Authored By: Proma Debnath
University of Asia Pacific
I Introduction
Bangladesh’s rivers continue to disappear under the relentless pressure of illegal encroachment, despite of laws and policies, judicial interventions aimed at protecting them. By 2019, the National River Conservation Commission of Bangladesh had identified tens of thousands of river grabbers across the country; yet the Environment Courts had prosecuted virtually none of them.[1] This single disparity encapsulates the institutional failure at the heart of Bangladesh’s environment justice system.
Bangladesh possesses a dedicated environmental adjudication framework in the form of the Environment Court Act, 2010.[2] Yet the country ranks consistently among the world’s most polluted nations. The Buriganga, the Turag and the Shitalakhya continue to receive untreated industrial discharge daily, while the environment courts burdened by criminal procedure, starved of technical expertise and gatekept by executive discretion; remain functionally irrelevant to scale of ecological harm Bangladesh faces.[3] The gap between legal promise and environmental reality is not incidental; it is structural.
This article argues that the Environment Court Act 2010 is institutionally incapable of delivering effective environmental justice and that the establishment of a dedicated expert tribunal modelled on India’s National Green Tribunal Act 2010 is both constitutionally mandated and practically urgent. Part II examines the existing legal framework. Part III analyses the relevant case law. Part
IV identifies the three structural deficiencies of the current system. Part V draws on comparative experience from India, Kenya and Australia. Part VI makes the constitutional case for reform.
II.Legal Framework: The Environment Court Act 2010
The ECA 2010 constitutes the primary institutional mechanism for environmental adjudication in Bangladesh. Section 4 of the act establishes environment courts at the district level, each presided over by a Joint District Judge who performs this function in addition to his or her ordinary civil court duties.[4] The courts possess jurisdiction over offences and compensation claims arising under the Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act 1995 and any other law subsequently specified by the Government in the official Gazette.[5]
The ECA 2010 creates a prosecution-dependent model: the environment courts may only receive a claim for compensation upon the written report an Inspector of the Department of Environment (DoE).[6] Similarly, no Special Magistrate Court may take cognizance of an offence expect on the written report of a DoE Inspector.[7] This gatekeeping function vests significant discretionary power in an executive agency subject to political influence and budgetary constraints. In practice, despite tens of thousands of documented environmental violations, the environment courts have received an average of fewer than one hundred cases per since 2010.[8]
The procedural framework is equally deficient. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 governs trials before the environment courts.[9] Criminal procedure is adversarial, slow and designed for individual culpability rather than systemic environment harm. There is no provision for scientific assessors, no mechanism for precautionary interim relief independent of executive action and no Suo motu jurisdiction. The ECA 2010 also makes no reference to the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principles or sustainable development; norms central to environmental jurisprudence globally and expressly adopted by the Indian NGT.[10]
III.Case Law Analysis
Judicial engagement with environmental protection in Bangladesh has occurred not primarily through the environment courts but through the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court Division under Article 102 of the Constitution[11]. The foundational case is Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh (1997) in which the Appellate Division recognized the standing of the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) to bring a public interest petition challenging the environmental impact of a flood management project.[12] The court interpreted the phrase ‘person aggrieved’ in Article 102 expansively, holding that organizations espousing genuine public causes could bring proceedings on behalf of those unable to access the courts themselves. This decision constituted the foundation of environmental public interest litigation in Bangladesh, though it operated entirely outside the ECA framework.
In the Industrial Pollution Case (2001), the High Court Division to ensure that industrial units adopted adequate pollution control measures within one year and to report compliance to the court.[13] The judgement acknowledged that although extensive environmental legislation existed, the polluting industrial units and factories continued to operate in reckless disregard of constitutional mandates. Orders remained largely unimplemented, illustrating the enforcement gap between judicial pronouncement and executive compliance that consistently afflicts environmental adjudication in Bangladesh.
