Authored By: Juwe Uzochikwa Rabin
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
CASE Name: Wilkie v. London Passenger Transport Board [1947] 1 All ER 258
Court: Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
Name of the Judges: Lord Greene MR, Scott and Somervell LJJ
Bench Type: Division Bench
Date of Judgement: 22 November 1946
Parties Involved:
The Appellant: Mr. Wilkie, an employee of the Board who was provided with an “employee pass”.
The Respondent: London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB), the public body responsible for local transport in London.
Facts of the Case
The appellant was an employee of the Board and, as part of his employment benefits, he was issued a free travel pass by the respondents. This pass allowed him to travel on their buses free of charge, but it contained a specific exclusion clause. It was a ‘privilege pass’ and was to be issued and accepted on condition that ‘neither the board nor their workers would be liable to the holder for loss of life, injury or delay’.
Mr. Wilkie was in the act of boarding an omnibus at a stop (he had one foot on the platform and was holding the rail), suddenly, the bus started to move due to the conductor’s negligence. Mr. Wilkie tried to hold onto the bus, but he was thrown off when it swerved, causing his fall and injury.
Following this, he brought a claim against the Board for negligence.
Issues Raised
- At what point is a contract formed between a carrier and a passenger?
- Whether the ‘free travel pass’ was a legally binding “Contract of Carriage” or merely a “Revocable License”?
- Whether the exclusion clause on the pass violates Section 97 of the Road Traffic Act 1930?
Arguments of the parties
Appellant:
Clarification of Conveyance: Wilkie argued that the exclusion clause on his pass only applied when he was actually being conveyed. He contended that since he was still in the act of boarding the bus and had not yet reached a seat or stabilized himself, the use of the pass and its conditions had not begun to apply.
Negligence and Common Law Duty: He also claimed that the Board owed him a general duty of care as a person lawfully on their premises/vehicle. The Board had breached this duty by causing his injury which resulted from the negligence of the conductor.
Statutory Protection (Road Traffic Act 1930): The technical argument of the appellant was that the pass constituted a “contract for the conveyance of a passenger”. The appellant argued that, pursuant to Section 97 of the Road Traffic Act 1930, any term in such a contract that tries to restrict liability for death or bodily injury is void.
Therefore, he argued that the exclusion clause was illegal and unenforceable.
Respondent:
Contract vs. License: The Board argued that there was no contract of carriage because Wilkie had not provided “consideration” (payment). They stated that the pass was a mere revocable license – a gift or privilege provided to employees, without contractual effect. As it was a gift, they argued that they had a right to attach any conditions they liked.
Timing of Acceptance: They argued that the legal relationship (whether contract or license) began the moment Wilkie accepted their offer by conduct. They contended that by putting his foot on the bus with the intent to travel, he was already “using” the pass and was therefore bound by its terms.
Non-applicability of the Act: In response to the argument of the appellant regarding the applicability of the Road Traffic Act, the Board argued that the said Section 97 only applies to contracts where a fare is paid (contracts for ‘reward’). Since Wilkie was traveling free of charge, they argued the statutory ban on exclusion clauses did not apply to his specific situation.
Judgement
The Court of Appeal held that the plying of a bus on a route is an implied offer. The passenger accepts that offer by boarding the bus.
As Lord Greene stated: ‘When a bus stops and the passenger boards it, the passenger makes an implied acceptance of the offer agreeing to be bound by the company’s conditions and to pay the appropriate fee.
The court also held that the pass granted to the appellant was a mere revocable license and not a ‘commercial contract’. Since, Wilkie did not pay for the pass as specific exchange for that journey (lack of consideration); it did not fall under the strict rules governing standard contracts of carriage. As a result, the Board was free to set its own terms regarding the pass.
The court decided that Section 97of the Road Traffic Act was intended for “contracts for reward”. Since the pass was a gratuitous gift, it did not count as a “contract for conveyance” under the meaning of the Act.
The presiding judge, Lord Greene MR, ruled that Mr. Wilkie started “using” the pass the moment he began to board the bus. The act of boarding is considered acceptance by conduct. Therefore, it was said that the exclusion clause was exercised the second Wilkie put his foot on the bus.
The court held that the appellant, when the injury occurred, was acting in a way that the pass entitled him to and was taking the benefit of a right, which the pass gave him, therefore the condition in the pass operated.
