Authored By: Lethabo Moffat Myakayaka
UNISA (University Of South Africa)
Introduction
On 9 February 2020, intruders broke into President Cyril Ramaphosa’s Phala Phala farm in Limpopo and allegedly stole a hefty sum of undeclared foreign currency, roughly US$580,000, that had been hidden inside a sofa. What began as a mere burglary quickly became one of the most significant tests of executive accountability in the history of South Africa’s democratic era.[1] The incident might never have reached public awareness had it not been for Mr Arthur Fraser, the former Director-General of the State Security Agency, who brought it to light in June 2022 by filing a formal criminal complaint against President Ramaphosa.[2] These serious charges against a head of state have exposed deep tensions between the constitutional promise of ethical leadership.
At the heart of the matter is section 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which sets out the ethical standards and rules of conduct applicable to Cabinet members, including the President, requiring them to act in line with a prescribed code of ethics.[3] This constitutional duty is given practical effect by the Executive Ethics Code, which explicitly prohibits members of the executive from engaging in conduct that falls outside acceptable ethical boundaries.[4] These standards are an essential part of the Constitution’s broader commitment to accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, as reflected in sections 1 and 195.[5]
The Phala Phala matter raises pressing questions about how effectively these ethical standards are enforced It came as a shock to many South African citizens when the Public Protector cleared the President of certain criminal or ethical breaches,[6] while an Independent Panel established under section 89 of the Constitution found prima facie evidence of serious violations implicating the President.[7] This finding, and Parliament’s initial refusal to act on it, was later declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in its May 2026 judgment in Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly.[8]
This article examines the Phala Phala scandal as a critical case study in the enforcement and limitations of South Africa’s executive ethics framework. It argues that while ethical standards exist in written form, they are not consistently applied in practice, and that this has created a persistent accountability gap at the highest level of government.
The Legal and Ethical Framework for Executive Accountability
The foundation of this matter rests in section 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which establishes the ethical standards and rules of conduct for Cabinet members, including the President.[9] Section 96(1) requires members of the Cabinet and Deputy Ministers to act in accordance with a code of ethics prescribed by national legislation. Section 96(2) expressly prohibits them from:
(a) acting in a manner inconsistent with their office,
(b) exposing themselves to a conflict between their official responsibilities and private interests, and
(c) using their position to enrich themselves or improperly benefit others.
Given that the President regularly emphasises constitutional supremacy in his public addresses, it is worth noting that this constitutional obligation is given effect by the Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and the Executive Ethics Code promulgated in 2000.[10] The Code sets out detailed standards of conduct expected of the President and other executive members. It requires them to act honestly and in good faith even in private settings, to avoid conflicts between official duties and personal interests, to disclose financial interests and gifts, and to protect their office from reputational harm or undue influence.
These ethical standards form a core part of the Constitution’s broader commitment to accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, as reflected in sections 1 and 195.[11] Section 1 establishes the Republic on the foundations of constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and accountability. Section 195(1) further requires public administration to be guided by democratic values and principles, including the promotion and maintenance of high professional ethical standards.
Oversight of executive conduct is spread across several institutions. The Public Protector, under section 182 of the Constitution, has the power to investigate improper conduct in state affairs.[12] Parliament exercises political oversight, including through section 89 impeachment processes. The judiciary, and particularly the Constitutional Court, plays a significant role in interpreting these provisions and ensuring compliance.
While this framework appears thorough and well-structured on paper, critics point out that the Executive Ethics Code has significant practical shortcomings, most notably the lack of strong, independent enforcement mechanisms.[13] A great deal of the oversight ultimately depends on political actors in Parliament, and this structural vulnerability raises fundamental questions about how effective the accountability system can be when the allegations concern the President himself.
This legal and ethical framework provides the standard against which the conduct at the centre of the Phala Phala matter must be assessed.
Case Law Analysis: Institutional Responses to the Phala Phala Matter
The fact that these allegations against the head of state only became public knowledge in June 2022, already a warning sign regarding the President’s approach to transparency, followed the former Director-General of the State Security Agency laying criminal charges against him.[14] Those charges included concealment of a crime, money laundering, tax violations, and the alleged involvement of the Presidential Protection Service in a private matter.
Several key institutions have examined this case, and their responses have differed considerably in both approach and conclusion.
The Public Protector investigated the allegations and released a report in 2023, clearing President Ramaphosa of major ethical or criminal wrongdoing.[15] This finding has drawn criticism for relying on a narrow reading of the Executive Ethics Code and for not adequately engaging with the broader questions of conflict of interest and the use of state resources for private protection.
In contrast, the Independent Panel appointed by Parliament under section 89 of the Constitution took a markedly different approach. Chaired by retired Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo, the Panel released its report in November 2022 and found prima facie evidence that the President had committed serious constitutional violations.[16] It specifically identified potential breaches of section 96(2), including a failure to report the theft under section 34(1) of PRECCA, the involvement of the Presidential Protection Service, and the risk of conflict between private business interests and presidential duties. The Panel’s reasoning made clear that the President is held to the highest ethical standards, and that even the appearance of impropriety can undermine constitutional democracy and damage the reputation of the presidential office.