In the Tannery Relocation Case (2003), BELA filed a writ petition seeking directions for the relocation of tanneries from which was causing grievous damage to the Buriganga River and surrounding ecology.[14] Despite judicial intervention, relocation was delayed for over a decade due to failures of inter-agency coordination and executive inaction. These cases reveal a consistent pattern of meaningful environmental adjudication in Bangladesh has occurred through the superior courts acting in their constitutional capacity not through the specialist tribunal established for that purpose. The environment courts have generated negligible reported jurisprudence.[15]
IV.Critical Evaluation: Three Structural Deficiencies
Absence of Technical Expertise
Environmental disputes are frequently of a scientific character. Determining whether a discharge exceeds permissible limits, evaluating the adequacy of an environmental impact assessment or assessing cumulative ecological harm requires expertise in chemistry, hydrology, ecology or environmental engineering. The ECA 2010 makes no provisions for technical members or scientific assessors on the bench. The designated Joint District Judge brings legal training, but no scientific competence and the Act imposes no obligation on the court to obtain independent technical assistance.[16]
This contrasts sharply with the Indian NGT, whose composition under section 5 of the NGT Act mandates both judicial members drawn from the superior judiciary and expert members possessing postgraduate qualifications and a minimum of fifteen years of experience in environmental science or related disciplines.[17] Section 4 of the ECA Act 2010 contains no equivalent expertise requirements, despite the self-evidently scientific and technical nature of environmental violations.[18] Furthermore, section 5(3) of the NGT Act prohibits judicial and expert members from holding any other office simultaneously; ensuring full-time dedication to environmental adjudication, a requirement wholly absent from the ECA 2010.
Structural Barries to Access
Access to environmental justice in Bangladesh is constrained by the prosecution-dependent model of the ECA 2010. Affected communities, local NGOs and civil society organizations cannot initiate proceedings as of right. Sections 6(3) and 7(4) impose a requirement for prior DoE Inspector authorization that has in practice, deterred private complaints.[19] The DoE maintains offices in only a limited number of districts and its inspectorate is chronically understaffed. The financial and procedural burden of navigating criminal procedure further excludes the rural and marginalized harm.
The Indian NGT by contrast, permits any person aggrieved by an environmental decision or seeking enforcement of environmental law to file an application directly before the tribunal.[20] Filling fees are nominal and procedures simplified to facilitate lay participation. This design reflects the principle of public access to environmental justice affirmed in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration to which Bangladesh is signatory.[21]
Enforcement Deficit
The enforceability of environment court orders is hampered by structural constraints. The penalty ceiling a maximum of ten lakh taka under section 15 of the Environment Conservation Act 1995 bears no proportionate relationship to the scale of industrial environmental harm. Tanneries in Hazaribagh, documented by Human Rights Watch to be discharging toxic chromium effluent into the Buriganga, faced penalties negligible relative to their operational profits.[22]
A study of heavy metal contamination in 2025 found surface water of Buriganga had chromium concentrations as high as 167,160 μg/L and lead as high as 3,830 μg/L, several orders of magnitude higher than safe limits. Effluent from tanneries, textiles and dyeing was identified as the main contributor.[23] The failure to enforce the law continued even after the tanneries were moved from Hazaribagh. By 2025, the Department of Environment had served final notices of compliance to 390 industries in the relocated tannery belt alone, but more than 90 percent of them still had no effluent treatment plants in operation.[24] This pattern documentation without consequence is the empirical signature of the enforcement deficit described above.
The NGT Act 2010 by contrast, empowers the tribunal under section 20 to award compensation, impose penalties and direct environmental, impose penalties and direct environmental restoration as civil remedies without requiring criminal conviction.[25] In Re: Ganga and Yamuna River Pollution (2015), the NGT imposed substantial financial penalties and directed remediation on a scale and within a timeline that criminal prosecution could not have achieved.[26]
V.Comparative Perspectives
The Indian National Green Tribunal established under the NGT Act 2010, represents the most directly relevant model for Bangladesh. It exercises original jurisdiction under section 14 of the NGT Act over all civil cases involving a sustainable question relating to the environment.[27] Its bench combines judicial and expert member in equal numbers. This tribunal applies the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle and sustainable development as mandatory interpretive frameworks under section 20; norms conspicuously absent from the ECA 2010. The NGTs constitutional grounding draws on Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and the landmark environmental jurisprudence of MC Mehta v Union of India (1987).[28]
Kenya’s Environment and Land Court established under the Environment and the Land Court Act 2011, exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction over environmental disputes and integrates alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to facilitate community-level resolution.[29] The New South Wales Land and Environment Court established in 1979 is among the oldest specialist environmental courts globally, demonstrating the long-term institutional sustainability of such bodies.[30] A direct comparison between the NGT and Bangladesh’s environment courts reveals a decisive institutional gap across every measurable dimension: judicial composition, access to justice, procedural flexibility, remedial powers and enforcement capacity. [31]The convergence of global practice confirms that environmental adjudication cannot be adequately conducted within general-purpose criminal or civil courts.
