Authored By: Nokwanda Nkumane
University of Fort Hare
INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a major issue in South Africa, billions go missing annually. One may ask why those in higher positions who misuse their powers to benefit themselves are not held accountable by the law? The present-day developments in the judiciary, such as the commission of inquiry into the corruption prosecutions, have revealed the true extent of the menace and how our laws are failing to address it effectively. Abuse of a position in public or private life for personal or corporate benefit has a damaging effect on governance, destroys public trust, and undermines the rule of law. Despite the presence of robust anti-corruption laws, lack of effective enforcement, political manipulation, and weak institutions often prevent effective accountability. Many countries have in place effective laws against the plague, but the issue of accountability remains a major challenge.
The article will outline that, despite the many legislative and institutional mechanisms in place to combat the problem, their effectiveness depends on enforcement and on lessons drawn from more effective jurisdictions. The article will first discuss the extent to which the law defines and covers the problem, then proceed to draw lessons from more effective jurisdictions, and finally propose reforms to strengthen existing legislation.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING CORRUPTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
In South Africa, corruption is regulated through the constitution and legislation. Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 sets forth basic values of accountability, responsiveness, and openness. Section 195 of this constitution entrenches public administration and holds that a high standard of professional ethics shall be maintained and that public administration shall be characterized by efficiency and transparency. These provisions establish a context in which public power is exercised and by which corruption is measured.
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (Precca) sets forth a strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption or corrupt activities. Section 3 sets forth a general offense of corruption that requires a showing of evidence of gratification given or received for the benefit of improper activities. As stated by Snyman, PRECCA extends corruption beyond bribery to include indirect and systematic acts.
Corruption ruined public trust, weakened democracy, hampers economic development, and worsens inequality, poverty, social division, and the environmental crisis. It occurs when public servants demand or accept money any Favors in exchange of service politicians misuse public funds, or award jobs or contracts to friends, family members, and sponsors. It also includes corporations bribing officials to secure lucrative deals. Corruption can occur anywhere in business, government, or the courts, involving anyone like politicians, officials, and the public. It can happen in secret with the help of professional enablers like bankers, lawyers, accountants, and real estate agents.
Accountability mechanisms are found in the Public Management Act 1 of 1999 and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003. The MFMA aims to secure reasonable management of municipal finance, regulate financial dealings within the local sphere of government, while the PMA regulates financial management in the national and provincial government to ensure that all revenue, expenditure, assets, and liabilities of those governments are managed effectively, to provide for the responsibilities of persons entrusted with financial management in those governments; and to provide for matters connected therewith. However, De Vos argues the framework remains normatively strong but institutionally weak, highlighting the gap between legal design and effective enforcement.
KEY CASE LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
South African courts have played a massive role in enforcing accountability and structuring anti-corruption jurisprudence. In Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court held that the state has a constitutional obligation to create and maintain an independent anti-corruption body. The court emphasises that independent agencies are essential to combat corruption effectively.
Similarly, Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and others, and Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and others, confirmed the binding nature of the Public Protector’s remedial action. The court held that the state actors’ failure to comply with such findings infringes constitutional accountability, and ordered the president to repay the state funds that were misused. In Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa, the court further stated the independence of the Hawks, reinforcing the requirement of structural and operational autonomy.
Outside of the judiciary, commissions of inquiry have also shed more light on the endemic nature of the problem. For instance, the Zondo Commission Report (2022) has offered sufficient evidence of state capture, detailing how corruption was organised and facilitated by organs of the state both in public and private sectors. Similar to the Madlanga commission(2025) announced in July to investigate allegations made by KwaZulu-Natal provincial police commissioner Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi of collusion and corruption between politicians, senior police, prosecutors, intelligence operatives, and elements of the judiciary in South Africa. It highlighted the ongoing failure of governance, political interference, and poor enforcement systems, confirming that corruption in South Africa is more deeply protected than incidental.
At an operational level, the case of Vusimuzi “cat” Matlala shows how corruption manifests within law enforcement structures, and it also provides the commission with leads on how organised crime may have interacted with senior law enforcement and political figures, forming a nexus between crime, governance, and administrative oversight.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS: GAPS, CHALLENGES, AND THE CASE OF REFORM
The ongoing case of corruption in South Africa demonstrates the disparity between the laws that exist and the laws that are implemented. Although the court has laws that address the issue of corruption, the implications of the laws are inconsistent and are often influenced by politics. As De Vos argued, the core issue lies not in the lack of laws but in the failure of the institutions to apply them correctly.