The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appellant’s claim for damages, on the grounds that the exclusion clause on his travel pass was legally valid and protected the bus company from liability for his injuries. The court determined that since Mr. Wilkie was using a ‘free pass’ rather than a paid contract of carriage, the statutory protections for paying passengers did not apply.
In his final assessment of the case, Lord Greene MR concluded:
“The plaintiff was using the pass at the time when he met with his accident. He was using it under the conditions that it specified; it excluded the liability of the defendants for the negligence of their servants. The appeal must be dismissed!”
(Lord Greene MR).
Legal Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi
The court reasoned that a person who possessed a free pass only has a license, and is not a contractual passenger for reward. The conditions of the license apply from the moment the user begins to board the vehicle.
In giving its judgement, the court had to distinguish between the ‘general rule’ for paying passengers and the ‘specific rule’ for people using free passes.
The reasons behind the decision of the court:
- The Principle of ‘Acceptance by Conduct’
The core reasoning regarding contract formation is that a contract of carriage is most times formed by actions rather than words.
The court reasoned that the Transport Board, by plying their buses on a public route, make a standing offer to the world. An intending passenger accepts this offer the moment they take the first step to board the vehicle with the intention of becoming a passenger. This means the legal relationship and all its terms and conditions begin at the boarding stage.
- The ‘Consideration’ (the fare).
Wilkie was using a free pass; he had not given any payment or ‘value’ in exchange for that specific journey. A free travel pass is not a commercial ‘contract of carriage’ but a revocable license. Thus, the provider is entitled to attach any condition to that gift, including a complete exclusion of liability for negligence.
- The applicability of Section 97 of Road Traffic Act
The court determined that Section 97 was designed to protect people entering into contracts for the conveyance of passengers. Since the court had already decided the pass was a license and not a contract, they reasoned that the Act did not apply.
The principle or rule of ‘Implied Offer’ was enunciated in this case. (Explain How Lord Greene used the arguments to create the “Implied Offer” rule)
The court, in giving its judgement, relied on the case of Parker v. South Eastern Railway (1877) as precedent for the “Reasonable Notice” test, determining that having the exclusion clause printed clearly on the back of the staff pass constituted sufficient legal notice, whether Mr. Wilkie read it or not.
Conclusion
This case is a landmark case for three reasons:
- Clarifying “Offer and Acceptance” by Conduct
- The distinction of Gratuitous License
- Interpreting the provisions of Road Traffic Act 1930
It was established in Wilkie’s case that, in transportation contracts, a contract is made when an intending passenger puts himself either on the platform or inside the bus. The principle of Implied Offer was also established in this case.
It was also agreed that the corporation makes an offer of carriage by running the bus and that the passenger accepts the offer when he gets onboard. The contract would then be complete even if no fare has been paid or any ticket given. (Furmston and Simpson).
However, there is a better view and recommendation as has also been expressed by other writers that “an offer should only be made when the passenger gets into the bus, which the company then accepts by putting the bus in motion”. (Edwin Obimma E.) It is only when the bus begins to move that a contract is made, in which case, none of the parties can back out without liability. Thus, a passenger who waits at a bus terminal makes an invitation to treat, so also, the bus that stops to pick up passengers also makes an invitation to treat.
Reference(S):
Primary Sources
Statutes and Statutory Instruments
Road Traffic Act 1930
Textbooks
Ezike EO, Nigerian Contract Law
Furmston and Simpson (n 54) 34
Secondary Sources
Cases
Wilkie v London Passenger Transport Board [1947] 1 All ER 258 (CA) 260 (Lord Greene MR)
Parker v. South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416 (CA)
Websites, Blogs and Online Reports
Nicole Yau, ‘Wilkie v London Passenger Transport Board Case Digest’ (Scribd) <https://www.scribd.com/document/190674297/Wilkie-v-London-Passenger-Transport-Board-Case-Digest> accessed 29 December 2025
‘Wilkie v London Passenger Transport Board Case Digest’ (Studocu) <https://www.studocu.com/row/document/university-of-lagos/contract-law/190674297-wilkie-v-london-passenger-transport-board-case-digest/122381111> accessed 29 December 2025
‘Offer and Acceptance’ (vLex Carribean) <https://carribean.vlex.com/vid/offer-and-acceptance-1067805367> accessed 30 December 2025