The Constitutional Case for an NGT-style Tribunal in Bangladesh
Bangladesh’s domestic reform obligation does not rest on constitutional text alone; it is reinforced by a dense web of international environmental commitments the state has already undertaken. Bangladesh signed the convention on Biological Diversity at Rio in 1992 and ratified it in 1994[32], committing the state to conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components and equitable benefit-sharing obligations directly implicated by the continued degradation of riverine ecosystems such as the Buriganga and Turag. Bangladesh is likewise a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change which entered into force in 1994 and has since submitted Nationally Determined Contributions elaborating sector-specific climate obligations. [33]
None of these instruments is self-executing in Bangladeshi law and none of them creates a directly enforceable individual right without the enactment of domestic legislation. Nevertheless, they are important to the argument of this article in three ways. Secondly, the duty to “protect and improve the environment” under Article 18A cannot be interpreted to be narrower than the substantive content already accepted by Bangladesh under the CBD, UNFCCC and Stockholm Convention[34], pursuant to the interpretive principle that, where possible, domestic law should be construed consistently with the international obligations voluntarily assumed. Second, the enforcement gap found in enforcement deficit is not simply a failure of domestic administration, but a deficit in Bangladesh’s capacity to comply with these treaties, because a state cannot fulfil treaty-level pollution control and biodiversity obligations effectively through a court system that hears fewer than one hundred cases per year. Third, the Indian NGT itself was partly designed to operationalize India’s international environmental commitments via a specialist domestic forum. An NGT-style tribunal in Bangladesh would perform the equivalent domesticating function here, translating treaty level commitments into justiciable domestic standards rather than leaving them as unenforceable executive undertakings.
Article 18A of the Constitution of Bangladesh, inserted by the Fifteenth Amendment in 2011 imposes on the state a duty to protect and improve the environment, to preserve and safeguard natural resources, biodiversity, wetlands, forest and wildlife for present and future generations.[35] This provision informs the constitutional obligation of the legislature to enact effective institutional mechanisms for environmental protection. The persistent failure of the ECA 2010 to deliver meaningful outcomes constitutes, it is submitted a failure of the state to discharge this constitutional commitment.
The establishment of a National Green Tribunal in Bangladesh would be legally straightforward within the existing constitutional framework. The model proposed by this article would compromise a principal bench in Dhaka and circuit sittings in Chattogram and Khulna. The tribunal should exercise original jurisdiction over applications by any person for enforcement of environmental laws and relief from environmental harm as well as appellate jurisdiction over DoE decisions. The composition of the bench should require at least one judicial member drawn from the District Judge cadre or above and at least one expert member possessing postgraduate qualifications and professional experience in environmental science or a cognate discipline.
The tribunal should be empowered to apply the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle as mandatory interpretive framework giving statutory expression to the international; environmental commitments Bangladesh has undertaken.[36] Without such a dedicated institutional framework, Article 18A will remain a constitutional aspiration rather than an enforceable environment.
VII.Conclusion
The ECA 2010 has not failed Bangladesh’s environment solely due to poor implementation. It has failed because it was designed to fail. It uses a criminal procedure framework for environmental harm, overseen by part-time judges without scientific knowledge. Access relies on executive discretion and the solutions focus on individual punishment rather than overall restoration. The Buriganga still receives industrial waste. The tanneries only moved after decades of court orders. Environmental courts remain sidelined in environmental governance.
This article argues that the structural problems in the ECA 2010 cannot be fixed within the current framework. Only by creating a National Green Tribunal made up of expert judges, allowing open access for affected individuals, having civil remedial powers and being grounded in Article 18A can we achieve the environmental justice that Bangladesh’s ecological crisis requires. The experiences of India, Kenya and New South Wales show that these tribunals can work well, be legally effective and gain public trust. This systemic failure also impacts the international scene. A court system handling fewer than one hundred cases a year cannot effectively meet the pollution control and biodiversity duties Bangladesh has already accepted under the CBD, UNFCCC and Stockholm Convention. Bangladesh has made a constitutional promise to protect the environment. What it needs now is the determination to enforce it. The establishment of an NGT-style tribunal is not merely a reform option; it is a constitutional imperative. Green justice has been long enough.
References and Bibliography
Cases
Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v Bangladesh and Others, Writ Petition No 1430 of 2003 (High Court Division, Bangladesh) (Tannery Relocation Case).