The biggest challenge in SA is not the lack of laws, but a lack of consistent, institutional independence and capacity, even though Glenister requires an independent anti-corruption body like Hawks to remain exposed to executive influence. The outcome of the Madlanga Commission reinforces this concern, illustrating poor safeguards and a lack of accountability as the main cause of the current corruption in SA. Also, the political interference remains the biggest problem to meaningful accountability as the shield allies from investigations and delays the investigative units and prosecutors.
The PRECCA, even though it provides a strong framework, enforcement is inconsistent as the corruption offences tend to complicate enforcement. As Burchell notes, modern corruption operates in the complex networks that are hard to prosecute using old legal tools. SA accountability mechanisms are more reactive in a way that the public protectors and the commissions of inquiry, such as the Zondo commission and the Madlanga commission, tend to act after the corruption has occurred, rather than preventing the corruption from happening.
To fight corruption, we must embrace transparency, which is all about knowing who, why, what, how, and how much. Transparency simply means shedding light on formal and informal rules, plans, processes, and actions, which helps us, the public, hold all powers to account for the common good. Seeking and receiving information is a human right that can act as a safeguard against corruption and increase trust in decision makers and public institutions. However, transparency is not only about making information available, but it ensures that information can be easily accessed, understood, and used by citizens.
Another area for reform is in the strengthening of the doctrine of the separation of powers, which is part of our constitutional framework, and which is essential in the avoidance of the abuse of power in the various spheres of government through checks and balances. This would include the independence of the National Prosecuting Authority, parliamentary oversight, and the independence of anti-corruption bodies. In this way, it could serve as a structural mechanism to prevent corruption.
This is evident in comparative jurisdictions, where in Hong Kong and Singapore, it has been noted that a strong anti-corruption strategy is one that relies on independent bodies, strong political will, and a single “type A” anti-corruption agency (ACA). . What is thus necessary for South Africa is to strengthen its anti-corruption agencies, constitutional framework, and culture of accountability to close the gap between our laws and how they are practiced.
CONCLUSION
The analysis has sought to illustrate that while South Africa has an overarching body of legislation aimed at combating corruption, which is constitutionally entrenched and underpinned by legislation such as the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, and is further buttressed by landmark Constitutional Court decisions such as Glenister and Economic Freedom Fighters, its efficacy is significantly undermined by institutional incapacity. Moreover, the analysis of the case law, combined with that of the Zondo and Madlanga Commissions, has sought to illustrate that corruption is not merely an unfortunate feature of South African society, but rather a pervasive problem that is embedded within the body politic and is enabled by institutional incapacity.
In this context, this article has sought to illustrate that the problem is not that South Africa does not have adequate legislation aimed at combating corruption, but rather that such legislation is not being effectively implemented within a system that is fundamentally flawed because of institutional incapacity. In this context, the only way forward is to ensure that there is a reform of the system that ensures greater independence and efficacy of anti-corruption institutions in terms of the doctrine of separation of powers. One concrete step forward would be the establishment of a fully independent, constitutionally entrenched anti-corruption body with full autonomy and resources. Such a reform is essential to the restoration of public trust and the realisation of the constitutional promise of accountability and transparency.
REFERENCE(S):
CASES
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and others, and Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and others CCT 143/15 and CCT 171/15 (2016).
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC).
Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC).
S v Vusimuzi “cat” Matlala (ongoing case).
LAGISLATIONS
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 2004.
BOOKS
Burchell J, Principle of criminal law (2016).
Jon S.T. Quah; Combating Corruption in Asian Countries: Learning from Success & Failure. Daedalus 2018; 147 (3): 202–215.
Snyman CR criminal law 6 ed (2014).
JOURNAL ARTICLES
De Vos, P “State capture and the rule of law” (2019) SAJHR.
“Madlanga commission must confront criminal capture of justice system”. www.polity.org.za. Retrieved 17 September 2025.
Transparency International, ‘About Us’ (n.d.) <https://www.transparency.org> accessed 25 March 2026.
REPORTS
Madlanga Commission Report (2025).
The Zondo Commission Report (2022).
