Authored By: Atiya Ahmed
Middlesex University, Dubai
Introduction:
Armed conflicts in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Myanmar have involved large numbers of child soldiers, many of whom were forcibly recruited and exposed to extreme violence. UNICEF reports that thousands of children are still being drawn into armed groups around the world, with more than 105,000 verified cases between 2005 and 2022. [1]These children are used not only in combat but also as porters, guards, and messengers, often placed in situations where violence becomes part of their daily reality. Many are also forced to take part in serious abuse against civilians.
This reality raises a difficult question: when children are pulled into this kind of environment, should they be seen as perpetrators of international crimes, or mainly as victims who need protection and rehabilitation?
Many international legal frameworks, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, emphasise protection and reintegration rather than punishment.[2] However, international criminal law does not provide any clear answer when children commit grave offences. International criminal tribunals have proved to largely avoid prosecuting minors, yet the absence of a clear legal doctrine for responsibility leaves a gap where serious crimes committed by children remain legally unsolved.
This essay argues that international law should firmly prioritise restorative justice for child soldiers, given their age and the number of coercive circumstances under which they are often recruited, and the lasting psychological impact of the armed conflict. Instead of focusing only on punishment, legal responses should prioritise rehabilitation and long-term support. To explore this argument, the essay first examines the relevant international legal framework, then considers key judicial decisions and practice, before evaluating the shortcomings of approaches that place greater weight on accountability and prosecution.
Legal Status of Child Soldiers in International Law
International law has always treated children involved in armed conflict as victims rather than criminals. The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC) prohibits armed forces and groups from recruiting children under 18.[3] It reflects the fact that children lack the full capacity to consent to participation in war.
However, international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) does not entirely exclude the possibility of prosecuting child soldiers[4]. They possessed jurisdiction over individuals aged 15-17 at the time of alleged offences, but it never actually prosecuted any person for crimes committed while under the age of 18, instead prioritising accountability for those who recruited and exploited them in the first place.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also sets 18 as the minimum age for prosecution before the ICC, reinforcing the idea that children should not be subject to international criminal punishment.[5]
A significant case that depicted the ICC’s jurisprudence was Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, which was the institution’s first-ever conviction on the recruitment of child soldiers, and it highlighted the severity of the crime.[6] Lubanga’s trial cemented the principle in international criminal law that recruiting and using child soldiers is a prosecutable war crime. It established an important precedent that military leaders can be held directly accountable on the world stage for deploying children in armed conflicts, and further strengthened the argument that children are not appropriate subjects of criminal punishment.
The Question of Responsibility: Can child soldiers be blamed?
At the core of this debate is the question of moral and legal responsibility. It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that child soldiers often operate under extreme coercion. Many are abducted, drugged, threatened or psychologically conditioned to obey orders, which undeniably compromises their ability to form independent moral judgement.
From a criminal law perspective, responsibility depends on capacity, which is the ability to understand the nature of one’s action and to act voluntarily. For many child soldiers, especially those recruited at very young ages, this capacity is significantly impaired.
However, not all child soldiers have the same level of coercion. Some also tend to join these groups voluntarily due to poverty, ideology or survival needs. An example of this is what happened in Sierra Leone during the civil war, where children joined such groups because they were left with no meaningful alternative after their families and communities had already collapsed. What looks like participation from outside often means survival inside extremely limited choices.
This variation makes the legal position more complex. It is difficult to assume that all child soldiers lack capacity in the same way; instead, their experiences, shaped by force, vulnerability and context, are what need to be scrutinised to explain this. This is exactly where international law faces tension, as it must balance the recognition of children as inherently vulnerable with the reality that their involvement in these groups leads to such drastic consequences.
Responsibility, Coercion, and the Limits of Punishment:
The question of criminal responsibility for child soldiers cannot be separated from the conditions in which they are recruited and operate. While criminal law generally relies on both an understanding of wrongdoing and the ability to act freely, both of these elements become complicated in conflict settings involving children. Many of them are exposed to prolonged coercion, fear, and manipulation, which makes it difficult to say their choices are fully voluntary. This is especially evident in situations where refusal is not realistically possible and compliance becomes a matter of survival rather than decision-making.
At the same time, the impact of repeated exposure to violence cannot be ignored. Children who grow up inside armed groups are often shaped by that environment in ways that blur the line between imposed behaviour and internalised conduct. This makes it harder to assess responsibility in a uniform way and reinforces the need for case-by-case evaluation rather than broad assumptions. However, removing accountability entirely raises concerns about justice for victims and the seriousness of international crimes. Even older adolescents can sometimes make limited choices, especially when they’re operating under pressure and coercion, so it becomes more difficult to discuss cases with children even younger (Under 15). The legal challenge is therefore to recognise both victimhood and limited responsibility without collapsing any category.
A solution that offers a workable balance is restorative justice. It focuses on rehabilitation and reintegration rather than punishment, acknowledging harm while reflecting diminished culpability. What makes this approach particularly significant is that it does not ignore accountability, but redefines it in a way that is more realistic for children shaped by conflict. More importantly, this framework aligns with international child rights standards that prioritise the best interests of the child, while still recognising the harm caused and the need for social repair.
Conclusion:
Child soldiering sits in a really uncomfortable space between harm and helplessness. International law clearly sees children as people who need protection, yet their involvement in armed conflict also creates serious harm that cannot simply be ignored. That tension is exactly why traditional ideas of criminal responsibility don’t fit neatly here, since they were built for people acting with real freedom and control, not those shaped by fear, coercion, and survival.
Because of this, treating them only as criminals risks ignoring the conditions that shaped their actions, while treating them only as victims can feel incomplete to those who suffered because of what they did. The challenge is finding a way to recognise both realities without oversimplifying either side.
Restorative justice offers a more balanced way forward. Focusing on healing and reintegration, and it allows for recognition of harm without permanently defining these children by it. In the end, the aim shouldn’t just be punishment, but breaking the cycle that leads children into war in the first place.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES: (OSCOLA)
Primary Sources:
Treaties / International Instruments
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 2002) 2173 UNTS 222 (OPAC)
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3
Case Law / International Tribunals
- Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012)
- Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007)
- Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002)
United Nations Materials
- United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict’ (various annual reports, especially 2005–2022 series)
- UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict S/RES/1612 (2005)
Secondary Sources:
UN Agencies / Reports
UNICEF, Children Recruited by Armed Forces and Armed Groups: Global Trends (2005–2022) (UNICEF Report, 2023)
UNICEF, Children and Armed Conflict: The Impact of War on Children (UNICEF Publications)
UNODC, Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes (United Nations 2006)
[1] UNICEF, Children and Armed Conflict: 25 Years of Grave Violations (Fact Sheet) (UNICEF 2022) https://www.unicef.org/ accessed 30 May 2026.
[2] Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3
[3] Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 February 2002) 2173 UNTS 222 (OPAC)
[4] Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002)
[5] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3
[6] Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012)