Parliament’s decision in December 2022 not to proceed with impeachment was subsequently challenged by the Economic Freedom Fighters and the African Transformation Movement. In its landmark judgment of 8 May 2026 in Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court found that Parliament’s process and its reliance on Rule 129I were unconstitutional.[17] The Court reaffirmed Parliament’s constitutional duty to properly consider prima facie findings of presidential misconduct, drawing on its earlier reasoning in the Nkandla matter (Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016).[18] Notably, the Constitutional Court confined itself to procedural issues and did not determine the substantive merits of the allegations against the President. While this judgment strengthens procedural safeguards, it has also highlighted the ongoing challenges in holding the executive accountable through politically influenced institutions.
Comparative Perspectives
The difficulties exposed by the Phala Phala matter are not unique to South Africa. Looking briefly at other countries helps illustrate both the strengths and the weaknesses of South Africa’s framework for holding the executive accountable.
Kenya offers a useful point of comparison within Africa. Like South Africa, Kenya adopted a progressive Constitution in 2010 that places strong emphasis on leadership and integrity. The country created the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) as an independent body with a broad mandate to investigate and address corruption. The EACC has certainly faced political interference and limited resources, but its existence as a dedicated, specialised anti-corruption institution still stands in contrast to South Africa’s more fragmented approach, which leans heavily on the Public Protector and Parliament. Despite its flaws, Kenya’s model makes a more deliberate effort to shield anti-corruption work from direct political influence than South Africa’s current system does.
In the United States, Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution allows for the removal of a president on grounds of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours. The American system is also susceptible to partisan politics, as recent impeachments have shown, but it functions within a stronger culture of separated powers and independent institutions. Congressional oversight committees, a relatively independent Department of Justice, and a free press together create multiple layers of accountability that South Africa currently lacks at the executive level. That said, the high bar for conviction – requiring a two-thirds majority in the Senate – often makes impeachment more of a symbolic exercise than a practical enforcement tool.
These comparisons point to a clear pattern. South Africa’s Constitution contains sophisticated accountability mechanisms in theory, but in practice the country relies too heavily on institutions that are vulnerable to political influence. Nations that maintain stronger and more independent anti-corruption bodies, or that draw clearer boundaries between political actors and oversight functions, generally do a better job of enforcing ethical standards – even though no system is entirely immune to political pressure.
Conclusion
The Phala Phala scandal has laid bare the significant gap between South Africa’s constitutional promises of executive accountability and the practical reality of their enforcement. This article has demonstrated that while section 96 of the Constitution and the Executive Ethics Code establish clear ethical standards for members of the executive, these provisions have proven largely ineffective when applied to the President. The contrasting outcomes of the Public Protector’s clearance and the Independent Panel’s prima facie findings, coupled with Parliament’s initial resistance and the Constitutional Court’s procedural intervention, illustrate how political majoritarianism continues to undermine independent oversight.
Ultimately, the Phala Phala matter confirms the central argument of this article: although South Africa possesses a sophisticated constitutional framework for executive ethics, systemic weaknesses in enforcement mechanisms particularly the over-reliance on politically influenced institutions have created a persistent accountability gap at the highest level of government. This gap not only erodes public trust but threatens the credibility of the constitutional democracy established in 1994.To address these shortcomings, meaningful reforms are urgently required. These should include the establishment of an independent Ethics Commission with investigative and prosecutorial powers, the strengthening of section 89 procedures to reduce political interference, and clearer guidelines on the separation between presidential private business interests and official duties. Legislative amendments to the Executive Members’ Ethics Act that introduce automatic consequences for serious breaches of the Code should also be considered.
The Phala Phala case serves as a critical litmus test for South Africa’s constitutional maturity. Without deliberate and decisive action to close the accountability gap, the ideals of ethical leadership and the rule of law will remain aspirational rather than real. The future legitimacy of the country’s democratic institutions may well depend on how effectively this challenge is confronted.
References (OSCOLA)
Cases
Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly [2026] ZACC 10 (8 May 2026).
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC).
Statutes
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998.
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.
Secondary Sources
Independent Panel, Report of the Independent Panel established in terms of Rule 129 of the Rules of the National Assembly (November 2022).
Public Protector, Report on an Investigation into Allegations Relating to the Phala Phala Farm (2023).
[1] News24, ‘Phala Phala: What We Know So Far’ (updated June 2022).
[2] Criminal complaint laid by Arthur Fraser against President Cyril Ramaphosa (June 2022).
[3] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 96.
[4] Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and Executive Ethics Code (2000).
[5]Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 1 and 195.
[6] Public Protector, Report on an Investigation into Allegations Relating to the Phala Phala Farm (2023).
[7] Independent Panel, Report of the Independent Panel established in terms of Rule 129 of the Rules of the National Assembly (November 2022).
[8] Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly [2026] ZACC 10 (8 May 2026).
[9] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 96.
[10] Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and Executive Ethics Code (2000).
[11] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ss 1 and 195.
[12] Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, s 182.
[13] Independent Panel Report (n 7).
[14] Criminal complaint by Arthur Fraser (n 2).
[15] Public Protector Report (n 6).
[16] Independent Panel Report (n 7).
[17] Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Speaker of the National Assembly [2026] ZACC 10 (n 8).
[18] Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 (3) SA 580 (CC).