Farooque v Bangladesh, Writ Petition No 891 of 1994 (High Court Division, Bangladesh, 15 July 2001) (Industrial Pollution Case).
In Re: Ganga and Yamuna River Pollution, Original Application No 200 of 2014 (National Green Tribunal, India, 2015).
MC Mehta v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395 (Supreme Court of India).
Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh (1997) 49 DLR (AD) 1 (Appellate Division, Bangladesh).
Legislation
Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act 1995 (Act No 1 of 1995) (Bangladesh).
Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898) (Bangladesh).
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972.
Environment and Land Court Act 2011 (Act No 19 of 2011) (Kenya).
Environment Court Act 2010 (Act No 56 of 2010) (Bangladesh).
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW, Australia).
National Green Tribunal Act 2010 (Act No 19 of 2010) (India).
International Instruments
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (adopted 14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26.
Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79; Bangladesh ratified 1994.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107.
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (adopted 22 May 2001, entered into force 17 May 20040, 2256, UNTS 119.
Secondary Sources
Habib MA, ‘Reflections on Environmental Adjudication Regime of Bangladesh’ (Bangladesh Law Digest, 12 June 2015) https://bdlawdigest.org/bangladesh-environment-court-act-2010.html accessed 20 June 2026.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Toxic Tanneries: The Health Repercussions of Bangladesh’s Hazaribagh Leather’ (HRW 2012) https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/09/toxic-tanneries/health-repercussions-bangladeshs-hazaribagh-leather accessed 1 July 2026.
Heavy Metals and Microplastics as Emerging Contaminants in Bangladesh’s River Systems’ (2025) NCBI PMC12474336 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12474336/ .
The Business Standard, ‘Billions Down the Drain, Yet Dhaka’s Rivers Are Still Dying’ (2026) https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/billions-down-drain-yet-dhakas-rivers-are-still- dying-1454166 accessed 1 July 2026.
Islam R, ‘Environment Courts of Bangladesh in Comparison with Indian Court’ (Law Help BD, 8 December 2017) https://lawhelpbd.com/international-law/environmental-law/environment-courts-bangladesh-comparison-indian-court/ accessed 20 June 2026.
Lawyersclub Bangladesh, ‘Revisiting Enforcement of the Environment Court: A Contextual Analysis’ (5 June 2020) https://lawyersclubbangladesh.com/en/2020/06/05/revisiting-enforcement-of-the-environment-court-a-contextual-analysis/ accessed 20 June 2026.
New Age, ‘It is Well Past Time to Save Rivers’ (18 March 2022) https://www.newagebd.net/article/165725/it-is-well-past-time-to-save-rivers accessed 20 June 2026.
Prothom Alo, ‘Environment Laws and Courts Exist, but No Cases’ (13 March 2021) https://en.prothomalo.com/environment/environment-laws-and-courts-exist-but-no-cases accessed 20 June 2026.
Sands P and Peel J, Principles of International Environmental Law (4th edn, Cambridge University Press2018)https://assets.cambridge.org/97811084/20952/frontmatter/9781108420952_frontmatter.pdf accessed 1 July 2026.
TBS News, ‘Restricted Access to Environmental Justice’ (27 January 2022)https://www.tbsnews.net/supplement/restricted-access-environmental-justice-363046 accessed 20 June 2026.
The Daily Star, ‘Effective Functioning of Environment Court’ (25 August 2015) https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/effective-functioning-environment-court-131956 accessed 20 June 2026.
The Daily Star, ‘Should Bangladesh go for Green Tribunals?’ (26 December 2024) https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/should-bangladesh-go-green-tribunals-3785321 accessed 20 June 2026.
[1] New Age, ‘It is Well Past Time to save Rivers’ (18 March 2022) https://www.newagebd.net/article/165725 accessed 20 June 2026.
[2] Environment Court Act 2010 (Act No XLVIII Of 2010) http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-1061.html accessed 20 June 2026.
[3]Lawyersclub Bangladesh, ‘Revising Enforcement of the Environment Court’ (5 June 2020) https://lawyersclubbangladesh.com/en/2020/06/05/revisiting-enforcement-of-the-environment-court-a-contextual-analysis/ accessed 20 June 2026.
[4] Environment Court Act 2010 (Act No 56 of 2010), s 4 (Bangladesh).
[5] Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act 1995 (Act No 1 of 1995) http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-791.html accessed 20 June 2026.
[6] Environment Court Act 2010, s 7(4).
[7] Environment Court Act 2010, s 6(3).
