Request Under Established Procedures’ Indian Defence News (11 August 2026) <www.indiandefensenews.in/2026/08/india-examining-sheikh-hasina.html> accessed 23 August 2026. ‘India Is Examining Bangladesh’s Request for Extradition of Sheikh Hasina’ Business Today (12 August 2026) <www.businesstoday.in/india/story/india-is-examining-bangladeshs-request-for-extradition-of-sheikh-hasina-548631-2026-08-12> accessed 23 August 2026.
[3] Treaty between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Relating to Extradition (signed 28 January 2013) <indiankanoon.org/doc/37474049/> accessed 23 August 2026. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (official notification) <www.mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/BG13B1143.pdf> accessed 23 August 2026.
[4] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ‘List of Extradition Treaties/Arrangements’ <www.mea.gov.in/leta> accessed 23 August 2026.
[5] Treaty between India and Bangladesh Relating to Extradition (n 3) arts 1–2.
[6] ibid art 6. PWOnlyIAS, ‘India-Bangladesh Extradition Treaty’ (24 November 2025) <pwonlyias.com/current-affairs/about-india-bangladesh-extradition-treaty/> accessed 23 August 2026.
[7] ‘Bangladesh Seeks Extradition of Ex-PM Sheikh Hasina: MEA Receives Diplomatic Note’ All India Radio News (23 December 2024) <www.newsonair.gov.in/bangladesh-seeks-extradition-of-ex-pm-sheikh-hasina-mea-receives-diplomatic-note> accessed 23 August 2026.
[8] ‘Bangladesh Seeks Extradition of Ex-PM Sheikh Hasina: MEA Receives Diplomatic Note’ All India Radio News (23 December 2024) <www.newsonair.gov.in/bangladesh-seeks-extradition-of-ex-pm-sheikh-hasina-mea-receives-diplomatic-note> accessed 23 August 2026.
[9] n2
[10] ‘Bangladesh’s Hasina Condemns Guilty Crimes Against Humanity Verdict’ Gulf News/AFP (17 November 2025) <gulfnews.com/world/asia/bangladeshs-hasina-condemns-guilty-crimes-against-humanity-verdict-1.500349184> accessed 23 August 2026. ‘Sheikh Hasina Vows to Return, But Will Bangladesh Accept Convicted Ex-PM?’ Al Jazeera (6 August 2026) <www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/6/sheikh-hasina-vows-to-return-but-will-bangladesh-accept-fugitive-ex-pm> accessed 23 August 2026.