[8] Lawyerclub Bangladesh (n 1); Md Ahsan Habib, ‘Reflections on Environmental Adjudication Regime of Bangladesh’ (Bangladesh Law Digest, 12 June 2015) http://bdlawdigest.org/bangladesh-environment-court-act-2010.html accessed 20 June 2026.
[9] Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1989) (Bangladesh) http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-75.html accessed 2 July 2026.
[10] The Daily Star, ‘Should Bangladesh go for Green Tribunals?’ (26 December 2024) https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/should-bangladesh-go-green-tribunals-3785321 accessed 20 June 2026.
[11] Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 102.
[12]Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh (1997) 49 DLR (AD) 1 (Appellate Division, Bangladesh) https://www.studocu.com/row/document/eastern-university/consumer-behavior/49-dlr-ad-1-ashkdvabdlanukid/124800871 accessed 1 July 2026.
[13]Farooque v Bangladesh, Writ Pettion No 891 of 1994 9High Court Division, Bangladesh 15 July 2001) (Industrial Pollution Case) https://belabangla.org/dr-mohiuddin-farooque-v-bangladesh-others-writ-petition-no-891-1994-industrial-pollution-case/ accessed 1 July 2026.
[14] Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v Bangladesh and others, Writ Petition No 1430 of 2003 (High Court Division, Bangladesh) (Tannery Relocation Case) https://elaw.org/resource/bangladesh-bela-v-government-bangladesh-and-others-wp-2003-tannery-case-original-petition accessed 1 July 2026.
[15] TBS News, ‘Restricted Access to Environmental Justice’ (27 January 2022) http://www.tbsnews.net/supplement/restricted-access-environmental-justice-363046 accessed 20 June 2026.
[16] The Daily Star (n 8); Rayhanul Islam, ‘Environment Courts of Bangladesh in Comparison with Indian Court’ (Law Help BD, 8 December 2017) https://lawhelpbd.com/international-law/environmental-law/environment-courts-bangladesh-comparison-indian-court/ accessed 20 June 2026.
[17] National Green Tribunal Act 2010 (Act No 19 of 2010), s 5 (Indian) https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2025 accessed 1 July 2026.
[18] Islam (n 13).
[19] Environment Court Act 2010, s 6(3) and 7(4) Bangladesh.
[20] National Green Tribunal Act 2010, s 18 (India).
[21] Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (adopted 14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26, Principle 10 http://www.un-documents.net/rio-dec.htm accessed 1 July 2026.
[22] Human Rights Watch, ‘Toxic Tanneries: The Health Repercussions of Bangladesh’s Hazaribagh Leather’ (HRW 2012) 1 https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/10/09/toxic-tanneries/health-repercussions-bangladeshs-hazaribagh-leather accessed 1 July 2026.
[23]‘Heavy Metals and Microplastics as Emerging Contaminants in Bangladesh’s River Systems’ (2025) NCBI PMC12474336 https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12474336/ accessed 1 July 2026.
[24] The Business Standard, ‘Billions Down the Drain, Yet Dhaka’s Rivers Are Still Dying’ (2026) https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/billions-down-drain-yet-dhakas-rivers-are-still- dying-1454166 accessed 1 July 2026.
[25] National Green Tribunal Act 2010, s 20 (India).
[26] In Re: Ganga and Yamuna River Pollution Original Application No 200 of 2014.
[27] National Green Tribunal Act 2010, s 14 (India).
[28] MC Mehta v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395 (Supreme Court of India) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1486949/ accessed 1 July 2026.
[29] Environment and Land Court Act 2011 (Act No 19 of 2011) (Kenya) https://www.parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2017-05/EnvironmentandLandCourtAct_No19of2011.pdf accessed 1 July 2026.
[30] Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW, Australia) https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act-1979-204 accessed 1 July 2026.
[31] Islam (n 13).
[32] Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79; Bangladesh ratified 1994 https://jncc.gov.uk/our-work/convention-on-biological-diversity/ accessed 1 July 2026.
[33] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change accessed 1 July 2026.
[34] Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (adopted 22 May 2001, entered into force 17 May 20040, 2256, UNTS 119 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_Convention_on_Persistent_Organic_Pollutants accessed 1 July 2026.
[35] Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 1972, art 18A (as inserted by the Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act 2011) http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367.html accessed 1 July 2026.
[36] Philipps Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2018) 228 https://assets.cambridge.org/97811084/20952/frontmatter/9781108420952_frontmatter.pdf accessed 1 July 2026.
